TEB crash 5/15/17

It seems strange that while the pilots were on the runway 6 final, they said they're basically on a downwind. Which only makes sense to me if they were thinking about circling to a right downwind to land 19 (especially considering they had no idea about what was going on) instead of landing 1. And then didn't figure it out until tower asked if they were in the circle yet.
 
Stinger said:
It seems strange that while the pilots were on the runway 6 final, they said they're basically on a downwind. Which only makes sense to me if they were thinking about circling to a right downwind to land 19 (especially considering they had no idea about what was going on) instead of landing 1. And then didn't figure it out until tower asked if they were in the circle yet.
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They had started the circle when they said that iirc. They circled very late and were basically past the threshold of 1 already, so as they made the circle they almost had to do a mini downwind for 1.
 
milleR said:
Nobody who is based in Terboro, or “home” as I believe the PIC called it, would have no idea how far away Philadelphia is.

Context matters.
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They were based in SLC but the SIC was from NJ.

Reading the full report, originally the passengers they brought to PHL were supposed to be on board for the flight to TEB, but the landing at PHL shook them so badly they decided to drive.
 
milleR said:
Personally, I hate that this particular CVR is the only insight I have into either of these two individuals personalties or professional comportment.
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Go read the interviews that were posted earlier, and what their sim instructors, coworkers, mothers, wifes etc. said about their personalities and professional development. There is a common trend leading up to this occurrence, it wasn't a one off incident. Loss of situational awareness, being behind the airplane, problems circling, problems with unusual attitudes and stall recovery were all documented problems in their training.
 
kryan11 said:
There is a common trend leading up to this occurrence, it wasn't a one off incident. Loss of situational awareness, being behind the airplane, problems circling, problems with unusual attitudes and stall recovery were all documented problems in their training.
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This approach with this weather in this airspace was a perfect storm for both pilots. The SIC could barely talk to ATC proficiently.
 
NovemberEcho said:
They had started the circle when they said that iirc. They circled very late and were basically past the threshold of 1 already, so as they made the circle they almost had to do a mini downwind for 1.
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At 15:28:58 is when the pilots say they're going to circle for runway 1.
2 seconds later at 15:29:00: "we're kinda on a downwind."
Another 5 seconds at 15:29:05: autopilot disconnected
15:29:07: tower says "you gonna start that turn?"
36 seconds later is the crash.

So they had barely started any kind of turn when tower mentioned anything.

But that's just going off the transcript, and I can barely remember what the radar replay looked like when I saw it last summer. But I didn't think it was an accurate radar return, it seemed like STARS giving an estimate because of how fast the Lear was turning with target jumps.
 
milleR said:
*General statement about CVR's, not specific to this particular accident*

But it doesn't add anything. We've all been in dysfunctional crew situations at some point, we've all put ourselves in a corner, we've all screwed up; when things go south it's relatable enough through an objective analysis from a professional third party.

I would challenge anyone here to simply record a flight and then listen to it afterwards.

Context. Is. Everything.

And when the context is a fatal accident then every single word gets read in that context, regardless of the background.

Again, this is about the privacy of the flight crew. Nothing is gained from reading a CVR transcript IMO when it can get professionally analyzed and the relevant points disseminated through a professional body. Personally, I hate that this particular CVR is the only insight I have into either of these two individuals personalties or professional comportment.
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"Context. Is. Everything."
I'm chuckling, because I actually cut and pasted precisely that line from my post, but then came up with other language with which to replace it.
Yes! It is. But from my perspective, that's precisely why you need all the words, in order and cadence. That provides the context of the flight and the conversation.
Is it unfair? Maybe, but no more than the transcript of a trial is. Is it real? As real as it gets.
It's appropriate to get upset with those who would misuse or misinterpret the information, but the information itself is primary source which is the best information there is.
Information should be free; Facebook and Twitter should be expensive.
 
Richman said:
The Canadian TSB treats all parts of the CVR as privileged, including the transcript.

IMHO, this is nothing more that surfing Youtube for traffic accident dashcam videos.
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I've got to whole heartedly disagree with you here. Reading the back and forth you actually get a feel for how they were working together (or not) that day. It was extremely evident just from the read that the FO was less pilot than the CA could keep up with.
 
I don't think I've ever read an expletive-ridden CVR transcript like this one. The PIC seems to completely lose it at ATC, the vectoring, the spacing, altitude, speed requirements, etc.

# is an expletive:



15:13:10.2 HOT-1
yeah (now) don't # put us at # at four thousand all the # way. what the #? [high pitch, exclaiming].

15:13:16.7 HOT-1
yeah. she's gonna # carry it we-we won't # make it if we got (a) four thousand. she's a # idiot. get us someone else if she can't do it [high pitch, exclaiming].

15:17:38.0 HOT-1
but they got us at # three thousand. really? [high pitch, loudly]. what the # over? [high pitch, loudly] and we're goin’ # south we're not goin’ # north [high pitch, loudly].



The whole flight he's pretty much telling the FO how to fly, like literally how to fly. :eek:
 
Crop Duster said:
"Context. Is. Everything."
I'm chuckling, because I actually cut and pasted precisely that line from my post, but then came up with other language with which to replace it.
Yes! It is. But from my perspective, that's precisely why you need all the words, in order and cadence. That provides the context of the flight and the conversation.
Is it unfair? Maybe, but no more than the transcript of a trial is. Is it real? As real as it gets.
It's appropriate to get upset with those who would misuse or misinterpret the information, but the information itself is primary source which is the best information there is.
Information should be free; Facebook and Twitter should be expensive.
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Crop Duster said:
"Context. Is. Everything."
I'm chuckling, because I actually cut and pasted precisely that line from my post, but then came up with other language with which to replace it.
Yes! It is. But from my perspective, that's precisely why you need all the words, in order and cadence. That provides the context of the flight and the conversation.
Is it unfair? Maybe, but no more than the transcript of a trial is. Is it real? As real as it gets.
It's appropriate to get upset with those who would misuse or misinterpret the information, but the information itself is primary source which is the best information there is.
Information should be free; Facebook and Twitter should be expensive.
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Now THAT I’m on board with.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
I don't think I've ever read an expletive-ridden CVR transcript like this one. The PIC seems to completely lose it at ATC, the vectoring, the spacing, altitude, speed requirements, etc.

# is an expletive:



15:13:10.2 HOT-1
yeah (now) don't # put us at # at four thousand all the # way. what the #? [high pitch, exclaiming].

15:13:16.7 HOT-1
yeah. she's gonna # carry it we-we won't # make it if we got (a) four thousand. she's a # idiot. get us someone else if she can't do it [high pitch, exclaiming].

15:17:38.0 HOT-1
but they got us at # three thousand. really? [high pitch, loudly]. what the # over? [high pitch, loudly] and we're goin’ # south we're not goin’ # north [high pitch, loudly].



The whole flight he's pretty much telling the FO how to fly, like literally how to fly. :eek:
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What's intereting is that it'quite normal to be no higher than 4000ft going from PHL to TEB. Especially when you're doing the approach for 6. There's nothing abnormal about that altitude at all.

That language sets a whole other dynamic in the cockpit. It could be very intimidating to a green FO.
 
KLB said:
What's intereting is that it'quite normal to be no higher than 4000ft going from PHL to TEB. Especially when you're doing the approach for 6. There's nothing abnormal about that altitude at all.

That language sets a whole other dynamic in the cockpit. It could be very intimidating to a green FO.
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And they were complaining about the S turns from Philly when thats because TEB landers are fed over BIGGY/REGAL either at 4000 like them or descending to 7,000 on the JAIKE so if there's faster traffic above you descending to 7,000 they'll have to s turn the 4000 guy to give us a couple miles in trail (or at least they're supposed to, a lot of times PHL just shrugs and lets us figure it out)
 
After reading the CVR i cant help but point out the delicious Irony of a guy who spent the whole flight bitching about ATC ( as if they were the incompetent ones, and in some cases we are) but ends up flying a perfectly good Aircraft into the ground. (please dont hate me )
 
I read through a lot of that. A lot of cringe-worthy stuff in there. Bad CRM, inexperience, and bad technique. I don’t know the experience level of the FO, but there seemed to be a helluva lot of coaching going on.

One of the things that always struck me about 135/91 operations... Not much in the way of standardization (in my experience). It’s one of the things that is literally paramount to safe operations in the 121 world.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Colgan 3407? Got a link? I'm not aware of any actual CVR leak for this particular accident. There are recordings from the ATC tapes, but not from the flight deck CVR.
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There is no public CVR recording from the 3407 Accident.

Folks need to read up on ICAO Annex 13 concerning the use of CVRs as it pertains to an accident investigation. We got the “Fitness for Flight” certification thanks to the Colgan CVR.
 
How does it work at most of these 135 companies? Is the SIC given a PIC type or is he just a gear swinger? A friend of a friend flies for a small 135 operation and the guy flies like 3 different jets. Do they actually get to fly?
 
chrisreedrules said:
I read through a lot of that. A lot of cringe-worthy stuff in there. Bad CRM, inexperience, and bad technique. I don’t know the experience level of the FO, but there seemed to be a helluva lot of coaching going on.

One of the things that always struck me about 135/91 operations... Not much in the way of standardization (in my experience). It’s one of the things that is literally paramount to safe operations in the 121 world.
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One of the things that is paramount? Literally paramount?
Must be very unique! ;)
 
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