German Wings A320 crashed

Derg said:
The whole Boeing versus Airbus thing is "Atari versus Commodore".

Pay rates, days off, the seat I'm sitting in. Meh, everything else doesn't matter.
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I agree to a certain extent which is why I'm flying a pos airbus with lots of days off and good health ins instead of my beloved 757 that I was chained too. That being said if my airline ever came to its senses and got boeings you bet I would be first in line.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
You will come back to Fifi and you will apologize to her for leaving her for a Boeing. :)




Quote:
In the Boeing, the computer doesn't normally second guess the pilots control inputs. If the pilot tries to roll a 777 upside down it will roll upside down, the Airbus autopilot would normally stop the bank angle automatically at 30 degrees. Airbus thinks that this is safer; Boeing thinks that their way is safer. (Remember I'm a Boeing fan and a Boeing pilot).

If he admits being clueless about Airbus he probably shouldn't make false statements about it...
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You must not have kept up. Boeing instituted full envelope protection on their FBW aircraft, quietly, several years ago. This followed the CAST LOC recommendation on the topic. In both the Airbus and Boeing it can be overridden using different methods, but the hard protection is there.
 
seagull said:
You must not have kept up. Boeing instituted full envelope protection on their FBW aircraft, quietly, several years ago. This followed the CAST LOC recommendation on the topic. In both the Airbus and Boeing it can be overridden using different methods, but the hard protection is there.
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Out of curiosity, when does that sort of thing kick in?
 
dustoff17 said:
And like the CA in the crash you've cited, the AF447 crew didn't know they were stalling either......because of the programming put in place by Airbus engineers and a lack of understanding of "law" programing.
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You are correct that they did not know they were stalling, but that is not really a consequence of the programming. The programming maintained a constant pitch through the stall, but at high altitude you would actually get a mild pitch up due to mach effects as it stalled. Stall buffet is generally absent in either case. Pilots think that because they can recognize a stall as low altitude that it would also apply at high altitude, but the aircraft does not behave the same way.
 
ppragman said:
Out of curiosity, when does that sort of thing kick in?
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The values are about the same, but it is incorporated by increasing control forces to the point that it would take a significant amount of force to override. At that point the Airbus is actually easier as the switches can be rapidly just turned off!
 
Baronman said:
Even the Captain of the "Hope And Change Express" isn't a fan!

Of course it's important to disregard the Asiana 777, the missing Malaysian 777, the Turkish 737 at AMS that wrecked because the RA was malfunctioning.....
Danziger, who flew 737s, 757s and 767s, says he's not a fan of Airbus planes. An Airbus A320 plane is seen under construction in Hamburg, northern Germany.
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Why do the loudest Anti-Airbus rhetoric almost always come from pilots that have ZERO time in the plane? It's like the Tea Party movement just the pilot version.
 
seagull said:
The values are about the same, but it is incorporated by increasing control forces to the point that it would take a significant amount of force to override. At that point the Airbus is actually easier as the switches can be rapidly just turned off!
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I kind of like that interface, the logic of increasing control pressures kind of logically makes sense - at least, intuitively to me anyway, there's no switch, or whatever, you just make the airplane do what it needs to do conventionally. Either way, I suspect that if you're sharp on the systems, and understand what the airplane is telling you, Boeing or Airbus probably doesn't matter either way you'll be alright. I suspect some of the hate for Bus products is because guys grew up Boeing then had to learn a different way...
 
Trip7 said:
Why do the loudest Anti-Airbus rhetoric almost always come from pilots that have ZERO time in the plane? It's like the Tea Party movement just the pilot version.
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I noticed that too. When I read this dude's article, I was looking for a mention of his experience on the A320 but nothing. Considering the significant differences between the 320 and 737 or any Boeing product, unless you have time in the 320, its probably best to not spray an opinion to the national media. Even if he had time in the airplane, bashing it only feeds into the BS hysteria that the A320 is doomed. Its unprofessional IMO and believe a public flogging is in order.
 
Considering that according to Boeing's own data the A-320 has a better record than the 737, one should be careful ;)
 
PeanuckleCRJ said:
Wrong... wrong wrong wrong. The fact is that the pilots were trained to be button pushers instead of actual pilots.

They proceeded to pitch to 17 degrees nose up at FL350. You had a cruise pilot that was trained to be a button pusher. DL(or NW) had the exact same malfunction in China, but they went "huh... this isn't right" and held 2.5 nose up and around 88% power and they were fine. We teach the same to every pilot that comes through the program.

That Asiana 777 had the same issues- the CA was a button pusher. No one spoke up and let him drag the thing in when he had no clue what the plane was doing.
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You apparently missed the post(s) that preceded mine. You have stated pretty much the point I (and others) was trying to make as well. You might want to go back and put mine in context with the conversation.

dustoff17 said:
And like the CA in the crash you've cited, the AF447 crew didn't know they were stalling either......because of the programming put in place by Airbus engineers and a lack of understanding of "law" programing.
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PeanuckleCRJ said:
How much wrong can you post in one thread?
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So you disagree with my statement; fair enough. However, care to clarify your position?
The pilots exceeded a combination of pitch and airspeed that the engineers never dreamed would happen, therefore they programmed into system a condition that resulted in the pilots maintaining the stall all the way to the ocean. Seems like my comment was pretty accurate.
 
The only issue is that with the Boeing method the forces to exceed those limits may well be beyond some pilots strength, if I recall the numbers right. Still, the main issue is that the protections are there because there has never been once instance where it was shown that exceeding those values would prevent an accident, but plenty of evidence the other direction!
 
dustoff17 said:
You apparently missed the post(s) that preceded mine. You have stated pretty much the point I (and others) was trying to make as well. You might want to go back and put mine in context with the conversation.



So you disagree with my statement; fair enough. However, care to clarify your position?
The pilots exceeded a combination of pitch and airspeed that the engineers never dreamed would happen, therefore they programmed into system a condition that resulted in the pilots maintaining the stall all the way to the ocean. Seems like my comment was pretty accurate.
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How do you think the system programming did that? I agree that they never knew they stalled, but I am having trouble with logic on the programming issue.
 
Cptnchia said:
If you're talking about the Brunswick crash, the prop control part that failed was not the one the FAA certified. Hamilton Standard changed the manufacturing process of the torque tube and failed to notify the FAA. If they had done so, additional testing would have determined the new harder metal would eventually wear down the splines on the tube which led to the failure.

A decision made by a bean counter to save money, which cost people their lives. Same with the Carrolton crash. Hamilton Standard changed the process to refurbish the blade spines without notifying the FAA, to save money, and killed people.

Yes, I was a CASC volunteer and ALPA accident investigator for ASA when I worked there.
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With respect to the overall system, the transfer tube is a single point of failure; the 'extremely remote' probability of failure required of such things is still not zero, which means that one will eventually fail.

Indeed, though. The amount of crap that Ham-Standard got away with regarding how they did things with those props is sort of staggering, and they (in my no way humble or respectful opinion when it comes to this topic) are pretty much fully responsible for both accidents.
 
seagull said:
You are correct that they did not know they were stalling, but that is not really a consequence of the programming. The programming maintained a constant pitch through the stall, but at high altitude you would actually get a mild pitch up due to mach effects as it stalled. Stall buffet is generally absent in either case. Pilots think that because they can recognize a stall as low altitude that it would also apply at high altitude, but the aircraft does not behave the same way.
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seagull said:
How do you think the system programming did that? I agree that they never knew they stalled, but I am having trouble with logic on the programming issue.
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This is my OPINION based on the crash investigation report:
They were in a deep stall, no question there; the audible "STALL" warning was heard more than 70 times from onset to crash. The aircraft was in such a high AOA and the airspeed was so low, the audible warning and shaker shut off. The engineers determined that this condition would never happen in flight so it was thought that any pitch and airspeed combination beyond "X" parameter would be an error. Therefore, they did not program the aircraft to respond to this condition. [AF447 was well below this "X" point]
When the senior CA got to the cockpit all hell was breaking loose. He assessed the situation and told the pilots to drop the nose. When the they did, the aircraft increased airspeed and exceed the "X" parameter. As soon as it did, the STALL warning system kicked back in....shaker started, audible could be heard. The crew thought they were entering a stall from the top side of the stall "window". What they didn't know is that they were entering at the BOTTOM of the stall "window".

At this point they already knew that the airspeed indications were messed up. Since they nosed down and got a stall warning, they trusted the stall warning system more than the displayed airspeed, therefore they pitched back up. Every time they pitched down they got a stall warning....when they pitched up it went away.

Knowing this programming error (my word) now, it makes sense to me why they held the airspeed just BELOW the stall "window" all the way down.
 
PeanuckleCRJ said:
Wrong... wrong wrong wrong. The fact is that the pilots were trained to be button pushers instead of actual pilots.

They proceeded to pitch to 17 degrees nose up at FL350. You had a cruise pilot that was trained to be a button pusher. DL(or NW) had the exact same malfunction in China, but they went "huh... this isn't right" and held 2.5 nose up and around 88% power and they were fine. We teach the same to every pilot that comes through the program.

That Asiana 777 had the same issues- the CA was a button pusher. No one spoke up and let him drag the thing in when he had no clue what the plane was doing.
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This. We require pilots to have 1500 hours and then allow their skills to degrade in the cockpit button pushing.
 
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