American 767 RTO at ORD

My feeling is they want us to know as little as they can get the FAA to buy off on. Anyone else heard of pilots chastised for a write up and being told "you aren't supposed to check that"?
 
I don't really get the reference, but that's aww'right aww'right aww'right.

The thing with trying to have a masters-level understanding of the Airbus is that without a maintenance manual, it's a fools game as a lot of functions are "bussed" together.

Personally, in my experience, the last jet I had a good handle on the "I'm an electron"-level systems knowledge was the MD-88 because it was a very manual aircraft with minimal automation and that annunciator generally meant one thing, compared to say LGICU1/2 on the big bus which was pages and pages of considerations and failures.

Every airline has it's "truisms". Our truism here at SouthernJets is that if you can't feel, taste, affect or see it, it's something we don't commit to memory. The man that signs the paycheck says it's so, and in our world, it's so.

It's different at other shops, which is fine.

It's french fries man. I think herbed European mayonnaise is delicious on fries, but there's always going to be someone across the room thinking I've lost my cotton-pickin' mind for foregoing ketchup.

There's a difference between knowing the principles and operation of a particular system, and knowing the mechanics of it. Is it interesting to know the detailed mechanics of it...to the level of an A&P? Sure. Is it always necessary? Depends. Normally, no IMO.

When I flew the A-10, one of the weapons we carried was the AGM-65 Maverick missle. Some IPs and evaluators with the electrical engineering degrees or similar got really into how all the thinking algorithms of the weapon worked, far beyond just understanding how to use those for employing the weapon.....to the point of darn near being engineer-like. How do all 14 of the algorithms the missie's seeker head uses, work, for it to come off the rail and hit the target? For me, I could care less how to build or work on the missile, I need to know how to best employ it. To do that, I needed to know it's strengths and limitations, not how the seeker head specifically, mathmatically computes it's launch transient assist, for example. If it's not something I can operate or fix from the cockpit, then I don't get too wrapped up about it....it either works as advertised, or doesn't. Nothing I can do to fix one that's broken from the cockpit, nor am I going to work on it on the ground. However, what I can do, is have enough of an understanding of said algorithms in order to "help" place the missile in an envelope that will minimize the number of mental-obstacles it's seeker head has to overcome or solve once coming off the rail and target-bound.

That's the example of working knowledge (operating it) vs intricate mechanical knowledge (building it); but you get the point.
 
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There's a difference between knowing the principles and operation of a particular system, and knowing the mechanics of it. Is it interesting to know the detailed mechanics of it...to the level of an A&P? Sure. Is it always necessary? Depends. Normally, no IMO.

I can tell you unequivocally, at least for United, that they don't care. 18 years of A&P level knowledge, overhauling, troubleshooting and maintaining part 121 jets and they couldn't care less. 15 years of that time was spent maintaining their very own jets so yes, I would have to agree with you, not necessary.
 
I can tell you unequivocally, at least for United, that they don't care. 18 years of A&P level knowledge, overhauling, troubleshooting and maintaining part 121 jets and they couldn't care less. 15 years of that time was spent maintaining their very own jets so yes, I would have to agree with you, not necessary.

Agreed. Unless for instance one is doing a pilot job that maybe has A&P additional duties, such as an airtanker operator for the USFS contract companies or something like that. But for most pilot jobs that are just pilot jobs, agreed.
 
Pilots with an A/P and a screwdriver might be one of the most dangerous foes to safe air commerce yet seen.

Edit to add: Shut up and drive monkey.

Edit to Edit::sarcasm:
Luckily I'm an A&P with a whole bunch of pilot certificates ;)

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I've dealt with some FE's. If you were to insult them by asking if their poop stank, the answer would be a resounding "no".
 
I aborted past V1, post MX shakedown flight. Since I insisted on using the longer of the two runways, instead of just following the 135 normalization of deviance and taxing to the closest runway the aircraft wasn't totaled. Or worse.

It's a tough call to make.


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Come off your 121 high horse. There are idiots in every nook and cranny of this industry. They're not all relegated to 135.
 
I aborted past V1, post MX shakedown flight. Since I insisted on using the longer of the two runways, instead of just following the 135 normalization of deviance and taxing to the closest runway the aircraft wasn't totaled. Or worse. It's a tough call to make. Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
Come off your 121 high horse. There are idiots in every nook and cranny of this industry. They're not all relegated to 135.
15 years of 135/91 only 1 year of 121. Still haven’t met an idiot yet at the new job. I’m sure I will eventually. I’ll let you know... Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Come off your 121 high horse. There are idiots in every nook and cranny of this industry. They're not all relegated to 135.
15 years of 135/91 only 1 year of 121. Still haven’t met an idiot yet at the new job. I’m sure I will eventually. I’ll let you know... Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

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A few issues that can be seen in the videos. For one, while firefighting from the truck is standard, as the truck is the firefighting source and in-cab firefighting protects from the extreme radiant heat, there comes a point where you have to dismount and begin pulling handlines. Once the bulk of the major fire is under control or suppressed, there is now only so much reach that the truck's fixed turret nozzle or even HRET nozzle (High Reach Extendable Turret) has on the truck. It cannot reach deep-seated fires located in places such as main landing gear wells and other nooks and crannies on the aircraft. At some point, firefighters need to dismount and pull a handline in order to get into places like these and be able to suppress these fires that the truck cannot reach. Often, when multiple crash trucks are on scene, one truck will be designated to cease using its turrets and go into handline mode much like a standard engine truck, while the others remain in crash mode.

Once the bulk of the fire was extinguished, there was a particularly difficult 3-dimensional fuel fire still going. A flowing-fuel fire like this cannot be extinguished by water/foam, as there is nothing....no surface area.....for the foam to adhere to. You can see the gallons upon gallons of foam they're pouring onto this fire, with little to no effect; and crash trucks only have 1-3 minutes of firefighting capability at full discharge, depending on the gallon-capacity of the particular vehicle. 3-dimensional fuel fires require dry chemical to extinguish, normally Purple K powder, which these trucks carry. And depending on the turret type, if it's a dual agent turret, dry chemical can be expended through the nozzle along with foam. However if it's a single-agent turret, the dry chemical is located on a handline on one side of the truck and has to be discharged by a dismounted firefighter. At least one of the trucks in the video has a dual-agent turret, and uses it to good effect eventually with a combined foam/PKP attack, in the last video.

Another interesting thing, in the second video, each time one of the responding crash trucks makes a high speed turn, the tilt-warning can be heard sounding. ARFF trucks are very high CG, top heavy, and rollover prone, and there have been many rollover accidents of these trucks. That's always something one has to be mindful of as the driver-operator when responding to a real-world incident, and not let adrenaline make one drive too aggressively.





 
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My contract ARFF company is wanting to try this F-500 additive to replace standard AFFF firefighting foam. Impressive in its knock down power by separating hydrocarbons from heat and oxygen, and breaking the chemical chain reaction. Very little water used in the process as compared to foam/water; which being as rural as our company operates, where hydrants are a luxury we often don't have, we have to rely on what water is on our trucks. Making the most efficiency of that water is key. Also like the fact that because it breaks down chemical chain reaction, that the jet fuel can't be reignited even with them trying to, something foam can't do.



 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...6-evacuation-of-burning-jet-put-lives-at-risk

The emergency evacuation of a wide-body airliner in Chicago was anything but orderly.

As flames engulfed the right wing, passengers screamed and clambered over seats even before the American Airlines jet came to a stop on the runway after the aborted takeoff, ignoring flight attendants’ pleas to stay seated. Within seconds, people were surging onto the runway even though the engine was still blasting exhaust, sending them rolling like tumbleweeds.

“Although everyone successfully evacuated, the investigation revealed ways that the evacuation could have been improved,” U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Robert Sumwalt said Tuesday as the agency opened a meeting to conclude its investigation.
No one died in the Oct. 28, 2016 incident as Flight 383 prepared for takeoff, but the severity of the fire and the chaotic evacuation made it one of the most serious aviation incidents in recent years. It has also given the NTSB a platform to raise long-standing concerns about aircraft evacuations.

The NTSB is preparing at its meeting to adopt recommendations to reduce the risks of emergency evacuations, as well as preventing the initial engine failure that led to the fire.

The Boeing Co. 767-300 bound for Miami was accelerating for takeoff at O’Hare International Airport when its right engine exploded, spraying metal debris. After reaching 154 miles (248 kilometers) per hour, pilots hit the brakes and stopped as leaking fuel ignited and engulfed the right wing.

An imperfection in the metal used to make a spinning disk within the engine caused it to weaken and break apart, the NTSB said in documents it released earlier.


U.S. aviation regulators and aircraft manufacturers have taken steps in recent decades to improve passenger safety during evacuations, such as reducing the flammability of plane interiors and making seats more impact-resistant. But the Chicago incident highlights how human behavior and the chaos of an emergency still creates risk. Crashes on or near the ground during takeoff and landing killed more people around the world than other accident causes from 2007 through 2016, according to Boeing.

With the plane stopped on the runway and a fireball engulfing the American plane’s right wing, poor communication and panic dominated, according to NTSB documents.

Flight attendants and pilots are supposed to coordinate an evacuation, but attendants reported they could not reach the cockpit. The captain told investigators the evacuation checklist the cabin crew was required to follow was "cumbersome" and slowed the cockpit crew’s response.

Passengers repeatedly failed to follow crew instructions. In multiple cases, they took luggage with them, which airlines prohibit because it can slow an evacuation or block aisles. In one case, an attendant tried unsuccessfully to wrestle a large bag away from a woman after she refused to leave it, according to NTSB records. The attendant said she gave up because the dispute was slowing the evacuation.

"Let me say a word to the flying public," Sumwalt said. "Follow your crew’s instructions. Things can be replaced. People can’t."

A 77-year-old man suffered multiple broken bones and swelling on the scalp, according to NTSB. Twenty others, including one crew member, reported more minor injuries, according to NTSB. The plane was carrying 161 passengers and nine crew members.

The fire was so hot that it burned through the fuselage and the tip of the wing slumped onto the runway.

“American is proud of the way its pilots and flight attendants handled this event,” American Airlines said in a statement Tuesday. “The flight attendants performed a successful evacuation of all passengers and crew, despite concerns for their own personal safety. The cabin crew’s judgment, skill, and self-discipline likely prevented significant injuries.”
 
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