...the captain forcefully pulled back on the controls, raising the plane's nose and further lowering its speed.
...But at that point, according to people familiar with the details, the captain continued pulling back sharply on the controls and added power, instead of following the proper procedure of pushing forward to lower the nose to get out of a typical stall.
The safety board is looking at general training issues and the specific flight techniques Colgan pilots are taught to use in icing conditions or when an aircraft is entering a stall. In addition, investigators will look into why another Colgan-operated Q400 later experienced the beginning of a stall while approaching the airport in Burlington, Vt.
...stall-recover training...
A few issues here. And this just from a pilot's perspective.
Stalls just don't occur. And I'm sorry to say this, but if you've experienced stick shaker while operating a 121 flight, maybe you need to review why this occured. There are reasons why the stick shaker is there and there are events that have to occur in order to activate the shaker.
If you're flying around at slow airspeeds and encounter turbulence that activates a shaker, you're flying too slow. This is why I am a proponent of configuring the aircraft early during the approach phase, particularly in windy/turbulent conditions. Why not use the highest flap setting available for your given speed to give a larger stall margin? If operating according to your company OPSPECS regarding aircraft speed and configuration during a phase of flight and you encounter a stick shaker, you need to address this sort of thing immediately to a Chief pilot or at least, a check airman. Stick shaker activation is not a normal occurance in flight, its your duty as a pilot to report an event like that to the proper people. You don't shrug off the stick shaker as if its a minor event, turbulence or not. If ATC instructs you to maintain a speed which will not give you sufficient buffet margin in the given turbulent condition, than you need to notify ATC that you are unable that speed. I'm sure the FAA would not shrug off a stick shaker event.
Secondly, why do stall recovery techniques suddenly change when you become a 121 pilot? What is the recovery technique for a stall in a C-172? A Seminole? A Cherokee? The recovery procedures are the same to my knowledge. Add power, decrease angle of attack. What would lead a pilot to change this procedure from what has been a constant training parameter from day 1? Is it the fact that the higher performance of 121 aircraft allow you to "power out" of a stall condition? Again, to my knowledge, powering out of a stall condition is not the recovery technique. Reducing angle of attack and adding power are the cornerstones of stall recovery.
As we progress from a private to commercial level of standard, we learn to recover from a stall condition with minimal altitude loss. But the constants of reducing angle of attack and increasing power still remain the same.
Confusion may be created during 121 training on the windshear scenario. This is the only condition in which I recall would contradict stall recovery techniques, yet with indications of stall. Firewall thrust and a pitch attitude just below the shaker. Its typical to get the shaker during windshear recovery. Other than windshear, the other scenario of confusion for stall recovery would be tail stall.
I don't recall tail stall training on the 1900 while I was at Colgan. It was discussed, but was not practiced in the simulator. One of the key indicators of a tail stall, would be control column buffet. There would be no stall warning on a PFD or airspeed indication. To which the recovery prodecure would be adding power and increasing pitch (back pressure). A certain concern regarding control column buffet on an aicraft with fly-by-wire controls must be noted, but the indicator of a tail stall could catch someone by surprise. The sudden drop in pitch would command and almost instant reaction to pull back on the yoke. Other than the obvious loss of pitch, what other indications would command a pilot to recover from a tail stall? So much so that they induced a wing stall?
If that were the case, serious training needs to be conducted in differentiating a wing stall from a tail stall.
Recovering from stalls is one thing, but to allow an aicraft to approach a stall condition is another. I firmly believe that as paid air carrier pilots, we would never become ignorant to the speed of our aircraft, so much so to be "caught off guard" by stall warnings.
I am by no means pointing fingers or making accusations, if you believe that is my intent, than maybe you need to look a bit further. It just appears to me that there are various opinions on a subject that shouldn't have various opinions. The consequences of making mistakes in this profession are real. 49 people have lost their lives. It would be devastating to learn that such a loss of life occured because of an improper recognition of a stall or improper recovery technique from a condition we have been practicing from the early hours of our training. This should be a wake up call to everyone that we need to review stalls during the approach phase and proper recovery.