AirAsia Accident Report Released

You only see these incidents with the carriers that do the low time button pusher thing.

NW had something like 11 malfunctions identical to AF 447, with one particularly nasty one in China (I recently did this guy's recurrent)... they just held the plane level and set a sensible power setting. They didn't go AHH! and go full back stick like the button pushers in AF 447 and AirAsia did.

Unloading the wing should be the primary reaction- AF 447, Colgan 3407, Pinnacle 3701, Air Asia- they all pulled as a rote shock reaction.

We fight like we train. The training needs to understand that and not just check boxes.
 
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So... About that jetBlue ab-initio program. Is that still something that's considered a good idea? And why exactly are they not just calling the thousands of interested and experienced existing applicants??
 
GypsyPilot said:
So... About that jetBlue ab-initio program. Is that still something that's considered a good idea?
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I don't think so. Folks from ab-initio programs have led to a lot of the most recent fatal accidents internationally. Domestically, the last three fatal accidents in the United States went the US version of ab-initio...Gulfstream

And why exactly are they not just calling the thousands of interested and experienced existing applicants??
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Want folks who don't know any better and can just drink this...

lSvWizsD.jpeg
 
somewhereupthere said:
Highest I've ever hand-flown (admittedly neither Boeing nor Airbus) was FL370. I didn't like it. AP was inop (pre-RVSM days).

Because of the thinner air the airplane tends to be less responsive, you need greater deflection of a control surface to achieve the same reaction of a lesser input in thicker air. Because the aircraft's reaction time for a given input (as compared to lower altitude) is increased, pilot's tend to over control the aircraft using larger inputs, and thus experiencing PIO.

The problem with that can be the so called coffin corner, where you may be near critical AOA for stall, but also near a speed at which the local airflow around the wing surfaces have reached Mach1. A shockwave over the wing develops and eventually can lead to mach tuck.

I'm not a fan of pilots intentionally hand flying an aircraft at altitude, but I am a fan of pilots receiving appropriate training in this area, especially concerning high altitude upset recovery.

Very good video here
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True on high altitude handling, not true about "coffin corner", the newer wings do not have an issue with the shockwave position as older aircraft did and that misunderstanding is part of the reason that most believe AF447 happened (it is even discussed in the Final Report on AF 447). Read my article here on the accident and it references my other article on high altitude stalls.
 
I'm wondering if anyone on this thread noticed that Captain had some extensive prior military experience? While the nose attitude was recognized earlier on it is pretty clear that the stall was not recognized for most of the flight. The idea that it could not happen to a U.S. crew is laughable to anyone who has spent much time looking at ASIAS data. The word I would use is "lucky". The gaps in training is a worldwide problem.
 
Skåning said:
http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

The basics after a quick look:

Equipment failure leads to alternate law

Pilot flying (first officer) initially corrects rudder induced left roll but also pitches up 15 degrees.

Aircraft climbs rapidly to FL380, stall warning followed by stall.

Pilot flying maintains full back stick to end of recording.

Stall upset recognized by Captain but no clear transfer of control.

Contrasting dual stick inputs for the most part.

From the report:

Contributing factors

The cracking of a solder joint of both channel A and B resulted in loss of electrical continuity and led to RTLU failure.

The existing maintenance data analysis led to unresolved repetitive faults occurring with shorter intervals. The same fault occurred 4 times during the flight.

The flight crew action to the first 3 faults in accordance with the ECAM messages. Following the fourth fault, the FDR recorded different signatures that were similar to the FAC CB‟s being reset resulting in electrical interruption to the FAC‟s.

The electrical interruption to the FAC caused the autopilot to disengage and the flight control logic to change from Normal Law to Alternate Law, the rudder deflecting 2° to the left resulting the aircraft rolling up to 54° angle of bank.

Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope and entering prolonged stall condition that was beyond the capability of the flight crew to recover.
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This plays into the RLA trying to lower the hourly standards for the ATP. This F/O was most likely an MPL pilot with very little actul time in an airplane. What does it mean when an airplane is buffeting and shaking and there is no real control authority and the speed is way low??? Why are you pulling back on the stick you idiot?
 
Zapphod Beblebrox said:
This plays into the RLA trying to lower the hourly standards for the ATP. This F/O was most likely an MPL pilot with very little actul time in an airplane. What does it mean when an airplane is buffeting and shaking and there is no real control authority and the speed is way low??? Why are you pulling back on the stick you idiot?
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You might be surprised that it is much less obvious when you are in the situation than you might think with the benefit of hindsight.
 
seagull said:
You might be surprised that it is much less obvious when you are in the situation than you might think with the benefit of hindsight.
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I got a spurious stick shaker on the RJ a couple years ago about five secs after rotation. My reaction was to do nothing - it was that it was incorrect and "how could it be happening"?

I remember remarking to the copilot how I should've immediately lowered the nose and gone TOGA but just never crossed my mind, despite doing thousands of stalls as a trainee and then a CFI.

Training for something in a scripted environment and having things happen randomly is completely different. I wish our training allowed for random events like windshear, stalls, engine failures etc, it would allow a true evaluation and areas to focus on for actual training.
 
wheelsup said:
I got a spurious stick shaker on the RJ a couple years ago about five secs after rotation. My reaction was to do nothing - it was that it was incorrect and "how could it be happening"?

I remember remarking to the copilot how I should've immediately lowered the nose and gone TOGA but just never crossed my mind, despite doing thousands of stalls as a trainee and then a CFI.

Training for something in a scripted environment and having things happen randomly is completely different. I wish our training allowed for random events like windshear, stalls, engine failures etc, it would allow a true evaluation and areas to focus on for actual training.
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It is even worse than that in the conditions that led to those accidents so good point.
 
I'm wondering if the dumb-proof solution to split control inputs on Airbus would simply be to link both sticks, with movement and resistance to movement in thhem. But then again, sadly, not enough graves yet to impose that fix,so we'll keep seeing the blame the pilot... And while you're at it, increase the training needed to hire them.
 
MaRiO FDZ said:
I'm wondering if the dumb-proof solution to split control inputs on Airbus would simply be to link both sticks, with movement and resistance to movement in thhem. But then again, sadly, not enough graves yet to impose that fix,so we'll keep seeing the blame the pilot... And while you're at it, increase the training needed to hire them.
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That's the the first human factors based correction I'd take. It's what Gulfstream did.
 
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