We summon the flap raising subroutine and our processor executes the gear raising routine instead.
Excellent example! Following this logic, it would seem that a sufficient amount of 'programming' would fix the processor.
In your example, the programming was done in a simple unstressed manner, but the call-up was under duress, so the processor malfunctioned. Of course. A human is in a different program when stressed. Flight training, including gear operation, needs to be trained in a fashion that proceeds from simple to complex. You know how the FOI explains that?
Which is the main problem in most all flight training - most people don't wanna spend a lot of time in primary training - learning absolute control and mastery of the aircraft machine. They are too focused on achieving PTS minimums at the least cost. Just do normal routine get past the checkride stuff. Don't spend any time getting actually proficient at unusual situations.
The bottom line is that most all accidents are preventable with a sufficient amount of training that is focused on the specific problem of that particular student.
It is a sad state of the aviation training industry that such policies as no touch-n-go's, no spins, or no actual IMC, or must always fill up the tanks even for a local flight, or all the "safety nets" that schools put around students because the main number one objective is to
rent, not to teach.
These so-called 'safety' policies actually cause the accidents that occur after flight school.
One of the main causes of accidents is an off-airport landing due to fuel starvation. Well, of course. The PPL who never had to workout an actual fuel consumption problem, except on his knowledge test and groundschool environment, because the flight school and/or his overprotective underconfident instructor always made him/her take-off with full fuel and always have 2 hours reserve, and in real life, his lack of experience in fuel management causes a surprise when the tanks are near empty.
A forced touch and go can, and will, happen. A late go-around due to a really bad gusty cross-wind. I'm sure you can think of many reasons why a surprise can happen in any phase of flight.
It seems, to me, that any where a particular situation causes a spike in accidents, that particular area needs
more training. That has been my mode of operation all my life. I have focused on the specific problem areas, such as touch and go's, spins, actual IMC, flying with just enough fuel to accomplish the mission, and no more, and so on.
Of course, this kind of training is fed in at the students rate of learning. All the safety nets and no-no policies are good for the beginner, but by the time he/she is ready to be certificated to carry pax, he/she must have been trained to think before acting.
This kind of thinking seems to have been dropped from the syllabus. I see too many people actually believing that training to minimum standards and rote PTS monkey demonstrations is sufficient to put people out in airplanes in our system.
Your comments, and those others who would 'restrict' the learning just to save time and money, help continue this cancer of pilot training. Maybe not on purpose, and maybe you really believe that these 'no-no's' for 'students' are really in their best interest, but please consider my long-time learned opinion. You're a smart guy. I am not trying to 'overule' your opinion, but am trying to engage in intelligent discussion over this 'training' philosophy.
Can you support your opinion that such training should not be done?