V1 cuts anyone?
- Thread starter TallFlyer
- Start date
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
Perhaps he meant "it put the controlled fires that make the bladey-things spin out".
If they were at V1 then they would have continued, no? It's typically very difficult for non-pilot bystanders to judge aircraft speed if memory serves.
Hacker15e
Who am I? Where are my pants?
Perhaps I'm confused on this one, but isn't V1 your "stop" speed (ergo, the maximum speed that you can accelerate to, lose an engine, and stop in the remaining runway distance)?
It's 'decision' speed. Below V1 stop, at or above V1 continue the take-off.
Screaming_Emu
Well-Known Member
You know that's something I've wondered about a lot.
I may have, but I don't think I've had a single engine failure in the sim that wasn't either early in the takeoff roll making it an obvious abort, right at V1 making it seem kind of "canned", or a flameout in more or less level flight.
While I get it that V1 is pretty much the worst time it could happen, it can happen in any phase of flight and the canned response to a failure right at V1 might be slightly different.
I think it would be a good idea to include engine failures in the initial climb out stage but after V1, thus varying the required steps ever so slightly. I feel with every engine failure looking exactly the same, any variation may cause a delayed or inappropriate response.
Another thing I'd like to see in the sim is losing an engine on final. Jets have a lot of flaps out that create a lot of drag. Our normal procedure for a single engine landing is to land at flaps 20 instead of flaps 45. Its not unfathomable to ingest a bird on short final and to have to deal with the problem that close to the ground.
Our training department is pretty good, but I'm starting to feel that because of poor design of the airplane and some recent events, more of the time in the sim is being spent retraining the obvious (watching the stick pusher recover from a stall on its own) and coming up with extra procedures instead of fixing problems with the airplane (zero flap landings out the ying yang, turning on the wing anti ice for a second before departure if OAT is less than 5, even if its clear and a million, etc)
Hacker15e
Who am I? Where are my pants?
I'm assuming that most aircraft have assumptions built into these V speeds, like reaction time (AF aircraft do...). In other words, the speed is calculated to allow a pilot to contemplate the decision to abort or continue for a few seconds, all the while accelerating at takeoff power.
So, the reality is in these aircraft, there's a b.s. factor built into the numbers so that the "wrong" decision (ergo, deciding to abort above V1) won't necessarily result in rolling off the end of the runway. In other words, the "canned response" right at the critical speed isn't as critical as it might appear.
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
You'll doubtless require a few seconds to realign the mental model although the end result is the same - continue. Your reflexes are conditioned for reacting to a different and arguably more critical situation, although at 400' AFE I'd guess a slightly different set of reflexes are required to respond to an engine failure than for zero feet AFE.
A company called Western Airlines actually did train for the last above eventuality. It was a memory item checklist for the 737-300 that went something like "Set MCT or as required - Flaps to such and such right now - continue the approach." I may be able to find the checklist and associated Flight Training pages somewhere in the house, actually - we don't throw anything airplane related away in the Blue house.
Once upon a time I flew a Level D 757-200 sim, and we did an engine failure on final approach, flaps 30, and gear down. It was an enlightening experience to be sure: immediate reconfiguration was required.
You remember the old Category 1/2/3 takeoff charts? The one where CFL is either less than, equal to, or greater than RL?
V1 is what we know as refusal speed. Civvies combine refusal and decision speed into one definition.
dasleben
That's just, like, your opinion, man
Did you then circumvent a thunderstorm out of Eagle, CO?
dasleben
That's just, like, your opinion, man
I agree 100%. In fact, I'm really hoping I get to see some new and interesting things in training at my new job coming up. The V1 cuts at XJT were definitely the most workload intensive in the sim, but they were easy once you'd done them a couple times.
But, what about an engine failure or fire just after accel height when you're clean and accelerating to 250? Definitely a much less complicated maneuver than an engine failure right at V1, but one of those non-standard procedures that may make you hesitate and say "Huh..." Best to see that in the sim.
Polar742
All the responsibility none of the authority
Your post brings up a couple of thoughts.
First, typical 121 training you have one of two (really, that's about it) events to bring about your OEI takeoff scenario. First, is the engine failure, which is usually a roll back. The second is a catastrophic event with the engine, which usually has a fire indication attached.
Due to the second scenario, a catastrophic engine failure, with a fire event attached, we tend to forget the FIRE and the Failure are really separate events. The fire is only an indication of it being hot where it's not supposed to be hot. It does NOT mean the engine is NOT producing power.
However, due to Pavlovian conditioning with the fire indications, we tend to react in a manner that fire=failure, which is not true.
Second, if you experience an engine rollback in climb, or cruise, or even approach, the aircraft is in a much higher energy state, as well as a higher airspeed, making control effectiveness much better than at the low energy state at takeoff.
Let's take the engine failure inside a FAF. At this point, how much diagnosing do you really want to do? Let's weight the consequences of the energy state of the aircraft and transitioning to an OEI go-around scenario versus working the other engine very hard until landing. I'm not telling you what to do, as I don't fly your airplane. If you're in some of the aircraft I have flown, the jets would do just fine established in a 3 degree descent with the normal landing configuration. At that point, in the aircraft I flew, I would land. No discussion.
Now, in the whale, the OEI approach and landing configs are exactly the same as a All-Engine approach.
Again, there are so many scenarios, and I sincerely hope you are introduced to instances like that on your LOFT training. As the practice for the organizational exercise and demonstration of basic aircraft control merely set you up for a checkride. However, it does very little in giving you experience outside the training "box".
That being said, the skills and experience your training give you, you should be able to handle the aircraft safely in any scenario when you are not at the edges of the envelope, such as you are as an engine loss takeoff or go-around.
$19.95 of my $.02. Sorry, I'm a rambler.
R
Roger, Roger
Guest
Didn't that happen on a 767 a while back resulting in loss of the aircraft?Actually the T/R deployment at cruise speed at high altitude was even more interesting than the V1 deploy.
Orange Anchor
New Member
That is a fairly common procedure to go with reduced flaps and continue the approach. On the 737 you went from 30/40 to 15deg. Other aircraft go back to an approach flap setting, increase Vref by about 10kts, add a smidge of power and it works out nicely. The trick comes in abandoning the hunt for a soft touchdown with the increased speed and reduced drag.
Orange Anchor
New Member
A single T/R deployment at V1 can be a little bit sporty. Got to do one of those in the sim.
Actually the T/R deployment at cruise speed at high altitude was even more interesting than the V1 deploy.
A thrust reverser deployment at V1 is a challenge but the more interesting challenge is a V2 failure. The V1 failures occur on the runway when you can still botch things and not lose control. In the air, with low speed and high angle of attack, losing (loosing) an engine requires more precise control and PROPER rudder input.
A while back, there was a DC-9 with an engine failure after airborne. The guys stepped on the wrong rudder and they rolled inverted and that was that.
The other incident mentioned in this thread was a 767 with Lauda Air over Thailand.
Screaming_Emu
Well-Known Member
Exactly why I'd like to see some of those before they happen in real life.
Speaking of thrust reverser deployments i had something amusing happen to me in new hire training. We had a thrust reverser deployment at or shortly after V1. My sim partner (also a new hire) was playing captain and forgot/didn't know to take his hand off the thrust levers after V1.
My airplane has an auto retard function that in the event of an inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, it will take that thrust lever and mechanically drive it back to idle. His hand was on both thrust levers so they both came back. I was thinking "I know our performance should be terrible, but I can't even get this off the ground....oh, wait"
R
Roger, Roger
Guest
Ugh. I've had students try to do that to me in a twin.
Is that a recoverable failure, or if the TR pops at cruise are you pretty well hosed?
Orange Anchor
New Member
That is one reason you do NOT want to have your hand on the back of the throttle quadrant. When the thrust lever comes back, it will come back with force and you get a very nice, painful blood blister.
Orange Anchor
New Member
In the case of the Lauda 767, here is a synopsis
Never had a reverser open in flt but we practiced it in the sim of various machines I flew. As noted in a previous post, the engine goes to idle to open the reverser so the drag associated with it is the problem, not the reverse thrust. Still, it is a good idea to get the engine shut down in a timely manner using the checklist. It was not a memory item and if one followed the primary rule (FLY THE AIRPLANE) at least in the sim, you could successfully deal with the abnormal.
R
Roger, Roger
Guest
Interesting. I'd read the CVR transcript but not an analysis of what actually happened and how it could be handled.