Report: Pilots in deadly Black Hawk crash disobeyed orders

Went so far with go fever one day I had to tell a senior ranking officer and the aircraft commander, "find another bird or find another gunner." It took that to re-cage him.
The very first, and last thing we say in our crew brief: "advocacy and assertion, if you don't feel safe, speak up."
Anicdote: one of our crew chief flying a VIP mission, didn't feel safe, spoke up and the crew turned around. No repercussions or stigma. However that is the command climate we have.

Also, I can understand the "coolness" factor of working with special people. I'm junior in my unit, however I have a modest amount of experience to draw from. When we fly 90% of our AFTP's to the same training AO, something different pops up, I can understand the enthusiasm than folks have, perhaps pushing their comfort factor; blurring the safety line perhaps.
 
Having been both in the 160th as an RLO and the National Guard as a -60 IP some random observations.
1. There is a stigma attached to the National Guard that is can have a basis in truth, but in many cases, particularly in units with specialised skills such as aviation units is unfounded. The National Guard unit I flew with had a level of experience that would have rivaled the 160th. Sometimes with experience, however, comes the "r" word- responsibility. The responsibility to say "Not today". My Guard unit had an OR and mission completion rate when we deployed that blew away active duty units, and we did so without damaging any airframes. Yet this was not because we launched in dangerous weather conditions, it was because we were experienced enough and worked together long enough that we could plan in execute mission safely and much quicker than our active duty counterparts who felt the need to do rock drills and long mission briefs every time they flew; yet we also knew when to say "this is too much".
We did cancel missions that did not meet specific parameters. We had a check and balance- if a mission hit a certain risk level, someone higher in the "food chain" had to sign off on it. We did turn back when encountering sand storms. In some cases aircraft climbed up and hit Basra for the ILS. In another case we did a mission a few times, but doing it was at the extreme end of the crew day in tough conditions (NVGs with body armor for about 9 hours in hot weather), and could not be safely sustainable for an entire year. So we passed it off to fixed wing assets for which it was better suited.
My Guard unit even did Ranger training missions at times, both in the mountains and in Florida. Again, these missions were treated no different from others. It met the safety parameters or it didn't go. It probably helped that we had other former 160th crews, crews that saw combat before 9/11 (even some Viet Nam pilots), so we had nothing to prove. We were mostly airline, EMS, police and corporate pilots who were exposed to civilian safety cultures as well.
2. The Army has a risk assessment process and it broke down in this mission- that is probably what the disobeying a direct order part was about. I don't have the weather forecast, but I assume it was less than 1000/3 which meant for an NVG overwater mission it would probably have needed the first O-4, possibly O-5 to sign off on it. At best. Yet two crews launched. I'm sure the AMC in chalk two was some LT who looked at the experienced crew in lead and went along. It should have been the flight lead telling the AMC they needed to CXL and try the next day. Shame on them. Unfortunately I can guarantee this was not the first mission where something like this happened, but nothing was done.
Kudos to the PIC in chalk 2 for saying "Heck with this" and not following lead into the bay.
3. Once they were in the bay flight lead messed up again by trying to maintain visual. Again, I don't get it. Punch in and recover. I assume this was a -60M since it had an autopilot. Good grief.
4. The military, particularly aviation, needs to look at the culture on the civilian side and see what they can learn and incorporate. I can say from experience that simulator training, for example, was worthless in the Army when compared to the airlines. IIMC should be a "LOFT" event for every RW aircrew in the simulator every year.

Yes, I've been there. But that was as a young LT when the senior pilots went along and I was riding the train. I remember breaking out of a fog bank over downtown Seoul and seeing the tops of apartment buildings above me sticking in the clouds. When I became a "salty" WO, however, I looked at the young pilots and realized I would have to be the one to say "No", and I had to know THEIR limits as well as my limits. Again, I was lucky enough to serve in a Guard unit surrounded with like minded senior pilots. We did not always see eye-to-eye, but I would serve with them again if given a chance.
The military is risky. Aviation is risky. Combine military, aviation and the sea and it's really risky. But we need to balance risk versus reward. The military needs to be able to look into the eyes of the parents, wives, sons and daughters of those lost and tell them that we will learn from this and won't needlessly sacrifice our greatest national treasure in the future.
 
One thing that shocks me in the findings is actually the hours in a helicopter and especially in a helo on NVGS.

Griffin, 37, had 1,017 combat hours and 6,112.2 combined military/civilian flight hours, and had flown with night vision goggles for 1,082.9 hours as of the day before the incident, according to the report. Most of that time was in other types of aircraft, including a C-12 Huron twin-engine turboprop plane. He'd flown 81.8 hours with NVGs in a UH-60M and 357.7 hours overall.

A UH-60 instructor pilot, Strother, 44, had 2,486 total flight hours, including nearly 735 in combat. He'd logged 13 hours with NVGs aboard a UH-60M.

Maybe i'm misreading this information and hours in different UH-60 models are logged separately, but if not that is not really anything at all since we'd log 13 hours on goggles in 2-4 nights of flying which was less than one week at our mission and training pace.
 
One thing that shocks me in the findings is actually the hours in a helicopter and especially in a helo on NVGS.

Griffin, 37, had 1,017 combat hours and 6,112.2 combined military/civilian flight hours, and had flown with night vision goggles for 1,082.9 hours as of the day before the incident, according to the report. Most of that time was in other types of aircraft, including a C-12 Huron twin-engine turboprop plane. He'd flown 81.8 hours with NVGs in a UH-60M and 357.7 hours overall.

A UH-60 instructor pilot, Strother, 44, had 2,486 total flight hours, including nearly 735 in combat. He'd logged 13 hours with NVGs aboard a UH-60M.

Maybe i'm misreading this information and hours in different UH-60 models are logged separately, but if not that is not really anything at all since we'd log 13 hours on goggles in 2-4 nights of flying which was less than one week at our mission and training pace.

I'm retired, but my assumption is that the -M is logged separately as the cockpit is quite different from the -A/L models.
I'm also going to assume Strother had more than 13 hours of NVG time based upon his rank and total time- the 13 hours is -M only.
 
That would make sense Blackhawk, I know for us, the hours in the MH-53J and MH-53M were logged separately for some things, but I thought the NVG time for us was the same.
 
Last edited:
That would make sense Blackhawk, I know for use, the hours in the MH-53J and MH-53M were logged separately for some things, but I thought the NVG time for use was the same.
For pilots the time in the type would matter in some cases. In the case of the A/L there is not much of a difference in the cockpit when operating the two. For the -M, however, it is very different and requires an understanding of the different avionics and flying a glass panel versus steam gauges.
 
The M is a different bird. More gusto at times and much better flow to cockpit management.

However the PFDisplay is dumb. Electronic steam gauges. Really Sikorsky!?!
 
However the PFDisplay is dumb. Electronic steam gauges. Really Sikorsky!?!

A friend of mine from college did some work on that system. He has said that the original design called for much more modern avionics, but the DOD went all Southwest on them and requested glass versions of old round dial displays in order to "ease" the transition for pilot.
 
A friend of mine from college did some work on that system. He has said that the original design called for much more modern avionics, but the DOD went all Southwest on them and requested glass versions of old round dial displays in order to "ease" the transition for pilot.
Wow. I never really looked at it before. You're right. They pretty much took the six pack and put it on a PFD. Dumb, but I'm not surprised. That's the Army for you. The GPS is not even IFR certified. Can you imagine a civilian aircraft costing $6 million a pop without an IFR GPS?? Especially a utility airframe such as this.
 
Wow. I never really looked at it before. You're right. They pretty much took the six pack and put it on a PFD. Dumb, but I'm not surprised. That's the Army for you. The GPS is not even IFR certified. Can you imagine a civilian aircraft costing $6 million a pop without an IFR GPS?? Especially a utility airframe such as this.

Did the same thing in the Echo.

First GPS capable aircraft in Army aviation... Will be the last one with an IFR cert for it.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Again, typical. Rather than learning something from the modern design of glass cockpits the DOD makes a retro six pack PFD.
 
Weather forecasts mean something.
Says you...
We laugh when we have to pull a dash 1. The product we get is pulled directly from duats or adds. But yet its regulatory to grab AF weather...

I shake my head at our efficiency...
 
Trust me, I am absolutely embarrassed by the products some of our crews get on the AF/Army side of things. Unfortunately a number of Guard weather shops were closed down a few years back and now the aviation units are getting their "official" weather by untraditional means.

Nevertheless, I hate to say but I was down along the NW FL coast at the time of this accident. It wasn't pretty from Pensacola eastward and my stomach sank the moment I heard the news.
 
Says you...
We laugh when we have to pull a dash 1. The product we get is pulled directly from duats or adds. But yet its regulatory to grab AF weather...

I shake my head at our efficiency...

While "regulatory," I'd argue there are enough outs available between 95-1 and the FIH to make pulling a dash one pretty rare.
 
I remember when we deployed there were civilian weather forecasters on the base but our "Official weather forecast" came from... Shaw AFB. Yes, some E-3 thousands of miles away who could not spell haboob was giving us our forecasts.
 
Wow. I never really looked at it before. You're right. They pretty much took the six pack and put it on a PFD. Dumb, but I'm not surprised. That's the Army for you. The GPS is not even IFR certified. Can you imagine a civilian aircraft costing $6 million a pop without an IFR GPS?? Especially a utility airframe such as this.
No, and also, I think maybe a call to someone in Congress is in order about that.
 
I remember when we deployed there were civilian weather forecasters on the base but our "Official weather forecast" came from... Shaw AFB. Yes, some E-3 thousands of miles away who could not spell haboob was giving us our forecasts.

Wonder if the NOTAM system was operating in a similar manner......

99.jpg
 
Back
Top