Re: Who Owns The MU2\'s at BWI?
Excerpt of article from Aviation Consumer follows:
Mitsubishi MU-2
A capable, if unusual, turboprop, but its workload and handling are demanding enough that it can bite the unwary. Training is critical.
Though it seems there’s little room inside an
MU-2, it’s an illusion: owners report spacious,
though noisy, cabins.
Pilots browsing through the light turboprops as a natural step up from a piston twin might be drawn to the Mitsubishi MU-2s by the lure of dazzling speed, unbeatable short-field work and a less-than-shocking purchase price. However, the airplane has a reputation as being “hot” and dangerous. Most owners attribute this to bad press, but the press had to come from somewhere: in this case, it was the accident rate, which was very high in the early years—so high that the FAA considered requiring a type rating for the MU-2. That never came to pass, however.
So, is the MU-2 unsafe? Owners universally say “no, but....” The “but” is the need for initial and recurrent training. One respondent said that he’s already been to Flight Safety twice this year, and is planning to go again. That’s higher than average, but all of the owners who replied to our request for feedback stressed the need for good training.
Safety record
The MU-2 has, in the past, displayed a greater than average accident rate, which is the underlying cause of its reputation. However, of late operators seem to be more cognizant of the need for recurrent training, and the rate has fallen. It’s also difficult to draw statistically valid conclusions due to the overall low number of accidents. Nevertheless, the record is instructive and highlights the areas pilots need to be aware of. For example, the number two accident problem with the MU-2 models in a 13-year accident rundown turned out to be hard landings. The number three problem area was undershoots—as might be expected in an aircraft that can be set up for a high sink rate on final, with the possibility of getting behind the power curve.
The leading probable cause for accidents in the MU-2 was engine failure. This was also blamed for the greatest number of fatal accidents in the MU-2—three. This is somewhat deceptive: on all three of these fatals, only one engine failed, but the pilot was unable to make a safe return with the remaining powerplant. A stall/spin was blamed in each case, with the pilots accused of “diverting attention” from flying the aircraft. All this reinforces the case for recurrent training.
This might suggest that the loss of an engine, especially on takeoff and climbout and in the landing pattern, can he a serious cause for concern in the MU-2. In fact, the only safe return with an engine out was made when the failure occurred during normal cruise and the pilot apparently had the time to sort things out and make it to an airport. The airplane, like other turboprops, is certainly able to fly on one engine; however, the pilot has to stay ahead of matters.
It should be noted that the six engine failure accidents (and one incident) were all evidently the result of some sort of malfunction. Another four engine failures occurred because of fuel exhaustion, caused, in turn, by pilot mismanagement; and three other fuel exhaustion accidents were the result of mechanical failures.
Though there are three main sets of fuel tanks in the MU-2, the monitoring system would not appear to be inordinately demanding. There is one main tank in the central wing section into which outer wing tanks feed by electrical fuel pump and into which the tip tanks feed by pressurization from engine bleed air.
Since both engines feed from the center tanks, there is not even a need for crossfeed arrangement, and all the pilot has to do is monitor the transfer of fuel from the outer tanks into the center ones. We noted no accidents from landing with asymmetrical tip loadings.
The last significant cause of MU-2 accidents disclosed in the NTSB briefs is gear-up landings. In the years surveyed there were seven of these altogether—and in four of these the pilot simply forgot to lower the gear.
Excerpt from Aviation Consumer article ends.