UPS MD-11 crash at SDF

So wondering what was actually looked at/inspected at this C check; reading from the prelim, "A 24-month/4,800 hour lubrication task of the pylon thrustlinks and pylon spherical bearings was last accomplished on October 18, 2025." This seems to indicate *just* a lubrication and not a detailed inspection of the components. Again, I don't know what is on those inspection cards, but if it was just a lubrication, then any cracks could have just been missed.

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Sure looks like just a lubrication. Usually the metallurgy nerds can look at the fracture surfaces and beaching marks and estimate if the crack might have been visible, but may well not have been if as the report seems to insinuate it started in the bore of the holes.

Gotta wonder where the fatigue analysis went wrong for the part to fail at like 75% of the first NDI interval…
 
My read from those images is that this was immediately unsurvivable. The leading edge damage, the wing fire ... you can see an uncommanded left roll developing immediately.

Doesn't matter if anything got FODded or if the engine hit anything (my read based on the image sequence is that it probably didn't).
I agree. I think most of us in the business (or formerly in the business) want to figure out *what* could have saved a situation and it's painful to not be able to find a solution for such an analytical group. When there is no lesson to learn in such a conundrum, it leaves us powerless. Again, this is based on nothing more than assumptions and incomplete information...so take that into consideration.
 
I agree. I think most of us in the business (or formerly in the business) want to figure out *what* could have saved a situation and it's painful to not be able to find a solution for such an analytical group. When there is no lesson to learn in such a conundrum, it leaves us powerless. Again, this is based on nothing more than assumptions and incomplete information...so take that into consideration.
I mean when they figure out what caused what appears to be a spectacular fatigue failure of critical structure well before its life limit, there may be plenty of lessons to learn from that. Nothing that we as pilots can directly apply on a daily basis unfortunately
 
Sure looks like just a lubrication. Usually the metallurgy nerds can look at the fracture surfaces and beaching marks and estimate if the crack might have been visible, but may well not have been if as the report seems to insinuate it started in the bore of the holes.

Gotta wonder where the fatigue analysis went wrong for the part to fail at like 75% of the first NDI interval…
Add that to fact that the last "visual" inspection was in 2021; "A review of the inspection tasks for the left pylon aft mount found both a general visual inspection (GVI) and a detailed visual inspection of the left pylon aft mount, required by UPS's maintenance program at a 72-month interval, was last accomplished on October 28, 2021."

I can't imagine that the abbreviated/compressed inspections that have been common place in recent years won't be implicated in the final report.
 
Been thinking about the potential loss of lift for FedEx and UPS, particularly with peak being here. I offer a potential solution:
View attachment 86804

I know @mikecweb loves the MD-11 and previously the Lears. And has an aversion to toilets in the cockpit like 767's. This might prove fun for him. And while I know @Boris Badenov doesn't fly the -11 I think operating one of these 90'ish year old machines in all weather, over all terrain doing night freight might scratch the "death wish" itch he hasn't scratched since the MU-2. Y'all take it to your companies and let me know - I know where all of them are and we can get them online quickly.

well that explains why they grounded them so fast. Damn near exactly like AA191

No mention if #2 compressor stalled or was otherwise comprised.
They flew them for days after.
 
I mean when they figure out what caused what appears to be a spectacular fatigue failure of critical structure well before its life limit, there may be plenty of lessons to learn from that. Nothing that we as pilots can directly apply on a daily basis unfortunately
For sure, but I was more speaking to looking at this from the crew's perspective on this flight. There will certainly be lessons to be learned.
 
I mean when they figure out what caused what appears to be a spectacular fatigue failure of critical structure well before its life limit, there may be plenty of lessons to learn from that. Nothing that we as pilots can directly apply on a daily basis unfortunately
One of the oddly healthy behaviors I've noticed in aviation is that when there's an incident or accident, pilots blame the pilots, ATC blames ATC, and I can only assume mechanics look askance at the mechanical issues, because we all come from our own base of experience and we all want to solve the problem.

That's good, I think.

But in any system of sufficient complexity, at scale, behaviors will emerge that are unpredicted by—and unpredictable to—its designers, maintainers, and participants. We can strive for perfection—and we should, within reason—but sometimes failure will happen.

And that, ultimately, is life.
 
I agree. I think most of us in the business (or formerly in the business) want to figure out *what* could have saved a situation and it's painful to not be able to find a solution for such an analytical group. When there is no lesson to learn in such a conundrum, it leaves us powerless. Again, this is based on nothing more than assumptions and incomplete information...so take that into consideration.

Sadly, sometimes that’s the case. Sometimes one is a proverbial dead man walking on taxi out, and they just don’t know it yet.

Had a fellow pilot friend, headed out to the bombing range west of Yuma to go drop live heavyweight bombs. Had no idea the bomb fuzes were defective. On bomb release in a dive pass, instead of the fuze propellers spinning up when the bomb released from the rack in order to arm the bombs as they fell away from his jet so they would explode on ground impact, the fuzes instead auto-detonated the instant they were released from the bomb racks. 4000lbs of bombs exploded right next to the jet. The plane, and him, instantly vaporized into a fireball. Completely unexpected. And trust of the next guys going out to drop bombs…..you can imagine the feeling.

Sometimes that’s just how it goes in this business. Still, have to find out the how and why, for future prevention to the highest degree possible.
 
Add that to fact that the last "visual" inspection was in 2021; "A review of the inspection tasks for the left pylon aft mount found both a general visual inspection (GVI) and a detailed visual inspection of the left pylon aft mount, required by UPS's maintenance program at a 72-month interval, was last accomplished on October 28, 2021."

I can't imagine that the abbreviated/compressed inspections that have been common place in recent years won't be implicated in the final report.
I'd imagine to accomplish the DVI of the aft pylon mount the engine and pylon would both require removal. You say these inspection programs are "abbreviated/compressed" and I disagree. The airplane had recently had some work performed but the interval for a "C" check had not been reached. Take everything I'm about to say with a grain of salt because it's all hearsay and I have absolutely no evidence to prove its authenticity. A little bird told me the airplane was in San Antonio for some repairs, not inspections, for a fuel tank issue. I asked the little bird what fuel tanks they were working on but the little bird flew away and I never heard from him again. Where is most of the fuel on an MD-11 stored?
 
I'd imagine to accomplish the DVI of the aft pylon mount the engine and pylon would both require removal. You say these inspection programs are "abbreviated/compressed" and I disagree. The airplane had recently had some work performed but the interval for a "C" check had not been reached. Take everything I'm about to say with a grain of salt because it's all hearsay and I have absolutely no evidence to prove its authenticity. A little bird told me the airplane was in San Antonio for some repairs, not inspections, for a fuel tank issue. I asked the little bird what fuel tanks they were working on but the little bird flew away and I never heard from him again. Where is most of the fuel on an MD-11 stored?

Most fuel is stored in the wings and largest in the belly with the ability to move some of it to the tail tanks airborne for CG. All total around 256K..
 
I'd imagine to accomplish the DVI of the aft pylon mount the engine and pylon would both require removal. You say these inspection programs are "abbreviated/compressed" and I disagree. The airplane had recently had some work performed but the interval for a "C" check had not been reached. Take everything I'm about to say with a grain of salt because it's all hearsay and I have absolutely no evidence to prove its authenticity. A little bird told me the airplane was in San Antonio for some repairs, not inspections, for a fuel tank issue. I asked the little bird what fuel tanks they were working on but the little bird flew away and I never heard from him again. Where is most of the fuel on an MD-11 stored?
The only reason I brought up the C Check from what DE727UPS said:
The plane came out of C check just a couple weeks before the accident. UPS used a vendor for this.
And the compressed/modified nature of the C check is a just a general observation as this seems to be a trend across the industry...including much of it being offshored. This combined with the nature of corporations looking to pinch pennies...well, just an observation.
 
I think I read that on our union message board but a quick google search doesn't confirm that. I'm seeing heavy maintenance and/or fuel tank repairs. I guess we'll find out.
 
The only reason I brought up the C Check from what DE727UPS said:

And the compressed/modified nature of the C check is a just a general observation as this seems to be a trend across the industry...including much of it being offshored. This combined with the nature of corporations looking to pinch pennies...well, just an observation.
Are you just trying to stir the pot? You posted the airplane had been inspected in '21, what does "compressed/modified nature of the C check" mean? Are you saying folks are sending their jets overseas to get a "quick" C check? That might be happening but apparently UPS does not engage in that behavior because as far as I know San Antonio is still considered domestic.
 
I think I read that on our union message board but a quick google search doesn't confirm that. I'm seeing heavy maintenance and/or fuel tank repairs. I guess we'll find out.
I'm not a heavy jet guy, what do you consider heavy maintenance? In my world heavy maintenance is removing a stabilizer or a wing or landing gear, changing an engine or APU is just another day.
 
I'm not a heavy jet guy, what do you consider heavy maintenance? In my world heavy maintenance is removing a stabilizer or a wing or landing gear, changing an engine or APU is just another day.

I’ve always heard “heavy maintenance” in describing depot maintenance, most commonly C and D-checks.
 
The MD-11 could be dead, with final trips to the boneyard.

Elsewhere in the multiverse, UPS and FedEx double-down on the MD-11 and Trump sells the KC-10 fleet for a buck a piece. I think the KC-10 fleet is still pretty fresh by airline standards.
 
I'd think from an engineering/physics standpoint, it makes some sense that it would have happened then. Rotation imparts a force on the airframe/engines/pylons, which could have been the final straw for whatever failed in the engine pylon attachment hardware. Hardware that would already be under heavy loads even in a normal situation, trying to restrain a motor at high thrust from ripping itself off the wing. From there, it's just the physics of an underwing engine at a high power setting, that now has a rotational moment applied (due to the pylon likely not failing symmetrically/immediately) to its thrust vector. At least that would be my armchair analysis. Horrifying images for sure.
There is a significant amount of gyroscopic precession at rotation. It's one of the highest load periods that the engine mounts will see - Maximum fan speed/rotor speed and a relatively large pitch change. I would expect the engine to want to rotate the front section inboards.
 
Actually, that's the whole question: If #2 was operating normally, I think the aircraft would be flyable. In fact, you could argue that they did fly it. We have an engine "...separation" checklist on my fleet. The engine is near enough to the CG that while there would be a CG shift, I'd guess it's still controllable. On the other hand, you aren't climbing with a dual engine failure.
I'm going to go out on a limb and assume that with all the warnings that #1 was setting off, there's probably a decent chance that a problem with #2 wouldn't have been noticed. From the "what would you have done" point of view, however, it wouldn't have mattered at that point.
 
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