AF447 Vanity Fair article

[A Life Aloft]

I've insisted no such thing. Apparently your reading comprehension skills are inferior to your plagiarism skills

I've only insisted that the assumptions made by the haters are BS. Stop making assumptions, good or bad.

Why do you continue to be an insulting, off the subject, unnecessarily rude, bitter, hyperbolic, exaggerating, mean spirited, ego driven person on every single subject that you post on? Are you this unhappy in life that being a tiny internet bully/pseudo tough guy makes your day? It is impossible to have any type of reasonable discussion with you. Seriously, you need to take a look at your negative self-serving attitude. You don't have to behave like an ass 24/7, even if you enjoy it/get off on that.

You just assume he had none, despite the fact that he had been flying for about a decade at the time of his death, had all of his ratings (including the glider rating) prior to joining AF, and had been a pilot for a few years prior to joining AF.

This statement alone, is untrue. He obtained his ATPL in 2007 for example.

You're making an incredible number of assumptions about his time. You have no idea how much time he had flying little airplanes prior to Air France. You just assume he had none.

You are the one doing the assuming here and yet calling out others. You have no idea whatsoever how many flight hours he had before being accepted at the AF Academy, what types pf planes he had flown nor what sort of aviation jobs he had if any or what his true experience was.

 

[jynxyjoe]

And you can totally say ass on here.

The world for once, in perfect harmony, la la la la laaaa.

 

[A Life Aloft]

And you can totally say ass on here.

The world for once, in perfect harmony, la la la la laaaa.

And in ATN's case, apparently revel in being one. lol

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

Why do you continue to be an insulting, off the subject, unnecessarily rude, bitter, hyperbolic, exaggerating, mean spirited, ego driven person on every single subject that you post on?

I don't. Just with people who twist words, plagiarize, lie, etc.

This statement alone, is untrue. he obtained his ATPL in 2007 for example.

An ATPL is not a required certificate to fly airliners in France. He was flying A320s without it.

 

[A Life Aloft]

I don't. Just with people who twist words, plagiarize, lie, etc.
An ATPL is not a required certificate to fly airliners in France. He was flying A320s without it.

You lie constantly on this forum, accuse others of things they did not do or say, make all sorts of false assumptions, bully people, belittle members on a daily basis in almost every single thread that you post on, have been banned a number of times, and act like a complete pompous ass at every opportunity. You are the king at twisting people's words and the meaning of what they are saying. You are so obnoxious that it's mind boggling. You have no ability to see anything except your own warped view. You take a stance and no matter how wrong/incorrect you are, you stick by it.

 

[A Life Aloft]

An ATPL is not a required certificate to fly airliners in France. He was flying A320s without it.

You stated:

You just assume he had none, despite the fact that he had been flying for about a decade at the time of his death, had all of his ratings (including the glider rating) prior to joining AF, and had been a pilot for a few years prior to joining AF.

You are wrong. But you cannot accept that fact that you are and now are trying to justify your incorrect statement. No surprise.

 

[seagull]

The criticism I saw from the Vanity Fair article was that our young FO was a Air France Baby and didn't have a strong foundation flying other aircraft, or years of training / teaching like you'd find with some of those RJ captains you bemoan. Do you think it's possible an instructor could have frozen the sim in that situation and explained what he was doing and he'd have this "holy crap I've never heard this before" moment? Or if he'd read this article and have to ask someone to explain to them what everyone was talking about? In other words, did he simply not understand high altitude stalls and didn't understand how to scan around a failed instrument like we learn in instrument course BAI lessons?

Is there a simple fix to getting guys "good hours"? Am I just biased thinking "boy when I was a lad we earned our hours!" like an old man who can't accept there are other ways of learning besides the "school of hard knocks" or whatever.

I think the question of this F/O's experience has been answered. I never "bemoaned" RJ captains", by the way.

Did we read the same article? He explicitly states at least twice that it's not a "weak pilot caused it" situation. If I remember his closing paragraph correctly, it was something along the lines of "Automation reduces the danger enormously, but the reliance on said automation makes the pilots less likely than ever to be able to figure out and fix what's wrong when the automation can't or doesn't, for whatever reason, function". That does not seem at all congruent with your notion that he's blaming the cruise F/O, that I can see.

Although, while I don't think he does, I'd be perfectly happy to throw the PF under the bus.

Which is misplaced. The problem is not the automation per se, but rather that we do not properly train pilots to anticipate and understand what the automation will do.

How much time have most pilots spent hand flying a jet at 35,000? If you "cam of age" since RVSM, the answer to that is likely ZERO. How much time was spent flying it in a degraded mode? Maybe in the simulator?

That was a really decent article. I've read and heard various things that it took the CA 2 minutes to get to the cockpit once he was called. Is that true? Not sure why it would have taken that long.

How long do YOU think it would take to wake up and get out of the bunk, etc?

The normal reaction to losing airspeed indication is never to pull back on the stick. Not sure why that would be an immediate reaction. I'm with you on this, aside from the stated reliance on automation, basic instrument flying skills and 'partial panel' skills seemed to be a large contributing factor.

The pitch changed very, very slowly. Look at the graph. As I recall it was about 12 degrees over 20 seconds. That is hardly a big pull. In fact, that rate would be barely perceptible, and in a conventional yoke, you would be hard pressed to see that the stick was back.

I think the automation policies and technology advances have played a key part in the safety record that US airlines now enjoy. That's not to say that it's not a double edged sword, and that we should ONLY rely on the automation. But the demonizing that automation has received recently seems misplaced, particularly for the Airbus. How does one go about flying an Airbus without automation? Unless you're in direct law, it seems that manual flight is really just manually telling the autopilot what to do using a side stick. (Oversimplification, I know, but it has some truth to it.)

At any rate, we focus more on hand flying in the training program at my current airline more than my previous one. Recurrent has a couple of hand flown departures and visual patterns flown with level 1 automation (completely raw data, no auto throttles). But when the emergencies happen, we expect crews to turn on the automation to help increase their situational awareness.

The U.S. record is also a lot of luck. Having been privy to a lot of data around the industry, you would be VERY surprised as to how often we (the U.S. airline industry) have "close calls", LOC events, etc. Very surprised.

When was the last accident that was a result of a cascading multiple failure? When was the last accident due to complacency and incompetence?

Answer those questions and you'll see why we focus more on the latter than the former. The former are exceedingly rare, and difficult to prepare for. In fact, I fear that if we trained people to go "full cowboy" and start flipping switches off script it would increase risk, not decrease it.

I would say that "complacency and incompetence" are easily "seen" in hindsight. Classic hindsight bias, a major problem in accident investigation (and other things too).

I hear ya, but in this case if the FO had just reverted to "pitch and power" all would've been fine. The number one rule is to fly the damn airplane. If your airspeed is incorrect, pitch to a reasonable attitude and add/reduce thrust as required. He had good motors. He had good wings and flight controls.

I guess I just don't see this as a cascading failure that should've caused an accident.

IMC at night in the clouds and turbulence with FD pitch commanding "nose up".

 

[A Life Aloft]

Then feel free to ignore me, Jayson Blair.

Feel free to behave and interact like a normal human being for a change.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

I would say that "complacency and incompetence" are easily "seen" in hindsight. Classic hindsight bias, a major problem in accident investigation (and other things too).

This just needed to be repeated. Every pilot who ever has the urge to blame a fellow aviator for being incompetent should come back and read this statement.

 

[MikeD]

Which is misplaced. The problem is not the automation per se, but rather that we do not properly train pilots to anticipate and understand what the automation will do.

How much time have most pilots spent hand flying a jet at 35,000? If you "cam of age" since RVSM, the answer to that is likely ZERO. How much time was spent flying it in a degraded mode? Maybe in the simulator?.

I don't fault automation either, or even really the Airbus design necessarily. In the sense that, regardless of the design type/style, anyone wishing to utilize (fly) that type needs to be sufficiently trained and understand the nuaces of that system, both for what goes on normally as well as degraded or abnormally.

Woe be the pilot who:

1. Doesn't understand what his aircraft is specifically trying to tell him at any given time. (inexperience with the system), or

2. Doesn't speak the language (partially or fully) that the aircraft is communicating to him in. (training deficit)

While this can apply to any aircraft, with complex systems-depth aircraft like the Airbus, this becomes especially true, in my opinion. A pilot just needs to learn its language.

Is it an optimal design? Looks it could improve the sidestick command design, but that's also a CRM issue in having to ensure verbally who has control of the plane, rather than being used to "feeling" it, with a conventional aircraft.

 

[PhilosopherPilot]

I




The U.S. record is also a lot of luck. Having been privy to a lot of data around the industry, you would be VERY surprised as to how often we (the U.S. airline industry) have "close calls", LOC events, etc. Very surprised.

I'm not at all surprised. I've been involved with FOQA and ASIAS since 2009.

I would say that "complacency and incompetence" are easily "seen" in hindsight. Classic hindsight bias, a major problem in accident investigation (and other things too).

Agree, but that misses my point. None of the recent US accidents was caused by multiple cascading failures that were outside the scope of normal training. That point was directed at Boris, and not meant as a hindsight bias. Those words (complacency and incompetence) were his, not mine.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

Mike, it's just not that simple. You can't train out primacy, at least not to the degree necessary to where that primacy won't take over in the heat of an incredibly chaotic situation in the pitch dark. You can train people until they're blue in the face on the various "laws" and how the controls don't behave like the controls of real airplanes, but if a pilot's initial training was in real airplanes and not computer games with wings, then when that chaotic situation comes up, he's not going to sit there and think calmly about how he was trained that this particular airplane doesn't behave like a real airplane, he's going to revert to the basis of his original training.

No airplane should be intentionally designed to have flight controls that behave fundamentally differently than the flight controls on any other airplane. Differences in performance are one thing, but differences in fundamentals are not. When one control stick/column moves, the other needs to move too. That's how every airplane we train on from the beginning of our basic pilot training works, and it's what the mind automatically expects because of primacy. Boeing designs FBW airplanes, but they engineer them to behave like normal airplanes. Move the yoke on a FBW 777, the other yoke moves just like it would on a DC-9 or a Cessna 152.

Damn, I hate Airbus.

 

[MikeD]

Mike, it's just not that simple. You can't train out primacy, at least not to the degree necessary to where that primacy won't take over in the heat of an incredibly chaotic situation in the pitch dark. You can train people until they're blue in the face on the various "laws" and how the controls don't behave like the controls of real airplanes, but if a pilot's initial training was in real airplanes and not computer games with wings, then when that chaotic situation comes up, he's not going to sit there and think calmly about how he was trained that this particular airplane doesn't behave like a real airplane, he's going to revert to the basis of his original training.

I agree. The point I was driving at was that the initial issue here appeared to be one of not understanding the system fully, for whatever reason, be it training or experience or a combo of both some degree. Especially in an airplane that requires one be more a systems engineer than a classic stick/rudder pilot.

And in any emergency, I also agree that there will be some degree of CRM breakdown, be it minor or major, simply due to what was normal 5 seconds ago, now being not normal. Just the change will make a CRM dent of some kind, whether noticed or not. How the crew manages that and whether a situation has a manageable timeframe or goes to hell quickly, will obviously also determine how much breakdown occurs.

No airplane should be intentionally designed to have flight controls that behave fundamentally differently than the flight controls on any other airplane. Differences in performance are one thing, but differences in fundamentals are not. When one control stick/column moves, the other needs to move too. That's how every airplane we train on from the beginning of our basic pilot training works, and it's what the mind automatically expects because of primacy. Boeing designs FBW airplanes, but they engineer them to behave like normal airplanes. Move the yoke on a FBW 777, the other yoke moves just like it would on a DC-9 or a Cessna 152.

Damn, I hate Airbus.

The Airbus is a complex design indeed, and like any complex design, could always use improvement in many differerent ways, large or small. Unfortunately, as you point out, with how many are in fleetwide service, pilots are going to have to understand and play the cards they're dealt, so to speak, to the best of their ability.

My question then, is "different" or possibly "advanced/new" design unsafe necessarily, or just a new concept to have to be able to think and understand? I guess that depends who you ask. Some of the Airbus logic isn't fully understood by me either, but I also don't fly their jets and haven't been trained on them, so I don't have that to compare to.

 

[seagull]

I don't fault automation either, or even really the Airbus design necessarily. In the sense that, regardless of the design type/style, anyone wishing to utilize (fly) that type needs to be sufficiently trained and understand the nuaces of that system, both for what goes on normally as well as degraded or abnormally.

Woe be the pilot who:

1. Doesn't understand what his aircraft is specifically trying to tell him at any given time. (inexperience with the system), or

2. Doesn't speak the language (partially or fully) that the aircraft is communicating to him in. (training deficit)

While this can apply to any aircraft, with complex systems-depth aircraft like the Airbus, this becomes especially true, in my opinion. A pilot just needs to learn its language.

Is it an optimal design? Looks it could improve the sidestick command design, but that's also a CRM issue in having to ensure verbally who has control of the plane, rather than being used to "feeling" it, with a conventional aircraft.

Agree completely. Unfortunately, the airline industry does not want to take the time to properly train pilots, but instead does what works 99% of the time. When a pilot encounters a corner-point, they are on their own, and the great safety record is testament to the fact that we do a damn good job in SPITE of the lack of training, but there is definitely some luck involved. Encounter the wrong set of circumstances with a "just average" pilot and you have an accident.

 

[seagull]

, but that misses my point. None of the recent US accidents was caused by multiple cascading failures that were outside the scope of normal training. That point was directed at Boris, and not meant as a hindsight bias. Those words (complacency and incompetence) were his, not mine.

I just grabbed the quote to respond, was not meant to be directed at any one person.

How do you define "multiple cascading failures"? I would argue that most U.S. accidents could be so contributed. Regardless of that aspect, I would state that most "normal training" is not broad enough in scope to handle the "corner-points" as I said above.

 

[seagull]

No airplane should be intentionally designed to have flight controls that behave fundamentally differently than the flight controls on any other airplane. Differences in performance are one thing, but differences in fundamentals are not. When one control stick/column moves, the other needs to move too. That's how every airplane we train on from the beginning of our basic pilot training works, and it's what the mind automatically expects because of primacy. Boeing designs FBW airplanes, but they engineer them to behave like normal airplanes. Move the yoke on a FBW 777, the other yoke moves just like it would on a DC-9 or a Cessna 152..

However, the 777 has its own corner-point design flaws (Asiana SFO). There are more too, but that's a topic for another day.

Part of the issue is also the degree of movement, but I would also prefer having feedback on that and the throttles.

 

[ppragman]

However, the 777 has its own corner-point design flaws (Asiana SFO). There are more too, but that's a topic for another day.

Part of the issue is also the degree of movement, but I would also prefer having feedback on that and the throttles.

So, to be clear, you classify the Asiana accident as a design flaw?

 

[wheelsup]

No airplane should be intentionally designed to have flight controls that behave fundamentally differently than the flight controls on any other airplane. Differences in performance are one thing, but differences in fundamentals are not. When one control stick/column moves, the other needs to move too. That's how every airplane we train on from the beginning of our basic pilot training works, and it's what the mind automatically expects because of primacy. Boeing designs FBW airplanes, but they engineer them to behave like normal airplanes. Move the yoke on a FBW 777, the other yoke moves just like it would on a DC-9 or a Cessna 152.

Damn, I hate Airbus.

How are the Airbus flight controls different than other airplanes?

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

How are the Airbus flight controls different than other airplanes?

Come on, don't you fly it? You know the differences. Sticks are independent, they average inputs when both are moved simultaneously, one can override the other without feeling it, the throttles don't move in autothrust, the list just goes on and on.

And whenever someone who loves his Airbus responds to any of this, it always involves how much he likes having a tray table.

 

[SlumTodd_Millionaire]

However, the 777 has its own corner-point design flaws (Asiana SFO). There are more too, but that's a topic for another day.

Yes, but the design flaws aren't in the flight controls, which is what we all ultimately revert to in an emergency (aviate, navigate, communicate). The world goes to hell in a hand basket, we grab for our flight controls. We don't start punching buttons in the FMS or analyzing schematics.

Looking at the Asiana accident, there was clearly a lack of understanding of a system. But that system was the autopilot, not the primary flight controls. I'll give @Boris Badenov a woody here by saying that the whole thing could have been solved by simply clicking off the automation and going to the old fashioned yoke, rudder, and throttles. And that's not an indictment of the crew, to be clear. It's an indictment of many things, from culture to training. But it's definitely not an indictment of Boeing flight control design philosophy.