United Airbus almost lands at wrong airport

We can all feel high and mighty, believing that we are somehow immune to similar errors, but that is just a lie to make ourselves feel better. Truth is, we all make errors every single flight, the whole goal is to catch those errors as soon as possible. Sometimes it takes longer than other times to catch the mistake, but they did prior to causing an accident, so live and learn and fly another day.

I don't think anyone is being high and mighty or acting immune. However lets not make excuses such as "there are lots of gotcha's here", and lets be honest about why or how the situation developed. Bottom line is, this was getting an airplane from point A to point B, albeit a short distance and a non-standard operation, but nothing that should've been a difficult or overly taxing task either.

Also, a clear VMC day in a modern airplane is, in my humble opinion, a significantly higher workload environment. Instead of just staring at the pretty colored screens and needles you now have to look outside and clear, while moving at ~250kts, while getting all your stuff set up from takeoff to landing in a very short amount of time. Airliners don't exactly have the best outward visibility. And when you start looking outside your cross check of all the pretty pink goo that you were looking at drops out a bit, especially once you "know" you have the field in sight. Instead of crucifying the pilots, lets learn something and go forward.

Yes, I agree. That's why when performing a flight operation visual only, lower level within a terminal environment [and not usually performed] and not having the luxury of all the colored screens while sitting back and relaxing at FL350 on autopilot; there has to be a certain amount of preplanning and SA building in order to get and remain ahead of the game; you know...Back-to-Basics 101 stuff.

The learning comes from pilots being honest with why this occurred and taking those lessons forward; not from making excuses about why this basic operation was so apparently difficult.

The pilots made a mistake. The mistake was caught and corrected with no foul. Now the learning begins through honest breakdown of the situation so these guys, as well as others, can avoid a similar circumstance.
 
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A crappy landing doesn't break FARS, SOP's or endanger the lives of the general flying public.

In the training word these two pilots would have busted a private pilot checkride, instrument rating checkride, commercial checkride, ATP checkride, and type checkride. In each instance the applicant has to have additional training on the area they busted on, and be signed off by a instructor in order to retest.

Some airlines simply wont hire people with training event failures...and your telling me that 2 airline pilots that just busted every checkride known to man doesn't deserve additional training at a private pilot level? Sorry, but this was a clear VMC day in a modern airplane. The work load just is not that high. Inexcusable.
It's not a checkride. It was an error that was corrected before it became an incident. Fly enough and it happens.
 
A crappy landing doesn't break FARS, SOP's or endanger the lives of the general flying public.

In the training word these two pilots would have busted a private pilot checkride, instrument rating checkride, commercial checkride, ATP checkride, and type checkride. In each instance the applicant has to have additional training on the area they busted on, and be signed off by a instructor in order to retest.

Some airlines simply wont hire people with training event failures...and your telling me that 2 airline pilots that just busted every checkride known to man doesn't deserve additional training at a private pilot level? Sorry, but this was a clear VMC day in a modern airplane. The work load just is not that high. Inexcusable.

I am gonna wager here that you don't fly 121, and write your attitude off as general no-idea-what-really-happens-at-121-airlines-ignorance... Which is fine.
 
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Clueless.

Thats a pretty strong statement coming from someone who has idea who they are talking too.

Since you can seemingly only post one word at a time, let me just ask you a simple yes or no question.

Do you think the crew deserves additional training in this scenario based upon their mistakes? Yes or No?
 
Thats a pretty strong statement coming from someone who has idea who they are talking too.

Since you can seemingly only post one word at a time, let me just ask you a simple yes or no question.

Do you think the crew deserves additional training in this scenario based upon their mistakes? Yes or No?

Yes, I thought so too, apologies.

To answer your question, absolutely NOT.
 
I don't think anyone is being high and mighty or acting immune. However lets not make excuses such as "there are lots of gotcha's here", and lets be honest about why or how the situation developed. Bottom line is, this was getting an airplane from point A to point B, albeit a short distance and a non-standard operation, but nothing that should've been a difficult or overly taxing task either.



Yes, I agree. That's why when performing a flight operation visual only, lower level within a terminal environment [and not usually performed] and not having the luxury of all the colored screens while sitting back and relaxing at FL350 on autopilot; there has to be a certain amount of preplanning and SA building in order to get and remain ahead of the game; you know...Back-to-Basics 101 stuff.

The learning comes from pilots being honest with why this occurred and taking those lessons forward; not from making excuses about why this basic operation was so apparently difficult.

The pilots made a mistake. The mistake was caught and corrected with no foul. Now the learning begins through honest breakdown of the situation so these guys, as well as others, can avoid a similar circumstance.

Mike at your experience level you've never encountered a situation that shouldn't have been difficult or overly taxing, that turned into one? I have several that come to mind.

A routine flight into MEX, briefed everything CAVOK, no wind, no turbulence... Backed up with all navaids. Then a missed approach, followed by and approach to the opposite runway. There were a million threats that day, and we're lucky to have caught all of them on a VERY routine "this should be easy" flight. So crap if something happened, and we made a mistake? Say over-sped flaps or something, am I going back to training now?
 
Yes, I thought so too, apologies.

To answer your question, absolutely NOT.

Fair enough, apologies accepted and thank you. To answer your question, I do not fly 121.

With that mindset though, why are we in the training world required by the FAA to give additional training after a failure? (This was a failure after all) Should simply the thought of "I cant believe I busted that maneuver/landing/clearance etc...I KNOW I will never do that again" after a failed checkride be enough?
 
To add I did something stupid in an airplane the other night and I'll admit it. But no one was around to catch it but me. I am headed to the airport tonight to play with the sim for awhile to make sure I brush up on what I was deficient on.

To me, thats additional training. Yes, the experience of doing something dumb would tell me I most likely wont do it again, but as a professional? Thats not enough.
 
Fair enough, apologies accepted and thank you. To answer your question, I do not fly 121.

With that mindset though, why are we in the training world required by the FAA to give additional training after a failure? (This was a failure after all) Should simply the thought of "I cant believe I busted that maneuver/landing/clearance etc...I KNOW I will never do that again" be enough?

At this level, it really isn't considered a failure. At the most basic level it was an undesired aircraft state (UAS) which was corrected. I'll agree that it shouldn't have gotten to that point, but it does, and will continue to happen. Threats are everywhere. The threats that UA crew might have seen could include unfamiliarity with the area, a short segment, and empty airplane, ATC pushing them to accept the visual approach, misinterpretation of instructions, complacency or fatigue, Capt/FO relationship...

There are a TON of threats, that can sneak up on a pilot, which pushes the aircraft into a UAS. It's something that crew will not forget, as @CaptBill said, it will be stuck in their mind as "that time we nearly landed at the wrong airport."

As far as a UAS being a failure? It's not always a failure, not even on a checkride. For instance my last 121 checkride, we had a UAS. We had briefed a flaps 22 landing, and through 1500AGL the PF called for flaps 45. Flaps 45 is the usual setting we use to land, and by habit I didn't even think, "oh we're set up for flaps 22." So I put in the flaps 45, and we both realized what happened. I reset the landing data and eliminated the UAS.

This stuff happens. A LOT. And its a big subject during recurrent training.
 
Thats a pretty strong statement coming from someone who has idea who they are talking too.

Since you can seemingly only post one word at a time, let me just ask you a simple yes or no question.

Do you think the crew deserves additional training in this scenario based upon their mistakes? Yes or No?

If it was ASAP, I'd bet they'd make a trip to the schoolhouse. But, maybe not. Just depends on what led to the event and what the ERC decides.

It could have just as well been a policy or training pipeline systemic failure.
 
Mike at your experience level you've never encountered a situation that shouldn't have been difficult or overly taxing, that turned into one? I have several that come to mind.

Of course there's been. And there will be more to come for me. The question I'm asking is just one of "where did the problem occur, and could've it been mitigated somewhere?" And only asking that from a learning and carrying-forward perspective.

Was this situation:

1. An unforseen circumstance or set of circumstances that occurred even after flight preparation was made for what was somewhat a non-standard operation? Something that couldn't have been planned for or was outside the crew's control?

or

2. Was this a circumstance or set of circumstances that resulted from possibly inadequate planning, whether realized or not by the crew, that sent them down a path to where they would inevitably run into the situation they did, or to where SA was just enough ahead where any monkey wrench thrown into the flight, would cause it to fall behind?

None of these are criminal acts, they're mistakes. Especially when no foul occurred from them, no bent metal, nothing but a little later of a landing time and maybe a bit more fuel burnt.

On the issue of any kind of retraining, I haven't mentioned that point up until now, but I'll address my thoughts on that. It would depend on a couple of factors:

1. What was the totality of the circumstances here? Was this failure to preplan adequately given the non-standard mission tasking? Was it just task saturation due to outside factors? Was it a simple mis-identification? Or was it a combination of things? Ie- Would a "reasonable man" crew have made the same mistake, placed in the same set of circumstances and having taken the same actions (or inactions) this crew did?

which leads to:

2. Did the crew realize what they did wrong, or did they not?

Hypothetically, if the crew was able to say "here's what happened, here's where we screwed up or what unforseen factors occurred, here's what we could/should've done to prevent it. We just didn't or couldn't do that, and here's why". A crew like that doesn't require retraining.....the situation that occurred (a no harm/no foul one) WAS their retraining. The situation probably shocked them into reality and they knew it.

On the other hand, if the crew was completely clueless, negligent, or had no idea why what happened or their role in contributing to what happened; or all they did was place the blame here, there, or everywhere and they had zero part in it in their mind. Then those guys WOULD need to go VFR direct back to retraining.
 
Airline procedures aren't really conducive to 5NM flights either, add that into the equation. But I think this thread has pretty much jumped the shark.
 
Airline procedures aren't really conducive to 5NM flights either, add that into the equation. But I think this thread has pretty much jumped the shark.

Completely agree, which is why I describe this as a very non-standard operation/repo they were doing; and would be very curious as to the answers to the questions I posed, just out of learning. Again, a mistake(s) was made that wasn't even a terminal one, not a crime of any kind. But there's always good learning to be had from these for anyone, but especially those who are used to a "style A" of everyday flying, but get assigned a "style B" flight one day and what allowances or changes they may have to make for that with the different circumstances involved.

Best case situation for lessons learned is something like this where no cliff was gone over, but one was able to stand at the edge and look down at what potentially could've been. A "whew, that was close" situation.
 
I'm getting the impression that people are guessing that airline pilots don't ferry often, or are easily befuddled by shorter segments. Or that we just stare at screens. Or our procedures are tailored to longer segments. All of that is hyperbole, and anyone who flies in the 91/135 world would be right at home in most airline cockpits. We're professional pilots just the same as anyone else, prone to the same errors, and enjoy a very, very high level of safety overall.
 
Airline procedures aren't really conducive to 5NM flights either, add that into the equation. But I think this thread has pretty much jumped the shark.
Anything less than about 75-100NM, even at turboprop speeds, can be very 'busy' unless you have a high degree of familiarity with both ends.

I don't envy a guy doing 250 knots between SEA and BFI; basically, everything would need to be done before takeoff in order to get it all set.

I'm getting the impression that people are guessing that airline pilots don't ferry often, or are easily befuddled by shorter segments. Or that we just stare at screens. Or our procedures are tailored to longer segments. All of that is hyperbole, and anyone who flies in the 91/135 world would be right at home in most airline cockpits. We're professional pilots just the same as anyone else, prone to the same errors, and enjoy a very, very high level of safety overall.
I spend a lot of my time looking out the window, actually. Natasha is very unreliable, but she knows - more or less - how to hold a course and altitude.
 
I'm getting the impression that people are guessing that airline pilots don't ferry often, or are easily befuddled by shorter segments. Or that we just stare at screens. Or our procedures are tailored to longer segments. All of that is hyperbole, and anyone who flies in the 91/135 world would be right at home in most airline cockpits. We're professional pilots just the same as anyone else, prone to the same errors, and enjoy a very, very high level of safety overall.

Not at all. NO one is or should be questioning any kind of professionalism here, that's nowhere near the discussion. I would've thought I'd made that clear in my postings.

Procedures are indeed tailored to longer segments, which is why when one receives a short segment or something that's not very standard or part of the daily norm, it's a logical question to ask what mitigation (planning, operationally, etc) do the individual crews take to fit the longer-segment procedures into the shorter-segment tasking, and thus mitigate the risk? And it's possible that no two crews would do that in the exact same way. That's a fair question to ask as part of the totality of the circumstances.
 
Anything less than about 75-100NM, even at turboprop speeds, can be very 'busy' unless you have a high degree of familiarity with both ends.

I don't envy a guy doing 250 knots between SEA and BFI; basically, everything would need to be done before takeoff in order to get it all set.

And that familiarity can either currently exist, or needs to be planned for in some way. And even with a 5NM leg, who says it has to be direct? Couldn't an option be to take vectors someplace or around a box pattern to buy more time?

Want fun? Low level MTRs at 300-500 AGL and 480 knots, hand flown, all pilotage with map or DR, and single pilot; really defined the meaning of task saturation and being able to keep the SA ahead as much as possible. You trip up or miss something, and what was SA 5 miles ahead of the plane, all of a sudden became 5 miles behind, with the plane dragging you along for the ride. :)
 
And that familiarity can either currently exist, or needs to be planned for in some way. And even with a 5NM leg, who says it has to be direct? Couldn't an option be to take vectors someplace or around a box pattern to buy more time?

Want fun? Low level MTRs at 300-500 AGL and 480 knots, hand flown, all pilotage with map or DR, and single pilot; really defined the meaning of task saturation and being able to keep the SA ahead as much as possible. You trip up or miss something, and what was SA 5 miles ahead of the plane, all of a sudden became 5 miles behind, with the plane dragging you along for the ride. :)
I'm just not that cool, sorry. ;)
 
I'm just not that cool, sorry. ;)

That's fine. It's just an illustration that while taxing, it can be done safely. Yet it too is risky and has small margins for error requiring a fair amount of preplanning. Half the speed, twice the crew onboard, and a controlled environment, should be able to balance the difference in procedures; it just all depends on the techniques used. And that's only discussing things that are under the crew's control.

I'm still curious on the risk mitigation though, as well as all the fair questions asked. None of this will prevent this from happening again, this isn't the first crew or pilots to happen to and it won't be the last. The key is miniizing the occurances as much as possible.
 
That's fine. It's just an illustration that while taxing, it can be done safely. Yet it too is risky and has small margins for error requiring a fair amount of preplanning. Half the speed, twice the crew onboard, and a controlled environment, should be able to balance the difference in procedures; it just all depends on the techniques used. And that's only discussing things that are under the crew's control.

I'm still curious on the risk mitigation though, as well as all the fair questions asked. None of this will prevent this from happening again, this isn't the first crew or pilots to happen to and it won't be the last. The key is miniizing the occurances as much as possible.
Automating the humans out might do it, but it turns out that automation is designed by humans too.

Stupid stuff will continue to happen in airplanes (and airliners), mostly when people are in a hurry.
 
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