V2 and the 4 segment climb

I can dig that. I'm surprised a check airmen is getting bent out of shape about being within V2+10 but your data that is telling you that V2+10 is based off the "measure with a micrometer, mark with a grease pencil, cut it with a hatchet" mentality.

I think this is a good picture into what is, IMO, one of the biggest problems we have right now.

Oh I agree completely. The flip side of it, though, is that they pay us to fly their profile, and thus, I'll fly the profile.

Now if I ran the training department, we'd do things a little differently.
 
Vmc is also used in multi engine flying to describe Velocity minimum control. Since we are talking about single engine ops in multi engine A/C, I could see the confusion.<edited>.

Which leads me to your respones to ppraggman. I am pretty sure he's done the freight dog piston airplane thing, so he might not know a lot about jet flying. However, the plane I think he SIGNS for now is a Caravan. So I think he was asking a decent question about airspeed, since in piston multi flying airspeed can be your friend. (See Vmc). <edited>

So what A/C do you sign for when you go to work? Last I read you are an FO at a southeast regional? If you've since been upgraded, well then congrats captian. And for clarity I sign for a Lear 45 that I am captian on when i go to work. Are we done measuring yet?

Vmc = airspeed

VMC = Visual Meteorological Conditions.

I sign for no aircraft. Wasn't a measuring stick at all, but good job going there. Nice use of tool bag too, perhaps you should be a little bit slower in trying to jump to someone's defense when they were not being attacked. Not really making yourself look all that agreeable in Doug's living room really.

I can't possibly keep track of where EVERYONE on this forum works, or what equipment they're flying. But if someone isn't familiar with OEI jet operations, then I can't honestly expect them to understand why flying at V2+(airspeed additive) is so important. At least as an SIC or PIC in a jet, you shouldn't be bugging out on one engine at 300ft at a speed that is significantly faster than V2.
 
Exactly. You guys have a speed RANGE to fly, where we have one single speed to fly (as it's trained, I guess I could stop being lazy and double check that we don't have a V2 to V2 + 10 speed range, but I'm guessing it DOESN'T exist because every sim instructor and check airman we saw was on our ass if we were 2-3 knots above V2). Because of that, I have no idea what kind of buffer we're dealing with.

Yeah, I dunno. I think I have a CFM Vol. 1 hanging around here somewhere...

Tough to say about the V2 range without looking at the manual. Case in point: I had a sim instructor who'd be on my ass if I was a knot above V2+15 in a normal takeoff profile, even though the profile is V2+15 to V2+25 to acceleration height. Oh well, like you said, just do what bossman says in the sim.
 
Vmc is also used in multi engine flying to describe Velocity minimum control. Since we are talking about single engine ops in multi engine A/C, I could see the confusion. <edited>

Which leads me to your respones to ppraggman. I am pretty sure he's done the freight dog piston airplane thing, so he might not know a lot about jet flying. However, the plane I think he SIGNS for now is a Caravan. So I think he was asking a decent question about airspeed, since in piston multi flying airspeed can be your friend. (See Vmc). <edited>

So what A/C do you sign for when you go to work? Last I read you are an FO at a southeast regional? If you've since been upgraded, well then congrats captian. And for clarity I sign for a Lear 45 that I am captian on when i go to work. Are we done measuring yet?

ppragman has time in a 1900 and thus should understand all of these concepts.
 
MikeD mentioned American 191 in Chicago back in 1979. They slowed to the profile and promptly lost control. I'm NOT saying that it is wrong to fly the profile at all, or arguing with Jtrain on this topic because there are obviously excellent reasons to fly the profile. Also, AA191 had some anomolies - FO was flying and had no stick-shaker, slats retracted because of lost hydraulic pressure, and just a bad set of facts for these guys to deal with. Question is though - within the profiles - how much do you follow them by rote and how much are you open to "whatever works and whatever allows us to maintain control"? I've always been fascinated by the AA191 crash precisely for that reason - the cockpit crew did exactly what they were instructed to do with precision - and it killed them. How do you apply the lessons of that crash to this topic? Is the answer as simple as "Always fly the profile...and sometimes it's your time to go so tough-titty". I'm thinking that could actually BE the answer because I'm not sure there are any real ways to prepare for something like AA191.
 
I love these arguments.

V+eleventybillion is what I do.

Fly the book, whatever it may be. If you fly the book, on profile, or as close to it with as little positive variance, you're going to reach that acceleration height and be able to continue your climb at Vt earlier than if you decided to keep a lower pitch with a faster airspeed. Thus, potentially, not getting your obstacle clearence. Although, the TERPs are pretty conservative - but OEI is no time to be trying to create your own profile in IMC.

VMC = Visual meteorological conditions. The opposite of IMC, Instrument Meteorological Conditions.



Just for my own information, what type jet have you been responsible for? I just can't remember what types you are, or have flown in the past. But I would have figured that someone who has gone through some initial jet training for any jet type would understand the importance of gaining ALTITUDE rather than DISTANCE / AIRSPEED at a low altitude with only one motor.

Climb. On profile. Reach your MEA/MSA whatever, and get your ass back on the ground safely.

So let me make sure I've got the this right. For your own info, you simply couldn't ask what your background is or what type of equipment you fly? You just had to ask what airplane he signs for? Because every time I meet a pilot, I ask, hey what type of airplane you sign for? Instead of hey man whatcha flyin? Your're right, your way is sooooo much better in Dougs living room. We both know you've been a bit snarky on here in the past and will probably continue to be. You chose your words carefully, they didn't just come fylin out of your mouth all willy nilly. So, I took that as being rude in Dougs living room.
 
MikeD mentioned American 191 in Chicago back in 1979. They slowed to the profile and promptly lost control. I'm NOT saying that it is wrong to fly the profile at all, or arguing with Jtrain on this topic because there are obviously excellent reasons to fly the profile. Also, AA191 had some anomolies - FO was flying and had no stick-shaker, slats retracted because of lost hydraulic pressure, and just a bad set of facts for these guys to deal with. Question is though - within the profiles - how much do you follow them by rote and how much are you open to "whatever works and whatever allows us to maintain control"? I've always been fascinated by the AA191 crash precisely for that reason - the cockpit crew did exactly what they were instructed to do with precision - and it killed them. How do you apply the lessons of that crash to this topic? Is the answer as simple as "Always fly the profile...and sometimes it's your time to go so tough-titty". I'm thinking that could actually BE the answer because I'm not sure there are any real ways to prepare for something like AA191.

It's an interesting question, but it's also got an interesting flip side; how many pilots have killed themselves when they deviated from the profile? A lot. Making up procedures on the fly when you're very likely under the gun to get things done right the first time lends itself to mistakes, which is why you drill profiles and procedures so hard.

But frankly you're talking about statistical averages. Let's say that 95% of the time, if you follow the procedure you'll come out alive. Is it really worth chancing it that you're in that 5% range? Generally I don't think so, though there are always exceptions. American 191 was one of those exceptions, but for that one exception, there are countless other examples where somebody deviated from the profile/procedure and ended up riding it in.
 
MikeD mentioned American 191 in Chicago back in 1979. They slowed to the profile and promptly lost control. I'm NOT saying that it is wrong to fly the profile at all, or arguing with Jtrain on this topic because there are obviously excellent reasons to fly the profile. Also, AA191 had some anomolies - FO was flying and had no stick-shaker, slats retracted because of lost hydraulic pressure, and just a bad set of facts for these guys to deal with. Question is though - within the profiles - how much do you follow them by rote and how much are you open to "whatever works and whatever allows us to maintain control"? I've always been fascinated by the AA191 crash precisely for that reason - the cockpit crew did exactly what they were instructed to do with precision - and it killed them. How do you apply the lessons of that crash to this topic? Is the answer as simple as "Always fly the profile...and sometimes it's your time to go so tough-titty". I'm thinking that could actually BE the answer because I'm not sure there are any real ways to prepare for something like AA191.

They were at (IIRC) V2 + 6 or or thereabouts and under control, but slowed to V2 as per the profile, yet there was no way for them to know that it would kill them. Still, one has to wonder that when VMC WX-wise, and obstacle clearance isn't an issue, if it wouldn't be prudent to accept the extra 10-15 knots of speed, especially in the hindsight of having a damaged aircraft. Again, there was no way for 191s crew to know any different, but their accident provides a good amount of learning for "what if's" for other aircrews.

It's similar to the "past V1 we're going to take it" mentality. To me, that depends. I have certain criteria of aircraft that I will not take airborne, period. If I have a fuselage/cabin fire or some sort of structural damage on takeoff roll past V1, Id take the high-speed abort over taking an obviously damaged or getting further damaged aircraft airborne, that will likely end up with me being a smoking hole in the ground a mile or so past the departure end into some neighborhood. Whereas a past-V1 abort for certain very specific situations would likely be more survivable; be it ending up in the overrun, or the barrier/arresting gear, or somewhat beyond. It all depends, just as it depends whats off the end of the runway. There are places like Sedona, AZ where my way of thinking simply won't work, lest you drop off the end of the runway and down the cliff to your death. There are so many variables and I insure to brief these before each departure, as each one could potentially be different. With an ejection seat, there was added criteria to consider.

To date, I haven't been put in the position to have to make that decision yet, but have had an engine failure past refusal speed in the Hog, and having a 46,000 lb aircraft losing one of its 9000 lb thrust engines on takeoff isn't fun, especially when there's nowhere clear to jettison ordnance off the end of the runway.
 
It's an interesting question, but it's also got an interesting flip side; how many pilots have killed themselves when they deviated from the profile? A lot. Making up procedures on the fly when you're very likely under the gun to get things done right the first time lends itself to mistakes, which is why you drill profiles and procedures so hard.

But frankly you're talking about statistical averages. Let's say that 95% of the time, if you follow the procedure you'll come out alive. Is it really worth chancing it that you're in that 5% range? Generally I don't think so, though there are always exceptions. American 191 was one of those exceptions, but for that one exception, there are countless other examples where somebody deviated from the profile/procedure and ended up riding it in.

It just all depends. Procedures are there, but don't cover all circumstances. Judgement and airmanship do have to come into play in those 5% times AND at the other times so you don't end up in that 5%. American 191 lost while going by the info they had at the time. United 232 had nothing to go by and had to fly completely by deviation. It just all depends.
 
So let me make sure I've got the this right. For your own info, you simply couldn't ask what your background is or what type of equipment you fly? You just had to ask what airplane he signs for? Because every time I meet a pilot, I ask, hey what type of airplane you sign for? Instead of hey man whatcha flyin? Your're right, your way is sooooo much better in Dougs living room. We both know you've been a bit snarky on here in the past and will probably continue to be. You chose your words carefully, they didn't just come fylin out of your mouth all willy nilly. So, I took that as being rude in Dougs living room.

Pat's his own guy. I certainly hope I didn't offend him. I also expect that he is reasonable enough to know when someone is making a dig at him and asking a single question, with an added sentence for clarity of context.

Being responsible for a type of jet means more than simply signing for the airframe and taking PIC responsibility. I'm sure you allow your SIC's to fly the plane on a couple takeoffs and landings right? I wasn't sure if Pat had moved into new equipment recently, or what his airframe past was, that perhaps he had not been through an SIC or PIC type ride or initial type course for a jet. Honest question, but you want to go ahead and magnify that subject and come charging in on your white horse to supposedly save him from your perception of an attack.

I find even some of the most outspoken people on this forum to be quite reasonable, but you don't seem to be that outspoken and I haven't seen you post enough to make a determination on your rhetoric, but just from this simple exchange things are becoming a bit clearer now. I'm glad you know all about my posting history and my rhetoric. That being the case, it would appear to me that there is no real convincing of you that my statement wasn't an attack on Pat. Perhaps work on being a bit more reasonable and patient before charting a course into rough seas.

You ready to move on and allow the guys to discuss the subject at hand?

MikeD said:
American 191 lost while going by the info they had at the time. United 232 had nothing to go by and had to fly completely by deviation. It just all depends.

Internet at work is slow...but AA191 was the DC-10 incident at ORD correct?

From what I recall, those guys didn't deviate from the profile outside of not being able to fly the plane through a catastrophic control surface failure that no crew would have been that successful with, especially considering the cockpit technology and safety tools available to them at the time.
 
It just all depends. Procedures are there, but don't cover all circumstances. Judgement and airmanship do have to come into play in those 5% times AND at the other times so you don't end up in that 5%. American 191 lost while going by the info they had at the time. United 232 had nothing to go by and had to fly completely by deviation. It just all depends.

Good points, but let's address another.

Don't be a hero. We're pilots, but we need to remember that the profiles and procedures were thought up when nobody was on fire and could think through what should be done. I'm saying that more specifically to the guys out there with low experience levels. When you have low total time, or low time in type, you're likely not in the position to make up procedures on the fly in MOST situations.

Which I think leads to why the United 232 guys were successful, they had nearly a billiondy hours up front in that thing and they were able to make things happen. I generally don't think you'd have the same result with a captain and first officer who had 100 hours each in the aircraft.

Generally, I think it's safe to assume that the ability to flex the procedures to the situation is a sliding scale that's related to experience and knowledge of the aircraft.
 
It really is amazing how much time and development goes into single-engine departure procedures. The guys at AeroData or any other vendors don't mess around when it comes to keeping us from hitting the ground.

Trust them. Reduce your liability. Fly standard. On Profile.

It may end up saving your life.

Do we really want to end up talking about poor CRM and deviating from company procedures (4-1-0 Dude!).
 
Good points, but let's address another.

Don't be a hero. We're pilots, but we need to remember that the profiles and procedures were thought up when nobody was on fire and could think through what should be done. I'm saying that more specifically to the guys out there with low experience levels. When you have low total time, or low time in type, you're likely not in the position to make up procedures on the fly in MOST situations.

Which I think leads to why the United 232 guys were successful, they had nearly a billiondy hours up front in that thing and they were able to make things happen. I generally don't think you'd have the same result with a captain and first officer who had 100 hours each in the aircraft.

Generally, I think it's safe to assume that the ability to flex the procedures to the situation is a sliding scale that's related to experience and knowledge of the aircraft.

It really is amazing how much time and development goes into single-engine departure procedures. The guys at AeroData or any other vendors don't mess around when it comes to keeping us from hitting the ground.

Trust them. Reduce your liability. Fly standard. On Profile.

It may end up saving your life.

Do we really want to end up talking about poor CRM and deviating from company procedures (4-1-0 Dude!).

I fully agree. However I'm also saying that there are times when one must be able to be flexible to the unexpected. Pinnacle 3701 doesn't really fit into this particular discussion in the sense that the crew had no safety or situational reason for doing the deviation they were doing other than showing off. Procedures are the baseline and should always be followed to the maximum extent possible, but NO procedure fully replaces good judgement for situations that may not be covered by the book. Being a complete drone to a procedure regardless of the situation at hand, is the flip-side to the coin of being one who throws all procedures out the window. Being able to flex in times when flex is necessary, also may save your life someday.

I wrote this back in the day regarding the accident of NASA 712 in 1985:

As mentioned before, V1 philosophy has always been predicated on engine loss go/no go. V1 has evolved to become an abort speed for nearly any emergency that may require an abort. The biggest reasons for standardized abort procedures is simply due to the fact that a rote response is needed for times when the split-second decision needs to be made at high speed with little time, and the crew must respond in coordinated action. But should V1 training be modified to become somewhat situationally dependant for below-V1 continuations? Who knows. My opinion still stands that many RTOs are a gut call based on the situation at hand and the training/experience of the crew. There are many factors that the crew can control, yet many possibilities that the crew has no control over, again situational-dependant. For example, there are some emergencies where I'll easily abort past refusal speed. One example would be an engine failure in my former aircraft when the WX is low IFR and there's little chance I'd be able to work the problem in VMC. Any type of engine fire would be another one [engines in the airframe, not on detachable pylons]. Another example in my former aircraft would be dual generator failure with a takeoff that would put me in IMC (simply due to the myriad of problems that it would cause in-cockpit, and especially the fact that I'd be facing flight controls that have a limited lifetime left from battery-only; approximately 10-15 minutes before complete loss of FBW). But again, those are factors for my particular airplane and may or may not apply to another aircraft or another pilot; so as I often say, it really does depend. My decisions on these was also based on the fact that I had a drag chute and runway arresting gear available that I could use, but my point is that it's sometimes very situational-dependant. ....

Full report here, for anyone interested:

http://forums.jetcareers.com/technical-talk/91792-when-mr-murphy-rides-your-jumpseat.html
 
They were at (IIRC) V2 + 6 or or thereabouts and under control, but slowed to V2 as per the profile, yet there was no way for them to know that it would kill them. Still, one has to wonder that when VMC WX-wise, and obstacle clearance isn't an issue, if it wouldn't be prudent to accept the extra 10-15 knots of speed, especially in the hindsight of having a damaged aircraft. Again, there was no way for 191s crew to know any different, but their accident provides a good amount of learning for "what if's" for other aircrews.

It's similar to the "past V1 we're going to take it" mentality. To me, that depends. I have certain criteria of aircraft that I will not take airborne, period. If I have a fuselage/cabin fire or some sort of structural damage on takeoff roll past V1, Id take the high-speed abort over taking an obviously damaged or getting further damaged aircraft airborne, that will likely end up with me being a smoking hole in the ground a mile or so past the departure end into some neighborhood. Whereas a past-V1 abort for certain very specific situations would likely be more survivable; be it ending up in the overrun, or the barrier/arresting gear, or somewhat beyond. It all depends, just as it depends whats off the end of the runway. There are places like Sedona, AZ where my way of thinking simply won't work, lest you drop off the end of the runway and down the cliff to your death. There are so many variables and I insure to brief these before each departure, as each one could potentially be different. With an ejection seat, there was added criteria to consider.

To date, I haven't been put in the position to have to make that decision yet, but have had an engine failure past refusal speed in the Hog, and having a 46,000 lb aircraft losing one of its 9000 lb thrust engines on takeoff isn't fun, especially when there's nowhere clear to jettison ordnance off the end of the runway.


Mike, pardon me for being a little ignorant, but what are the T-1 guys taught in regards to V1/V2 cuts, etc?
 
Mike, pardon me for being a little ignorant, but what are the T-1 guys taught in regards to V1/V2 cuts, etc?

I would have to claim ignorance too on this end, as didn't go through that phase. Ian the C-5 pilot could likely answer here though.
 
Trying to save airspeed, gain altitude, and keep the plane from hitting something...is not the time to be making up your own procedures though.

I'm sure you've heard of rolling the clock back.

Focus on the most pressing issue. Keeping airspeed and gaining altitude. Reach acceleration altitude, follow your profile - because that's what you were trained to do - and that's what the company that is trusting you with their equipment to do. Once you have TIME to figure something out, go ahead - get creative. Do what you need to do.

It's different being a crew at FL350 and losing control surfaces, and being a crew that just popped a motor at V1+5kts staring at a quickly approaching treeline and some form of clearway. That crew at 350 at least has TIME to get creative, the crew popping the motor has a very small window of opportunity to salvage their lives. Do what you were trained to do, get creative at altitude if it's required.
 
Trying to save airspeed, gain altitude, and keep the plane from hitting something...is not the time to be making up your own procedures though.

I'm sure you've heard of rolling the clock back.

Focus on the most pressing issue. Keeping airspeed and gaining altitude. Reach acceleration altitude, follow your profile - because that's what you were trained to do - and that's what the company that is trusting you with their equipment to do. Once you have TIME to figure something out, go ahead - get creative. Do what you need to do.

It's different being a crew at FL350 and losing control surfaces, and being a crew that just popped a motor at V1+5kts staring at a quickly approaching treeline and some form of clearway. That crew at 350 at least has TIME to get creative, the crew popping the motor has a very small window of opportunity to salvage their lives. Do what you were trained to do, get creative at altitude if it's required.

All very true. And to add that with the variables of whats off the end of the runway? Are you VMC? If so, are there any obstacles? Maybe its Iowa corn fields with nothing but flat earth around and you're severely lightweight. Could go on and on, but the point being is knowing your situation prior to takeoff with your aircraft, how much power or control you may have, what's surrounding the area of the airport, whats off the end of the runway, etc, etc. It's the reason that no takeoff brief is truly "standard", as the variables of the above and more, are always different.

Sure, in a situation where you have little wiggle room, such as obstacles, IMC departure, etc; the procedures are really all there is, as there is very little room for flexibility. Taking into account the "totality of circumstances" in the departure brief, should give a crew or pilot an idea of just how much reasonable flexibility in addition to established procedures that he may or may not have for that particular takeoff, should something really out of the ordinary go wrong.
 
Yup.

It's a pretty standard briefing item in the 121 world. It's in our departure briefing before we leave the gate, and once again in our takeoff briefing. Most of us are wise enough that if it is VMC, or a simple single engine departure procedure (straight out, climb to 1000ft), there really is no debate because we can visually maintain our seperation and the 121 regulatory planning has been completed by the dispatcher that sent us a valid release indicating the proper weight for obstacle clearences have been calculated for. Let's go. We're going to clear the 35ft fence with little concern unless we lose BOTH engines, and well...no 121 regulatory planning requirement for two engine aircraft lol. :)
 
Look, i don't post that much on here because a lot brighter people tend to have most of the same answers or better ones than I would come up with. I prob wouldn't add any real substance to a discussion other to repeat what people have already said (which seems to happen enough as it is). I will apologize for having such a quick temper, I took your two posts (parts or all of) up to that point to be nothing short of a smart ass type response. Jtrain answered the VMC/Vmc question and you decided to explain that it was a term the meteorologist use to describe wx. It had the feel of being talked down too. I know its hard to get a feeling of tone on the internet. For some reason your tone rubs me the wrong way, but I'm an adult and thats my issue not yours. Again I apologize, I'll put my white horse in the stable and go back to learning from listening and reading and less typing.

For info, the lear 45 is V2+10 as well. During a V1 cut we accell to that and bug that speed. I always wondered why at xjt it was V2. People smarter then myself came up with it so we flew it.
 
Please take part more often. Not sure where you're located, but go to a M&G. Get to know these folks here. It's a great community with great people, even if we don't always see eye to eye when reading each other's rhetoric-laced phrases.

As a meteorologist, considering that pilots - generally - know very little about the science of our atmosphere, I do tend to highlight some of the phrases not usually recognized by even ATP rated folks. That's all.
 
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