United Pilots "Warning"

wheelsup said:
Pretty messed up that someone released that to the media.

I'll like this only because I feel it will bring a negative impression upon United due to the highlighting of deviations from policy.

Otherwise, the memo itself, while strongly worded I think will resonate with a lot of us who are focused on risk management. Numerous hazards exist in our industry with even more countless consequences evolving from those hazards. It is the safety structure, culture, and policy that helps keep the risks at a manageable level. The idea of even an undesired aircraft state, critical fuel situation, or a GPWS recovery procedure (granted, not sure how intense that really was...), must be respected.

The release of the memo, since we don't know the source, isn't necessarily a concern in my mind - at least not a negative one. To me it shows a management (dare I even call them leaders since they pretty clearly laid out a vision...) team that is taking the matters and incidents that they have seen as very serious. I commend them for doing such.

Pretty sure those of us working to improve overall flight safety wouldn't challenge their communication of said concerns. We pilots tend to do some boneheaded things from time to time. Occasionally we need to be called out, even sternly, for doing those stupid things. Flight safety tends to be a secret realm where public disclosure is not welcomed...especially in the military, so I can understand any harsh feedback United flight ops management receives, but nevertheless these issues do need to be communicated internally.

I am sure our resident United guru will chime in in a matter of minutes and tell me how horribly wrong I am for agreeing with United management, but it is their responsible to maintain the integrity of its operation and the wellbeing of crew and passengers - including company resources.
 
SpiceWeasel said:
Depends on what it says @surreal1221 ... if it says "this is your last warning you will be fired for x" then it's not a good letter.

If you google, you can find the full memo. I'll wait for you to read it before I comment further :)

Put simply, it wasn't addressed to a single pilot, rather it was addressed to the whole flight ops group and took a fairly straight to the point tone.

No mention of "firing" anyone was expressed. Oops, I broke my rule from sentence number two.

And heck, here - I'll help a #bro out:

http://www.newsnet5.com/news/united-airlines-sends-warning-memo-to-pilots-about-safety
 
If you google, you can find the full memo. I'll wait for you to read it before I comment further :)

Put simply, it wasn't addressed to a single pilot, rather it was addressed to the whole flight ops group and took a fairly straight to the point tone.

No mention of "firing" anyone was expressed. Oops, I broke my rule from sentence number two.

And heck, here - I'll help a #bro out:

http://www.newsnet5.com/news/united-airlines-sends-warning-memo-to-pilots-about-safety

I knew someone would help me with the memo! :D

And upon reading it, I find that management is fully within their right to distribute a wake-up call of this nature.
 
SpiceWeasel said:
I knew someone would help me with the memo! :D And upon reading it, I find that management is fully within their right to distribute a wake-up call of this nature.

I got choo!
 
It's kind of nice to see a management team who actually believes bad stuff can happen and that they've got a duty to prevent it as best they can.

To many place's safety departments look like this.
Everything-is-Awesome-Lego.jpg
 
It is a concern of mine as we enter an era of pilot shortages and fast upgrades and the "blind leading the blind", especially at airlines with poor training programs and no ASAP. It is easy in the 121 world to get complacent, to think you've got it nailed and it will never happen to you. I see the attitude quite often, but usually it is balanced by at least one person in the cockpit with a good deal of skepticism and humbleness to counteract it. Hopefully not my airline, hopefully not me, hopefully not my family if/when it happens.
 
It is a concern of mine as we enter an era of pilot shortages and fast upgrades and the "blind leading the blind", especially at airlines with poor training programs and no ASAP. It is easy in the 121 world to get complacent, to think you've got it nailed and it will never happen to you. I see the attitude quite often, but usually it is balanced by at least one person in the cockpit with a good deal of skepticism and humbleness to counteract it. Hopefully not my airline, hopefully not me, hopefully not my family if/when it happens.
As we enter, or as we reenter?
 
It is a concern of mine as we enter an era of pilot shortages and fast upgrades and the "blind leading the blind", especially at airlines with poor training programs and no ASAP. It is easy in the 121 world to get complacent, to think you've got it nailed and it will never happen to you. I see the attitude quite often, but usually it is balanced by at least one person in the cockpit with a good deal of skepticism and humbleness to counteract it. Hopefully not my airline, hopefully not me, hopefully not my family if/when it happens.

I was a relatively low time upgrade on the CRJ. I think I had about 2200 hours total time and about 1200 hours on the RJ. I'd been flying it for just over 2 years, although most of that was spent on reserve. The upgrade program was 2 weeks of ground that focused almost exclusively on systems and weather. At no point was leadership or CRM skills even mentioned. I had done a fair amount of reading on my own (most of Tony Kern's stuff as well as some course work from USC) as well as being fortunate enough to fly with a couple of really good mentors during my time as an FO. One of the interesting things I found, after looking back on my first 6 months as a captain (which is ALWAYS when the strange stuff happens) was that where I had thought I was going to be overly conservative, I ended up being less conservative than everybody else. I had assumed, wrongly, that I would constantly be telling myself, "I'm new... I'm not comfortable with that.. a more experienced guy would have no problem flying in that weather or taking that type of MX problem or dealing with that sort of passenger situation, but I'm not confident enough to do it yet". What ended up happening was that every time I had some doubt about a situation, I just told myself that my concern was simply because I was knew to the position and a more experienced captain would have no problem doing whatever it was, so I shouldn't worry about it and just go do it. Of course this was a terrible mindset but it took be almost 6 months to figure it out. Thankfully nothing went terribly wrong during that time period but it certainly could have. The takeaway is that new upgrades, if they have been paying attention in the right seat for the last year or so, will get by. It might not be pretty, but most of the time they will be ok.
 
Personally, sounds like the writing of a good boss/chief/whatever. No finger pointing, no threats. As a sidebar, what is an "undesirable aircraft state" specifically? I can think of many undesirable aircraft states, many of which I have put myself into, but just wondering what that actually refers to.
 
Personally, sounds like the writing of a good boss/chief/whatever. No finger pointing, no threats. As a sidebar, what is an "undesirable aircraft state" specifically? I can think of many undesirable aircraft states, many of which I have put myself into, but just wondering what that actually refers to.

It's a fairly generic term meaning the aircraft is in a position (laterally/vertically) or speed that's not intended. Could also be misconfigurations. Basically our Threat and Error management is supposed to help us avoid Undesired Aircraft States.

Examples =----
- Being high on a charted vertical arrival procedure.
- Being below the floor of a Class B at 250 knots.
- Having the spoilers extended while trying to climb.
 
///AMG said:
Personally, sounds like the writing of a good boss/chief/whatever. No finger pointing, no threats. As a sidebar, what is an "undesirable aircraft state" specifically? I can think of many undesirable aircraft states, many of which I have put myself into, but just wondering what that actually refers to.

It is the very bottom of the inverted Threat and Error Management, TEM, pyramid. TEM is part of the overall philosophical change in regards to safety and risk management that is built into ICAO required Safety Management System programs. An undesired aircraft state occurs when threats are not recognized, errors are not trapped (re: managed) which then can leave to the UAS.

The examples provided appear fairly benign, but also think of a UAS as a condition in which only superior airmanship will lead to a safe recovery of the aircraft.
 
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