1500TT minimums ?

So I've been following this thread pretty thoroughly, and both "sides" have valid arguments. I'm just a lowly 200 hour "almost" commercial pilot (checkride in a week), but what I keep coming back to is this question...

If we're now limiting guys to 1500 and 23 y/o, where does that leave them to get said time? It seems to me that the cycle is just going to continue, only earlier on in the process, ie as CFI's. Look at ATP, you take a guy through an accelerated 90 day program, 0 to hero, then turn around and think that they're qualified to teach anyone anything about an airplane? This continues with that student and so on and so forth. Don't get me wrong, my CFI at ATP has been extremely knowledgeable, it just seems counter-intuitive (even though I know that's how it's "always been done"). That being said, the question I have is if instructing is the only option for a "young buck" in the industry, at what point does the supply of people willing to go that route run dry? The military isn't putting out the number of pilots they used to. The regionals can't afford to pay guys what they deserve and will now start demanding as the shortage apocalypse looms, and even the little operators (Survey / tow / jump / etc) that are the only alternative to instructing start raising mins as well, where does that leave someone in my position?

Not trying to start anything here, but honestly trying to get a sense from the collective on what a fresh CMEL can do. I'm all for safety reform, but what I'm not all for is pulling up the ladder.

cheers

It's most certainly not pulling up the ladder. The 07/08 hiring boom of hiring people below 1500 hours was a bit of an aberration as far as 121 hiring is concerned... I couldn't get a call from a 121 operator in 2003 until I had 1800 hours, and except for the Gulfstreamers that bought their way in, I had one of the lowest times of my classmates.

There are numerous jobs available to build your time! I did CFI/CFII/MEI as well as part 91 corporate flying, plus aircraft sales demos and deliveries. Absolutely fantastic experience all around and I learned so much about flying as PIC and about myself.
 
@juxtapilot- You're still missing the idea of the multi-layered approach. Not one thing will help mitigate what contributed to the recent accidents. And, I think you're misplacing where the focus is- it is primarily on the new rest rules, the ATP is just a side deal of that. It is you that is thinking that is the focus of the new laws.

And yes, you'll change your mind in time. Heck, I would have been all for it when I was a 1000 or so hour pilot. Although... the age thing for the ATP would have delayed my entry into the airline world by a month and a half. :)

Not just me...


WASHINGTON – The Families of Continental Flight 3407 spent the fourth anniversary of the loss of their loved ones lobbying the Federal Aviation Administration and members of Congress for tougher rules for the nation’s pilots – and in doing so, they found new reason for frustration with the FAA.
Only hours after Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., told them that the FAA had committed to completing long-delayed new regulations for pilot qualifications and training this year, the agency’s administrator and top safety official told the families that the training rule will likely not be completed until June 2014.
“There was a disconnect” that apparently left Schumer with the wrong information, said Karen Eckert, one of the leading members of the families group.
The FAA feels it needs to redo the economic analysis undergirding the proposed new pilot-training rules, said Eckert, whose sister Beverly Eckert, a 9/11 activist, was one of the 50 people killed in the crash.
“They put some sense into some of the delays and explained why they have to go back to the drawing board,” Eckert said. “They said there’s a better way for them to do the cost-benefit analysis” on the training rule.
The FAA officials, including Administrator Michael P. Huerta, assured the families that the new analysis would likely make a better case for the new pilot-training rules, rather than lead to their weakening.
The proposed rules would, for the first time, require pilots to train in a simulator for how to react to unexpected stalls and upsets. The pilot of Continental Connection Flight 3407 did not know how to react to an aerodynamic stall, and his mistakes sent the plane plummeting into a house in Clarence Center.
Still, there was a sharp contrast between what the families learned at their meeting at the FAA and what Schumer announced at a news conference earlier in the day.
“We spoke to the FAA this morning,” Schumer said. “They assured us they are on track to meet both the August deadline for the pilot certification [regulations] and the October deadline for crew member training. They told us they will meet those deadlines.”
Asked to explain the discrepancy between what he had said and what the FAA officials told the Flight 3407 families, Schumer said: “The FAA promised – no ifs, ands or buts – that these regulations would be done by August and October of this year. We will hold their feet to the fire to ensure they live up to this commitment that they made to me, and to the families of Flight 3407. Any other action on their part would be absolutely unacceptable and a violation of the promises they made.”
However, both the Flight 3407 families at the news conference and Rep. Chris Collins, R-Clarence, expressed some skepticism about whether the FAA would meet those deadlines, no matter what Schumer heard.
Noting that Flight 3407 crashed because the pilot did not know how to recover from a stall, John Kausner, whose daughter, Ellyce, was killed in the crash, said: “I will submit to you that the FAA cannot get out of a stall.” He noted that the airline industry is fighting the new rules, suggesting that it would face an undue burden from them. That prompted him to gesture to the families standing with him and say: “You want an undue burden? Look behind me.”
Meanwhile, Scott Maurer, whose daughter, Lorin, was killed in the crash, appealed to President Obama to push the FAA to complete the new rules. “We’ve been patient, Mr. President, very patient,” he said. “But you know that the American people deserve better. You know that and we know that.”
Collins was equally skeptical of the FAA’s ability to complete the new air safety rules.
“I’m sorry, but a new deadline is unacceptable,” Collins said, before he had any reason to know that the FAA had set yet another new deadline. “To say – and I’m sorry, Sen. Schumer – to say they’re going to meet the deadline, they’ve missed the deadline, again and again. That is unacceptable. Words are unacceptable.” Collins, who was the Erie County executive in charge of the emergency response on the night of the crash, choked up during his comments, saying: “It’s hitting me like a tsunami right now.”
Collins’ comments prompted Schumer to return to the podium to reassure the families and the media that he is not going easy on the FAA. If agency officials do not complete the regulations on time, “they will be hearing from us,” he said.
Later in the day, the families held a memorial service for their loved ones in a Capitol Hill committee room. Schumer, Collins and Rep. Brian Higgins, D-Buffalo, joined Deborah A.P. Hersman, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, in reading the names of the crash victims.
And each of the family members then proceeded to the front of the room and, one by one, laid down a rose to mark their loss.
 
Saying 3407 crashed because the captain didn't know how to recover from a stall is like saying a lawyer lost a case because he didn't know how to use a period at the end of a sentence. It's so outrageous that it strains credibility.
 
Saying 3407 crashed because the captain didn't know how to recover from a stall is like saying a lawyer lost a case because he didn't know how to use a period at the end of a sentence. It's so outrageous that it strains credibility.

So please enlighten us, how did 3407 crash Renslow kill himself and 49 others?
 
So please enlighten us, how did 3407 crash Renslow kill himself and 49 others?
My learned colleague merely means that Colgan Air Flight 3407 (or any other airliner, really) crashed for about 1,099 reasons, and pointing to number 1,097 paints an insufficient picture.
 
Saying 3407 crashed because the captain didn't know how to recover from a stall is like saying a lawyer lost a case because he didn't know how to use a period at the end of a sentence. It's so outrageous that it strains credibility.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this
accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led
to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
 

Contributing to the accident
were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the lowspeed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s
failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed
selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

Notice what's last?
 
Saying 3407 crashed because the captain didn't know how to recover from a stall is like saying a lawyer lost a case because he didn't know how to use a period at the end of a sentence. It's so outrageous that it strains credibility.

No, I think he ignored an airspeed tape, and/or power, in a not-so-sterile cockpit.

Hard for me to disagree with you - as I have a had much respect for everything you add around here...

But I watched all of the hearings, and looked at every report I could find. Dude screwed the pooch. Could be any of us, any day. But I think there comes a point that looking for deeper meaning turns into looking the other way from what actually happened.

I've done careless things in airplanes, and lived to learn my lesson. Not everyone does. My opinion.
 
So if we have two captain qualified pilots in the airplane, do you think there's going to be lobbying for an increase in FO pay? I'm guessing pilots will still be willing to take the job regardless of pay , but still....
 
So if we have two captain qualified pilots in the airplane, do you think there's going to be lobbying for an increase in FO pay? I'm guessing pilots will still be willing to take the job regardless of pay , but still....

Dude, I believe that until recently there were 7 or 8 year F/Os flying around at Eagle. I mean, I'm sure they WANTED a raise, but...
 
So if we have two captain qualified pilots in the airplane....

You're bad enough as it is. I don't want to think about flying with you if you were "captain qualified".




On the topic of the ATP rule. I hate calling it the 1500 hour rule because we all know there are those facing furlough or termination because they aren't old enough to hold an ATP, yet have more than 1500 hours.

I agree with the increase minimums for First Officers. I also agree with the 1000 hours of 121 time to upgrade. BUT, I don't agree with the age limitation.

Old enough to drink, smoke, vote, and die for your country, but not old enough to fly an airliner. That is some major BS!
 
You're bad enough as it is. I don't want to think about flying with you if you were "captain qualified".




On the topic of the ATP rule. I hate calling it the 1500 hour rule because we all know there are those facing furlough or termination because they aren't old enough to hold an ATP, yet have more than 1500 hours.

I agree with the increase minimums for First Officers. I also agree with the 1000 hours of 121 time to upgrade. BUT, I don't agree with the age limitation.

Old enough to drink, smoke, vote, and die for your country, but not old enough to fly an airliner. That is some major BS!
I agree on the age thing, but I think it's the govt's way of saying go have some fun. You're in your early 20’s that's what they are for. :)
 
On the topic of the ATP rule. I hate calling it the 1500 hour rule because we all know there are those facing furlough or termination because they aren't old enough to hold an ATP, yet have more than 1500 hours.

I agree with the increase minimums for First Officers. I also agree with the 1000 hours of 121 time to upgrade. BUT, I don't agree with the age limitation.

Old enough to drink, smoke, vote, and die for your country, but not old enough to fly an airliner. That is some major BS!

And no one sees the age limitation going away? ( And I don't mean for 141 schools )
 
Beech90 said:
And no one sees the age limitation going away? ( And I don't mean for 141 schools )

It's a possibility. It would be nice if it did so I could still be gainfully employed, but if not, oh well.
 
Saying 3407 crashed because the captain didn't know how to recover from a stall is like saying a lawyer lost a case because he didn't know how to use a period at the end of a sentence. It's so outrageous that it strains credibility.

Although I haven't hit the search button, I am pretty sure you were singing a different tune a year or two ago.

Maybe if the guy had more than 300 hours before he became an airline pilot, he might have been able to recognize and recover from a stall properly. Obviously, there are systematic problems that still haven't been addressed, but maybe he shouldn't have been employed as an airline pilot. He had multiple failures in a flawed training environment. The fact of the matter is that regardless of Colgan's training, a stall is a stall. It was figured out a hundred years ago.

The FDR now indicated that the aircraft's speed was a dangerously slow 131 knots (243 km/h). However, instead of following the established stall recovery procedure of adding full power and lowering the nose to prevent the stall, the captain only added about 75% power and continued applying nose-up inputs. As the aircraft came even closer to stalling the stick pusher activated ("The Q400 stick pusher applies an airplane-nose-down control column input to decrease the wing angle-of-attack [AOA] after an aerodynamic stall").[22] The captain overrode the pusher and continued pulling on the control yoke causing the aircraft upset and subsequent loss of control.[23] The plane went into a yaw(moved off course) and pitched up at an angle of 31 degrees in its final moments, before pitching down at 45 degrees. It then rolled to the left at 46 degrees and snapped back to the right at 105 degrees. Occupants aboard experienced forces estimated at nearly twice that of gravity. Witnesses on the ground indicated that they heard the engines sputter just before the crash
 
Although I haven't hit the search button, I am pretty sure you were singing a different tune a year or two ago.

Maybe if the guy had more than 300 hours before he became an airline pilot, he might have been able to recognize and recover from a stall properly. Obviously, there are systematic problems that still haven't been addressed, but maybe he shouldn't have been employed as an airline pilot. He had multiple failures in a flawed training environment. The fact of the matter is that regardless of Colgan's training, a stall is a stall. It was figured out a hundred years ago.

The FDR now indicated that the aircraft's speed was a dangerously slow 131 knots (243 km/h). However, instead of following the established stall recovery procedure of adding full power and lowering the nose to prevent the stall, the captain only added about 75% power and continued applying nose-up inputs. As the aircraft came even closer to stalling the stick pusher activated ("The Q400 stick pusher applies an airplane-nose-down control column input to decrease the wing angle-of-attack [AOA] after an aerodynamic stall").[22] The captain overrode the pusher and continued pulling on the control yoke causing the aircraft upset and subsequent loss of control.[23] The plane went into a yaw(moved off course) and pitched up at an angle of 31 degrees in its final moments, before pitching down at 45 degrees. It then rolled to the left at 46 degrees and snapped back to the right at 105 degrees. Occupants aboard experienced forces estimated at nearly twice that of gravity. Witnesses on the ground indicated that they heard the engines sputter just before the crash
What was also figured out a hundred years ago was to fly the airplane. He stopped flying it, plain and simple. Yes he reacted to a stall recovery the wrong way, but he got slow and should've never been near the stall. I could buy blaming the stall recovery if we flew around all day with the shaker activating on every other approach. We don't though, I hope to go my entire career with the shaker never activating and that shouldn't be to hard. If we add drag we should probably add power or increase pitch. If we dont the other person in the other seat should be cognizant enough to bring it up. Like I said in previous posts; we are human, humans kill people in airplanes and will continue to do so as long as there are airplanes carrying people.

Probably 95% of us know what we are doing. We can have bad days, but we'll live. The smaller percentage squeaks by on the backs of of the rest. We are the checks and balances for these deficient ones. They make mistakes, we catch them. We make mistakes, they're oblivious. The problem lies when these people are paired with one another, or with one of us that is having an off day because of fatigue or sickness and are not 100%. Most of the time nothing happens but the one time during one of these rare parings another rare event happens and the holes I the Swiss start to line up. These people aren't bad people, they should probably try another safer career choice. So how do we solve it? Not sure, it's a sensitive issue and no one wants to ruin a persons career once they've spent the time and money to get here.
 
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