Mr Toad’s Wild Ride

[Wardogg]

I can’t find the Oh United thread this needs to go into. So here goes…..

- NTSB issues the preliminary report into the accident involving United Airlines flight 1890, a Boeing 777-222ER, N788UA, that occurred on February 10, 2024, near Kelsey, New York:

On February 10, 2024, about 15:43 eastern standard time (EST), United Airlines (UAL) flight 1890, a Boeing 777-222ER, N788UA, experienced moderate turbulence when descending to flight level (FL) 190 inbound to the Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. Of the 280 passengers and crew, two flight attendants received serious injuries and one received a minor injury. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California to EWR.

The first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The flight crew stated that the departure from LAX was uneventful and the flight leveled off at a cruise altitude of FL350. The FO stated that he was responsible for briefing the approach/arrival into EWR and in preparation for the brief, checked for potential turbulence using the Weather Services International (WSI) application (APP) and used the Skypath APP to see if there were any reports of turbulence. Neither application revealed any significant indications of turbulence along their route. After the brief, the captain turned the onboard weather radar ON for the eventual descent into EWR.

The FO stated that while descending through about FL270, the captain announced via the passenger address (PA) system for the flight attendants (FA) to prepare the cabin for landing. Following the announcement, the captain turned the seatbelt sign ON.

The FO stated that he observed an overcast layer of clouds ahead and below that the flight would penetrate on their descent to EWR. However, there was no indication of potential turbulence as nothing showed on the aircraft's weather radar or the Skypath APP. Additionally, there were no reports of turbulence from ATC or dispatch.

The pilots reported that while descending through about FL210 in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the flight encountered moderate turbulence lasting a few seconds that caused unsecured items on the flightdeck to be thrown about. After the event, the captain immediately called the cabin crew and was informed of multiple injuries with one flight attendant sustaining a head laceration. Upon being notified of the injuries, the flight crew declared a medical emergency and requested paramedics meet the aircraft at the gate in EWR. Post-flight, two FA’s were diagnosed with fracture injuries and a third was diagnosed with a sub-cranial bleed.

Postaccident examination of the weather in the area revealed a frontal boundary moving eastward across New York state. In addition, an upper-level jet stream maximum was located above the accident site. Satellite and weather radar imagery, along with lightning and surface data depicted strong cells in the vicinity of the flight. The U.S National Weather Service (NWS) had issued current Significant Meteorological (SIGMET) warning for embedded thunderstorms with tops reaching FL280 over the region.

NTSB group chairs in the areas of air traffic control, operations, meteorology, survival factors, and flight data recorder were assigned.Qualified parties were invited to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United Airlines, The Boeing Company, Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).

Certified ADS-B data and audio recordings were provided to the NTSB by the FAA. The NTSB is currently analyzing this data. At the time of the accident, flight 1890 was being controlled by air traffic control located at the Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW ARTCC). During the week of March 4th, 2024, the ATC group and meteorology specialist traveled to Nashua, New Hampshire to interview personnel at the control center.

Data from the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis.

The investigation continues.

- Report:

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193784/pdf

 

[CoffeeIcePapers]

Damn, that sucks. It’s hard to manage the FAs sometimes. Too conservative, they get upset or the pax accuse them of being lazy. Not conservative enough, people get seriously injured.

 

[Wardogg]

Damn, that sucks. It’s hard to manage the FAs sometimes. Too conservative, they get upset or the pax accuse them of being lazy. Not conservative enough, people get seriously injured.

Holy crap! That isn’t even the one I meant to post. It was this one!

- NTSB issues the preliminary report into the accident involving United Airlines flight 2477, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, N27290, that occurred on March 8, 2024, at Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH/KIAH), Houston, Texas:

On March 8, 2024, at about 0758 central standard time, United Airlines flight 2477, a Boeing 737-8, N27290, experienced a runway excursion while exiting runway 27 onto taxiway SC at the George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The left main landing gear (MLG) departed the paved surface and contacted a concrete structure that was recessed into the ground, resulting in its separation. The 6 crew and 160 passengers were deplaned via airstairs. No injuries were reported. The flight was a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee to IAH.

In response to the accident, the NTSB traveled to Houston. As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United Airlines, The Boeing Company, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).

The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Operations, Human Performance, Systems, Structures, Digital Flight Data Recorder (DVDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).

History of Flight
According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. The captain said he observed the reported runway surface condition codes when checking the automatic terminal information system (ATIS) via his electronic flight bag (EFB). For runway 26L and 26R, he recalled seeing codes of 3/3/3 and for runway 27 codes of 5/5/5. The actual runway surface condition codes being broadcasted on the ATIS for runway 27 at the time were 3/3/3 which according to the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) indicated the runway was slippery when wet and “braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied or directional control is noticeably reduced.”

When the crew checked in with Houston Approach Control, they were told to expect a landing on runway 26L. The captain asked the FO to request a landing on runway 27 instead. The FO made, and the controller approved the request and issued instructions for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27. After checking in with Houston Tower (about 12,000 feet msl according to the FO), the captain asked the FO to request approval to roll to the end of runway 27. The FO made the request. A tower controller approved it and instructed them, “keep your speed up”. The captain changed the autobrake setting from 2 to 1 (which would command a reduced deceleration rate). The approach was conducted in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and, according to the crew, the airplane broke out of the clouds between 800 and 1,000 feet msl. They reported that visibility under the clouds was good, and the captain recalled that the runway appeared dry. The FO recalled that the runway appeared wet.

The crew stated that the touchdown was uneventful, at an appropriate speed, and within the touchdown zone. The speed brakes extended normally, and the thrust reversers were deployed to idle reverse thrust. The captain said that, shortly after touchdown, he retracted the speedbrakes by the action of moving the speedbrake lever to its down and locked position, which disabled the autobrakes. He did not “slow too much initially” because the runway appeared dry, he wanted to expedite their time on the runway, and because he preferred decelerating gradually for passenger comfort.

The captain said he applied the brakes manually using the toe brakes at about 6,000 feet from the end of the runway but felt as if the deceleration was less than normal. DFDR data and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that after the disabling of the autobrakes occurred, manual braking did not begin until the airplane was about 4,000 feet from the end of the runway. The captain recalled hearing the runway awareness and advisory system (RAAS) alert indicating 1,000 ft of runway distance remaining. He became concerned and began applying more pressure to the brakes. As he approached the end of the runway, he elected to attempt to turn onto taxiway SC, by utilizing the steering tiller and rudder pedals while pushing aggressively on the brake pedals.

During the turn onto the taxiway, he felt the fuselage and rudder/brake pedals begin to shake violently. He briefly released the brake pressure and the shaking ceased. He then reapplied aggressive brake pressure and the shaking resumed. The airplane slid off the runway and the left MLG tires and nose wheels tires entered the grass before the airplane came to a rest with its left wing low.

A postaccident examination of the accident site revealed that the left MLG tires had impacted a large concrete “manhole” designed as an electrical junction box for lights/utilities at the airport. As a result of the impact, the left MLG separated from the airplane at the fuse pins near the rear spar as designed to prevent more severe damage to surrounding structures. The airplane came to rest on the left engine nacelle, left winglet, and aft fuselage and sustained substantial damage to the left wing and aft fuselage.

Flight Crew
The captain was 61 years old and held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with a rating for multiengine-land, commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, and type ratings on the B-727, B-737, B-757, B-767 which included the limitation English Proficient. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate dated October 4, 2023, with the limitation of must use corrective lenses to meet vision standards at all required distances.

The captain was hired by United Airlines on April 29, 1987, and had accumulated about 15,191 hours in B-737 aircraft with about 9,607 of those hours as pilot-in-command.

The FO was 38 years old and held an ATP certificate with a rating for multi-engine land, commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, and type ratings in the B-737, and L-188 which included the limitation of B-737 Circling approach VMC Only, and English Proficient. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate dated June 8, 2023.

The FO was hired by United Airlines on October 1, 2019, and had accumulated about 1,252 hours in B-737 aircraft.

Weather Conditions and Flight Crew Procedures
A Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) at IAH was reporting at 0753 CST, wind from 190° at 5 knots, tower visibility 1 ½ mile in mist, ceiling broken at 800 ft agl, overcast at 1,800 ft, temperature 23°C (73°F), dew point temperature 22°C (71°F), altimeter 29.71 inches of mercury. Remarks: automated observation system with a precipitation discriminator, surface visibility 2 ½ miles, sea level pressure 1005.9-hPa, temperature 22.8°C, dew point 21.7°C. Photos and surveillance video during and immediately following the accident indicated wet runway and taxiway surface conditions.

United Airlines supplementary flight crew procedures required for “Landing on Wet or Slippery Runway” stated in part:

𝘜𝘴𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘹𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘮 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘴 𝘴𝘰𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘴 𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘵𝘰𝘶𝘤𝘩𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘯. 𝘛𝘩𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘴𝘵 𝘦𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘵 𝘩𝘪𝘨𝘩 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘦𝘥. 𝘋𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘸𝘢𝘪𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘰𝘶𝘤𝘩𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘯.

𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘚𝘵𝘰𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨

𝘋𝘦𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘶𝘯𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘦𝘹𝘪𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘧 3 𝘰𝘳 𝘔𝘈𝘟, 𝘢𝘴 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦. 𝘐𝘧 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘥𝘰𝘶𝘣𝘵 𝘦𝘹𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘴, 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘳𝘶𝘯𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦, 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘔𝘈𝘟 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘴.

Data
Data from the DFDR was sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis. A preliminary review of data has been completed and a plot showing the braking parameters is shown in figure 3. Data showed that at touchdown the speed brake lever position [Speed Brake Lever Pos] and auto brake parameters were full up and on for about 5 seconds before transitioning to down and locked and off for the remainder of the landing rollout.

The engine thrust reversers were deployed for the left and right engines for about 27 and 26 seconds respectively at idle reverse. The left and right brake pressure increased to their maximum pressure consistent with aggressive manual braking before and as the airplane’s heading changed consistent with a right turn.

The CVR was removed from the airplane and sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis.

Certified ADS-B data, which records more accurate latitude and longitude data than the DFDR, was provided to the NTSB by the FAA. Analysis of the ADS-B and DFDR data shows that the airplane touched down about 1,000 feet from the runway threshold with a groundspeed of about 158 knots. With about 1,000 ft and 500 ft of runway remaining the airplane groundspeeds were about 72 kts and 57 kts respectively. The right turn to exit the runway was initiated at about 39 kts groundspeed and the aircraft departed the end of the paved surface at about 22 kts (figure 4).

- Report:

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193898/pdf

 

[🦈💜]

Holy crap! That isn’t even the one I meant to post. It was this one!

- NTSB issues the preliminary report into the accident involving United Airlines flight 2477, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, N27290, that occurred on March 8, 2024, at Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH/KIAH), Houston, Texas:

On March 8, 2024, at about 0758 central standard time, United Airlines flight 2477, a Boeing 737-8, N27290, experienced a runway excursion while exiting runway 27 onto taxiway SC at the George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. The left main landing gear (MLG) departed the paved surface and contacted a concrete structure that was recessed into the ground, resulting in its separation. The 6 crew and 160 passengers were deplaned via airstairs. No injuries were reported. The flight was a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee to IAH.

In response to the accident, the NTSB traveled to Houston. As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United Airlines, The Boeing Company, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).

The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Operations, Human Performance, Systems, Structures, Digital Flight Data Recorder (DVDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).

History of Flight
According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. The captain said he observed the reported runway surface condition codes when checking the automatic terminal information system (ATIS) via his electronic flight bag (EFB). For runway 26L and 26R, he recalled seeing codes of 3/3/3 and for runway 27 codes of 5/5/5. The actual runway surface condition codes being broadcasted on the ATIS for runway 27 at the time were 3/3/3 which according to the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) indicated the runway was slippery when wet and “braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied or directional control is noticeably reduced.”

When the crew checked in with Houston Approach Control, they were told to expect a landing on runway 26L. The captain asked the FO to request a landing on runway 27 instead. The FO made, and the controller approved the request and issued instructions for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27. After checking in with Houston Tower (about 12,000 feet msl according to the FO), the captain asked the FO to request approval to roll to the end of runway 27. The FO made the request. A tower controller approved it and instructed them, “keep your speed up”. The captain changed the autobrake setting from 2 to 1 (which would command a reduced deceleration rate). The approach was conducted in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and, according to the crew, the airplane broke out of the clouds between 800 and 1,000 feet msl. They reported that visibility under the clouds was good, and the captain recalled that the runway appeared dry. The FO recalled that the runway appeared wet.

The crew stated that the touchdown was uneventful, at an appropriate speed, and within the touchdown zone. The speed brakes extended normally, and the thrust reversers were deployed to idle reverse thrust. The captain said that, shortly after touchdown, he retracted the speedbrakes by the action of moving the speedbrake lever to its down and locked position, which disabled the autobrakes. He did not “slow too much initially” because the runway appeared dry, he wanted to expedite their time on the runway, and because he preferred decelerating gradually for passenger comfort.

The captain said he applied the brakes manually using the toe brakes at about 6,000 feet from the end of the runway but felt as if the deceleration was less than normal. DFDR data and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that after the disabling of the autobrakes occurred, manual braking did not begin until the airplane was about 4,000 feet from the end of the runway. The captain recalled hearing the runway awareness and advisory system (RAAS) alert indicating 1,000 ft of runway distance remaining. He became concerned and began applying more pressure to the brakes. As he approached the end of the runway, he elected to attempt to turn onto taxiway SC, by utilizing the steering tiller and rudder pedals while pushing aggressively on the brake pedals.

During the turn onto the taxiway, he felt the fuselage and rudder/brake pedals begin to shake violently. He briefly released the brake pressure and the shaking ceased. He then reapplied aggressive brake pressure and the shaking resumed. The airplane slid off the runway and the left MLG tires and nose wheels tires entered the grass before the airplane came to a rest with its left wing low.

A postaccident examination of the accident site revealed that the left MLG tires had impacted a large concrete “manhole” designed as an electrical junction box for lights/utilities at the airport. As a result of the impact, the left MLG separated from the airplane at the fuse pins near the rear spar as designed to prevent more severe damage to surrounding structures. The airplane came to rest on the left engine nacelle, left winglet, and aft fuselage and sustained substantial damage to the left wing and aft fuselage.

Flight Crew
The captain was 61 years old and held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with a rating for multiengine-land, commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, and type ratings on the B-727, B-737, B-757, B-767 which included the limitation English Proficient. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate dated October 4, 2023, with the limitation of must use corrective lenses to meet vision standards at all required distances.

The captain was hired by United Airlines on April 29, 1987, and had accumulated about 15,191 hours in B-737 aircraft with about 9,607 of those hours as pilot-in-command.

The FO was 38 years old and held an ATP certificate with a rating for multi-engine land, commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, and type ratings in the B-737, and L-188 which included the limitation of B-737 Circling approach VMC Only, and English Proficient. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate dated June 8, 2023.

The FO was hired by United Airlines on October 1, 2019, and had accumulated about 1,252 hours in B-737 aircraft.

Weather Conditions and Flight Crew Procedures
A Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) at IAH was reporting at 0753 CST, wind from 190° at 5 knots, tower visibility 1 ½ mile in mist, ceiling broken at 800 ft agl, overcast at 1,800 ft, temperature 23°C (73°F), dew point temperature 22°C (71°F), altimeter 29.71 inches of mercury. Remarks: automated observation system with a precipitation discriminator, surface visibility 2 ½ miles, sea level pressure 1005.9-hPa, temperature 22.8°C, dew point 21.7°C. Photos and surveillance video during and immediately following the accident indicated wet runway and taxiway surface conditions.

United Airlines supplementary flight crew procedures required for “Landing on Wet or Slippery Runway” stated in part:

𝘜𝘴𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘹𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘮 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘴 𝘴𝘰𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘴 𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘢𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘵𝘰𝘶𝘤𝘩𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘯. 𝘛𝘩𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘴𝘵 𝘦𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘵 𝘩𝘪𝘨𝘩 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘦𝘥. 𝘋𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘸𝘢𝘪𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘰𝘶𝘤𝘩𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘯.

𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘚𝘵𝘰𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨

𝘋𝘦𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘶𝘯𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘦𝘹𝘪𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘧 3 𝘰𝘳 𝘔𝘈𝘟, 𝘢𝘴 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦. 𝘐𝘧 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘥𝘰𝘶𝘣𝘵 𝘦𝘹𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘴, 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘳𝘶𝘯𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦, 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘔𝘈𝘟 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘣𝘳𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘴.

Data
Data from the DFDR was sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis. A preliminary review of data has been completed and a plot showing the braking parameters is shown in figure 3. Data showed that at touchdown the speed brake lever position [Speed Brake Lever Pos] and auto brake parameters were full up and on for about 5 seconds before transitioning to down and locked and off for the remainder of the landing rollout.

The engine thrust reversers were deployed for the left and right engines for about 27 and 26 seconds respectively at idle reverse. The left and right brake pressure increased to their maximum pressure consistent with aggressive manual braking before and as the airplane’s heading changed consistent with a right turn.

The CVR was removed from the airplane and sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis.

Certified ADS-B data, which records more accurate latitude and longitude data than the DFDR, was provided to the NTSB by the FAA. Analysis of the ADS-B and DFDR data shows that the airplane touched down about 1,000 feet from the runway threshold with a groundspeed of about 158 knots. With about 1,000 ft and 500 ft of runway remaining the airplane groundspeeds were about 72 kts and 57 kts respectively. The right turn to exit the runway was initiated at about 39 kts groundspeed and the aircraft departed the end of the paved surface at about 22 kts (figure 4).

- Report:

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193898/pdf

None of those numbers are lighting me up, even though the implication is that late braking is a cause.

At least on my airplane, the narrative doesn't sound unreasonable to me, although I'm not going to be doing 80kts to 1000' remaining, and I sure ain't gonna try to make a non-highspeed at 40kts.

But it sounds like the CA wasn't getting the braking he expected.

IDK, something something must be DEI.

 

[🦈💜]

Damn, that sucks. It’s hard to manage the FAs sometimes. Too conservative, they get upset or the pax accuse them of being lazy. Not conservative enough, people get seriously injured.

My tactic is to have the FAs sit and make a PA saying that I've asked them to sit.

Let the pax be mad at me, I can take it. (They never are)

 

[CoffeeIcePapers]

My tactic is to have the FAs sit and make a PA saying that I've asked them to sit.

Let the pax be mad at me, I can take it. (They never are)

I see a lot of rants on Twitter about it.

 

[Hacker15e]

IDK, something something must be DEI.

Not following the company's Ops Manual directives on reverser use and autobrakes use, following which your aircraft departs the prepared surface and sustains damage, can be hazardous to one's employment regardless of whom that individual is.

 

[DPApilot]

None of those numbers are lighting me up, even though the implication is that late braking is a cause.

At least on my airplane, the narrative doesn't sound unreasonable to me, although I'm not going to be doing 80kts to 1000' remaining, and I sure ain't gonna try to make a non-highspeed at 40kts.

But it sounds like the CA wasn't getting the braking he expected.

IDK, something something must be DEI.

Well yeah, since they apparently went against company policy. I’m sure I can make a super smooth rollout with auto brakes off, but SouthJet says no, so I do the things they pay me to do. If I want to

 

[DPApilot]

Not following the company's Ops Manual directives on reverser use and autobrakes use, following which your aircraft departs the prepared surface and sustains damage, can be hazardous to one's employment regardless of whom that individual is.

 

[🦈💜]

Well yeah, since they apparently went against company policy. I’m sure I can make a super smooth rollout with auto brakes off, but SouthJet says no, so I do the things they pay me to do. If I want to

Condescending much?

I get that everyone is so super standard that they wouldn't ever violate What The Company Wants(tm), and thus would Never Have An Issue With Anything Ever(tm), but setting that aside for a moment, from the perspective of a lowly 175 driver, the speeds and distances listed don't sound like "shouldn't be able to stop" distance, and that's the whole point I was trying to discuss.

Now I may be completely wrong when it comes to a Real Jet(tm), and I'm sure I'll be schooled by all the 737 drivers, which is actually just fine. Tell me I'm wrong, that 1000' remaining at 80 knots in a heavy 737 is crazy, that rolling to 4000' before braking is pushing it. I'll totally believe it, 100%, and be glad to know more than I did before. Tell me that the definition of "wet" versus "dry," enshrined in the manuals of Said Company, is crystal clear, or that the runway was reported to be wet, or NOTAMed wet, or had lower-than-6 RCCs. Tell me that from an experienced point of view on a given fleet, you're sure the guy was covering his tail. I'm game for any and all of that. I'd love to learn more about the relative performance of various airplanes in similar situations, and even knowing things like how the autobrake system differs from mine. But I don't have access to Said Company procedures, I don't know what those lines are excerpted from, and I'd welcome commentary from people who are actually familiar with it. If you selectively quote things the right way from any manuals, you can hang pretty much any crew any time.

Now, that said, I don't need to hear is how Good You Are at following procedures, or how "Brawndo's got Electrolytes."

And frankly, I REALLY, TRULY DO NOT CARE what SJ policy is. I don't work for SJ, and the airplane in question isn't a SJ airplane. The crew isn't an SJ crew.

I know, crazy huh?

 

[Boris Badenov]

I know, crazy huh?

As far as I'm aware, there are no bonuses given out for clearing the runway at a speed which makes the controller happy. Obviously, one attempts to expedite the flow of traffic to the extent that it conforms to rational safety standards. But there aren't any "get out of jail free" cards associated with that, so I figure that's a "them problem" at the margins. I'm certainly not going to risk my career over it. Hell, I'm going to make a big noise straight in to the CVR mic if I think the *C/A* is risking my career over it. *shrug*.

 

[🦈💜]

As far as I'm aware, there are no bonuses given out for clearing the runway at a speed which makes the controller happy. Obviously, one attempts to expedite the flow of traffic to the extent that it conforms to rational safety standards. But there aren't any "get out of jail free" cards associated with that, so I figure that's a "them problem" at the margins. I'm certainly not going to risk my career over it. Hell, I'm going to make a big noise straight in to the CVR mic if I think the *C/A* is risking my career over it. *shrug*.

100% agree. (But why are you quoting me?)

 

[derg]

I don't know what's even going on.

 

[inigo88]

I don't know what's even going on.

 

[mikecweb]

Condescending much?

I get that everyone is so super standard that they wouldn't ever violate What The Company Wants(tm), and thus would Never Have An Issue With Anything Ever(tm), but setting that aside for a moment, from the perspective of a lowly 175 driver, the speeds and distances listed don't sound like "shouldn't be able to stop" distance, and that's the whole point I was trying to discuss.

Now I may be completely wrong when it comes to a Real Jet(tm), and I'm sure I'll be schooled by all the 737 drivers, which is actually just fine. Tell me I'm wrong, that 1000' remaining at 80 knots in a heavy 737 is crazy, that rolling to 4000' before braking is pushing it. I'll totally believe it, 100%, and be glad to know more than I did before. Tell me that the definition of "wet" versus "dry," enshrined in the manuals of Said Company, is crystal clear, or that the runway was reported to be wet, or NOTAMed wet, or had lower-than-6 RCCs. Tell me that from an experienced point of view on a given fleet, you're sure the guy was covering his tail. I'm game for any and all of that. I'd love to learn more about the relative performance of various airplanes in similar situations, and even knowing things like how the autobrake system differs from mine. But I don't have access to Said Company procedures, I don't know what those lines are excerpted from, and I'd welcome commentary from people who are actually familiar with it. If you selectively quote things the right way from any manuals, you can hang pretty much any crew any time.

Now, that said, I don't need to hear is how Good You Are at following procedures, or how "Brawndo's got Electrolytes."

And frankly, I REALLY, TRULY DO NOT CARE what SJ policy is. I don't work for SJ, and the airplane in question isn't a SJ airplane. The crew isn't an SJ crew.

I know, crazy huh?

 

[CoffeeIcePapers]

I don't know what's even going on.

Someone has an increasingly bigger and bigger chip on their shoulder and is lashing out.

 

[mwflyer]

As far as I'm aware, there are no bonuses given out for clearing the runway at a speed which makes the controller happy. Obviously, one attempts to expedite the flow of traffic to the extent that it conforms to rational safety standards. But there aren't any "get out of jail free" cards associated with that, so I figure that's a "them problem" at the margins. I'm certainly not going to risk my career over it. Hell, I'm going to make a big noise straight in to the CVR mic if I think the *C/A* is risking my career over it. *shrug*.

I made that comment at the beginning of the other thread on this subject when it happened. The whole runway is mine until I clear it. The whole “you can roll to the end if you expedite” is b.s. I can roll to the end if I so choose, if it’s quick enough for you, great. If not, I guess someone is going around.

I’m not putting my career on the line on a contaminated runway because a controller’s got em stacked.

 

[roundout]

I don't know what's even going on.

It’s going off

The runway

 

[cmac88]

I made that comment at the beginning of the other thread on this subject when it happened. The whole runway is mine until I clear it. The whole “you can roll to the end if you expedite” is b.s. I can roll to the end if I so choose, if it’s quick enough for you, great. If not, I guess someone is going around.

I’m not putting my career on the line on a contaminated runway because a controller’s got em stacked.

To be fair the pilot requested to roll to the end and the controller approved it saying that it was fine if he "expedited." The controller didn't put this on him.

 

[Boots2Wings]

Condescending much?

I get that everyone is so super standard that they wouldn't ever violate What The Company Wants(tm), and thus would Never Have An Issue With Anything Ever(tm), but setting that aside for a moment, from the perspective of a lowly 175 driver, the speeds and distances listed don't sound like "shouldn't be able to stop" distance, and that's the whole point I was trying to discuss.

Now I may be completely wrong when it comes to a Real Jet(tm), and I'm sure I'll be schooled by all the 737 drivers, which is actually just fine. Tell me I'm wrong, that 1000' remaining at 80 knots in a heavy 737 is crazy, that rolling to 4000' before braking is pushing it. I'll totally believe it, 100%, and be glad to know more than I did before. Tell me that the definition of "wet" versus "dry," enshrined in the manuals of Said Company, is crystal clear, or that the runway was reported to be wet, or NOTAMed wet, or had lower-than-6 RCCs. Tell me that from an experienced point of view on a given fleet, you're sure the guy was covering his tail. I'm game for any and all of that. I'd love to learn more about the relative performance of various airplanes in similar situations, and even knowing things like how the autobrake system differs from mine. But I don't have access to Said Company procedures, I don't know what those lines are excerpted from, and I'd welcome commentary from people who are actually familiar with it. If you selectively quote things the right way from any manuals, you can hang pretty much any crew any time.

Now, that said, I don't need to hear is how Good You Are at following procedures, or how "Brawndo's got Electrolytes."

And frankly, I REALLY, TRULY DO NOT CARE what SJ policy is. I don't work for SJ, and the airplane in question isn't a SJ airplane. The crew isn't an SJ crew.

I know, crazy huh?

You shouldn't feel the need to denigrate or self deprecate (even in jest) your experience, knowledge, or the bird you fly. I doubt anyone thinks less of you as an aviator because you COMMAND an E175, as you argue what in general, is good and conservative aviating; regardless if its a C172 or a damn heavy.

To your point; 80knts in anything with 1000’ to a turn off, let alone with the end of the runway remaining should be an eyebrow raise…

Cant speak for the shop in question, or in the 737, but specifics at my shop, and in the bus:

1) RCAM anything (since 6 isnt reported) equals at least partial contamination/running of wet numbers.

2) Disarming ground spoilers via the lever is undesirable. Taking it from reverse idle-ground idle (which is done at 70kts), and then hitting them during after landing checklist is the go to.

3) We have to at least go into reverse idle every landing or FOQA gives us a ping, but generally, my rule is go full until I see DECEL so I know autobrakes work, and then I can be smoothy-mic-smooth with rollout.