System knowledge

As always, Douglas did it best. :) Do that in a 717 and the boards automatically retract and you get a message telling you to stow the handle.

At what amount of power? Airbus has automatic retract in certain situations (TOGA power selected, flaps full selected) and others it'll give you a message saying hey dummy, your boards are still out.
 
At what amount of power? Airbus has automatic retract in certain situations (TOGA power selected, flaps full selected) and others it'll give you a message saying hey dummy, your boards are still out.

Dude, it’s been years. I can barely still remember the takeoff callouts. :) But it wasn’t just a TOGA thing.
 
Exactly. Which is why we should be proactive and fix the Airbus design philosophy before it gets a bunch of people killed.

You could substitute any OEM there. It is like high speed buffet, people tend to fear what they do not understand or have not experienced.
 
Glad we can refuse instructors here, @ppragman your PERSONAL dream list would not fly at most airline's. Either you meet the standards set through your companies training program or you don't. No one should have play your BS game to stroke your ego because you think you are a vault of information and know more than the pilots you are quizzing.

I hope before you start your game of jeopardy that you tell your students they passed so they don't think they are failing while you sit and ask unneccesary questions.
You even read my posts?

That’s literally exactly what I gave them. A list of exactly what they had to know and if they passed they knew. It’s not jeopardy to be able to know some things about the electrical system on a single pilot airplane or know why the left engine is surging during a prop governor failure, or just some basic systems knowledge about the airplane. “What does this light mean” is pretty freaking basic. No you don’t need to be able to solder up a new PCB on demand but knowing that the reason you got the annunciator power light was probably because the boss just spilled his drink on the floor right over compartment where the PCB that controls that is at night come in handy one day - I can say that it did for me.

Pick up a book every once in a while. Learn. Try to be better than you were before.

We have a guy above you that says he doesn’t want to be too knowledgeable about the systems because it might confuse him. We can do better than that. We have guys in this thread that say, “the less systems knowledge the better.” What a sack of crap. How can you safely operate the thing during an abnormal if you don’t know how the thing actually works. Of course it’s hard work to know all the stuff you should know (not just need to know), but so what? Life is hard, and being good at anything is hard - I’m not a natural aviator, and I don’t have a photographic memory, if I want to do a good job I have to work at it. I didn’t spring forth after basic indoc with anything more than the baseline minimum amount of knowledge to operate the airplane. Now it’s my job to start learning.

I’ll tell you this, I make time for it in my life to learn the equipment I’m operatinf, I don’t always do as well as I’d like, but I try. I take time out of my own life to crack the book, and have gone down to the hangar to ask mechanics about how things “really” worked on more than one occasion. I figure if there were people that were going to be flying around in the back of the airplane I am driving I owe it to them to be as knowledgeable about the airplane as I can. I owe it to them to have thought about what I was going to do if things went sideways beyond simply, “pull out the QRH.” It’s an ethical obligation.

Hell some of the airplanes I’ve flown have had things that are straight up wrong in the QRH.


When I gave checkrides they were fair, if you knew the “need to know” material that I literally gave you in conveniently flash card form in advance you would be fine - and by the way, the need to know material was just the important limitations, memory items, and company mandated ops stuff. When I got through all those, I’d say, “hey you passed the oral, let’s talk about systems a little bit.”

Like I said, if we’re not willing to go the extra mile we deserve to be replaced by the robots. beyond that, why wouldn’t you want to learn this stuff? If you’re not interested in learning about then why are you still doing it?

Sorry for the inevitable typos - dropped my phone and now my touch input is wonky.
 
Well, obviously if you took any time at all to learn about systems, you'd know how to reset the touch input.

You're a terrible phone user.

:)

I earned that. :-)

I certainly am. I break about one smart phone a year - I even broke an otter box...

Snark aside, if I’m ever in the spot where deep phone systems knowledge is required by my career, I’ll get the manual out. ;-)
 
I earned that. :)

I certainly am. I break about one smart phone a year - I even broke an otter box...

Snark aside, if I’m ever in the spot where deep phone systems knowledge is required by my career, I’ll get the manual out. ;-)
How TF did you break an otter box? I dropped my phone from the engine bay of an amphib caravan all the way to the concrete hangar floor and it didn’t phase either the Otter box or the phone.
 
How TF did you break an otter box? I dropped my phone from the engine bay of an amphib caravan all the way to the concrete hangar floor and it didn’t phase either the Otter box or the phone.

After sliding it into and out of the side pocket on my carhartts fpr six months, my carhartts literally broke the seal around the edge then I dropped it and the otterbox broke apart and the phone cracked.
 
How TF did you break an otter box? I dropped my phone from the engine bay of an amphib caravan all the way to the concrete hangar floor and it didn’t phase either the Otter box or the phone.

After sliding it into and out of the side pocket on my carhartts fpr six months, my carhartts literally broke the seal around the edge then I dropped it and the otterbox broke apart and the phone cracked.
So it's not just me then?

Sent from my Moto Z (2) using Tapatalk
 
As for AF47, it doesn’t surprise me that you want to cast some blame to the pilots. With what they actually had (not what people think they had) far more pilots would have succumbed than is probably comfortable for you.

Of course there is at least SOME blame on the pilots. The blame goes all around. I would agree the system failed them that night and most airline pilots do not get high altitude realistic stall scenarios in the sim. I get that. There are so many what ifs that could have removed one cheese slice from the cheese model for accidents. What if they had deviated more around the weather. What if when one guy said "looks like we don't have good - indications of speed" the other guy said "ok, unreliable airspeed procedures please."

I do think we should get a lot more unusual attitude and upset recovery training, especially in the higher flight levels. Pilots can probably try and fly a bit more manually and not fall victims to automation reliance. When the Flash Airlines 737 out of Sharm el Sheikh starts to deviate from its flight path, and the CAs command twice to fix that is "Autopilot on!" , we have a problem. When it comes to the autopilot panel, pushing buttons will usually not fix problems that need to be fixed right now.

The AF guys did initially what they were taught. Run the ECAM. And that screen was full of stuff that initially started to go off. AP off, that has to be cleared. Autothrust locked, clear. Altn law/flgiht control protections lost. Clear. etc. etc. They managed to get through some of that stuff too. But controlling the flight path of the aircraft was something they were not able to handle. I can't imagine any scenario that would require in the Flight Level 330+ to bring the nose up to 10 degrees pitch (or higher) and then keep it there. You'll get a crazy climb rate but it can't sustain it.
 
Read the paper.

You highlighted some stuff I wasn't aware of:

PF Contextual factors

PF-CF-1: The PF was new to the 777 and still learning, having only 33 hours of 777 flight time
[PF-UCA-3,4,5,7,8]

PF-CF-2: This was the first time the PM was acting as an instructor pilot. There was no
requirement to ensure new 777 pilots are monitored by an experienced instructor pilot [PF-
UCA-4,5,8]

PF-CF-3: The 777 A/T behavior had confused even the more experienced Asiana 777
instructors [PF-UCA-5,7,8]

When other Asiana 777 instructor captains were asked about the A/T mode change
when thrust levers are pulled back, only 2 out of 4 captains knew it would transition to
HOLD mode.

When other Asiana 777 instructors and training captains were asked about A/T low
speed protection, 3 out of 5 said they were previously unaware that low speed
protection is not provided in HOLD mode

PF-CF-4: The PF’s 777 training regarding A/T behavior was inadequate [PF-UCA-3,5,7]

The PF’s 777 simulator training demonstrated the A/T “wake up” feature that provides
low speed protection, but did not demonstrate that the feature doesn’t work with A/T in
HOLD mode

Manual flying training that included the approximate power settings and pitch attitudes
required to achieve the glidepath was not in the training syllabus

A training module on the B777 flight controls incorrectly stated that the stall protection
feature automatically engages the autothrottle if it is armed

The above training modules did not specify that A/T would not activate when A/T is in
HOLD mode

Thank you for highlighting just how absolutely crappy training, culture, and instructors were at Asiana. Oh dear, 2 out of 4 instructors didn't know what hold mode really does. Well whose fault is that?

Regardless, on ANY approach by 500 ft, the PF hand should be on the throttle levers and a hand on the yoke. And inside the airplane on a visual approach, if you aren't looking at the airspeed then what are you looking at? In the Boeing the thrust levers move when the AT is on right? So on every approach they ever did, they know the thrust levers are half-way(ish) up for approach, and if their hands are on it, it moves under them. This one went to idle and stayed there. The PF hands should have been on the thrust levers. And at any point, a glance at the airspeed below 500 ft would have shown them that they needed to add power. The guy pulled back to stay on the PAPIs. So we know he was at least watching the lights outside. But it is an absolute failure of airmanship to not at least glance a couple times at their own airspeed to make sure they were at Vref. If they had seen that and recognized it a little bit higher altitude, then the next common sense would be to check the power setting and adjust as needed.

I understand their culture and training sucked. I understand they felt scared/intimiated to go around and never did much visual approach work and always tried to fly ILSes. I get the cultural, safety, and training aspects that led to this scenario. But ultimately when you step back, you are the CA of a 777, with a perfectly functioning 777, on a crystal clear calm day, with "this airplane, that runway" and they couldn't land.
 
Show me the accidents caused by lack of envelope protection features on 737s, 757s, 767s, and the entire DC-9 series.

AA 757 at Cali. Theoretically in an Airbus, when they hit max power and yanked back, they would have hit alpha prot and then alpha max and if spoilers were still out (as they were in the 757) they would have automatically retracted down. The AA jet almost missed the top of the mountain - and IIRC had the spoilers been down, they would have cleared the top.
 
Of course there is at least SOME blame on the pilots. The blame goes all around. I would agree the system failed them that night and most airline pilots do not get high altitude realistic stall scenarios in the sim. I get that. There are so many what ifs that could have removed one cheese slice from the cheese model for accidents. What if they had deviated more around the weather. What if when one guy said "looks like we don't have good - indications of speed" the other guy said "ok, unreliable airspeed procedures please."

I do think we should get a lot more unusual attitude and upset recovery training, especially in the higher flight levels. Pilots can probably try and fly a bit more manually and not fall victims to automation reliance. When the Flash Airlines 737 out of Sharm el Sheikh starts to deviate from its flight path, and the CAs command twice to fix that is "Autopilot on!" , we have a problem. When it comes to the autopilot panel, pushing buttons will usually not fix problems that need to be fixed right now.

The AF guys did initially what they were taught. Run the ECAM. And that screen was full of stuff that initially started to go off. AP off, that has to be cleared. Autothrust locked, clear. Altn law/flgiht control protections lost. Clear. etc. etc. They managed to get through some of that stuff too. But controlling the flight path of the aircraft was something they were not able to handle. I can't imagine any scenario that would require in the Flight Level 330+ to bring the nose up to 10 degrees pitch (or higher) and then keep it there. You'll get a crazy climb rate but it can't sustain it.

While some good points here, the contextual factor for why you are missing the bigger picture is in your line “There are so many what ifs that could have removed one cheese slice from the cheese model for accidents” as it is indicative of believing that accidents are a linear chain. Jim Reason was wrong about how accidents occur, or, more accurately, he didn’t mean it that way. Like a Gladwell simplification it caught on. The reality is that is just not how accidents happen. If it was they would be much easier to prevent.

While what you write is not technically incorrect from a superficial perspective, it completely misses the contextual factors that led them into the situation.
 
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