WSJ: 3407 to Public Hearing, Ice minimal factor

Must have been really dangerous for a pilot to get their job yanked like that. They couldn't arrange for additional training or anything?
 
Must have been really dangerous for a pilot to get their job yanked like that. They couldn't arrange for additional training or anything?

If Pinnacle management was involved and it would deflect any blame from them, they'll toss a guy under the bus in a heartbeat. Guy that ran off the end of the runway in TVC? FAA and NTSB both said he did what he was trained to do and did it well, but he still ran off the end. They didn't even hit him with any kind of certificate action. Company fired him.
 
Maybe not as uncommon as you think...I've had a shaker while in a hold, going pretty slow and hit some big bumps at about 190-200kts and got a rattle. Certainly surprised me.

ORLY?

Hopefully the CRJ has a touchy stick shaker activator, but I haven't seen it on the Beech, 727, 737, md-88/90 or the 757/67.

That's certainly something the Canadair engineers need to look into.
 
ORLY?

Hopefully the CRJ has a touchy stick shaker activator, but I haven't seen it on the Beech, 727, 737, md-88/90 or the 757/67.

That's certainly something the Canadair engineers need to look into.

EMB-145 actually.

It's not TOO surprising, depending on the conditions. I've seen the PLI bars drop down a few times when bumping along at 190-200 knots, no flaps (generally didn't come until 180 knots) after getting hammered by some moderate chop. As soon as those PLI bars hit the wings on your attitude indicator the shaker goes off.

That being said, in my short year on the line I never got the shaker. I can see how it could happen with how the airplane is put together, though. Keep in mind there are no leading edge devices (unless you count vortilons) and the flaps didn't come out until the minimum speed required (no speed card, flaps 9 come out at 180, flaps 22 come out at 160).
 
ORLY?

Hopefully the CRJ has a touchy stick shaker activator, but I haven't seen it on the Beech, 727, 737, md-88/90 or the 757/67.

That's certainly something the Canadair engineers need to look into.

Wouldn't surprise me if that were the case. This is the only jet I've flown, and the stick shaker is not an uncommon occurrence. As was mentioned, a strong gust when you're slow enough will trigger it. I'm betting similar design techniques were used in the Q.

The way the stall detection works on the CRJ is AoA vanes on the aircraft combine with the indicated speed. From there, the stall computer will determine how close you are to a stall speed and critical angle of attack. Haven't seen it in a while, but you would occasionally get a "stall fail" caution message on the takeoff roll if the AoA vanes went out of whack and disagreed with each other. It was so common and triggered so many aborts Bombardier had to issue alerts saying it was a "known problem" and didn't have to trigger an abort since once air flow was re-established the AoA vanes should return to normal.
 
Darn Canadians. Now I'm totally going to have to tease Toria about this!
 
Oh, true story, last time I said something derogatory aboot the Canadians, I got a bunch of literature in the Jetcareers PO box about the economic impact that Canadian trade has on the state of Arizona.

I guess I struck a nerve and I got a friendly "tap on the shoulder" from the consulate.
 
If Pinnacle management was involved and it would deflect any blame from them, they'll toss a guy under the bus in a heartbeat. Guy that ran off the end of the runway in TVC? FAA and NTSB both said he did what he was trained to do and did it well, but he still ran off the end. They didn't even hit him with any kind of certificate action. Company fired him.

:yeahthat:

I will limit my comments on this due to my involvement w/ the 3407 investigation....and the second incident.

However, I agree there is some level of "tossing under" here. This did not appear to be an egregious error. What it was was an unfortunate case of timing. Had 3407 not occurred, this pilot would 'most likely' not have been fired. There is more to it; but I'm not going to elaborate further. One thing is certain, however, mgmt is out for blood around here to make it look like they are/ have been doing something to prevent accidents.
 
:yeahthat:

I will limit my comments on this due to my involvement w/ the 3407 investigation....and the second incident.

However, I agree there is some level of "tossing under" here. This did not appear to be an egregious error. What it was was an unfortunate case of timing. Had 3407 not occurred, this pilot would 'most likely' not have been fired. There is more to it; but I'm not going to elaborate further. One thing is certain, however, mgmt is out for blood around here to make it look like they are/ have been doing something to prevent accidents.

If this pilot was let go recently... ALPA's got his/her back, right?
 
If this pilot was let go recently... ALPA's got his/her back, right?


Yes and No. Yes ALPA was there for the pilot and recommended a course of action. However, the pilot in question didn't want the help of ALPA. At that point, not much we can do about it.

So, in this case the cliché about 'leading a horse to water' is quite fitting. We're happy to help...but if you don't want it, we're not going to force you to use it.
 
Yes and No. Yes ALPA was there for the pilot and recommended a course of action. However, the pilot in question didn't want the help of ALPA. At that point, not much we can do about it.

So, in this case the cliché about 'leading a horse to water' is quite fitting. We're happy to help...but if you don't want it, we're not going to force you to use it.

If you didnt want ALPAs help, then I say your better off leaving the company and only helping us make it a better place.
 
If Pinnacle management was involved and it would deflect any blame from them, they'll toss a guy under the bus in a heartbeat. Guy that ran off the end of the runway in TVC? FAA and NTSB both said he did what he was trained to do and did it well, but he still ran off the end. They didn't even hit him with any kind of certificate action. Company fired him.

Did ALPA get his job back?
 
Did ALPA get his job back?

ALPA saw it coming and already had the paperwork for the grievance filled out when he got the termination notice. I don't think he WANTED the job back, actually. Not sure if they got him back pay or not, but I know they were fighting for it.
 
...the captain forcefully pulled back on the controls, raising the plane's nose and further lowering its speed.


...But at that point, according to people familiar with the details, the captain continued pulling back sharply on the controls and added power, instead of following the proper procedure of pushing forward to lower the nose to get out of a typical stall.



The safety board is looking at general training issues and the specific flight techniques Colgan pilots are taught to use in icing conditions or when an aircraft is entering a stall. In addition, investigators will look into why another Colgan-operated Q400 later experienced the beginning of a stall while approaching the airport in Burlington, Vt.

...stall-recover training...


A few issues here. And this just from a pilot's perspective.

Stalls just don't occur. And I'm sorry to say this, but if you've experienced stick shaker while operating a 121 flight, maybe you need to review why this occured. There are reasons why the stick shaker is there and there are events that have to occur in order to activate the shaker.

If you're flying around at slow airspeeds and encounter turbulence that activates a shaker, you're flying too slow. This is why I am a proponent of configuring the aircraft early during the approach phase, particularly in windy/turbulent conditions. Why not use the highest flap setting available for your given speed to give a larger stall margin? If operating according to your company OPSPECS regarding aircraft speed and configuration during a phase of flight and you encounter a stick shaker, you need to address this sort of thing immediately to a Chief pilot or at least, a check airman. Stick shaker activation is not a normal occurance in flight, its your duty as a pilot to report an event like that to the proper people. You don't shrug off the stick shaker as if its a minor event, turbulence or not. If ATC instructs you to maintain a speed which will not give you sufficient buffet margin in the given turbulent condition, than you need to notify ATC that you are unable that speed. I'm sure the FAA would not shrug off a stick shaker event.

Secondly, why do stall recovery techniques suddenly change when you become a 121 pilot? What is the recovery technique for a stall in a C-172? A Seminole? A Cherokee? The recovery procedures are the same to my knowledge. Add power, decrease angle of attack. What would lead a pilot to change this procedure from what has been a constant training parameter from day 1? Is it the fact that the higher performance of 121 aircraft allow you to "power out" of a stall condition? Again, to my knowledge, powering out of a stall condition is not the recovery technique. Reducing angle of attack and adding power are the cornerstones of stall recovery.

As we progress from a private to commercial level of standard, we learn to recover from a stall condition with minimal altitude loss. But the constants of reducing angle of attack and increasing power still remain the same.

Confusion may be created during 121 training on the windshear scenario. This is the only condition in which I recall would contradict stall recovery techniques, yet with indications of stall. Firewall thrust and a pitch attitude just below the shaker. Its typical to get the shaker during windshear recovery. Other than windshear, the other scenario of confusion for stall recovery would be tail stall.

I don't recall tail stall training on the 1900 while I was at Colgan. It was discussed, but was not practiced in the simulator. One of the key indicators of a tail stall, would be control column buffet. There would be no stall warning on a PFD or airspeed indication. To which the recovery prodecure would be adding power and increasing pitch (back pressure). A certain concern regarding control column buffet on an aicraft with fly-by-wire controls must be noted, but the indicator of a tail stall could catch someone by surprise. The sudden drop in pitch would command and almost instant reaction to pull back on the yoke. Other than the obvious loss of pitch, what other indications would command a pilot to recover from a tail stall? So much so that they induced a wing stall?

If that were the case, serious training needs to be conducted in differentiating a wing stall from a tail stall.

Recovering from stalls is one thing, but to allow an aicraft to approach a stall condition is another. I firmly believe that as paid air carrier pilots, we would never become ignorant to the speed of our aircraft, so much so to be "caught off guard" by stall warnings.

I am by no means pointing fingers or making accusations, if you believe that is my intent, than maybe you need to look a bit further. It just appears to me that there are various opinions on a subject that shouldn't have various opinions. The consequences of making mistakes in this profession are real. 49 people have lost their lives. It would be devastating to learn that such a loss of life occured because of an improper recognition of a stall or improper recovery technique from a condition we have been practicing from the early hours of our training. This should be a wake up call to everyone that we need to review stalls during the approach phase and proper recovery.
 
First of all, the chief is the LAST person I'm going to go to if I think I need some additional training. There are some other routes you can take WELL before that.

Second, not every aircraft is the same. As somebody noted above, it's possible to get the shaker for a second or two in the EMB-145 during moderate turbulence in a hold at 190/200 knots. I don't know anything about the -170/175, but I imagine the system is pretty similar. I imagine if the AOA veins that are at the front of the diving board...erm...EMB-145, get kicked around a little too much you'll get your PLI's dropping down REALLY fast and if it goes too far, then you get the shaker. You might well not be stalled, or anywhere near it, but it's possible to happen.

I'd be careful about making broad generalizations about aircraft you don't fly, including the Q.
 
<stall recovery technique>

If you browse up, specifically looking at my post(s), I am quoting word for word almost exactly the stall recovery technique in our aircraft. There is no "lowering the nose" involved in our stall recovery. Otherwise, don't you think it'd say so in our manuals?

In regards to self-reporting events, if you want to have a long career at the airlines, any "reportable" event, as defined in your operations manual ONLY, should be made through de-identified channels. The way the airlines work, and the FAA as well, isn't the way you'd think of traditionally correcting a problem (through training). The easiest way to fix things in 121 is to "make it go away" ie fire someone. It happens.
 
A few issues here. And this just from a pilot's perspective.

Stalls just don't occur. And I'm sorry to say this, but if you've experienced stick shaker while operating a 121 flight, maybe you need to review why this occured. There are reasons why the stick shaker is there and there are events that have to occur in order to activate the shaker.

Stick shaker isn't a stall. Means you're approaching a stall.

If you're flying around at slow airspeeds and encounter turbulence that activates a shaker, you're flying too slow.

I'll make sure I "see and avoid" the windshear that's set it off before.

Why not use the highest flap setting available for your given speed to give a larger stall margin? If operating according to your company OPSPECS regarding aircraft speed and configuration during a phase of flight and you encounter a stick shaker, you need to address this sort of thing immediately to a Chief pilot or at least, a check airman. Stick shaker activation is not a normal occurance in flight, its your duty as a pilot to report an event like that to the proper people. You don't shrug off the stick shaker as if its a minor event, turbulence or not. If ATC instructs you to maintain a speed which will not give you sufficient buffet margin in the given turbulent condition, than you need to notify ATC that you are unable that speed. I'm sure the FAA would not shrug off a stick shaker event.

What's your definition of buffet margin? Mine is vref for the configuration plus 10 knots. I'd say that's a pretty safe speed.

Secondly, why do stall recovery techniques suddenly change when you become a 121 pilot?

Simple. We go faster and have more potential thrust than a piston. Pistons can nose down and pick up speed without an large loss of altitude. What happens when you nose over in a jet? How much altitude do you lose in comparison to a piston? That's why you power out of a stall at lower altitude. You use the excess thrust the engines have rather than losing altitude.

Again, to my knowledge, powering out of a stall condition is not the recovery technique. Reducing angle of attack and adding power are the cornerstones of stall recovery.

Might not be for the E175, I wouldn't know. It is for the CRJ-200.

If that were the case, serious training needs to be conducted in differentiating a wing stall from a tail stall.

I agree on this, but there's a difference. You won't get the shaker on a tail stall since the wing is technically still flying.

Recovering from stalls is one thing, but to allow an aicraft to approach a stall condition is another. I firmly believe that as paid air carrier pilots, we would never become ignorant to the speed of our aircraft, so much so to be "caught off guard" by stall warnings.

You do realize that by landing you're allowing the airplane to approach a stall condition, right? How many hours do you have in the CRJ-200? I don't know what the stall characteristics or the systems are on the E175 or the B1900, so I can't say a whole lot about them. But I can give you a dissertation on my experience in the sim and the actual airplane when it comes to the systems, warnings, flying characteristics and techniques when it comes to the CRJ. I won't pretend to know how your airplane flies. Please don't assume you know how mine flies.

I am by no means pointing fingers or making accusations, if you believe that is my intent, than maybe you need to look a bit further.

Your tone in the message seems to be doing exactly that, though.
 
:yeahthat:

Not to mention, the shaker and pusher activate at a computer determined speed. Say you were to forget the increased ref switch was on, and fly clean speeds, you will(it's been proven, trust me) get the shaker and or pusher. Even though you were nowhere near a stall, and at the appropriate speed.
 
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