NickH
Uber Driver
I'm not really sure where your line is. I think the Human Factors stole it.
Comair 5191: Sole Survivor tonight 1/8 on CNN
- Thread starter mikecweb
- Start date
I'm not really sure where your line is. I think the Human Factors stole it.
3green
Well-Known Member
+1, add the fact that they engaged in non-sterile cockpit conversation to me that's negligent. Not an accident. If you knowingly engage in something that can distract you (texting, talking, eating) from your task (driving or flying a plane) you have now created a situation where you should be conscious enough to know that you have created a hazardous situation...
BobDDuck
Island Bus Driver
How much time have you spent in a 121 cockpit?
surreal1221
Well-Known Member
3green said:
Thank god we have perfect pilots like you.
Champcar
Well-Known Member
Homicide? I don't think so.
J Cole
Well-Known Member
While it is important to recognize that the responsibility of this accident (and similar accidents) rests largely with the crew, we must be careful not to blindly judge them out of a smug superiority which implies we (other professional pilots) are immune from such a series of mistakes. Remember as well that most accidents (including this one) do not result from a single mistake or a single poor act of judgement, but are the consequence of a chain of events, the reversal of any of which could have prevented the accident. If you get a chance, read through the CVR and parts of the NTSB report. What events led to Comair 5191?
First, the airport layout was confusing. It is worth noting that there were several previous incidents where aircraft had lined up on the wrong runway at KLEX but the mistake had been caught by the controller - averting a possible disaster. Furthermore, on the morning of August 27, 2006, there was construction going on making the taxi route different that it would have normally been. The Jeppesen chart issued to the crew also had the taxiway between the two runways mislabeled. The morning of the accident, due to staffing issues, there was only one controller in the tower working both tower and tracon. Had there been a second controller, he/she probably would have caught Comair's mistake. Another factor pointed out by the NTSB is was the old convention of giving taxi instructions to a runway which "implied" all runways on the route not mentioned could be crossed. Indeed, if you view the transcript, the controller merely says "taxi to runway two two." This may not seem important, but it removed one more possible cue that may have alerted the pilots (i.e. "cross runway 26"). Of course, it was also dark, which removed the pilots ability to see the end of the runway was much too close. Given all these factors, the crew of Comair 5191 was the final link in the chain. This is true with most aviation operations - while there are many safety features built into ATC, technology, and procedures, the crew is normally the final filter that all mistakes must pass through before they become an accident or an incident. Unfortunately, the lack of sterile cockpit combined with a low level of situational awareness made the crew miss those final important cues: the taxi route, the heading on the HSI, and the importance of the runway lights not being on. I point these mistakes out not to lambast the crew, but to point out how easy it was for them to make the mistakes that they did. I believe that we (professional pilots) ride much closer to a razor's edge than most of us believe, and, given the wrong series of circumstances, are vulnerable to the exact same mistakes as the unfortunate crew of Comair 5191.
First, the airport layout was confusing. It is worth noting that there were several previous incidents where aircraft had lined up on the wrong runway at KLEX but the mistake had been caught by the controller - averting a possible disaster. Furthermore, on the morning of August 27, 2006, there was construction going on making the taxi route different that it would have normally been. The Jeppesen chart issued to the crew also had the taxiway between the two runways mislabeled. The morning of the accident, due to staffing issues, there was only one controller in the tower working both tower and tracon. Had there been a second controller, he/she probably would have caught Comair's mistake. Another factor pointed out by the NTSB is was the old convention of giving taxi instructions to a runway which "implied" all runways on the route not mentioned could be crossed. Indeed, if you view the transcript, the controller merely says "taxi to runway two two." This may not seem important, but it removed one more possible cue that may have alerted the pilots (i.e. "cross runway 26"). Of course, it was also dark, which removed the pilots ability to see the end of the runway was much too close. Given all these factors, the crew of Comair 5191 was the final link in the chain. This is true with most aviation operations - while there are many safety features built into ATC, technology, and procedures, the crew is normally the final filter that all mistakes must pass through before they become an accident or an incident. Unfortunately, the lack of sterile cockpit combined with a low level of situational awareness made the crew miss those final important cues: the taxi route, the heading on the HSI, and the importance of the runway lights not being on. I point these mistakes out not to lambast the crew, but to point out how easy it was for them to make the mistakes that they did. I believe that we (professional pilots) ride much closer to a razor's edge than most of us believe, and, given the wrong series of circumstances, are vulnerable to the exact same mistakes as the unfortunate crew of Comair 5191.
pilotmg1501
Well-Known Member
Pilot Fighter has already said his objectivity is compromised, I think he also fails to realize that as professional pilots, we are a culture of SAFETY, not a culture of BLAME. In the two airlines I have flown for, I can think of at least 3 SOPs that have come as a direct result of the Comair crash. Things that now seem trivial and mundane, but were written in the blood of those lost in that crash. As a result we are FAR safer as an industry and have probably saved hundreds of lives because of it. I am able to admit my mistakes, without fear of prosecution or reprimand, SO I DO. And NASA, the FAA, and my company learns what is actually happening, what mistakes people are prone to make, what shortcomings there are in training, procedures, and regulations. They are then able to make changes that SAVE PEOPLES LIVES. Yes, some of these changes come from loss of life after a crash, but the whole reason we have the information we have (in the form of FDRs, CVRs, NASA, ASAP, FOQA etc.) is because we are a culture of SAFETY, and we can do our work, mistakes and all, while being recorded, without fear of reprimand or prosecution.
Also, in addition to new procedures and whatnot, this accident has been used EXTENSIVELY as a case study on Threat and Error Management, tens of thousands of pilots around the world have learned from this accident.
All that said, I wish I had cable, because I'm really curious about this documentary. I hope it is posted online soon.
Also, in addition to new procedures and whatnot, this accident has been used EXTENSIVELY as a case study on Threat and Error Management, tens of thousands of pilots around the world have learned from this accident.
All that said, I wish I had cable, because I'm really curious about this documentary. I hope it is posted online soon.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Tower staffing was a labor issue, not a safety issue. Even if there had been a dozen controllers, none would have been compelled to watch taxi and take-off.
The taxiways and runways were properly marked and illuminated.
They not only took off on the wrong runway, they took off on a pitch black closed runway - no lights.
Yes, I have read the CVR transcript and answered the questions of family members regarding its content and take-off procedures.
There is nothing smug about my attitude. Having flown a thousand hours beside some excellent pilots, I recognize that I am probably pretty average - no thoughts of superiority here. Like every other professional pilot, I make mistakes and learn from those mistakes. There is nothing smug about my attitude.
Considering the laws in this commonwealth, I think there was a compelling reckless homicide case to be made against Polehinke. My view is supported by every prosecutor and attorney I have consulted. We are a country of laws. Pilots shouldn't get a pass. If you don't think that pilots can be reckless without intent, you are embracing something other than a legal definition.
The fact that Polehinke has guilt and remorse is understandable. Those aren't legal defenses.
Accidents happen. Most aren't cases of recklessness. A number of people have suggested we can't learn from these tragedies if we label them as reckless. That's a silly notion. We can do both. The idea that we call something reckless doesn't mean that we aren't going to thoroughly investigate the accident and learn from the mistakes. I want the FAA and carriers to look at an accident like this and attempt to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents. I look to other branches of government to establish and determine criminality.
The taxiways and runways were properly marked and illuminated.
They not only took off on the wrong runway, they took off on a pitch black closed runway - no lights.
Yes, I have read the CVR transcript and answered the questions of family members regarding its content and take-off procedures.
There is nothing smug about my attitude. Having flown a thousand hours beside some excellent pilots, I recognize that I am probably pretty average - no thoughts of superiority here. Like every other professional pilot, I make mistakes and learn from those mistakes. There is nothing smug about my attitude.
Considering the laws in this commonwealth, I think there was a compelling reckless homicide case to be made against Polehinke. My view is supported by every prosecutor and attorney I have consulted. We are a country of laws. Pilots shouldn't get a pass. If you don't think that pilots can be reckless without intent, you are embracing something other than a legal definition.
The fact that Polehinke has guilt and remorse is understandable. Those aren't legal defenses.
Accidents happen. Most aren't cases of recklessness. A number of people have suggested we can't learn from these tragedies if we label them as reckless. That's a silly notion. We can do both. The idea that we call something reckless doesn't mean that we aren't going to thoroughly investigate the accident and learn from the mistakes. I want the FAA and carriers to look at an accident like this and attempt to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents. I look to other branches of government to establish and determine criminality.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Yes, I am aware of changes in policies and procedures resulting from thoughtful analysis of the Comair crash.
A criminal prosecution would not have precluded the investigation and subsequent changes in policy and procedure. I think this case is unique because cases of accidents due to reckless piloting are rare in the commercial aviation.
Sol Rosenburg
Well-Known Member
willful negligence? reckless? perhaps both for me
They stated on the cvr the lights were out. They continued...
SOP checking mag heading at line up. Didn't happen
Talking on the taxi, well they did it so yeah a component of recklessness, not following SOP/fars
Any one of these three and they might not have plowed it, towers aside, signs aside
Does anyone feel the same about the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1141 yacking and not setting flaps/slats. If they lived would you want them prosecuted? I'd say so. They obviously didn't intend to take off clean but they willingly distracted themselves.
They stated on the cvr the lights were out. They continued...
SOP checking mag heading at line up. Didn't happen
Talking on the taxi, well they did it so yeah a component of recklessness, not following SOP/fars
Any one of these three and they might not have plowed it, towers aside, signs aside
Does anyone feel the same about the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1141 yacking and not setting flaps/slats. If they lived would you want them prosecuted? I'd say so. They obviously didn't intend to take off clean but they willingly distracted themselves.
bksslc
Well-Known Member
I hope you don't make a mistake one day that is labeled as negligence, and results in a prison term.
But if you do maybe then you will understand mistakes are just that, mistakes. And unfortunately, despite everybody's best efforts, accidents can, and will happen.
Was that SOP for Comair prior to this accident? I know every place I've worked for since, granted all 91/135, changed following this accident.
Isn't the idea of punishment, jail time, to teach teach us all a lesson. If I see a fellow pilot goto jail because of some of the mistakes they made that isn't going to make me any safer. It's not like they willingly did this. There was no malicious intent.
The attitude possessed by some on here is, they made stupid mistakes and they should now pay. Everyone else did with their life so this FO should pay somehow too. I think the last miracle of this tragedy is he hasn't killed himself already, we should be thankful for that not calling lawyers to see if there is a case to be had.
I relish in the fact that I'll have some brothers and sisters out there that'll have my back if I make a mistake that I regret, can't say the same for some you.
The attitude possessed by some on here is, they made stupid mistakes and they should now pay. Everyone else did with their life so this FO should pay somehow too. I think the last miracle of this tragedy is he hasn't killed himself already, we should be thankful for that not calling lawyers to see if there is a case to be had.
I relish in the fact that I'll have some brothers and sisters out there that'll have my back if I make a mistake that I regret, can't say the same for some you.
Interesting indeed. I was fortunate enough to attend NJC when Al Haynes spoke and I will never forget his speach. For those that were not there he spoke very eloquently and gave a great presentation. Then towards the very end he stopped on one particular slide of someone carrying an infant child away from the crash site to mdeical care. He paused briefly and then spoke about the slide and introduced that very child who was now an adult. He had been sitting in the front row during the entire speach. It brings chills just thinking back to that even as I type this post out. You could have heard a pin drop in the room at that time. It was truly a moment i wont forget. I would think anyone there would agree... @Derg would you agree?
Indeed it did !!!
Btw, enjoy youre preflight in our lovely wx today.... IT's quite balmy isnt it?
J Cole
Well-Known Member
Allow to take a step back by saying I mean nothing personal, to you or anyone else, in applying the label of "smug superiority" to this discussion. My intent was to provide warning against simply dismissing the mistakes made by the crew as unintelligent, and not learning from them.
As to the issue of reckless homicide, I understand that you have a personal connection to the accident which (as you admit) removes your ability to be totally objective in this case. However, the law must be objective. I found the following in a definition for reckless homicide:
"In general, "recklessly" means that a person acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint."
http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/reckless-homicide/
To make a case for reckless homicide, you would have to argue that the crew understood the grave danger they were in and moved forward, regardless of the risks. I believe that the case is much more innocent than that. The crew engaged in nonpertinant conversation and were hampered by confirmation bias. It was an embarrassing, stupid mistake that in these circumstances turned tragic.