AF447 Vanity Fair article

[jynxyjoe]

Well I'll have to go through the accident with both articles looking specifically at:

• his reporting of the timing of events
• the amount of control input and when
• crew interactions

I can only speak on RJ operators I know of and had experience with, but where are the dearth of RJ captains with 2100 hours? Which more experienced crews are you referring to?

• the "inexperience" of the F/O, who had more flying time than many RJ captains out there.
• Much more experienced crews than this have fallen to a similar fate.

 

[wheelsup]

I'm continually amazed that we don't have an AOA indicator on any transport category aircraft. Maybe they think it's too hard to utilize? Or we'd use that over airspeed on approach? I dunno. Would be nice to have, with a corresponding red blinking light if the critical AOA is approached similar to the stall warning system maybe.

 

[jynxyjoe]

I'm continually amazed that we don't have an AOA indicator on any transport category aircraft. Maybe they think it's too hard to utilize? Or we'd use that over airspeed on approach? I dunno. Would be nice to have, with a corresponding red blinking light if the critical AOA is approached similar to the stall warning system maybe.

Supposedly you can lock into the AOA and get your best climbs/descents/approaches on every jet but I've never had one to know.

 

[MikeD]

Supposedly you can lock into the AOA and get your best climbs/descents/approaches on every jet but I've never had one to know.

AOA gives you instant visual of best range/endurance for cruise, as well being used on approach/landing for being on appropriate speed at any given time. Far more accurate than airspeed indications for certain flight conditions, and used almost exclusively during landing in tactical jets.

 

[seagull]

Well I'll have to go through the accident with both articles looking specifically at:

I can only speak on RJ operators I know of and had experience with, but where are the dearth of RJ captains with 2100 hours? Which more experienced crews are you referring to?

My point is that the F/O with 3000 hours is not all that "low time". Also, I am fairly sure his stick and rudder skills were just fine, as were the AA 903 and the C-5 crew I discuss in my article. As for going through the articles, those are just off the top of my head, there were other problems in it.

 

[seagull]

I'm continually amazed that we don't have an AOA indicator on any transport category aircraft. Maybe they think it's too hard to utilize? Or we'd use that over airspeed on approach? I dunno. Would be nice to have, with a corresponding red blinking light if the critical AOA is approached similar to the stall warning system maybe.

We have them on the HUD, but that is all. They are simple to use. It would also be a lot better for approaches, as the AoA is constant regardless of weight or CG. In my airplane the body angle is about 3 degrees different from a forward to aft CG just due to the trim load at a forward CG as opposed to an aft when using an approach speed based on weight alone. That is pretty significant. With AoA the changes in weight and CG would be a non-issue.

 

[seagull]

Supposedly you can lock into the AOA and get your best climbs/descents/approaches on every jet but I've never had one to know.

We have a hash mark for L/Dmax.

 

[MikeD]

My point is that the F/O with 3000 hours is not all that "low time".

While 3000 hours isn't low total time at all. With his focused, ab initio background, he potentially could run into a situation where he, in reality, has 1 hour, 3000 times. I don't know what kind of flying he did apart from only Air France, but there could variations on that experience/quality of time theme being somewhere in between the two extremes?

 

[jynxyjoe]

My point is that the F/O with 3000 hours is not all that "low time". Also, I am fairly sure his stick and rudder skills were just fine, as were the AA 903 and the C-5 crew I discuss in my article. As for going through the articles, those are just off the top of my head, there were other problems in it.

Depends who you ask. Ask jynxyjoe, Captain of the Saab 340 if 3000 hours was much and he'd say "it's a lot, my FO's have 500 hours". I don't know what high time means anymore. I think I know what low time means.

Well then another question for you. The criticism I saw from the Vanity Fair article was that our young FO was a Air France Baby and didn't have a strong foundation flying other aircraft, or years of training / teaching like you'd find with some of those RJ captains you bemoan. Do you think it's possible an instructor could have frozen the sim in that situation and explained what he was doing and he'd have this "holy crap I've never heard this before" moment? Or if he'd read this article and have to ask someone to explain to them what everyone was talking about? In other words, did he simply not understand high altitude stalls and didn't understand how to scan around a failed instrument like we learn in instrument course BAI lessons?

Is there a simple fix to getting guys "good hours"? Am I just biased thinking "boy when I was a lad we earned our hours!" like an old man who can't accept there are other ways of learning besides the "school of hard knocks" or whatever.

 

[Boris Badenov]

I'm continually amazed that we don't have an AOA indicator on any transport category aircraft. Maybe they think it's too hard to utilize? Or we'd use that over airspeed on approach? I dunno. Would be nice to have, with a corresponding red blinking light if the critical AOA is approached similar to the stall warning system maybe.

Hawkersaurus and Bitchjet both have them. It's nice on approach, sure, but where I find it's really useful is high altitude. Particularly if, as often happens (particularly in the Lead Sled Hawker), they need more climb than you really want to give them.

 

[Boris Badenov]

II found it interesting that the most significant factor in this accident, confirmation bias, is also what led to Langewiesche ignoring so many of the facts to come up with the simple "weak pilot caused it" approach in the article itself.

Did we read the same article? He explicitly states at least twice that it's not a "weak pilot caused it" situation. If I remember his closing paragraph correctly, it was something along the lines of "Automation reduces the danger enormously, but the reliance on said automation makes the pilots less likely than ever to be able to figure out and fix what's wrong when the automation can't or doesn't, for whatever reason, function". That does not seem at all congruent with your notion that he's blaming the cruise F/O, that I can see.

Although, while I don't think he does, I'd be perfectly happy to throw the PF under the bus.

 

[SeanD]

That was a really decent article. I've read and heard various things that it took the CA 2 minutes to get to the cockpit once he was called. Is that true? Not sure why it would have taken that long.

 

[Jimflyfast]

My point is that the F/O with 3000 hours is not all that "low time". Also, I am fairly sure his stick and rudder skills were just fine, as were the AA 903 and the C-5 crew I discuss in my article. As for going through the articles, those are just off the top of my head, there were other problems in it.

3000 hours is low when 2700 of it is 10 hours at a time on a widebody in cruise in 3 or 4 man crews. I will be willing to bet he had little true stick and rudder skills

 

[Pichettet1]

Although, while I don't think he does, I'd be perfectly happy to throw the PF under the bus.

The normal reaction to losing airspeed indication is never to pull back on the stick. Not sure why that would be an immediate reaction. I'm with you on this, aside from the stated reliance on automation, basic instrument flying skills and 'partial panel' skills seemed to be a large contributing factor.

 

[T/O w/FSII]

That was a really decent article. I've read and heard various things that it took the CA 2 minutes to get to the cockpit once he was called. Is that true? Not sure why it would have taken that long.

Because he was passed the hell out after partying all night the day before apparently. But thats none of my business though.

This FO had no experience. Just hours. BIG difference.

 

[Jimflyfast]

In general, though, the premise of this article is wrong as it was not really an issue of a "weak pilot", but more an issue of mental models, high gain control response (startle, relatively never trained alternate control law and no familiarity with handling qualities at that altitude with low q-factors), plus a lot of emotional aspects. The latter was due to inexperience, but the stick and rudder skills were not a factor here, per se. It is apparent that nobody recognized the aerodynamic stall conditions. Much more experienced crews than this have fallen to a similar fate.

I agree with most of what you are saying here

The problem was pairing a weak pilot(s) with an airplane that did something some engineers swore it could never do. When you tell someone a ship cant sink, then the captain doesnt slow down near icebergs. If you tell a pilot that a plane can not stall, it is not in his mind that is a possible outcome. It isnt even in the back of his mind a something he should be recovering from. The airbus design of invalid airspeed below 100 knots in cruise was a fatal assumption. What would you do if when you pulled back, the plane was quiet, and when you pushed, it suddenly said "Stall"? Throw in night, likely no horizon, startle and uncertainty, and damn near everyone would do the same thing. The autotrim was the part that sealed their fate. The nose was trimmed full up the entire descent. Even if he had pushed, it was unlikely he would have held it long enough for the trim to run the correct way. I would say that passing 20000 feet they were dead, as the only recovery from that high of a deck angle was full rudder to drop the nose, and there are about 4 line pilots in the world that are willing to use full rudder in cruise.

I could go on and on about this, either as an engineer and design assumptions or as someone with a fair enough time in the 330, or as someone who has done full aerodynamic stalls in transports at altitude

 

[T/O w/FSII]

I agree with most of what you are saying here

The problem was pairing a weak pilot(s) with an airplane that did something some engineers swore it could never do. When you tell someone a ship cant sink, then the captain doesnt slow down near icebergs. If you tell a pilot that a plane can not stall, it is not in his mind that is a possible outcome. It isnt even in the back of his mind a something he should be recovering from. The airbus design of invalid airspeed below 100 knots in cruise was a fatal assumption. What would you do if when you pulled back, the plane was quiet, and when you pushed, it suddenly said "Stall"? Throw in night, likely no horizon, startle and uncertainty, and damn near everyone would do the same thing. The autotrim was the part that sealed their fate. The nose was trimmed full up the entire descent. Even if he had pushed, it was unlikely he would have held it long enough for the trim to run the correct way. I would say that passing 20000 feet they were dead, as the only recovery from that high of a deck angle was full rudder to drop the nose, and there are about 4 line pilots in the world that are willing to use full rudder in cruise.

I could go on and on about this, either as an engineer and design assumptions or as someone with a fair enough time in the 330, or as someone who has done full aerodynamic stalls in transports at altitude

Haaaa. Wow. Where to begin?

 

[USMCmech]

One thing that stood out to me was that the stall warning blanked out after the pilot pitched up well beyond normal flight attitudes, and then reengaged when he lowered the nose. The author notes that this may have mislead the pilot to think that lowering the nose was causing the wing to stall.

I certainly could see how a pilot could be fooled by that scenario.

 

[USMCmech]

3000 hours is low when 2700 of it is 10 hours at a time on a widebody in cruise in 3 or 4 man crews. I will be willing to bet he had little true stick and rudder skills

I wonder how many of the crashes in the past 10 years came at the hands of pilots who went straight to the airlines with less than 300 TT.

I seem to recall that in addition to this crash both pilots in Colgan 3407, and both the guys in the Pinnacle CRJ that flamed out at 410 did.

 

[jynxyjoe]

One thing that stood out to me was that the stall warning blanked out after the pilot pitched up well beyond normal flight attitudes, and then reengaged when he lowered the nose. The author notes that this may have mislead the pilot to think that lowering the nose was causing the wing to stall.

Yeah the computer is negating the AOA because it would consider that bad info. I don't know how to program that away, becuase the computer has to be able to remove that bad info from the equation. Of course, in this situation, the AOA was good info, but no one really plans for that sort of stuff. Maybe you silence the stall horn tied to AOA once the data meets criteria for it being corrupted.