Southwest flight incident

With decades of experience, the CA flew the first leg to LIH.



Cause being 120 miles out, cleared to NAPUA, cross NAPUA at or above 3000, cleared for the ILS 35 is too hard for the new kids these days?





That said, I think (I’ll have to look it up) that LIH is a special airport. FOs couldn’t takeoff/land as PF for the first 100 hrs at our shop.
 
With decades of experience, the CA flew the first leg to LIH.



Cause being 120 miles out, cleared to NAPUA, cross NAPUA at or above 3000, cleared for the ILS 35 is too hard for the new kids these days?





That said, I think (I’ll have to look it up) that LIH is a special airport. FOs couldn’t takeoff/land as PF for the first 100 hrs at our shop.

They were using the RNAV to 17. And despite the visibility being reported above minimums, most flights weren't getting in, which is pretty normal for Kona wind days over there because of where the sensor is located.

17 isn't as tricky as 3, but it's not as simple as the ILS to 35.
 
They were using the RNAV to 17. And despite the visibility being reported above minimums, most flights weren't getting in, which is pretty normal for Kona wind days over there because of where the sensor is located.

17 isn't as tricky as 3, but it's not as simple as the ILS to 35.

Maybe it's just me but I'm sticking up for the crew and FO on this one. Should they have not done this. Yes absolutely but this trip has all the pitfalls of a sleeper super difficult leg all the while appearing to be a nice chill flight through the islands from the outside looking in. It would be easy for a crew to be pulled into complacency for a simple 30 minute flight. When in my mind this flight has almost all the threats: weather, terrain, compressed time, automation, performance for landing and unfamiliar approach.

It's easy to just blame this on the FO for being a newb and the captain for being a SWA boomer but I think it shows some really big issues with the 737 and it appears to me that it reveals a training deficiency at my own airline. I've seen more than one mishandled go around in VFR weather. I think this is a training issue. Sometimes the pilots hit the autothrottle button instead of the TO/GA button. I flew 2 corporate jets where the TO/GA switch was where the autothrottle disconnect button is. I've mixed these two buttons up just due to primacy and being task saturated.

Also, we get super complex training on outlandish scenarios that never happen on the line but very little time on simple things we see on the line all the time. The biggest issue: a simple go around in VFR weather. Where the MCP is set at 2000 the aircraft is at 2500' and coupled to the ILS. Go around instructions are issued and it doesn't go well. We need back to basics CQ scenarios. Not heroic save the dying passenger with 15 MELS and failed MEDLINK communication CQs.

The 737 MCP is a black hole of automation that is several layers deep if not more. The entire reason I cover the VNAV isms of that airplane during my briefing with the FO is to avoid the catastrophic button mashing I see if I don't cover the illogical VNAV of the 737 prior to push. The only south landing IFR approach at LIH is LNAV/VNAV. I have a feeling the crew of that SWA aircraft were button mashing the MCP. It even says the FO attempted to turn on the autopilot, which is on the MCP and couldn't. The autopilot won't engage unless the aircraft is trimmed. So the aircraft isn't doing what he wanted, expected or briefed now he smashes the autopilot due to high workload. What does that get you? You have one of the most annoying sounds on earth, the 737 autopilot disconnect sound on top of all the other chaos in that cockpit.

The only way to stop this is to brief the approach ideally on the ground of the departure point before you take off for a less than 30 minute flight. Then start hand flying the aircraft around 10K. Make sure you are slower than you think you need to be because the 737 is super slippery and won't slow at all. Configure early. You should have already run landing numbers on the ground before departure. Since LIH is short and it's raining. Flaps 40 for sure. Ideally you should be configured, on speed and have completed the landing checklist by 1500'. When I am done with all that I'll say "OK if we go around it's: "TO/GA, positive rate, gear up, flaps 15. You won't see me add full TO/GA thrust I'm just going to add 85% or so. Please call out anything you don't like."

I do this often on the Juneau to Sitka flight. There is a lot of time built into that leg. So I program 210 knots as our max speed. Its the same altitude, 16K for cruise as well. It's really an almost identical flight. I get the performance numbers for landing on the ground in JNU. I brief the entire flight. I connect the entire flight plan so there is no need to touch the FMC ideally as long as we are cleared by ATC. That is briefed as a threat. These are the most challenging flights.

I think we do have a problem industry wide but we are missing the point. My shop is training us to handing complex issues that we never see on the line and barely checking the box on simple common errors that lead to the outcome we are discussing.
 
With decades of experience, the CA flew the first leg to LIH.



Cause being 120 miles out, cleared to NAPUA, cross NAPUA at or above 3000, cleared for the ILS 35 is too hard for the new kids these days?





That said, I think (I’ll have to look it up) that LIH is a special airport. FOs couldn’t takeoff/land as PF for the first 100 hrs at our shop.

At my company, only captains are permitted to be the PF landing at or taking off from LIH.
 
Sometimes the pilots hit the autothrottle button instead of the TO/GA button. I flew 2 corporate jets where the TO/GA switch was where the autothrottle disconnect button is. I've mixed these two buttons up just due to primacy and being task saturated.

This is a failure to fly issue. Pilots get too dependent on the automation. It shouldn’t matter if the TOGA engages or not, whether you get the fly-up indication from it or not, or whether the autothrottles are engaged or not. The pilot flying should be manually doing all of this first, manually flying the plane, to ensure that the plane is going where it needs to, how it needs to, as the various items are being engaged to ensure they do engage correctly. Even if on a fully coupled missed. I’ve seen a few pilots who are trying to engage automation at the worst possible time, low to the ground, instead of set the the plane where it needs to go pitch, power abd/or heading-wise.
 
Yeah, I've seen a bit of "AP TAKE THE WHEEL!!" in my time. I was just debriefing this with an FO half an hour ago. If the airplane isn't doing what you want it to do, focus on making the airplane do what you want it to do in the most direct way possible.
Also there are a lot of accident reports where the PF was mashing the AP button shortly before everybody died.
 
Yeah, I've seen a bit of "AP TAKE THE WHEEL!!" in my time. I was just debriefing this with an FO half an hour ago. If the airplane isn't doing what you want it to do, focus on making the airplane do what you want it to do in the most direct way possible.
You shouldn't have to debrief this stuff. *wanders off muttering*

WHY, BACK IN MY DAY...why am I in this room? Am I looking for my cheaters?
 
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