ATR down in Taipei

On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51Z, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33Z. At 10:52:38Z at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43Z the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00Z the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06Z the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12Z a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18Z. At 10:53:19Z the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34Z the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34Z a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
 
There have been several accidents where despite there being a third pair of eyes on the jumpseat crew actions lead to an accident. The Turkish stall near Amsterdam was one example.

In this case, suggestions that before the flight the crew were concerned with the left engine led them to automatically take action on the left engine rather than identify and verify the failure. Surely the handling cues to PF as the live thrust lever was retarded should have given them some indications.
 
It is official. According to local news report, black box reported # 2 engine went into feather mode, and # 1 engine throttle slowly retard to 0 thrust. reason unknown :(
 
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You're the third person to suggest this, and I was thinking it was bollucks shortly after I suggested it the first time...
Geez, why am I so sensitive about people trying to sit in my arm chair??
I gotta work on my self confidence..
:(

Perhaps you should try INSTRUCTING...

Oh wait...
 
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51Z, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33Z. At 10:52:38Z at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43Z the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00Z the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06Z the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12Z a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18Z. At 10:53:19Z the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34Z the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34Z a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
tumblr_luu2d94ZYR1qhansmo1_400.gif
 
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51Z, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33Z. At 10:52:38Z at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43Z the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00Z the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06Z the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12Z a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18Z. At 10:53:19Z the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34Z the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34Z a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
Remind me again of why they'd have the right engine pulled back?
$64,000 question has been answered.
 
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51Z, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33Z. At 10:52:38Z at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43Z the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00Z the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06Z the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12Z a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18Z. At 10:53:19Z the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34Z the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34Z a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.

so-much-derp.jpg
 
From a flightglobal twitter account. It looks like the trouble started at 02:52:37 and BOTH engines were shut off at 02:53:23 (+46 sec). The heartbreaker appears to be that they got the engines started and producing power about 15 seconds before the crash. (My armchair quarterbacking is why the NTSB doesn't release stuff like this early on … tho the ATR72-600 does have an impressive amount of instrumentation recorded.)
B9JarHTIAAAgAy3.jpg
 
Don't know much about engine out procedures in ATR's but i wonder if the crew was in too big a hurry to shut things down after the initial master warning of an engine out. Not exactly the same situation but reminds me of the discussion that was on this forum about a different incident where the captain seemed to be in a hurry to shut things down after a fire at takeoff.
http://forums.jetcareers.com/thread...ne-fire-tear-drop-return-with-cvr-fdr.205257/
 
Don't know much about engine out procedures in ATR's but i wonder if the crew was in too big a hurry to shut things down after the initial master warning of an engine out. Not exactly the same situation but reminds me of the discussion that was on this forum about a different incident where the captain seemed to be in a hurry to shut things down after a fire at takeoff.
http://forums.jetcareers.com/thread...ne-fire-tear-drop-return-with-cvr-fdr.205257/

On the transport aircraft I've been trained to fly, we don't touch the thrust levers (except to shove them both forward) on V1 cuts until we get to a safe altitude and reconfigure the airplane before we start securing engines. Seems like there wasn't much in the way of coherent procedures happening in that cockpit.
 
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