Air India plane crash

I've never made a penny flying a jet but I have rolled them around on the ground under their own power, that is to say I've ran and taxied a few during the course of my job. They don't let just anyone fly these things and they don't let just anyone try to autocross them either. Point is, regardless of the jet, someone that's allowed to taxi a hooptie around has been trained about what the switches and levers in the cockpit do, especially the fuel cutoffs. Most mechanics don't taxi a whole lot but what we often do is run engines when the pilots delicate heads are either sleeping or getting their feet massaged (by whom? I don't know and don't care) but the point is everyone and anyone who's been signed off to run engines knows exactly what that lever or switch does because if it isn't routine leak checks you might be testing a repair (there's a reason why we try it before we release the airplane) and if things start going sideways (temps and runaways, always temps and runaways) we have to know how to end the debacle before the airplane burns down or runs into a hangar (don't laugh, look it up, both have happened. Look up what happened to the very last LR60). Pretending a pilot just after rotation inadvertently reached over and shut down both engines seems incongruous to me. If there's a problem with the 787 that they're hiding (highly doubtful) there'd be some action on Boeings side to all of their customers, I guess we'll all have to wait for the report. And yes, I have seen a runaway. It was on a TFE731 on a Lear and it went from start to T/O in less than 10 seconds and it was immediately shut down using the fuel cut off. We'd just changed both engines and were confounded with our obvious ineptitude so we started making phone calls, in the end we were completely innocent of either negligence nor ignorance. The DEEC controlling that engine had just chosen that moment to want to go back to the mothership at Honeywell. Which oddly worked out, we were in Scottsdale and Honeywell was just down the road in Phoenix so a swap was made and everyone lived happily ever after.
 
Airbus (which is not Boeing) had an issue with A350 pilats spilling beverages on the center console which resulted in a series of airworthiness directives back in 2020.

“Two in-service occurrences were reported, involving inadvertent liquid spillage on the ENG START panel and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) Control Panel (ECP), otherwise known as the Integrated Control Panel (ICP), on the centre pedestal in the flight deck on A350 aeroplanes. In both cases, after the liquid spillage, the aeroplane experienced an un-commanded engine in-flight shut-down (IFSD). Subsequent engine relight attempts were not successful. In both events, the flight crew performed a diversion and landed the aeroplane safely. Results of the preliminary technical investigations indicated abnormal operation of the components of the ICP due to liquid spillage in the system.”

News reporting says in one case the engine shutdown occurred 15 minutes after the spill, in the other it was around an hour after the spill.

I note we are approaching the date for the 30-day ICAO timeline for releasing a preliminary accident report. Being preliminary, there is no requirement to include much more than "this airplane crashed, we are investigating," so don't expect much.
That's wild. Had those happened over BFE or the ocean, the outcome would had been much different. Did they figure out a fix? Coincidentally, I'll be on a A350 for the first time later this month from TPE to LAX.
 
Preliminary report is out. I can’t figure out how to post the download here.

3.3 PROBABLE CAUSE


The probable cause of the Air India Flight AI171 accident was the uncommanded, simultaneous, and complete


loss of thrust from both GEnx-1B64 engines, coupled with a total failure of the primary electrical power


generation system shortly after takeoff. This catastrophic dual system failure rendered the aircraft


uncontrollable, leading to an aerodynamic stall at low altitude and subsequent impact with terrain.
 
I wonder what caused the complete electrical bus failure, and the report indicates the cockpit design does not provided the needed information to fly the plane when the RAT is deployed.
 
OpenAI does wonders.

This took about five seconds with minimal prompt information:

“Create a 10 page NTSB-style preliminary investigation for the TWA 800 crash involving clowns”

Sure! Here’s a 10-page NTSB-style fictional preliminary investigation report for the TWA Flight 800 crash — with an absurd twist involving clowns. Please note this is entirely satirical and not based on the real tragedy of TWA 800, which was a serious aviation disaster investigated by the real NTSB.



National Transportation Safety Board

Preliminary Investigation Report

TWA Flight 800 - “Clown Factor” Incident

NTSB Report Number: C-800-CWN
Date of Incident: July 17, 1996
Location: Atlantic Ocean, near East Moriches, New York



Page 1: Executive Summary

On July 17, 1996, Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 800, a Boeing 747-131 (registration N93119), exploded and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after departing John F. Kennedy International Airport. All 230 persons on board were fatally injured.

Initial recovery and forensic efforts indicated a midair explosion originating near the center fuel tank. However, further review uncovered highly unusual circumstances. A parallel clown entertainment charter event operated by “Big Top Skies LLC” was on board for a surprise mid-flight performance, which is now being considered a potential contributing factor.

This preliminary report summarizes factual information gathered to date and introduces hypotheses related to high-density helium containers, pyrotechnic confetti devices, and potential unintended consequences of slapstick aviation.



Page 2: Flight Overview
• Flight Number: TWA 800
• Aircraft Type: Boeing 747-131
• Tail Number: N93119
• Departure: JFK International Airport (KJFK), New York
• Destination: Charles de Gaulle Airport (LFPG), Paris, France
• Occupants: 212 passengers, 18 crew
• Fatalities: 230
• Crew Reports: Last communication was normal at 8:29 PM EDT

The aircraft was carrying a unique entertainment charter segment: 12 professional clowns contracted by “The Big Top Skies” in association with a private birthday celebration occurring in the first-class cabin.



Page 3: Clown Manifest Review

The manifest revealed:
• 12 clowns boarded under professional aliases (e.g., Bubbles, Squeaky, Mr. Gags).
• Onboard equipment included:
• 6 pressurized helium tanks
• 2 mechanical flower-squirters (modified with compressed air)
• 1 novelty “popcorn cannon”
• 1 inflatable giraffe costume with auxiliary fans
• Total additional weight: ~480 lbs including clown shoes and wigs
• Several items lacked FAA-approved certification for onboard performance devices



Page 4: Aircraft and Maintenance

N93119 was built in 1971 and had logged 93,303 flight hours. Key notes:
• The aircraft had undergone routine maintenance 3 days prior.
• No anomalies were recorded in the fuel systems or pressurization.
• Maintenance logs showed minor electrical rewiring in the forward cabin for entertainment lighting.

Importantly, FAA investigators found unsanctioned splices of party string lights integrated into the aircraft’s DC bus system — attributed to an “aesthetic enhancement” request from the clown team.



Page 5: Witness Accounts

Over 200 witnesses reported seeing:
• A “fireball” or “bright flash” midair
• Followed by a “trail of sparkles” descending
• One witness described “glitter raining down like in a circus finale”

A nearby pilot radioed:

“We saw a burst… looked like someone opened a champagne bottle of confetti midair. Bizarre.”

Radar analysis detected a sudden loss of altitude and explosive decompression signatures consistent with center wing tank (CWT) ignition — though unusual gas signatures were also detected.



Page 6: Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Analysis

The CVR captured the following exchanges:

[8:29:37 PM]
CAPTAIN: “Clowns just requested cabin power to inflate something big…”
FIRST OFFICER: “They said a giraffe. I… I don’t see how that’s safe.”
[8:29:55 PM]
(clown horn sounds followed by audible “boing!”)
[8:30:01 PM]
CAPTAIN: “That thing just sparked—what was—”
[8:30:03 PM]
(sudden high-pitched whistle followed by an explosion)



Page 7: Helium & Pyrotechnics Forensics

Laboratory analysis uncovered:
• Residual traces of compressed helium and nitrocellulose glitter — both highly flammable
• Melting around a modified confetti-cannon trigger wired to an onboard USB power source
• One inflator pump motor showed arc pitting near a fuel vapor line in the cabin floor

Experts concluded that the ignition of flammable vapors in proximity to modified entertainment devices — possibly due to a pie-in-the-face routine gone wrong — led to a chain reaction in the CWT.



Page 8: Safety Violations

Numerous FAA and airline protocol violations were documented:
• Unchecked transport of pressurized tanks in cabin
• Unauthorized entertainment device modifications
• Use of electronic components near fuel tank pathways
• Crew unfamiliarity with clown-specific hazard training

Additionally, TWA did not file an entertainment deviation plan as required under FAA Advisory Circular 120-62: Performances Involving Explosive Props, Clowns, or Balloon Animals.



Page 9: Probable Cause (Preliminary)

The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this incident was:

“The ignition of flammable vapors in the center wing fuel tank, likely triggered by an arc discharge from unauthorized clown entertainment devices involving helium and pyrotechnics. Contributing to the accident were inadequate oversight of novelty performance materials and failure to adhere to clown-in-flight safety protocols.”

Pending further toxicology and clown-makeup residue testing, these findings remain provisional.



Page 10: Recommendations

Immediate Safety Recommendations:
1. Ban all onboard clown performances pending FAA Clown Safety Certification Program (CSCP).
2. Require airlines to implement:
• Pre-flight clown material inspections
• Onboard helium suppression systems
3. Establish clear regulatory guidance for:
• Comedic prop use in flight
• Onboard animal costume inflation thresholds
4. Develop pilot training modules for inflight comedy interference (ICI) incidents.



Prepared by:
Fictional Investigations Division
NTSB Office of Imaginary Incidents
Report Authored: July 11, 2025



Would you like this exported as a PDF or turned into a presentation next?
 
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