REACT helicopter crash

Not a firefighter but suddenly curious as to why the responders didn't fight the fire right then and there...any ideas?

I hate to Monday morning QB anything, but with this accident, there were complaints and rumblings I'd heard from some in the EMS community about the slow fire response to this accident. One crewmwmber was killed on impact. Two others survived the accident, but died either enroute or at the hospital.

As an ARFF-trained firefighter, and one who currently does contract firefighting operations with local raceway, I'm well aware of the operational aspects of aircraft crash/fire/rescue operations as well as operations involving Class B/D fire classes (flammable liquids/metals), and know that time is of the essence regards survivalibility in these type of fires (and of course, in any fire), as well issues surrounding extrication involved/needed.

Referencing the video of the immediate post-accident, there's selected commentary that was posted with it, which I'll comment to. Watching it is tough, seeing as how there seems to be much time being taken to size-up, versus commencing firefighting operations. Yes, a proper size-up is important, and that's usually done approaching the scene initially. But commencing suppression operations ASAP is equally important, if only to enhance the survivability aspects of any potential live victims. In this case, there were two still alive in the wreckage.

...The footage reveals a post crash fire. The survival probabilty of post crash fires involving helicopters is low. With that said and viewing the footage the crew and passengers of this aircraft were probably dead indicating the fire departments response was of no consequnce. From a tactical standpoint the IC would have been justified in treating this a exposure protection, extinguishment and recovery incident. In should be noted that firefighter safety ranks above the safety of potential victims.

Yes, a post crash fire. Yes, survivability is generally low. But "probably dead" isn't good enough, and further treating this as an exposure protection and recovery based on "probably" also isn't good enough. Firefighter safety always ranks above the safety of potential victims, yes, (ie- don't make yourself a victim too) but there's a fine line between your safety as a firefighter and taking the risks you get paid to take.

...and by the way - remember that there just aren't hoses connected around the neighborhood, just waiting for things to catch on fire. the firefighters must get their orders, unload the line, hook it up to a water source, start the flow, build the pressure...this could account for a good minute after the team arrived for things to start happening.

Incorrect there. There's a reason fire trucks carry a water tank, so they can begin initial attack on a fire immediately, while other crew or the second-due engine takes the reponsibility of supplying them; either by laying them back to a hydrant, laying from a hydrant forward to them, or supplying them with their own truck if a hydrant isn't available. Either way, quick initial attack on something like this is paramount. And this isn't an ARFF specific idea, it's something all firefighters should at least know.

......These engines are not equipped with dealing aircraft. These engines are designed to fight mainly structure fires or cars. In any situation you access your scene and make sure its safe. What good is it for a first responder to try to do a rescue mission and die in the process of doing so. If you are not certified by your state for Structural Firefighter or AFFF please don't comment.

Since I'm certed and current as both in your last sentence here, I will comment. Yes, the average structure engine (regular fire truck) isn't specifically equipped for aircraft fires. But that doesn't mean they don't do anything on scene, as they still possess the ability to fight aircraft or fuel fires. Yes, in any situation scene safety is very important, but equally important is commencing suppression operations.

......I love the people that are commenting as if this video is telling the whole story. As a fireman, and one that has aircraft disaster response training, these units that responded DO NOT carry AFFF....a foam product designed to extinguish petroleum fires - aircraft fires. Secondly - these firemen did exactly what their training taught them...determine what is burning first - before you attempt to extinguish. In my area a volunteer fireman was just killed by an explosive reaction of water put on an aluminum fueled fire.....he was killed instantly. Speak from a place of intelligence - Oh, lastly, having been sent to the scene with information that this was a bell helicopter, seeing the scene in the state it was in when they rolled, survivors werent going to be found....

Never say never. DO NOT carry AFFF (a Class B foam for fuel fires)? It depends. Some do, some don't. Most all engines carry Class A foam, which can be used on a Class B fire, but isn't optimal due to its inability to secure explosive vapors due to some chemical incompatibility; but it will extinguish the fire, which is the important thing. Secondarily, all engine trucks carry limited stocks of dry chemical, normally in an extinguisher...also useful. Sure, it's important to determine what's burning before you start extinguishing it, but you also would know that prior to arriving on scene, and a simple 10 second size-up would also give you most of what you need to know in a situation like this.

And lastly: "Survivors weren't going to be found?" Really? Guess what, they were found, and later succumbed. Could've/should've/would've.....but what if, they had been extricated even 1 minute earlier? You cannot go by that instant assumption. You simply cannot.
 
I hate to Monday morning QB anything, but with this accident, there were complaints and rumblings I'd heard from some in the EMS community about the slow fire response to this accident. One crewmwmber was killed on impact. Two others survived the accident, but died either enroute or at the hospital.

As an ARFF-trained firefighter, and one who currently does contract firefighting operations with local raceway, I'm well aware of the operational aspects of aircraft crash/fire/rescue operations as well as operations involving Class B/D fire classes (flammable liquids/metals), and know that time is of the essence regards survivalibility in these type of fires (and of course, in any fire), as well issues surrounding extrication involved/needed.

Referencing the video of the immediate post-accident, there's selected commentary that was posted with it, which I'll comment to. Watching it is tough, seeing as how there seems to be much time being taken to size-up, versus commencing firefighting operations. Yes, a proper size-up is important, and that's usually done approaching the scene initially. But commencing suppression operations ASAP is equally important, if only to enhance the survivability aspects of any potential live victims. In this case, there were two still alive in the wreckage.

Yes, a post crash fire. Yes, survivability is generally low. But "probably dead" isn't good enough, and further treating this as an exposure protection and recovery based on "probably" also isn't good enough. Firefighter safety always ranks above the safety of potential victims, yes, (ie- don't make yourself a victim too) but there's a fine line between your safety as a firefighter and taking the risks you get paid to take.
I just think of a few accidents in which those who got to the accident scene responded quickly, and as a result some of the occupants survived.

Incorrect there. There's a reason fire trucks carry a water tank, so they can begin initial attack on a fire immediately, while other crew or the second-due engine takes the reponsibility of supplying them; either by laying them back to a hydrant, laying from a hydrant forward to them, or supplying them with their own truck if a hydrant isn't available. Either way, quick initial attack on something like this is paramount. And this isn't an ARFF specific idea, it's something all firefighters should at least know.
tl;dr: "Ya know, we should probably fight the fire being firefighters and all."

Since I'm certed and current as both in your last sentence here, I will comment. Yes, the average structure engine (regular fire truck) isn't specifically equipped for aircraft fires. But that doesn't mean they don't do anything on scene, as they still possess the ability to fight aircraft or fuel fires. Yes, in any situation scene safety is very important, but equally important is commencing suppression operations.
I can easily see how discretion would be the better part of valor, but at the same time, protecting the public at large (much less possibly rescuing an aircraft occupant) has to rank pretty high up on the list of Things To Do At The Scene Of A Fire. (I mean, that's why we the taxpayer pay for fire departments.)
Never say never. DO NOT carry AFFF (a Class B foam for fuel fires)? It depends. Some do, some don't. Most all engines carry Class A foam, which can be used on a Class B fire, but isn't optimal due to its inability to secure explosive vapors due to some chemical incompatibility; but it will extinguish the fire, which is the important thing. Secondarily, all engine trucks carry limited stocks of dry chemical, normally in an extinguisher...also useful. Sure, it's important to determine what's burning before you start extinguishing it, but you also would know that prior to arriving on scene, and a simple 10 second size-up would also give you most of what you need to know in a situation like this.
I'd think/expect that some sort of fuel firefighting capability would be on board most trucks for responding to an auto accident in which a fuel tank is breached. Thanks.
 
Well, this is a tough video to watch as an old firefighter.

I can't speak to other jurisdictions but I hope many departments might present a different initial attack after a more timely (yet proper) size-up, while dressed in full PPE, and confident in their ability to knock down a fuel-fed fire of that size in order to better protect any occupants who may have survived impact. While AFFF is the correct tool ultimately, it is NOT required for an initial attack on a fuel-fed fire of this intensity and you CAN knock down a lot of fire, or at least move it from surviving victims with an eye toward rescue, by the correct application of water only as you set-up additional resources.

My heart goes out to all involved.
 
Well, this is a tough video to watch as an old firefighter.

I can't speak to other jurisdictions but I hope many departments might present a different initial attack after a more timely (yet proper) size-up, while dressed in full PPE, and confident in their ability to knock down a fuel-fed fire of that size in order to better protect any occupants who may have survived impact. While AFFF is the correct tool ultimately, it is NOT required for an initial attack on a fuel-fed fire of this intensity and you CAN knock down a lot of fire, or at least move it from surviving victims with an eye toward rescue, by the correct application of water only as you set-up additional resources..

Very true, sir. Very true indeed. You also noticed the Engine Capt with no helmet or SCBA, doing a walkaround. And the fireifghter seemingly taking time in deploying the crosslay.
 
I'm not involved in suppression or rescue as I once was. I do work closely with coworkers in command/line positions and they are "hands-on" in the field while my office coordinates reources with LifeNet helicopters for serious incidents within our county, probably averaging three times monthly. We used the video today for an extended critique of our own response and planning for the field. It is difficult to say anything at all about this for fear of saying too much, based just on that short five minutes of video. Still, it was a grim reminder of a solemn trust given to those who answer the bells. Much depends on our very best effort. Anything less is simply not good enough, even if the fire always goes out.
 
Dunno if anyone heard, but just east of RPJ (Rochelle) a kit plane P-51 replica was found upside down, pilot trapped inside just after takeoff from KDKB. I saw it from the air myself no more than a few hours ago while flying. Freaky, honestly.
 
As for the Astars, I lost a friend and coworker in Missouri last year to a screwed up autorotation after fuel exhaustion caused a flame out. The Tucson accident was attributed to a loose fuel line following engine change. High speed low altitude autos in the Astar need two things very rapidly, collective down and cyclic way back.

I would love to see a direct per flight hour comparison on injury or fatality statistics between singles and twins. I would bet that it would be close.
 
I would love to see a direct per flight hour comparison on injury or fatality statistics between singles and twins. I would bet that it would be close.

It might be interesting, but like the fixed wing statistics I've never seen enough details. A big one being, you simply do not opperate a twin fixed the same as a fixed single. Night low ifr in the mountains? You don't do it in a single. It's not safe, but it's still statistically more dangerous to fly night LIFR than day IFR. The former can be done safely with a twin, but not a single. Without seeing the type of flying being done, which is incredibly subjective, it's hard to make a good comparison.
 
As for the Astars, I lost a friend and coworker in Missouri last year to a screwed up autorotation after fuel exhaustion caused a flame out. The Tucson accident was attributed to a loose fuel line following engine change. High speed low altitude autos in the Astar need two things very rapidly, collective down and cyclic way back.
.

In general, the AStar doesn't preserve NR as good as some other helos do. As high speeds down low, you generally will be alright with a straight ahead auto if you have a choice of landing areas. Collective down rapidly combined with cyclic way back rapidly, will likely lead to an NR overspeed, which granted can be controlled with the collective and smooth application of the controls. I don't mind having a good pile of speed in a low-altitude auto, whereas in a higher altitude one, Ill start slowing down more rapidly.
 
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Would a twin help with higher altitudes, like a rotor going to aspen?

Not necessarily. Like I mentioned, some have the extra power that only manages to carry the extra weight of both the engine as well as extra gearbox components.
 
Probably not in Aspen, but in Northern Illinois? justhelicopters forums look like a tactical nuke just hit. What a freaking mess.
 
RIP to the crew!

Something has got to give with HEMS! Years ago when I first started flying it was my career goal. Now with a family I would have to think very hard about it. Safety should be improving with technology but it can only get you so far if you take a flight and the weather changes.
 
In general, the AStar doesn't preserve NR as good as some other helos do. As high speeds down low, you generally will be alright with a straight ahead auto if you have a choice of landing areas. Collective down rapidly combined with cyclic way back rapidly, will likely lead to an NR overspeed, which granted can be controlled with the collective and smooth application of the controls. I don't mind having a good pile of speed in a low-altitude auto, whereas in a higher altitude one, Ill start slowing down more rapidly.
Fascinating. I should learn more about this. (0.0 of rotor-wing time, and $0 to buy rotor time with, but I am curious. I've had one helicopter ride back when I was very very young, I'd like to take another.)
 
With the LifeNet accident, like jergar mentioned, it was the auto. The field they went into needed a zero ground run, but it still had speed when it touched and then rolled. I seem to recall JH blowing up (as BB mentioned about this) at the time that AMC doesn't train full-downs. Anybody know if that's true?

Sad day. Four shifts left before retiring.
 
As for the Astars, I lost a friend and coworker in Missouri last year to a screwed up autorotation after fuel exhaustion caused a flame out. The Tucson accident was attributed to a loose fuel line following engine change. High speed low altitude autos in the Astar need two things very rapidly, collective down and cyclic way back.

I would love to see a direct per flight hour comparison on injury or fatality statistics between singles and twins. I would bet that it would be close.
Was this the one where the pilot called dispatch about his low fuel situation or was this a mechanical issue?
 
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