AirAsia Accident Report Released

[Skåning]

http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

The basics after a quick look:

Equipment failure leads to alternate law

Pilot flying (first officer) initially corrects rudder induced left roll but also pitches up 15 degrees.

Aircraft climbs rapidly to FL380, stall warning followed by stall.

Pilot flying maintains full back stick to end of recording.

Stall upset recognized by Captain but no clear transfer of control.

Contrasting dual stick inputs for the most part.

From the report:

Contributing factors

The cracking of a solder joint of both channel A and B resulted in loss of electrical continuity and led to RTLU failure.

The existing maintenance data analysis led to unresolved repetitive faults occurring with shorter intervals. The same fault occurred 4 times during the flight.

The flight crew action to the first 3 faults in accordance with the ECAM messages. Following the fourth fault, the FDR recorded different signatures that were similar to the FAC CB‟s being reset resulting in electrical interruption to the FAC‟s.

The electrical interruption to the FAC caused the autopilot to disengage and the flight control logic to change from Normal Law to Alternate Law, the rudder deflecting 2° to the left resulting the aircraft rolling up to 54° angle of bank.

Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope and entering prolonged stall condition that was beyond the capability of the flight crew to recover.

 

[RedBaron2000]

I don't speak Airbus, but this looks like AF447 part II: failure of an important but relatively minor component (i.e., it's not a total hydraulics loss or engine failure) leads to the plane going into alternate law at high altitude, crew reacts with poor airmanship, and stalls it all the way to the sea.

Haven't finished reading the entire report yet but so far this caught my eye:

"The right side stick input was mostly at maximum pitch up until the end of recording."

And this:

"The Angle of Attack (AOA) was almost constant at approximately 40 degrees up and the stall warning continued until the end of recording."

 

[Champcar]

I don't speak Airbus, but this looks like AF447 part II: failure of an important but relatively minor component (i.e., it's not a total hydraulics loss or engine failure) leads to the plane going into alternate law at high altitude, crew reacts with poor airmanship, and stalls it all the way to the sea.

Haven't finished reading the entire report yet but so far this caught my eye:

"The right side stick input was mostly at maximum pitch up until the end of recording."

And this:

"The Angle of Attack (AOA) was almost constant at approximately 40 degrees up and the stall warning continued until the end of recording."

How frustrating, we shouldn't be repeating accidents like this.

 

[Wardogg]

"The investigation concluded that the un-commanded roll was caused by the rudder deflection, the autopilot disengaged and no pilot input for nine seconds."

I'm sorry gents, but you can't be nine seconds behind your magic flying machine and expect to win. Nine seconds is an eternity when your airplane is rolling over on you.

 

[RedBaron2000]

I've pretty much read the whole report now. The frustrating thing is it appears the CA (who was PNF) recognized that the PF was not responding correctly, but he communicated poorly (telling him to "pull down") and his control inputs were correct (pitching full nose down) while the PF was pitching full nose up. Of course the net effect on the Airbus is a neutral elevator. But the PIC never took the controls, and never used the override switch (or whatever it's called). It's almost like he was deferring to the PF's poor airmanship.

The other thing to note is the French FO had about 2200 hours, with the vast majority of that (1300 or so I think) in the 320 with Air Asia, so he probably didn't have great primary training...

 

[wheelsup]

These accidents have been unfortunate but say a lot about putting low skilled, low time pilots in transport category aircraft.

 

[jynxyjoe]

I feel like a teenager, being unable to comprehend, "I just can't even"

 

[Autothrust Blue]

Wait. Have I seen this show before?

 

[AAPalmTree]

If a computer flys the plane don't unplug the computer.

 

[trafficinsight]

Wait. Have I seen this show before?

Wait, I know this song....

Sent from my XT1254 using Tapatalk

 

[Cptnchia]

Wait, I know this song....

Sent from my XT1254 using Tapatalk

"Let's change the beat."

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Synopsis..........................

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Images.......................

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

These accidents have been unfortunate but say a lot about putting low skilled, low time pilots in transport category aircraft.

But it's not just that though. The CA here was very experienced, upwards of 20,000 hrs flight time with about 4-5k time on type. Sure, the FO inputs put the aircraft where it was, but the CA's verbal commands were appropriate to fix the situation if they were acted on. Based on the images above, it seems he didn't take over until much later and then it was not with the take-over push button, rather, just pushing the nose full down while the FO had it full back. Alebraic sum zero. There were definitely CRM issues here.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

The bigger problem is that, worldwide, statistically speaking if a commercial jetliner goes beyond 90 degrees in bank, the chances of the crew recovering the aircraft are not that good.

We can continue blaming pilots for these things.

OR we can say hey, maybe the industry needs to change the mentality and the proficiency check and proficiency training events to INCLUDE cruise level flight upsets.


For us Bus guys, enough of this normal-law only mindset and that we can't stall in it. Every time we enter the sim for a 4 hr session, at least 1 hr should be spent dealing with cruise level flight, upsets, in both normal (30 degree) banks, and abnormal banks and attitudes. Experience both normal law and then degrade the sim to an alternate law set up. Put the aircraft in all sorts of banks and pitch upsets and have the crew deal with it.

For you Bus guys ask yourself, when is the last time you saw alternate law in the sim? Direct law? Upset recover training while in the cruise levels?


It used to be we bungled up ILS approaches, hit mountains accidently (CFIT), windshear/microburst crashes, and we for the most part 'fixed't those things with aircraft equipment and proper crew training. But the crashes of this decade (past 10 years) are definitely severe LOC events, and we honestly have not done enough to address it.

Our training regime needs to be changed industry wide.

And this is especially true as the future trend looks more and more to be ab-initio types.

 

[Baronpilot244]

Wow - simply shocking. However the CA bears a lot of the blame here, all he needed to say was "Hey let go of the stick, you moron, I've got it..."

Bp244

 

[Maurus]

Sounds like a bit of bad english . "Pull down" makes absolute no sense. The only time you "pull" on a yoke or stick is to go up.

Also yet again Airbus design causes some issues that would not happen in a competitors product. Yes they are overall safe but I can't stand seeing the potential for a split control input ever being a good thing. I want to know what the guy next to me is doing and I want to know what the autopilot is doing. Having all flight controls move helps provide that feedback.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Sounds like a bit of bad english . "Pull down" makes absolute no sense. The only time you "pull" on a yoke or stick is to go up.

Could be a bit of an English transition issue. Was that phrase spoken in English or their local language? I remember for the Egypt Air crash there was one phrase the NTSB members got an Arabic panel to translate and the best they could come up with was "get away in the engines." Sometimes there isn't a good enough English translation to what is being said, and in their native language, maybe the phrase being spoken was a "push nose down." But again, I don't know what was said or if the phrase was said in English or the local language.

Also yet again Airbus design causes some issues that would not happen in a competitors product. Yes they are overall safe but I can't stand seeing the potential for a split control input ever being a good thing. I want to know what the guy next to me is doing and I want to know what the autopilot is doing. Having all flight controls move helps provide that feedback.

Once the FAC CBs were pulled and the FACs not reset one by one, then both FACs were gone. Which means Fifi isn't flying herself anymore: the AP is kicked off and so is the AT (into thrust lock mode, it'll hold the current thrust setting). As for the asynchronous flight controls, that's always been the case and the 320 has been flying since 1988ish. The post above yours does pretty much hint that if the other guy wants to take over, make the intention known AND push the take-over button on the sidestick.

 

[JustinS]

Really sad to hear Air France part II... As professional pilots there really isn't any excuse for these kinds of accidents, but there is definitely a problem wih high altitude upset/stall recognition and recovery that needs to be addressed. What worries me further is the lack of primary flight training... Who tries to pull back during a stalled condition?? Just boggles my mind...

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Really sad to hear Air France part II... As professional pilots there really isn't any excuse for these kinds of accidents, but there is definitely a problem wih high altitude upset/stall recognition and recovery that needs to be addressed. What worries me further is the lack of primary flight training... Who tries to pull back during a stalled condition?? Just boggles my mind...

But these are two man flight crews. You can't just blame the one guy when the other one is sitting there too. This is a crew problem too, and IMO, industry-wide training problem.