Wtf is wrong with you? Is this some way for you to try to make sense of what happened? Whatever pain he was in, it was no one else's right to end. And a counter-retribution? You can't be serious.
Maybe you aren't familiar with the accident? It was largely not the controller's fault. Had any one of a number of factors been different that night, this accident might not have occurred. Nielson wasn't even convicted in this accident, but 4 Skyguide managers were convicted of manslaughter due to their negligence. Their sentences were suspended. Why didn't Kaloyev go after these people? In their trial, the Skyguide managers all blamed Nielson, of course. Kaloyev only received 5 years for the murder of Nielson. He was given a hero's welcome upon his return to Russia, hailed as a "real human being."
A rational person could read about this investigation and understand that there were systemic issues at play at multiple levels which contributed to this accident, as there are with most aviation accidents. Nielson made some mistakes, but he isn't solely (or even mostly) responsible. Kaloyev wasn't rational.
"The airspace was controlled from Zürich, Switzerland, by the Swiss federal airspace control Skyguide. Air traffic controller Peter Nielsen, the only controller handling the airspace, was burdened with working two workstations at the same time.
Nielsen permitted Flight 611 to climb after about four to five minutes, after which Flight 611 reached the desired altitude at 23:29. Meanwhile, Flight 2937 contacted Nielsen at 23:30, which also reported to be at flight level 360. Nielsen acknowledged the flight, but did not assign a different altitude to either aircraft. That meant that both were now at the same altitude and on a collision course. Hero's welcome for murderer
Some excerpts from Wiki:
"At 23:34:49 bout a minute before the collision, Flight 2937's TCAS instructed them to climb; seconds later, Nielsen, realizing the oncoming danger, contacted Flight 2937 and instructed the pilot to descend to flight level 350 (1000 ft lower) to avoid collision with crossing traffic (Flight 611). The crew of Flight 2937 disengaged the autopilot and initiated their descent at 23:35, obeying the controller instead of the TCAS. At about the same time, the TCAS on Flight 611 instructed the crew of that aircraft to descend. The collision would thus not have occurred if both the aircraft's crews had obeyed the TCAS's instructions."
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"Other factors in the crash
Only one air traffic controller (ATC), Peter Nielsen of ACC Zurich, was controlling the airspace through which the aircraft were flying. The other controller on duty was resting in another room for the night. This was against Skyguide's regulations, but had been a common practice for years and was known and tolerated by management. Maintenance work was being carried out on the main radar image processing system, which meant that the controllers were forced to use a fallback system. Telephone systems were also under maintenance, preventing contact between other air traffic control personnel. A delayed flight arrived for landing at Friedrichshafen, and with the telephone system under maintenance, Nielsen was forced to remain in contact with the pilots, until they came into contact with the Friedrichshafen tower, while the two planes approached collision.The ground-based optical collision warning system, which would have alerted the controller to the pending collision about two minutes before it happened, had been switched off for maintenance. An aural short-term conflict alert warning system released a warning addressed to workstation RE SUED at 23:35:00 (32 seconds before the collision). This warning was not heard by anyone present at that time, although no error in this system could be found in a subsequent technical audit; however, whether or not this audible warning is functional is not something that is technically logged. Even if Nielsen had heard this warning, at that time finding a useful resolution order by the ATC was impossible."
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"The statement by Bahrain, the home country of the DHL plane, mostly agrees with the findings of the report. It says that the report should have put less emphasis on the actions of individuals and more on the faults within Skyguide's organization and management. Bahrain's statement also mentions the lack of crew resource management in the Tupolev's cockpit as a factor in the crash."
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"Switzerland notes that the Tupolev was about 33 m (108 ft) below the flight level ordered by the Swiss controller, and still descending at 580 m/min (1,900 ft/min). The Swiss say that this was also a cause of the accident. Switzerland also requested that the BFU make a formal finding that the TCAS advisories would have been useful if obeyed immediately; the BFU declined to do so."
