USAF Report on Oct 2015 C-130 Crash

Hacker15e

Hacker15e

Who am I? Where are my pants?
I didn't see another thread on this, but...wow.

http://www.ktxs.com/news/air-force-releases-cause-of-dyess-c130j-crash-that-killed-11/39064100
According to that statement, the pilot placed a night-vision goggle case on the yoke to keep the elevator in the raised position.

The investigation revealed he did this to make it easier to off-load tall cargo.

The flight crew did not remove that case prior to take-off.

Once off the ground the plane climbed too fast, and the plane stalled.

The pilots were unable to recover resulting in the crash.
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Herk dudes: is this a normal thing to do (blocking the yoke to place the elevator up while loading/unloading cargo)?
 
Hacker15e said:
I didn't see another thread on this, but...wow.

http://www.ktxs.com/news/air-force-releases-cause-of-dyess-c130j-crash-that-killed-11/39064100


Herk dudes: is this a normal thing to do (blocking the yoke to place the elevator up while loading/unloading cargo)?
Click to expand...

A civilian C-130 crashed on a night takeoff from Kelly AFB in 1986 due to nearly the same thing, just a different manner of yoke security. Same set of events, crashed into a hangar on the flightline.

Same mistake, 29 years earlier.
 
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I'm a little confused. If the case was propping up the yoke, wouldn't you notice that? Or do you not even touch the yoke until your taking off?
 
So the pilot couldn't push forward on the yoke because the case was still there. :eek2:

Reminds me of the Air Midwest 1900D crash at CLT. Althogh that resulted in a change to the standard weights (aft cg), I believe another factor was improperly rigged elevator or elevator trim didn't allow full nose-down deflection.
 
smack300 said:
I'm a little confused. If the case was propping up the yoke, wouldn't you notice that? Or do you not even touch the yoke until your taking off?
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What operation doesn't do a control check before taking off on every flight? Pretty basic stuff right there... Right up there with checking for enough gas.
 
GypsyPilot said:
What operation doesn't do a control check before taking off on every flight? Pretty basic stuff right there... Right up there with checking for enough gas.
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They landed and never shut down the engines while loading cargo. The quick turn hot engine checklist did not have a control check on it. They did follow the checklist, just did not do a control check.
 
Just remember this - these guys DID comply with the Engine Running Offload (ERO) checklist.

Very abnormal thing to put a case there, but not abnormal to have the loadmaster ask the pilots to raise the elevator for forklift clearance. I can easily see someone at zero dark thirty in that awful corner of the world thinking, "Hey, it's just like a gust lock." Black on black in a blacked out airplane is easy to miss. I've heard of people leaving the APU running up to FL180 (it's supposed to be off for takeoff roll). Some people miss 29.92 on the altimeter, or set 200 instead of 300 for mins; these guys bit it hard.

At the time of the incident, J's did not have a flight control check on the ERO checklist; many of us did one anyway. The H-model did have the flight control check, but it was very common for crews to state, "previously checked". For what it's worth, the ERO checklist from landing to takeoff is less than 15 items in the J. The H-model is north of 40 items for an ERO because you run the full after landing, ERO, before taxi, and before takeoff.

Without getting into much detail, I doubt that it would have been noticed even if they had done a flight control check.
 
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Hacker15e said:
I didn't see another thread on this, but...wow.

http://www.ktxs.com/news/air-force-releases-cause-of-dyess-c130j-crash-that-killed-11/39064100


Herk dudes: is this a normal thing to do (blocking the yoke to place the elevator up while loading/unloading cargo)?
Click to expand...

Reading that excerpt, I had a moment of "WTF, Over? This? Again?"
One time, in grade school, I took a box of snakes to school and they all got out and I couldn't find them again.
But I always find the sunshade when I leave it in the windscreen.
 
JPilot9 said:
Just remember this - these guys DID comply with the Engine Running Offload (ERO) checklist.

Very abnormal thing to put a case there, but not abnormal to have the loadmaster ask the pilots to raise the elevator for forklift clearance. I can easily see someone at zero dark thirty in that awful corner of the world thinking, "Hey, it's just like a gust lock." Black on black in a blacked out airplane is easy to miss. I've heard of people leaving the APU running up to FL180 (it's supposed to be off for takeoff roll). Some people miss 29.92 on the altimeter, or set 200 instead of 300 for mins; these guys bit it hard.

At the time of the incident, J's did not have a flight control check on the ERO checklist; many of us did one anyway. The H-model did have the flight control check, but it was very common for crews to state, "previously checked". For what it's worth, the ERO checklist from landing to takeoff is less than 15 items in the J. The H-model is north of 40 items for an ERO because you run the full after landing, ERO, before taxi, and before takeoff.

Without getting into much detail, I doubt that it would have been noticed even if they had done a flight control check.
Click to expand...

If you read the NTSB report, there were incidents where the lock was left in and noticed, as well as not noticed..
 
deadstick said:
So the pilot couldn't push forward on the yoke because the case was still there. :eek2:

Reminds me of the Air Midwest 1900D crash at CLT. Althogh that resulted in a change to the standard weights (aft cg), I believe another factor was improperly rigged elevator or elevator trim didn't allow full nose-down deflection.
Click to expand...

Though the 1900 was loaded aft of CG, what did them in was the mis-rig which robbed them of the full range of nose down authority. 1900D's to that point had been flying for years out of CG and survived to tell the tale.

So, I can see the similarity here. One was pilot error, one was mechanic error, end result was pilot went for control range that wasn't there and binned it.
 
Similar accident at my base in Germany. In the F-4 you start your takeoff with the stick full aft and move it forward when the a/c rotates. During the roll the WSO's metal knee clipboard fell between the stick and the instrument panel. Aircraft went straight up, stalled and both safely ejected. The AF quickly banned all metal kneeboards.
 
@GypsyPilot This is during EROs, which are done after the initial takeoff. The flight controls are even checked visually outside the aircraft during preflight which in the H is accomplished by the flight engineer, prior to the Pilots/Nav getting to the plane. I am not sure how it's accomplished on the J, but I would imagine either by a crew chief or the loadmasters on their preflight.

@Hacker15e During ERO's (engine running offloads) occasionally one of the two pilots is supposed to hold the yoke aft to create clearance underneath the elevator for the forklift or whatever is taking the pallets off.

Apparently it was commonplace in this particular squadron to use an NVG case to hold the yoke aft instead of doing it with their hands as EROs can sometimes take upwards of 15 minutes. Well in this case the guys forgot the case was there, so when they went to takeoff the yoke was still being held aft, thus the airplane rotated early, then stalled, then crashed.

The J model checklist does not redirect you to accomplish a flight controls check prior to taking off after an ERO, but under no circumstances should flight controls ever be purposely binded.

In H model C-130s the ERO ops stop checklist directs you to complete a before takeoff checklist. In the before takeoff checklist you are directed to do a flight controls check. Prior to this accident 99% of guys would simply say "previously checked", after this accident everyone that I've flown with has accomplished a full flight controls check after completion of an ERO.

Lessons are that complacency kills and never neglect to check the flight controls prior to takeoff.
 
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The airlines have progressed from CRM (Crew Resourse Management), to the TEM (Threat Error Management). Part of this is the admission that no flight is perfect- every flight will have mistakes. The idea is to minimize them, catch them, try to prevent a UAS (Undesired Aircraft State), or if a UAS occurs correct it rather than concentrating on the "how it got there". It always seems the armed services are a step behind.
Part of this is identifying threats and setting up barriers to try and prevent them, but at the same time try not to put in place so many procedures that important stuff is missed. As an example, my airline HS reduced the before landing check to three items- landing gear, final flaps, thrust reverser a. That's it.
Pertinent to this crash a flight control check is done prior to taxi every flight.
 
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