B767Driver said:
I couldn't disagree more. Operating within the above confines is the basis for good decision making skills. I bet there is a dozen checklist items on my checklist that bears the response, "As Required". This requires the pilot to assess some condition and make a determination as to what response is required/desired.
I know you don't believe that these are critical decisions arrived upon by the crew...but I sure do. I would think most professional pilots would agree.
I may not be as advanced in my thinking to understand the intuitive nature of next generation technology, as you are prognosticating, but to throw out a statement that crews don't make many critical decisions is...crazy talk.
Correcto.
During my "fun with the IAE V-2532" in Chicago in May, there was nothing really in the checklist for that particular situation and we pretty much had to create our own procedure in a lot of different ways. If you follow the checklist to the T in the situation we had, we would have had much larger problems, trust me.
What if the captain was new and didn't trust a "Hey Skipper, let's think about this, we've got X and Y and Z, but if we do this part of the procedure, this might not be safe" from the FO? What if there was a fresh minimum qual'ed captain in the left seat and an FO fresh out of Gulfstream in the right seat?
Every emergency that I've had in the past 10 or so years a checklist was guidance but you really had to think on your feet to bring the aircraft back safely.
Like pressurization problems. I had an outflow valve that froze on a 727 about 17,000 feet and climbing. I could slowly close it, but I couldn't open it. So the more I tinkered with it, it kept increasing the differential. Can't just descend because you're over mountanous terrain. Do you close it and continue to your base? What do you do to depressurize as you're arriving? What about articulating the outflow valves as the pilots are advancing and retarding the throttle on arrival? How much of a pressurization surge is too much for your passengers? Whatdooyado? What happens when you brief the flight attendants about the possibilitiy of the masks dropping and they panic (true story!)?
There's no checklist or procedure for that at all.
So whenever the check airmen says, "Using your systems knowledge, work out this problem" he's actually doing you a favor helping you think outside of the box.
If the next generation of pilots thinks that highly automated planes don't require systems skill, experience and the ability to use systems knowledge to stabilize an abnormal, they're in for a big BIG surprise.
Hopefully not at a critical phase where someone gets hurt.
On another thread: Putting the go/no-go decision into the hands of automation is not someting I'm interested in. Don't misinterpret automation as this magic box which has the big picture which knows how to fly an airplane and the percentages of risk involved with aborting or continuing the takeoff roll.
Automation is a box programmed by engineers which may or may not understand the dynamics of flight and will execute responses programed by engineers which may or may not understand.
Remember the Airbus crash? Why would a plane fly so low and no want to land? Adding power or increasing back pressure isn't consistent with an airplane in the landing phase so lets go ahead and override the pilot's response consistent with a safe landing.
WHAP!
Or you're accelerating through about 70 knots and there's a flock of Canadian geese not paying attention and an antelope traversing the runway during takeoff roll in a DC-9. Do you continue? Do you abort? What would the automation do with what it can't see? What if the automation *could* see it, what would it do? If you hit the animals, had an engine fire and aborted, would it command evacuation? Or does the captain determine if it requires evacuation?