System knowledge

PeanuckleCRJ said:
That's exactly what NW did when they had the identical malfunction in the weather in China.

Just held the same pitch and power, and tada... they flew out of it and everything was restored on its own.

Pulling back is rarely the correct answer, but it has been a common theme among the "button pusher" training internationally reacting to events like this.
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Sometimes, you've just gotta go back to basics.
 
Crop Duster said:
I'm just trying to understand this. I fully admit I don't know all the details. So please explain with a bit more detail.

My point A. was lack of basic airmanship... to wit, they did not recognize that their plane's wings were no longer flying. Are you saying they did and screwed up the recovery? Or are you saying they didn't, and held the plane in a stall to the surface? Either way my point A. remains valid... at face value, either of those scenarios represents a lack of basic airmanship.

If it was not a lack of basic airmanship, then what was it that caused them to be unaware that their plane's wings were no longer flying? Is there something about the Airbus that makes it possible not to recognize a stall while the plane is stalling? Were the engine gauges, altimeters, ASIs, and AIs not functioning? Is there zero tactile or aural feedback in an Airbus? What?

As to your point B. OK, fair enough. Maybe they weren't taught this. But they sure as heck were entrusted to know it. As @seagull's blog's latest article states, there's a lot of training that should be done but isn't, so it's incumbent upon us as pilots to close that gap. What are you going to tell the deceased Pax survivors, "Oh, sorry folks, the guys who were entrusted to fly your dead relative's plane didn't really understand how the plane worked?"

Finally, to circle back to the thread title... if THIS Charlie Foxtrot can be the result of a lack of communication/training/insight about AOA info and how the computers work in the Airbus, that info sure as chit should be communicated/trained/learned!
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I think that at some point, they recognized a stall situation and at least attempted to begin proper recovery. However, because of the extreme set of circumstances outlined above, they perhaps deviated from that plan. They were being presented with all kinds of conflicting data and information in that event with a relatively short amount of time to sort through it all. There were all kinds of messages and sounds going off, I'm sure. On top of that, SOMEONE attempted to do the very thing that we are training to do in a low speed/stall situation and reduce the angle of attack, and the plane kept giving them NEGATIVE feedback to that action in the form of a stall warning horn that only went away when they pulled back on the stick. I have to imagine that even if they had held the nose down, it would have taken quite a few seconds for them to get far enough through the other side of the AOA envelope for that horn to stop blaring at them. I'm not convinced that a majority of pilots placed into that crazy situation where you're just trying to get the plane to stop yelling at you, would continue to hold that stick down while the plane is basically yelling at you to stop.

Yes...NOW we know the circumstances on why that stall warning horn turned off and on...and again, it's so easy to sit here in a calm environment with time to think through these things and just dole out absolutes about how they were just inferior pilots, but I really don't think that's the case.

And we can grandstand and say "well they should have known that" but in reality, how would they? Do you know the conditions for your stall warning horn to sound and if there's a cutoff point where it stops believing the data? Probably not. And I'd be willing to bet that it's not in any manual that you have access to either.

My point is that there was a LOT more going on there for you to just write it off as bad airmanship, and that this industry failed those pilots just as much as they may have "failed us."
 
MikeD said:
Sometimes, you've just gotta go back to basics.
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I guess I'm old fashioned, but me? I think you need to start with the basics and work outward from there. Always. That's why they're called basics.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
seagull, you have a book to sell, but please stop with the AF447 stuff could have happened to anybody and that they knew how to fly and didn't realize they were in a stall. As mentioned above, NW had a similar situation losing airspeed indications and they basically just flew straight through it. The PF of AF447 had ~2,900 hrs as a ab-initio pilot which meant most of his flight time was spent baby sitting the AP on the Airbus in the cruise levels. The PM FO was a management role and doing his one trip in 90 days just for currency. Their overall flight experience for flying a widebody was very low in comparison to US widebody standards. I don't think you would have seen an AF447 loss of control with an American crew, and NWA is just one example. The Air Asia A320 is yet another example of a clueless low time FO yanking the sidestick left/right and then full back.
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Pretty much wrong on every point, is your source Vanity Fair by any chance? By the way, I don't "have a book to sell". I wrote it after several years of research as an experienced accident investigator, and the reason was because so many people have this accident completely wrong, and so wrong in fact, that they are at real risk of falling victim to an event that is just enough different that they don't recognize it. As someone that distinctly does not enjoy working accidents, it did it out of a sense of duty to an industry I care about. That is why I happily also share my knowledge here and on my blog.
 
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Crop Duster said:
I'm just trying to understand this. I fully admit I don't know all the details. So please explain with a bit more detail.

My point A. was lack of basic airmanship... to wit, they did not recognize that their plane's wings were no longer flying. Are you saying they did and screwed up the recovery? Or are you saying they didn't, and held the plane in a stall to the surface? Either way my point A. remains valid... at face value, either of those scenarios represents a lack of basic airmanship.

If it was not a lack of basic airmanship, then what was it that caused them to be unaware that their plane's wings were no longer flying? Is there something about the Airbus that makes it possible not to recognize a stall while the plane is stalling? Were the engine gauges, altimeters, ASIs, and AIs not functioning? Is there zero tactile or aural feedback in an Airbus? What?

As to your point B. OK, fair enough. Maybe they weren't taught this. But they sure as heck were entrusted to know it. As @seagull's blog's latest article states, there's a lot of training that should be done but isn't, so it's incumbent upon us as pilots to close that gap. What are you going to tell the deceased Pax survivors, "Oh, sorry folks, the guys who were entrusted to fly your dead relative's plane didn't really understand how the plane worked?"

Finally, to circle back to the thread title... if THIS Charlie Foxtrot can be the result of a lack of communication/training/insight about AOA info and how the computers work in the Airbus, that info sure as chit should be communicated/trained/learned!
Click to expand...

No, I'm saying that virtually no current flying airline pilot in the U.S. would recognize what a stall looks like at altitude, or, more specifically, as we have now finally started EE training, virtually none would have at that time. Most still would not. That is because the real deal is completely outside of what you'd expect. Interestingly, the Boeing and Airbus engineering test pilots I work with are not at all surprised the pilots did not recognize it.
 
tizzizzailslf04 said:
I think that at some point, they recognized a stall situation and at least attempted to begin proper recovery. However, because of the extreme set of circumstances outlined above, they perhaps deviated from that plan. They were being presented with all kinds of conflicting data and information in that event with a relatively short amount of time to sort through it all. There were all kinds of messages and sounds going off, I'm sure. On top of that, SOMEONE attempted to do the very thing that we are training to do in a low speed/stall situation and reduce the angle of attack, and the plane kept giving them NEGATIVE feedback to that action in the form of a stall warning horn that only went away when they pulled back on the stick. I have to imagine that even if they had held the nose down, it would have taken quite a few seconds for them to get far enough through the other side of the AOA envelope for that horn to stop blaring at them. I'm not convinced that a majority of pilots placed into that crazy situation where you're just trying to get the plane to stop yelling at you, would continue to hold that stick down while the plane is basically yelling at you to stop.

Yes...NOW we know the circumstances on why that stall warning horn turned off and on...and again, it's so easy to sit here in a calm environment with time to think through these things and just dole out absolutes about how they were just inferior pilots, but I really don't think that's the case.

And we can grandstand and say "well they should have known that" but in reality, how would they? Do you know the conditions for your stall warning horn to sound and if there's a cutoff point where it stops believing the data? Probably not. And I'd be willing to bet that it's not in any manual that you have access to either.

My point is that there was a LOT more going on there for you to just write it off as bad airmanship, and that this industry failed those pilots just as much as they may have "failed us."
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Good post, my only change would be that there is no evidence that they ever recognized that they were in stall, and when you consider what a stall actually feels like in a big airplane and how the simulations of it (in those sims that are not new part 60 compliant) are not even close, that is not surprising.
 
Crop Duster said:
I haven't yet read the book. But, in fairness, I'm not sure that's ALL Shem is saying. That's why I asked above. That the crew flying didn't recognize the stall speaks for itself. I want to know what it is about the Airbus that caused this lack of recognition. I've never flown a plane in which stall recognition was not possible without instruments. In most airplanes, stalls -even high altitude stalls- have been quite obvious. But if someone with Shem's background says it's possible for a good pilot not to recognize a stall, I'm certainly willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and listen attentively. I really want to know why not. Frankly, it's pretty damned disconcerting that it could be the case.
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Have you read my article I posted a few years ago (and shared here previously)? It might help: https://airlinesafety.blog/2015/04/07/high-altitude-stalls-how-well-do-you-understand-them/
 
learhawkerbe400 said:
What opspecs do you need to know in day to day 121 ops? If we follow SOP then anything weird that comes up we will have covered.

If i ever have a question i just call the dispatcher. Let’s not make things harder than they should be.
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You’re talking to pilots, the Kings of making things harder than they need to be. I’ve never seen any other group of people so good at creating unnecessary work.

99 out of 100 part 121 flights are so standard that’s it’s almost impossible to be violating anything. It’s only when multiple issues start stacking up that it can even get strange and you always have your books and dispatch at your disposal.
 
TWP said:
You’re talking to pilots, the Kings of making things harder than they need to be. I’ve never seen any other group of people so good at creating unnecessary work.

99 out of 100 part 121 flights are so standard that’s it’s almost impossible to be violating anything. It’s only when multiple issues start stacking up that it can even get strange and you always have your books and dispatch at your disposal.
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So much for trying to continuously improve yourself, eh?
 
TWP said:
You’re talking to pilots, the Kings of making things harder than they need to be. I’ve never seen any other group of people so good at creating unnecessary work.

99 out of 100 part 121 flights are so standard that’s it’s almost impossible to be violating anything. It’s only when multiple issues start stacking up that it can even get strange and you always have your books and dispatch at your disposal.
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With integrated modular avionic systems, while extremely reliable, if things start to go south they can cascade into scenarios completely outside of the books very rapidly.
 
seagull said:
With integrated modular avionic systems, while extremely reliable, if things start to go south they can cascade into scenarios completely outside of the books very rapidly.
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Agreed. But it’s rare. Which is why I said 99 times out of 100. I’m not advocating never studying. I’m one of the few people I know who opens the systems book outside of the panic-week prior to recurrent; but we also don’t need to know how many rivets are on panel 9B of the discombobulater.
 
TWP said:
And now you’re personally attacking me because you’re upset about what happened in the lavatory.

Once again, I never said what you are claiming.

Onto the ignore list you go.
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Fine by me. I’m not personally attacking you for the lav, I feel I rebutted you just fine over there - I just think the mindset of “I don’t need to know my opspecs” or whatever to be the mark of someone who doesn’t care enough to try to get better at their job.

I don’t need to know a lot of things, but I try to learn them anyway because I desire to be good at what I do. Whenever someone talks about how little hey need to know to do their job I start to wonder what things that are important they they are intentionally skipping because they can get away with it.

As MikeC implied above I can lead a horse to water but I can’t make the horse drink. Two extra days of systems aren’t going to help someone who doesn’t want to learn it.

I’ll get off my soapbox now.
 
TWP said:
Agreed. But it’s rare. Which is why I said 99 times out of 100. I’m not advocating never studying. I’m one of the few people I know who opens the systems book outside of the panic-week prior to recurrent; but we also don’t need to know how many rivets are on panel 9B of the discombobulater.
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The high reliability is what has led to the dumbing down of training. The fact that it is rare is why we DO need to train for this. The current training is mostly limited to well defined scenarios. Those rarely kill you.
 
seagull said:
The high reliability is what has led to the dumbing down of training. The fact that it is rare is why we DO need to train for this. The current training is mostly limited to well defined scenarios. Those rarely kill you.
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Which is why we train v1 cuts and flap/slat jams to death and don't even touch on the random stuff.
 
BobDDuck said:
Which is why we train v1 cuts and flap/slat jams to death and don't even touch on the random stuff.
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Amazing isn't it. We train on the things that have happened (engine failures used to be common, relatively), and then post an accident (which is almost always something unexpected) we train what we think is the scenario (usually wrong, though, as the investigations are very flawed).
 
seagull said:
Amazing isn't it. We train on the things that have happened (engine failures used to be common, relatively), and then post an accident (which is almost always something unexpected) we train what we think is the scenario (usually wrong, though, as the investigations are very flawed).
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The most recent AQP program I went through consisted of 14 days of sim, which was a hell of a lot, but hey, if they are going to give us the time, we might as well use it. During that 14 day period, both my sim partner and I did EIGHT flap/slat jams each plus god knows how many V1 (and V2... on my checkride) cuts. We did one unknown flight computer failure (which ended with the airspeed being unreliable) and one FM computer failure. Seems... practical.
 
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