United Pilots "Warning"

surreal1221 said:
I'll like this only because I feel it will bring a negative impression upon United due to the highlighting of deviations from policy.

Otherwise, the memo itself, while strongly worded I think will resonate with a lot of us who are focused on risk management. Numerous hazards exist in our industry with even more countless consequences evolving from those hazards. It is the safety structure, culture, and policy that helps keep the risks at a manageable level. The idea of even an undesired aircraft state, critical fuel situation, or a GPWS recovery procedure (granted, not sure how intense that really was...), must be respected.

The release of the memo, since we don't know the source, isn't necessarily a concern in my mind - at least not a negative one. To me it shows a management (dare I even call them leaders since they pretty clearly laid out a vision...) team that is taking the matters and incidents that they have seen as very serious. I commend them for doing such.

Pretty sure those of us working to improve overall flight safety wouldn't challenge their communication of said concerns. We pilots tend to do some boneheaded things from time to time. Occasionally we need to be called out, even sternly, for doing those stupid things. Flight safety tends to be a secret realm where public disclosure is not welcomed...especially in the military, so I can understand any harsh feedback United flight ops management receives, but nevertheless these issues do need to be communicated internally.

I am sure our resident United guru will chime in in a matter of minutes and tell me how horribly wrong I am for agreeing with United management, but it is their responsible to maintain the integrity of its operation and the wellbeing of crew and passengers - including company resources.
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I, personally, want to print it out, scratch out the United, pencil in "SkyWest," and post it in our crew rooms. Crashing airplanes is bad, mkay?

Because...

Blackhawk said:
It is a concern of mine as we enter an era of pilot shortages and fast upgrades and the "blind leading the blind", especially at airlines with poor training programs and no ASAP. It is easy in the 121 world to get complacent, to think you've got it nailed and it will never happen to you. I see the attitude quite often, but usually it is balanced by at least one person in the cockpit with a good deal of skepticism and humbleness to counteract it. Hopefully not my airline, hopefully not me, hopefully not my family if/when it happens.
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...while we do not have a poor training program) by any stretch of the imagination (and we also have ASAP, which generates interesting "HEY GUISE! DON'T DO THIS" memos) where I work, you cannot afford to phone this job in.
 
I dunno. That memo seems appropriate and not out of line with a lot company memos in the business. Keep your head up, eyes out, and don't be complacent. Not too different than many other memos I have received.
 
///AMG said:
Cool, so it is a really unnecessarily complicated way of saying "not flying the jet"?
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Not necessarily. We often think of it that way, such as letting an airplane stall. It could, however, be a more subtle undesired aircraft state, such as landing outside the touchdown zone, letting the airplane descend below MDA, or maybe even something caused by an emergency. In almost every case, however, it has moved up to the number one task for a pilot- fix the undesired aircraft state.
 
I just want to point out how nice of a forum jetcareers is and how nice it is to be around educated people. Over on one of the Envoy forums this topic came up and here was THE VERY FIRST RESPONSE:

So much for the low time unqualified affirmative action hires.

I am embarrassed by some of the people I have to work with. I know it's not just an Envoy thing as I have heard similar garbage from pilots at other airlines. But it still sickens me. And worse: our society in this country has gotten to the point where people think it is OK to spew that crap out loud instead of keeping it to themselves.

Say what you will about jetcareers. In 2 pages nobody has even hinted at United being an "affirmative action" airline and thus the reason for these problems. Thank you.
 
Skyvector said:
I just want to point out how nice of a forum jetcareers is and how nice it is to be around educated people. Over on one of the Envoy forums this topic came up and here was THE VERY FIRST RESPONSE:

So much for the low time unqualified affirmative action hires.

I am embarrassed by some of the people I have to work with. I know it's not just an Envoy thing as I have heard similar garbage from pilots at other airlines. But it still sickens me. And worse: our society in this country has gotten to the point where people think it is OK to spew that crap out loud instead of keeping it to themselves.

Say what you will about jetcareers. In 2 pages nobody has even hinted at United being an "affirmative action" airline and thus the reason for these problems. Thank you.
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JC is an oasis in the harsh landscape that is online aviation boards. I don't know why but online aviation communities are the most toxic.

Hell we are even worse than gaming boards and all the PS4/Xbox One/PC master race crap.
 
///AMG said:
Cool, so it is a really unnecessarily complicated way of saying "not flying the jet"?
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Well, sure...but - and I am sure you are well aware, but specific terms are used to help improve the understanding and awareness of what everyone involved is really discussing/talking about.

However, dare I say it, but an UAS can certainly occur even if you perceive you are really flying the jet. Just afraid that your statement is overly simplistic due to the reality that does exist in a very complex system.

Autothrust Blue said:
I, personally, want to print it out, scratch out the United, pencil in "SkyWest," and post it in our crew rooms. Crashing airplanes is bad, mkay?
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I think you should. Reducing risk is everyone's job...not just that of an organization's safety department.
 
A wise CW4 once told me, "Whoever thinks they will never have an accident will probably have the next accident." He was not saying it as a form of resignation such as the statement about gear up landings, but as a word of caution to not get complacent.
 
Blackhawk said:
Not necessarily. We often think of it that way, such as letting an airplane stall. It could, however, be a more subtle undesired aircraft state, such as landing outside the touchdown zone, letting the airplane descend below MDA, or maybe even something caused by an emergency. In almost every case, however, it has moved up to the number one task for a pilot- fix the undesired aircraft state.
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All those things would fit in the category of "not flying the jet" in my book, just so we are all talking about the same thing. But I get it, we need to formalize the definition of the problem and apply some sort of standardized approach to mitigating the problem. I just wish we could not overcomplicate it with cool buzz terms, and realize that the same problems that caused mishaps 60 years ago continue to plague us today.....ie wrong priorities (aviate navigate communicate), and forgetting to fly the aircraft first and foremost.....whether that is something blatant like departing controlled flight, or just running yourself out of gas through poor planning or inattention, in *my mind* it is all the same root problem.
 
surreal1221 said:
However, dare I say it, but an UAS can certainly occur even if you perceive you are really flying the jet. Just afraid that your statement is overly simplistic due to the reality that does exist in a very complex system.
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I'd argue that in spite of complex technical systems in aircraft today, the same responsibilities and truisms still apply that did 50 years ago. But I am not saying you are wrong, and I'd be interested to hear what you mean by this specifically?
 
///AMG said:
I'd argue that in spite of complex technical systems in aircraft today, the same responsibilities and truisms still apply that did 50 years ago. But I am not saying you are wrong, and I'd be interested to hear what you mean by this specifically?
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Yes. They do.

But my mention of systems is in the greater context...not just aircraft of aircraft systems. I was speaking in the greater context of the overall system of aviation that we operate in.
 
Blackhawk said:
A wise CW4 once told me, "Whoever thinks they will never have an accident will probably have the next accident." He was not saying it as a form of resignation such as the statement about gear up landings, but as a word of caution to not get complacent.
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I take great pains to ensure I'm not the guy they're reading about in the ASAP. And I don't want to be a CQ poster child.

BUT

I know I could be.

"Hey yeah, that was me...sorry kids..."
 
///AMG said:
All those things would fit in the category of "not flying the jet" in my book, just so we are all talking about the same thing. But I get it, we need to formalize the definition of the problem and apply some sort of standardized approach to mitigating the problem. I just wish we could not overcomplicate it with cool buzz terms, and realize that the same problems that caused mishaps 60 years ago continue to plague us today.....ie wrong priorities (aviate navigate communicate), and forgetting to fly the aircraft first and foremost.....whether that is something blatant like departing controlled flight, or just running yourself out of gas through poor planning or inattention, in *my mind* it is all the same root problem.
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The problem with calling it "not flying the airplane" is that most pilots feel they still ARE flying the airplane even though it is in an undesirable state. I'm sure you've seen it, probably even done it if you are honest. You're unstabilized on an approach and you salvage it, maybe not for the best landing in the touchdown zone, but you "salvage it". Of anyone asked you if you were still flying you would respond "of course I was".
Airlines are trying to get away from the "salvage" it mentality to the point at some airlines at 1000' the PF must state "stabilized" or, if IMC go missed. At 500' the NFP must state "stabilized" or, in VMC and IMC it is a go around.
 
Blackhawk said:
The problem with calling it "not flying the airplane" is that most pilots feel they still ARE flying the airplane even though it is in an undesirable state. I'm sure you've seen it, probably even done it if you are honest. You're unstabilized on an approach and you salvage it, maybe not for the best landing in the touchdown zone, but you "salvage it". Of anyone asked you if you were still flying you would respond "of course I was".
Airlines are trying to get away from the "salvage" it mentality to the point at some airlines at 1000' the PF must state "stabilized" or, if IMC go missed. At 500' the NFP must state "stabilized" or, in VMC and IMC it is a go around.
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nope, sorry, never done that. Funny fact, I've never made an error in basic air work :)

/sarcasm

seriously, I have done some stupid stuff in airplanes. Like pretty glad I lived stupid stuff. And when I think back, every one of those instances, or maybe to a lesser extreme, every time I have had a less than satisfactory flight, there is one common theme. Thinking about something, maybe getting the soda straw of focus on something else, maybe something that was entirely less important, and gooning away something very basic in the process. Maybe this act occurs in the swiss cheese model with a more complicated overall system (ATC, mx, etc etc), but at the end of the day, it is the pilot at the controls who decides whether there is a mishap.
 
Yes, but sometimes it is difficult to overcome ego and stop that chain. Through ASAP airlines are realizing how often this actually occurs and are trying to find methods to to prevent these UAS's now, prior to an accident.
Just as an example, a major airline realized from ASAP they were experiencing unstabilized approaches at a rate of 36/10,000 approaches to landings. After instituting the procedure I mentioned in my previous post it went down to 1/10,000 approaches (and stayed down). Their rate of go arounds from unstable approaches (a good thing as a go around is not a UAS), increased to where it is significantly higher than the industry average. Put another way, the procedures force pilots to not just recognize the UAS but vocalize it (on the CVR I might add). Yes, they were suppose to vocalize it before, but often what happened is that pilots would just say nothing and hope for the best- I can salvage this, or the other pilot can make it.
I had something like this happen once. An ADC failed on a night approach, a failure that is suppressed on the alert system below a certain altitude. At the flair, just prior to touch down, the shaker kicked in- something that should not have happened based upon my indicated speed. Then on rollout the cautions came on. When I commented on my surprise at the shaker and how something did not feel right the last 100', the FO responded that his airspeed indicator showed me 10 knots below Vref- but he never said a thing. Mine indicated Vref. The ADC failure was causing a problem with the IAS tapes. Now, however, he would actually be forced to say either "stable" or "unstable" at 500' instead of keeping quiet.
This is just meant as an example of a UAS and how airlines are trying to get pilots to avoid them, but once in them make it a priority to undo them. Will it make everything better? We shall see.
 
///AMG said:
All those things would fit in the category of "not flying the jet" in my book, just so we are all talking about the same thing. But I get it, we need to formalize the definition of the problem and apply some sort of standardized approach to mitigating the problem. I just wish we could not overcomplicate it with cool buzz terms, and realize that the same problems that caused mishaps 60 years ago continue to plague us today.....ie wrong priorities (aviate navigate communicate), and forgetting to fly the aircraft first and foremost.....whether that is something blatant like departing controlled flight, or just running yourself out of gas through poor planning or inattention, in *my mind* it is all the same root problem.
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Hey, some PhD got a lot of grant money to come up with that overly complex nonsense! ;)
 
My airline uses 1000 AGL for stable. Used to be 500 but changed a few years back. I thought the industry had gone to 1000.
 
DE727UPS said:
My airline uses 1000 AGL for stable. Used to be 500 but changed a few years back. I thought the industry had gone to 1000.
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We are fully configured at 1000 and must be stable at that point if on an instrument approach. For a visual we are still to be configured at 1000ft above threshold height, but we must be stable at 500ft. We also recently went to a "stable" or "unstable" call-out as well at 1000 and 500. A lot more to it, but basically if a crew is unstable they are to execute the go-around. Which is how it's always been, but adding the verbal peer pressure element is suppose to encourage the crew to make the right decision rather than continue an unstable approach.

For the FSF members out there, FSF put together a lot of very good information on GA decision making and matters of stabilized approach concept, highly recommend it.
 
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