TEB crash 5/15/17

[Deleted member 27505]

Nailed it! Except that Extended Envelope Training which also came from the same fallout that brought us the 1500 hour rule is the requirement for simulators to be able to reproduce full stalls so we can realistically (sans all the Gs pulled) do extreme upsets. Previously, sims didn't have the data set beyond approaching the stall.

OK, so much for hope. I guess we still have some static on the freq.

I'm not talking about the other requirements of the Post-Colgan Legislation ; I'm talking specifically about the 1500 hrs.

As I've stated ad-nauseam, I agree with you that additional training is always a good idea; it's one reason I keep teaching upset recovery and keep seeking out and attending as many instructional opportunities as I have time for. Ok? No argument on that point.

And, yes, I understand the EET components, and EET is a good thing.

I'm simply trying to get you to understand that more hours do not necessarily mean more training. You seem to be conflating the two different things or creating a causal link where none exists.

We'll have to have a beer together sometime so you can hear the inflection in my voice and vice versa.

 

[CFI A&P]

It is amazing how many pilots out there lack the understanding of basic aerodynamics in conditions other than straight and level. It is no surprise that is the number one killer in GA airplanes! Not too long ago I used to do a ton of spin training for CFI candidates in a Pitts, and you wouldn’t believe what some of these people thought of when trying to explain a stall/ slip/ skid/ spin. Worse than some of the old wives tales on teen pregnancy. It was a lot of fun to tell someone to demonstrate their understanding of these conditions in an airplane other than a 172 or PA28. Truly humbling experiences for them, and I’d laugh every time.

There is no doubt the increased training brought on by the ATP rule is helping but, it doesn’t mean that 1,499 is more dangerous than 1,500. It just proves that informed pilots last longer.


Sent from my Startac using Tapatalk.

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

OK, so much for hope. I guess we still have some static on the freq.

I'm not talking about the other requirements of the Post-Colgan Legislation ; I'm talking specifically about the 1500 hrs.

As I've stated ad-nauseam, I agree with you that additional training is always a good idea; it's one reason I keep teaching upset recovery and keep seeking out and attending as many instructional opportunities as I have time for. Ok? No argument on that point.


We'll have to have a beer together sometime so you hear the inflection in my voice.

I've specifically separated out when I'm speaking of the 1500 rule vs not. Go back and read!

 

[Deleted member 27505]

I've specifically separated out when I'm speaking of the 1500 rule vs not. Go back and read!

Fair enough, I'll take your word for it. But when you specifically mention the fact they were hired below 1500 hours, it does kinda sorta imply that you think the 1500 hrs would have made a difference.
Maybe I'm taking your "1500 hr rule" to mean "1500 hr requirement". I'm meaning the 1500 hrs. You're meaning the rule in totality.

Definitely agree with you that the CA bears the brunt of the culpability. And the 1500 hour rule wouldn’t have saved the 50 doomed souls in 3407.

I've seen this written a lot, and it is a logical fallacy. The fact is that neither of the pilots would have been hired at Colgan when they were since they were both hired below 1500 hours.

Who cares when the hours were logged, before or after hire? The point is when the accident occurred both pilots had substantially greater than 1500 hours - many logged in "real" airplanes and "real" operations - and those hours didn't make one iota of difference.

The idea of the 1500 hour rule is founded upon gathering more experience before you end up in airliners, so yes, I care and clearly the FAA and those who wrote the rule care.

Besides, that's not the question at hand. You're giving your opinion as am I, but the FACT remains both pilots had significantly more than 1500hrs. So WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE???

I think we started to diverge here. It's my fault. I stated the question as "Who cares?" and didn't follow up with "What's the difference?" until my next post. You answered literally and answered "The FAA". I neglected to keep laser focus on the question at hand and buried it in the middle of a post.

So, let's go back to the beginning and clarify.

1. You say 1500 improves pilots - with an implication that it will prevent accidents like 3407

2. The now required 1500 hours do NOT include any training. They represent a total time requirement. (Obviously, many separate training events/checkrides, etc must occur, but they are not related to the 1500 hrs which stands alone.)

3. The pilots of Colgan 3407 both had significantly more than the 1500 experience hours now required, the Captain twice the required time.


So, the question that started this whole thing remains unanswered unequivocally and undiluted by irrelevant arguments (training, CFI time, EET, etc):

What difference would it have made whether the 3407 pilots got their 1500 hrs of experience before or after hire?

That's really all I have been asking. Please answer

 

[Richman]

The defacto minimums for the commuters and regionals were basically ATP mins for decades prior to the little blip of hiring low timers that started in 2005, so I guess someone, somewhere decided that was a good idea. Usually far more time than ATP minimums were required ...

In the corporate world, your insurance rates, in fact your very insurability hinged on your time, so clearly they see some kind of correlation.

Even the Feds require you to have 1,200 hours to be PIC 135 in IFR, and that's been around forever also, so I guess they think time count s as well.

Point is only a small fraction of people are going to make it to 1,500 hours without working for someone, and that means someone is looking at them, they are interacting with people,machines, students, weather, etc. and are otherwise being subjected to a significant, albeit informal, vetting process. Not very many people are going to barge around for 1,000 hours in a 172 without some kind of eyebrow raising occurring if they try to get a job somewhere.

The people who aren't really cut out for the job generally (although granted not entirely) weed themselves out during that 1,200 hour trek to 1,500 for any number of reasons. They either make bad choices, don't learn how to say no and subsequently get in a pinch, decide the business isn't for them, or otherwise fall afoul of the career traps that have been extant since the number of aviators was >1.

Therein lies the true power of the 1,500 hours. 300 hours in a sim or 1,000 watching the magenta line exposes none of the issues that may percolate up when it's on you to fly 1,000 hours with airplanes, weather, your boss or students conspiring against you.

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

What difference would it have made whether the 3407 pilots got their 1500 hrs of experience before or after hire?

That's really all I have been asking. Please answer

I have answered, but I'll try it again. It could have made a significant difference. Marvin couldn't have done the pay to play thing... perhaps he wouldn't have even been in the industry? Perhaps 1000 hours CFIing could have increased his stick and rudder skills to where he would have been more proficient than riding around in the right seat on a single pilot airplane in the Bahamas? Perhaps he would have had to have gone and gotten a night freight job getting more experience in icing conditions?

It's all speculation because what happened is what happened, but as outlined above, the 1500 hour barrier could have prevented 3407 from happening.

Make more sense?

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

That's how it is (at least in EVERY Part 91 and 135 operation I've been invlolved with). If both are CA qualified, the designated PIC IS the PIC regardless of who sits in which seat. That person is fully responsible for the aircraft and gets the blame for the outcome.

This is not unlike a 121 operation wherein the "FO" might have 20 years of experience in the airplane sitting next to the newest CA in the airline industry. Who is REALLY in charge of the plane vs. who will really be blamed?

This surface battle between 121, 135, and 91 operations cracks me up..........

That's not the point though. Say both of us are CAs and typed as such. We do a 2 legger day, I'm designated PIC on the first leg and as PF I sit left seat, you sit right. Then leg back, you're designated PIC and you as PF sit left seat and I sit right. Yeah I signed the paper or you signed the paper beginning the flight, but when ** hits the fan, with 2 CAs who always fly left seat and monitor out of the right seat, the distinction between the real PIC can get real muddy quick. It can come out as a CRM issue.


In the 121 world, there's saying by CAs about a FO who tries to run everything as "right seat Captain." These are the guys who start making decisions on their own, even if minor, without consulting with the CA and then the CA feels like he was left out of the loop, not involving CRM, and kinda going against the chain of command. I can see this kinda scenario happening a lot more in the corporate world than 121. Add in the shady operators that don't really have good SOPs and people doing their own thing, it can be a recipe for trouble.

The battle between 121, 135, and 91? IMO there isn't really a comparison. Accident history for at least the last 10 yrs for corporate vs airlines seem to show a worse picture for the corporate side. And a lot of them were CRM issues. CAE LR60, Akron LJ, TEB LJ35, and especially the Gulfstream at BED.

 

[KLB]

That's not the point though. Say both of us are CAs and typed as such. We do a 2 legger day, I'm designated PIC on the first leg and as PF I sit left seat, you sit right. Then leg back, you're designated PIC and you as PF sit left seat and I sit right. Yeah I signed the paper or you signed the paper beginning the flight, but when ** hits the fan, with 2 CAs who always fly left seat and monitor out of the right seat, the distinction between the real PIC can get real muddy quick. It can come out as a CRM issue.


In the 121 world, there's saying by CAs about a FO who tries to run everything as "right seat Captain." These are the guys who start making decisions on their own, even if minor, without consulting with the CA and then the CA feels like he was left out of the loop, not involving CRM, and kinda going against the chain of command. I can see this kinda scenario happening a lot more in the corporate world than 121. Add in the shady operators that don't really have good SOPs and people doing their own thing, it can be a recipe for trouble.

The battle between 121, 135, and 91? IMO there isn't really a comparison. Accident history for at least the last 10 yrs for corporate vs airlines seem to show a worse picture for the corporate side. And a lot of them were CRM issues. CAE LR60, Akron LJ, TEB LJ35, and especially the Gulfstream at BED.

It doesn't matter if it's dual captain or not. There's a PIC and there's an SIC. Everyone knows their role. Same as when you're in Captain IOE or on a checkride.

 

[Boris Badenov]

It doesn't matter if it's dual captain or not. There's a PIC and there's an SIC. Everyone knows their role. Same as when you're in Captain IOE or on a checkride.

I think we all agree about this, but what Cherokee brings up is real, and it happens all the time. An experienced 135 C/A knows this, and is prepared for it (at least I hope I, for example, am). But would it be better if the question never came up and there were no gray areas? IMHO, yes, it would be better that way. I go back to my experience of having an F/O tell me that it's his "day to be PIC". It's not so much the sheer absurdity of the claim, it's that the training environment had failed him so totally that he sincerely didn't understand what "PIC" means. To wit, he wasn't just being a Richard, he had been let down by his training, or lack thereof.

 

[KLB]

I think we all agree about this, but what Cherokee brings up is real, and it happens all the time. An experienced 135 C/A knows this, and is prepared for it (at least I hope I, for example, am). But would it be better if the question never came up and there were no gray areas? IMHO, yes, it would be better that way. I go back to my experience of having an F/O tell me that it's his "day to be PIC". It's not so much the sheer absurdity of the claim, it's that the training environment had failed him so totally that he sincerely didn't understand what "PIC" means. To wit, he wasn't just being a Richard, he had been let down by his training, or lack thereof.

I understand that. That definitely comes down to understanding of the roles and is totally up to company training. 121 guys coming over to corporate have a difficult time grasping it.

 

[Deleted member 27505]

I think we all agree about this, but what Cherokee brings up is real, and it happens all the time. An experienced 135 C/A knows this, and is prepared for it (at least I hope I, for example, am). But would it be better if the question never came up and there were no gray areas? IMHO, yes, it would be better that way. I go back to my experience of having an F/O tell me that it's his "day to be PIC". It's not so much the sheer absurdity of the claim, it's that the training environment had failed him so totally that he sincerely didn't understand what "PIC" means. To wit, he wasn't just being a Richard, he had been let down by his training, or lack thereof.

Concur with @Cherokee_Cruiser's point; that confusion can and does exist.

IMHO, that lack of training you point out is likely the single largest contributing factor to the suck of many 135 shops. Perhaps the only worse factor - qualitatively if not quant - is the negative transfer training that so often takes place. I suppose some would argue lack of standardization; but I would argue that standardization is predicated on at least a rough understanding of what the standards actually are, or that they do in fact exist.

If FO/SICs and/or CA/PICs don't even understand PIC Authoratuh, is it any wonder they so often don't understand other nuanced issues such as how to interpret MELs, and, therefore, don't know how to say NO with objective justification?

 

[dustoff17]

...................The battle between 121, 135, and 91? IMO there isn't really a comparison. Accident history for at least the last 10 yrs for corporate vs airlines seem to show a worse picture for the corporate side. And a lot of them were CRM issues. CAE LR60, Akron LJ, TEB LJ35, and especially the Gulfstream at BED.

All the MORE reason to operate single pilot!!! I do it all the time and have yet to have a power struggle or argument with myself. One the other hand, I try to avoid these type of situations for fear I might actually lose an argument with myself.....

 

[Inverted]

The problem is when you play both roles, CRM automatically diminishes. The distinctive rolls of SIC and PIC are separate for a reason, and they are proven necessary for a reason. Does that mean that swapping seats is dangerous? Not necessarily, but I think it increases risk, and this comes from 1500 hours of flying at 135 companies that did exactly that. I flew left set pax legs regularly, and sometimes I watched the PIC struggle as PM in the left seat. The roles were muddied, the responsibility wasn't, but the roles were. Now another 2,000 hours or more of 91k/135 that operate exactly like 121, and having that confirmed being 121 now, I see the importance of keeping these roles focused and separate.

If there were evidence to support that having SICs fly from the left seat made 91 and 135 safer, I would buy it, but this "prepping for captain" notion is nonsense. 121 is the metric for safety, and part 135 companies that adhere to part 121 training, policies and procedures have higher safety records. It is pretty evident that a 121 SIC can go through upgrade, go though IOE, and then hit the line and be safe. There is no reason a 135 PIC can't do the same.

 

[Inverted]

That's not the point though. Say both of us are CAs and typed as such. We do a 2 legger day, I'm designated PIC on the first leg and as PF I sit left seat, you sit right. Then leg back, you're designated PIC and you as PF sit left seat and I sit right. Yeah I signed the paper or you signed the paper beginning the flight, but when ** hits the fan, with 2 CAs who always fly left seat and monitor out of the right seat, the distinction between the real PIC can get real muddy quick. It can come out as a CRM issue.


In the 121 world, there's saying by CAs about a FO who tries to run everything as "right seat Captain." These are the guys who start making decisions on their own, even if minor, without consulting with the CA and then the CA feels like he was left out of the loop, not involving CRM, and kinda going against the chain of command. I can see this kinda scenario happening a lot more in the corporate world than 121. Add in the shady operators that don't really have good SOPs and people doing their own thing, it can be a recipe for trouble.

The battle between 121, 135, and 91? IMO there isn't really a comparison. Accident history for at least the last 10 yrs for corporate vs airlines seem to show a worse picture for the corporate side. And a lot of them were CRM issues. CAE LR60, Akron LJ, TEB LJ35, and especially the Gulfstream at BED.

I will add that those accidents all lacked SOP, in fact probably any standardization. They all went to CAE or FSI, flew the same recurrent doing approaches in MEM, and had no company callouts or procedures checked by the examiner. Read the CVR of every single one of those accidents, the LR in TEB being probably the worst. The verbiage, the verbal diarrhea (not to mention the swearing) was so hard to follow because there wasn't a single standardized callout or communication.