TEB crash 5/15/17

[obx]

If I was understanding and recalling correctly, the Trans Pacific claimed ARGUS Gold but there was no record of it anywhere

From the interview with the ARGUS Safety Analyst:
“Trans-Pacific was never audited since they had a Gold rating, and ARGUS had never done an onsite audit on Trans-Pacific. ARGUS removed their Gold rating after the accident until they could get more information. ARGUS will review the final report on the accident, and also the public docket information regarding the accident. Trans-Pacific’s Gold rating was pulled about an hour after the crash, and ARGUS was waiting on the full report on the accident before reinstating its rating.”

 

[Inverted]

If NJA participated, you’d never know. It’s not how shares are sold, it’s displayed nowhere on the aircraft, and I never heard it mentioned when I worked there.

 

[Inverted]

From the interview with the ARGUS Safety Analyst:
“Trans-Pacific was never audited since they had a Gold rating, and ARGUS had never done an onsite audit on Trans-Pacific. ARGUS removed their Gold rating after the accident until they could get more information. ARGUS will review the final report on the accident, and also the public docket information regarding the accident. Trans-Pacific’s Gold rating was pulled about an hour after the crash, and ARGUS was waiting on the full report on the accident before reinstating its rating.”

I’m sure Trans Pacific is still selling flights just fine too.

 

[Inverted25]

In my experience very few 135 shops do right seat flying (that is, when the F/O is flying he moves to the left seat). The rationale being, I suppose, that no one is going to be in the right seat for very long.

This is, of course, not always the case...

Our SIC (PIC typed) only fly right seat until they upgrade to captain. They get to fly every other leg but we don’t trade seats.

 

[v1valarob]

I wonder if this crash will lead to some greater regulation/transparency of the “jet card” industry. It seemed that the customer that booked the live leg prior to the crash was wholly unaware of what operator would be conducting the charter. I would be extremely uncomfortable with that.

It was the Challenger 600 that crashed on take off in Teterboro in 2005 that forced 135 crews to advise passengers which certificate was actually in operational control. I'm not sure it ever really matters though. Under Jet Linx we flew many NetJets, FlexJet, etc outsourced flights. We always started our passenger brief with "This flight is under operational control of Jet Linx." Do you think these passengers cared?

 

[CFI A&P]

It was the Challenger 600 that crashed on take off in Teterboro in 2005 that forced 135 crews to advise passengers which certificate was actually in operational control. I'm not sure it ever really matters though. Under Jet Linx we flew many NetJets, FlexJet, etc outsourced flights. We always started our passenger brief with "This flight is under operational control of Jet Linx." Do you think these passengers cared?

The irony of that is the requirement for placarding the operating certificate somewhere on the airplane. Usually it is in one in letters on the MLG door. Even if it was in 12" letters on the door, passengers wouldn't have a clue what JFK876A means.

 

[v1valarob]

The irony of that is the requirement for placarding the operating certificate somewhere on the airplane. Usually it is in one in letters on the MLG door. Even if it was in 12" letters on the door, passengers wouldn't have a clue what JFK876A means.

Especially in the case of the aircraft I flew. Black lettering on blue paint. We could barely tell that the letters and numbers were there!

 

[Deleted member 27505]

I hope this crash, and the Akron crash, leads to stricter and more frequent oversite of 135 operators from the FSDOs and POIs. The behavior, lack of professionalism, lack of standardization, lack of basic airmanship, and overall decorum displayed on this CVR is downright shocking.

Really? I sure don't want them visiting more often or being stricter.
I'll take less frequent but better targeted, more effective, more efficient oversight.
As it stands, the whole system is too often a multi-organizational kabuki dance.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

From the interview with the ARGUS Safety Analyst:
“Trans-Pacific was never audited since they had a Gold rating, and ARGUS had never done an onsite audit on Trans-Pacific. ARGUS removed their Gold rating after the accident until they could get more information. ARGUS will review the final report on the accident, and also the public docket information regarding the accident. Trans-Pacific’s Gold rating was pulled about an hour after the crash, and ARGUS was waiting on the full report on the accident before reinstating its rating.”

If the company's philosophy/culture is any of those akin to "the airplane is airworthy until it's written up", even the best audit is unlikely to find any violations.
Then there's reality; There's the law; And there's the spirit of the law. And the Reflexive, Symmetric, Transitive, and Substitution Properties all apply.

 

[knot4u]

Really? I sure don't want them visiting more often or being stricter.
I'll take less frequent but better targeted, more effective, more efficient oversight.
As it stands, the whole system is too often a multi-organizational kabuki dance.

True, sad that all you have to be is a good dancer and your integrity will never be questioned. Aviation as a barrel stinks because of a few bad apples.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

True, sad that all you have to be is a good dancer and your integrity will never be questioned. Aviation as a barrel stinks because of a few bad apples.

Lots of things stink that way. Unfortunately, too many corporate immune systems sense things that don't carry that smell as infectious invaders.

 

[obx]

Really? I sure don't want them visiting more often or being stricter.
I'll take less frequent but better targeted, more effective, more efficient oversight.
As it stands, the whole system is too often a multi-organizational kabuki dance.

No one WANTS them visiting more often, but I would argue that these accidents are two glaring examples that they certainly NEED to be visiting more often. Or at least increasing targeted survelience and line checks, etc.

Unless an operator can establish and maintain their own internal survelience (FOQA, etc.) and SMS, the onus of keeping these derelicts in line rests on the FAA.

The other thing that stands out when reading the interviews is, how in the world did this FO get through sim training at CAE? Dumb question because I know the answer, but shame on them for sending this guy to the line. He couldn’t even hold altitude or airspeed without near continuous prompting by the CA. A total lack of basic airmanship skills.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

No one WANTS them visiting more often, but I would argue that these accidents are two glaring examples that they certainly NEED to be visiting more often. Or at least increasing targeted survelience and line checks, etc.

Unless an operator can establish and maintain their own internal survelience (FOQA, etc.) and SMS, the onus of keeping these derelicts in line rests on the FAA.

The other thing that stands out when reading the interviews is, how in the world did this FO get through sim training at CAE? Dumb question because I know the answer, but shame on them for sending this guy to the line. He couldn’t even hold altitude or airspeed without near continuous prompting by the CA. A total lack of basic airmanship skills.

Meh, I really don't think all the King's horses and all the King's men doing more spot checks or audits would've made one whit of difference in this accident. If you don't know how to game an audit, you have no business being in the lower percentiles of 135. Paper is not reality.

Just like all the King's 1500 hours would not have made one whit of difference in the Colgan fiasco.

If you're the kind of operation whose management DGAS, cuts corners, and grunts "FIFI" before flights, the only things that will stop you are a one-strike-you're-out enforcement policy; or experienced, "hard ass" pilots who know how to say NO. The latter's numbers are dwindling in the 135 world.

You live as a crew and die as a crew. The Captain at TEB was as culpable as the FO, probably more so.

 

[obx]

Meh, I really don't think all the King's horses and all the King's men doing more spot checks or audits would've made one whit of difference in this accident. If you don't know how to game an audit, you have no business being in the lower percentiles of 135. Paper is not reality.

Just like all the King's 1500 hours would not have made one whit of difference in the Colgan fiasco.

If you're the kind of operation whose management DGAS, cuts corners, and grunts "FIFI" before flights, the only things that will stop you are a one-strike-you're-out enforcement policy; or experienced, "hard ass" pilots who know how to say NO. The latter's numbers are dwindling in the 135 world.

You live as a crew and die as a crew. The Captain at TEB was as culpable as the FO, probably more so.

Definitely agree with you that the CA bears the brunt of the culpability. And the 1500 hour rule wouldn’t have saved the 50 doomed souls in 3407. As for the rest, why even have an FAA? Your argument is that no level of oversite or survelience (and I’m not talking about some charade like ARGUS) will prevent a dirt bag operation from being a dirtbag operation. I disagree. A POI on the jumpseat observing similar behavior or an inspector dropping in to CAE and seeing this guy in the sim would probably have raised some eyebrows.

No, the FAA can’t be there for every leg or every sim event, but the normalization of deviance amongst 135 operators is, frankly, astounding. There’s no panacea that’s going to fix that deviance overnight, but my hope is that these two accidents in particular bear some modicum of advancement.

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

And the 1500 hour rule wouldn’t have saved the 50 doomed souls in 3407.

I've seen this written a lot, and it is a logical fallacy. The fact is that neither of the pilots would have been hired at Colgan when they were since they were both hired below 1500 hours.

 

[obx]

I've seen this written a lot, and it is a logical fallacy. The fact is that neither of the pilots would have been hired at Colgan when they were since they were both hired below 1500 hours.

Fair enough, although the FO was 30 hours shy of the 1500 when hired. I guess the 1500 hour rule would have been a barrier to entry that may have prevented them from having their butts in those seats on that given night, but I don’t think it addressed the training deficiencies of the CA. Having said that, I’m all for 1500 hour rule. I think it’s a good thing and and a positive outcome of the tragedy.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

Definitely agree with you that the CA bears the brunt of the culpability. And the 1500 hour rule wouldn’t have saved the 50 doomed souls in 3407. As for the rest, why even have an FAA? Your argument is that no level of oversite or survelience (and I’m not talking about some charade like ARGUS) will prevent a dirt bag operation from being a dirtbag operation. I disagree. A POI on the jumpseat observing similar behavior or an inspector dropping in to CAE and seeing this guy in the sim would probably have raised some eyebrows.

No, the FAA can’t be there for every leg or every sim event, but the normalization of deviance amongst 135 operators is, frankly, astounding. There’s no panacea that’s going to fix that deviance overnight, but my hope is that these two accidents in particular bear some modicum of advancement.

No, you misunderstand me. I agree with what you are saying. We definitely need enforcement. But it has to be real enforcement - with fast and sharp teeth- laser targeted at the actual tawdry, irresponsible, and often fraudulent actions of some operators. What you are talking about -training checks and line checks- would be very helpful. I've rarely seen training checks and never seen a 135 FAA line observation.
The typical inspection protocol I see is a paperwork check or an audit. Simply looking at a bunch of pieces of paper serving as a proxy for reality is not sufficient; Paperwork is way too easily gamed. And when something is noticed, it's way too easily written off as a "mistake". I've seen 30-45 year old airplanes that have had nothing squawked in the last 18 months. Really? The reality was something was broken almost every flight. But nothing ever happens. POI doesn't see any untoward anomolies in the paperwork and walks away. And there's always someone who will fly the illegal and often truly unsafe aircraft.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

I've seen this written a lot, and it is a logical fallacy. The fact is that neither of the pilots would have been hired at Colgan when they were since they were both hired below 1500 hours.

Who cares when the hours were logged, before or after hire? The point is when the accident occurred both pilots had substantially greater than 1500 hours - many logged in "real" airplanes and "real" operations - and those hours didn't make one iota of difference. A few good hours are worth hundreds of bad ones.
But perhaps you are right. Another 1000+ solo hours bumping around in a 172 getting really good at getting bad might have changed the outcome.

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

Who cares when the hours were logged, before or after hire? The point is when the accident occurred both pilots had substantially greater than 1500 hours - many logged in "real" airplanes and "real" operations - and those hours didn't make one iota of difference. A few good hours are worth hundreds of bad ones.

The idea of the 1500 hour rule is founded upon gathering more experience before you end up in airliners, so yes, I care and clearly the FAA and those who wrote the rule care.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

The idea of the 1500 hour rule is founded upon gathering more experience before you end up in airliners, so yes, I care and clearly the FAA and those who wrote the rule care.

Ever seen Blazing Saddles? Somebody didn't harumph.

The FAA didn't care at all. Their arm was twisted by Congress who were pressured by negative publicity and a need to show they were DOING SOMETHING and HARUMPHING!!! The 1500 hr rule as a cure for Colgan was much like pulling back on the stick was a cure for the Air France stall. But, hey, they were DOING SOMETHING!!

Besides, that's not the question at hand. You're giving your opinion as am I, but the FACT remains both pilots had significantly more than 1500hrs. So WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE???

And now we see one of the ways aviation safety gets confused with job security and associated artificial barriers to entry. BTW- I've got no skin in that game.

I don't know any honest, reasonable, experienced pilot who would disagree that standardized experience obtained under the supervision and training of experienced captains is going to make for a much more robust pilot than is experience obtained bumping around solo solidifying fubar behavior and habits.