737 goes down off Hawaii

an Airbus guy looking at all this 737 stuff like

1687046977157.gif
 
Boris Badenov said:
Well, in this case the engine was very not on fire, but they wound up crashing in to the ocean in the middle of the night and very nearly becoming fish-food, when they could easily have turned around and landed right now.

Landing an airplane isn't a freaking shuttle launch. Is the gear down? Are the flaps configured? Is the runway long enough? Do we have a good ref?

In general I agree with the "slow and steady" philosophy, but there are going to be some moments, however well one tries to engineer a "slow and steady" solution to every situation, which are exigent enough to require some individual initiative for an optimal outcome. IMHO, this was one of those.
Click to expand...
Experiencing stick shaker. Let’s exercise good CRM and discuss while utilizing instruments to determine configuration, airspeed, and AOA.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Right. But our profile, once at flap up speed, is to climb out at that speed, and 4 things PF calls for.

Level change
Set MCT
AP on
What’s the problem?


My point was our shop’s procedure of starting fire checklist after first flap retraction literally cannot work. Because you have 5-8 seconds before the next retraction of flaps, rinse/repeat until flaps up, after takeoff checklist. And then at up speed, those 4 things above. And after what’s the problem, you call for engine fire QRC.

It should be at 400 AGL when all the PF is doing is maintains directional control and the PM is “free” somewhat. But once you reach accel height and start accelerating to clean up, the PM is very busy now with the clean up profile. Can’t run engine fire items IMO.
Click to expand...

I'm all for following procedure. But there may be instances where the script isn't working. We've taken cascading failures out of training events because they are honestly unrealistic. But what happens when unrealistic becomes realistic? When do you go off of script because the script doesn't work anymore.

This crew attempted to stay in script and screwed it all up when they could have been on the ground in less in no time at all. They had already screwed the script up and followed the bad script all the way into the ocean.
 
KLB said:
I'm all for following procedure. But there may be instances where the script isn't working. We've taken cascading failures out of training events because they are honestly unrealistic. But what happens when unrealistic becomes realistic? When do you go off of script because the script doesn't work anymore.

This crew attempted to stay in script and screwed it all up when they could have been on the ground in less in no time at all. They had already screwed the script up and followed the bad script all the way into the ocean.
Click to expand...
So they couldn’t follow an engine failure checklist to include identifying the correct engine, yet they probably would have been fine just shooting from the hip and doing an air return off memory?
 
Roger Roger said:
So they couldn’t follow an engine failure checklist to include identifying the correct engine, yet they probably would have been fine just shooting from the hip and doing an air return off memory?
Click to expand...

I am a checklist follower to the T. But whether crew induced or not....if you are within 10 miles of the airport and can't maintain altitude.. heading back towards the runway has to be an option at some point.
 
KLB said:
I'm all for following procedure. But there may be instances where the script isn't working. We've taken cascading failures out of training events because they are honestly unrealistic. But what happens when unrealistic becomes realistic? When do you go off of script because the script doesn't work anymore.

This crew attempted to stay in script and screwed it all up when they could have been on the ground in less in no time at all. They had already screwed the script up and followed the bad script all the way into the ocean.
Click to expand...

Agreed. There has to be an inate flexibility to understand when the script isn’t working, whether by the given situation or whether self induced, and know how to flex properly to effect a positive outcome. In fact, the Capt had used this previously, and had been chastised for doing so (improperly, in my opinion). And that’s one of the drawbacks of 121: everything is taught as “the script”, which is fine and is the 99% solution for normal ops, but for abnormal ops, the script doesn’t and won’t cover everything, and crews aren’t taught to use flexibility……as seen by being chastised when they do use it.

121 training is great and all, but it’s been my experience and observation that they take a few of the simplest of things, and turn them into these complex monstrosities. The number of 121 pilots I’ve run into who find a go around, or a traffic pattern, or a go around to a traffic pattern, or even something like a touch and go landing, to be some sort of near-emergency of a maneuver, is perplexing.

I often wonder if the pilots we have today, could successfully manage another UA232 situation, if one wants to get into true no-script land.

Roger Roger said:
So they couldn’t follow an engine failure checklist to include identifying the correct engine, yet they probably would have been fine just shooting from the hip and doing an air return off memory?
Click to expand...

They correct engine was initially identified. But due to various distractions or situational stress, was forgotten as both throttles had been brought back for level off. Personally, both throttles should’ve been being flown, so to speak, until the checklist steps of ID and securing of the bad engine are completed. Because these weren’t completed, both throttles should continue to have been manipulated so the good engine won’t be sitting at low EPR, while the bad one is overtemping

Since when is a simple traffic pattern considered a shooting from the hip maneuver? A traffic pattern is one of the most basic of basic aviation maneuvers. Far less complex and time consuming than running a checklist while heading out to sea at low altitude in the dark. If you can take an air emergency and safely turn it into a ground emergency in fairly short order, that’s a good thing. It’s not like these guys would be trying to fly a traffic pattern in Aspen or Jackson Hole. They had all kinds of maneuvering room. And had the Capt not been chastised from before, it’s highly likely this jet would’ve been safely rolling out on landing on the runway following this incident, even with the bad engine being forgotten.
 
Roger Roger said:
So they couldn’t follow an engine failure checklist to include identifying the correct engine, yet they probably would have been fine just shooting from the hip and doing an air return off memory?
Click to expand...

In a word, "yes". In several words "Probably, since they didn't understand what was happening with the engines, since that sort of thing never *actually* happens to anyone until it does, whereas everyone has landed the plane about half a billion times." I'm not sure why everyone insists on treating turning around and landing like it's a mission to mars.
 
Boris Badenov said:
In a word, "yes". In several words "Probably, since they didn't understand what was happening with the engines, since that sort of thing never *actually* happens to anyone until it does, whereas everyone has landed the plane about half a billion times." I'm not sure why everyone insists on treating turning around and landing like it's a mission to mars.
Click to expand...

But that’s part of the mindset and training of 121; some of the simplest things are turned into these complex “mission to mars” style mindsets. I get standardization and checklist usage, but I also get the concept of “fly the aircraft and recover it safely”. The former concept above is proven by the chief pilot chastising this Capt for doing the latter concept and effecting a safe recovery.

121 in some ways reminds me of Admiral Painter (Fred Thompson) in Hunt for Red October: “121 pilots don’t take a dump without a checklist…” :)
 
If running an engine failure (without compounding failures) checklist in a two crew airplane with full system redundancy and a working autopilot is too much of a “production” then the problem isn’t in the airline or the checklist, it’s in the pilot seat.
 
Skåning said:
Slightly unorthodox but this Italian captain handles a 767 engine fire and immediate return really well. Great CRM too.

Accident Boeing 767-3G5ER EI-CXO, Friday 16 July 2004

4 kts before V1 the right engine exploded. The F/O was flying. The Captain elected to continue the take-off and, after completing the emergency actions, the fire was still uncontained. Th...
aviation-safety.net

Click to expand...

I dunno, going "hey I'm shutting down the engine immediately at like 300 feet" without any sort of confirmation doesn't really give me the warm and fuzzies.
 
Roger Roger said:
If running an engine failure (without compounding failures) checklist in a two crew airplane with full system redundancy and a working autopilot is too much of a “production” then the problem isn’t in the airline or the checklist, it’s in the pilot seat.
Click to expand...

In their defense, they were facing a lot of distractions, in an airplane that doesn’t remotely have the automation that a modern jet does. We have only two people on JC, @derg and myself, who have flown the 737-200, and as it comes to flying the airplane in an emergency, there’s a lot more to doing that in that jet than any 121 pilot of today is used to. So in that sense, I can see the rise in workload that these guys were facing, in light of various distractions and the flight conditions they were in.

The only reason they pressed out to a black hole ocean, at low altitude, at night….when they could’ve stayed visual with a lighted land mass and maneuvered to land, was because of management chastising the captain for using basic aeronautical judgement. There is no other logical reason to fly away from an airport at low altitude with engine problems, especially over the ocean in the dark. Had the crew flown both throttles in lieu of not being able to complete the first-third of the 737 engine failure checklist, they would’ve been fine. Unfortunately, the FO remembered the wrong engine after having earlier correctly identified the right one, likely due to tunnel vision of the situation.
 
Skåning said:
Slightly unorthodox but this Italian captain handles a 767 engine fire and immediate return really well. Great CRM too.

Accident Boeing 767-3G5ER EI-CXO, Friday 16 July 2004

4 kts before V1 the right engine exploded. The F/O was flying. The Captain elected to continue the take-off and, after completing the emergency actions, the fire was still uncontained. Th...
aviation-safety.net

Click to expand...


He asked his FO 2X if he was ok and if he thought anything was wrong. He verbally said check everything then ran the landing check. He also asked the FO to look around and see if anything else was wrong on final. Amazing CRM.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top