Dreamlifter lands at wrong airport and can't take off

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jhugz said:
Airline pilots. Lolz.
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We are our own worst enemies, and even the younger generation have a significant number of traditional thinkers. The "what an idiot??!?" types either don't have enough experience to know better, or just firmly have to believe their superior skill is why they haven't ever had a significant event.

Arrogance is a disease in aviation.
 
THE FIVE HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES

1. Anti-Authority:
"Don't tell me."

This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are saying, "No one can tell me what to do." They may be resentful of having someone tell themwhat to do, or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures as silly or unnecessary. However, itis always your prerogative to question authority if you feel it is in error.

2. Impulsivity:
"Do it quickly."

This is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something, anything, immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do; they do not select the best alternative, and they do the first thing that comes to mind.

3. Invulnerability:
"It won't happen to me."

Many people feel that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected. They never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely to take chances and increase risk.

4. Macho:
"I can do it."

Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else are thinking, "I can do it –I'll show them." Pilots with this type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male characteristic, women are equally susceptible.

5. Resignation:
"What's the use?"

Pilots who think, "What's the use?" do not see themselves as being able to make a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that someone is out to get me, or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along with unreasonable requests just to be a "nice guy."
 
Yea I'm arrogant because I believe pilots that land at the wrong airport shouldn't get a free pass.
 
cencal83406 said:
THE FIVE HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES

1. Anti-Authority:
"Don't tell me."

This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are saying, "No one can tell me what to do." They may be resentful of having someone tell themwhat to do, or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures as silly or unnecessary. However, itis always your prerogative to question authority if you feel it is in error.

2. Impulsivity:
"Do it quickly."

This is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something, anything, immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do; they do not select the best alternative, and they do the first thing that comes to mind.

3. Invulnerability:
"It won't happen to me."

Many people feel that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected. They never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely to take chances and increase risk.

4. Macho:
"I can do it."

Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else are thinking, "I can do it –I'll show them." Pilots with this type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male characteristic, women are equally susceptible.

5. Resignation:
"What's the use?"

Pilots who think, "What's the use?" do not see themselves as being able to make a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that someone is out to get me, or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along with unreasonable requests just to be a "nice guy."
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Someone trying to teach CFI topics that never CFI'ed.

Yeah, I can play that game too.
 
My questions:

1. The aforementioned question on the airport beacons and why they weren't apparently noticed, civil vs military field.

2. Relative size of the fields and general layout, from distant as well as close in. Small civil vs large military field, and why these differences weren't noted. Unlike mistaking a small airport for a small airport, or a large airport for a large airport.

3. ATC:

3.1 TRACON: How did ICT TRACON not notice what would be severely low Mode C readouts for the 747, were it to be landing at IAB? For its distance from the field, as it was decending for AAO, it would be at some severely low altitudes for where it should've been. If the radar controller was working the flight at the time, why didn't he notice? If he wasn't working the flight at the time or had already handed it off, why didn't he later notice?

3.2 IAB Tower: Why didn't the local controller not notice that there wasn't a large aircraft on final for his field? For those not in the know, USAF ATC controllers are primed (for military aircraft) to note whether the gear is down, and they make a call as-such in the landing clearnace for military aircraft, as well as check for landing lights and the like as a secondary confirmation. While not required for civil ops, the tower controller would still likely notice that there doesn't appear to be any landing lights on final, or an aircraft on final for his field, and I would think would at least make a gear inquiry, if not a "where are you?" inquiry. Why this wasn't done or noticed, is a question I have; as well as what the traffic load in the IAB pattern was at the time (light, heavy? other aircraft? potential mistaken identity?)
 
Mr Hugs,

Is this the first time you've opined about a subject you have zero experience with?

Or is this a pattern?

If you were smart you'd know how to project confidence, rather than cockiness. But you also have a lot of growing up to do it other areas first.
 
I flew with a Captain at ATI who had landed at the wrong airport. Great guy, awesome Captain and a fantastic aviator. His only real comment on the incident was "It can and will happen to you".

There is always going to be a certain amount of tunnel vision when flying. Learn to recognize when you are tunneling in on something and break out of it.
 
MikeD said:
My questions:

1. The aforementioned question on the airport beacons and why they weren't apparently noticed, civil vs military field.

2. Relative size of the fields and general layout, from distant as well as close in. Small civil vs large military field, and why these differences weren't noted. Unlike mistaking a small airport for a small airport, or a large airport for a large airport.

3. ATC:

3.1 TRACON: How did ICT TRACON not notice what would be severely low Mode C readouts for the 747, were it to be landing at IAB? For its distance from the field, as it was decending for AAO, it would be at some severely low altitudes for where it should've been. If the radar controller was working the flight at the time, why didn't he notice? If he wasn't working the flight at the time or had already handed it off, why didn't he later notice?

3.2 IAB Tower: Why didn't the local controller not notice that there wasn't a large aircraft on final for his field? For those not in the know, USAF ATC controllers are primed (for military aircraft) to note whether the gear is down, and they make a call as-such in the landing clearnace for military aircraft, as well as check for landing lights and the like as a secondary confirmation. While not required for civil ops, the tower controller would still likely notice that there doesn't appear to be any landing lights on final, or an aircraft on final for his field, and I would think would at least make a gear inquiry, if not a "where are you?" inquiry. Why this wasn't done or noticed, is a question I have; as well as what the traffic load in the IAB pattern was at the time (light, heavy? other aircraft? potential mistaken identity?)
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The above questions can be very easily answered when the crew/ATC folks answer this question...'Were you fatigued?'
 
Screaming_Emu said:
Flying out there is challenging. All roads run north/south or east/west. The sectional might say there is a town somewhere, but it's really a post office, bar, and three houses.
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Wrong. Doncha know ya gotta have at least a Packers bar and a Vikings bar, and one Lutheran and one Catholic church?
@Kristie

but yeah, I learned to fly in the Midwest, way easier to get lost navigating there than around here (so long as the weather is good).
 
Seggy said:
The above questions can be very easily answered when the crew/ATC folks answer this question...'Were you fatigued?'
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ATC was fatigued now? In both ICT TRACON as well as IAB tower? Why they missed what they did on their end? Thats what we'd be assuming if we paint this whole thing with a "fatigue" broadbrush.

If the crew were missing these items I mentioned, then they should've been missing all sorts of other items such as checklist items and the like; the CVR will reveal that.

Nothing is easy and nothing is "one simple answer". There are more complexities to this that need to be looked into regarding human factors, as well as fatigue. It will be interesting.
 
MikeD said:
ATC was fatigued now? In both ICT TRACON as well as IAB tower? Why they missed what they did on their end?
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Could be. Do they do training up in IAB tower? What about ICT TRACON? If TRACON handed the plane off to tower after a visual approach has commenced, is TRACON responsible still?

If the crew were missing these items I mentioned, then they should've been missing all sorts of other items such as checklist items and the like; the CVR will reveal that.

Nothing is easy and nothing is "one simple answer". There are more complexities to this that need to be looked into regarding human factors, as well as fatigue. It will be interesting.
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Yep.
 
Seggy said:
Could be. Do they do training up in IAB tower? What about ICT TRACON? If TRACON handed the plane off to tower after a visual approach has commenced, is TRACON responsible still?
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I'm not questioning the responsibility aspect, as much as Im curious of ATCs involvement or lack thereof as more a secondary or tertiary factor. It's not a primary factor, since the crew was ultimately responsible to land their plane at the correct field. However I am wondering if there were missed opportunities for ATC to notice that the crew had low SA or were "behind the power curve" or may have been fatigued.....noticed through radio comms (or not). And if ATC could've done more to help in that case.

Secondly, I want to know when the 747 was handed off from TRACON to tower, in order to see if there may have been a chance for TRACON to notice the altitude readout not making sense for a final approach to IAB.

For IAB tower, Im not sure if it's a training tower, but if it was, then where was the supervision/trainer?
 
Roger Roger said:
but yeah, I learned to fly in the Midwest, way easier to get lost navigating there than around here (so long as the weather is good).
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I've been to MidContinent and to Beech. The chart doesn't do the proximity of all of those airports justice.

jhugz said:
Said like a true douchebag.
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Tell me about a time you made a serious error of judgment or situational awareness.

If you can't tell me one, you're lying.
 
Autothrust Blue said:
I've been to MidContinent and to Beech. The chart doesn't do the proximity of all of those airports justice.


Tell me about a time you made a serious error of judgment or situational awareness.

If you can't tell me one, you're lying.
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I've made plenty of mistakes flying an airplane. I've never said I'm perfect or a skygod, just a typical pile on jhugz thread.

However, some mistakes are larger then others. Larger mistakes have larger consequences.
 
MikeD said:
I'm not questioning the responsibility aspect, as much as Im curious of ATCs involvement or lack thereof as more a secondary or tertiary factor. It's not a primary factor, since the crew was ultimately responsible to land their plane at the correct field. However I am wondering if there were missed opportunities for ATC to notice that the crew had low SA or were "behind the power curve" or may have been fatigued.....noticed through radio comms (or not). And if ATC could've done more to help in that case.

Secondly, I want to know when the 747 was handed off from TRACON to tower, in order to see if there may have been a chance for TRACON to notice the altitude readout not making sense for a final approach to IAB.
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I think the key here will be what the responsibilities of the TRACON are once a plane is handed off for a visual approach. Also, it will be interesting to see the Tower Controllers responsibility and if the tower/TRACON is staffed properly and had enough controllers on duty during the time of the incident.

For IAB tower, Im not sure if it's a training tower, but if it was, then where was the supervision/trainer?
Click to expand...

When I was conducting IOE as the 'supervisor' I got tired a lot quicker than if I was not doing training.
 
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