Curious, I checked the FAA website to check the status of accepting applicants into the Academy in OKC. Top of the page: "The application window is now closed." How will we EVER increase staffing levels if they're not even accepting applications!?
Yeah will wait for the real report, that seems way too long. But who knows, still a lot left to be answered I suppose.If the VASAviation video is synced up properly with the scope view they used they were at ~300 feet (26ish seconds to touchdown). This correlates with the timing on the audio in the video as well. The first time the tower told Truck 1 to stop was when they were at 200 feet. Roughly 17 seconds prior to the accident.
I have a feeling they may have thought the controller figured out the problem and rectified the issue even though Truck 1 never responded.
Honestly, this is definitely a failure across the board it seems.
I found the LiveATC audio. It seems the timeline may be a bit shorter than in the video. The real report will be interesting. Wish I didn't have to say that again.Yeah will wait for the real report, that seems way too long. But who knows, still a lot left to be answered I suppose.
The audio has them getting cleared in to their gate.Or did they simply taxi to the gate like normal?
I saw a report (forget where) that the engines were not running when other emergency responders arrived.
Everything I know is that the FADECs are mounted on the engines (they are not LRUs in an EE bay) and have their own permanent magnet alternators to supply power, which is why I wondered.
Given the mechanical damage, anything from the throttle cables, fire handles, or cutoff switches could have shut them down.
I don't want to be the first one to say this and I'm sure it came across a few peoples minds. When the RJ was on final, why did the crew not do a go around if they heard the trucks (I assume if the trucks were on tower frequency) were cleared to cross on RWY 4 that they were landing on?
Was 2nd RTO for strange odor (first was for an anti ice light). Got off runway just asked for fire to meet them at the gate. Couldn’t get a gate and LGA tower started making calls for them. About 2 mins later say they will need to declare emergency if no gate soon (aft FA feeling sick and odor still on plane). Say need air stairs soon if no gates. About a minute later get a lane entry and gate, and shortly after that is the crash. Can see how busy the LGA tower is during this incident.Can someone answer the United’s story?
RTO and return to ramp? Cant get a gate so they declare an emergency and ask for any gate? This ties up the controller to make numerous calls.
This is LGA at 1130pm. The chances of someone just magically finding a new open gate that is staffed/manned are fairly low.
I wonder how bad the inside of UA was? If it’s that bad, blow the slides and get out. In the end, the fire trucks headed to United obviously never made it. So…. what was United’s conclusion? Did they blow the slide and evac? Or did they simply taxi to the gate like normal? Curious to know. If it’s the latter, then that’s a tragically unlucky link in the chain accident, where perhaps the emer declaration was not necessary?
I’m just happy this can go back to blaming the MaxI’m still shocked there’s no EICAS/ECAM on a new aircraft or any sort of “inhibit”.
Not to mention they have the worst attitude in all of the system. I understand they have a tough job, but LGA controllers specifically go out of their way to be dicks.I’ve also experienced ARFF and ops vehicles running around seemingly cluelessly. I don’t think it helps that a good number of ground vehicles have substandard radios or the personnel have poor radio skills (or both). And, bluntly, controllers around NYC have some of the poorest phraseology discipline in the country. I’ve had an easier time understanding ATC in a good number of non-English speaking countries. Can it be cumbersome to use standard phraseology to convey something that plain English could do faster? Yes…but we need to all be on the same page as to the meaning of an instruction with as little ambiguity as possible. Teaching foreign airline cadets way back when reinforced to me how easily ambiguity can occur when departing from standard aviation English.
My conspiracy theory is that the tech bros are lobbying for a massive investment in some kind of AI solution
100kts is the threshold for the high speed regime on the bus at UA. Assume it’s the same for the 737Is this to be believed?
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UA guys on the 737, what’s your policy on aborts for a yellow master caution light?
Our shop once you’re above 80 kts we don’t stop for a yellow master caution light.
Similar question to anyone at Delta and AA on the 737.
Only curious.
And how do you propose that when we literally refuse to pay for and staff the system we have?AI isn't ready yet, obviously, but the FAA does need an overhaul to their tech stack.
100kts is the threshold for the high speed regime on the bus at UA. Assume it’s the same for the 737
Based on when the fire truck began crossing, it appears the RJ had already touched down and beginning its rollout, possibly with spoilers deploying or already deployed, and likely not on a position speed, available distance, or config-wise, to be able to rotate and get airborne again. Insofar as when the flight crew saw the fire truck, the CVR will reveal that.
Not to mention they have the worst attitude in all of the system. I understand they have a tough job, but LGA controllers specifically go out of their way to be dicks.
AI isn't ready yet, obviously, but the FAA does need an overhaul to their tech stack.