Pilots often head to wrong airports, reports show

TrustMeI'maPilot

Well-Known Member
Just thought I'd throw this grenade and run for cover. I love the first line.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/101402486

Do you know the way to San Jose? Quite a few airline pilots apparently don't.

On at least 150 flights, including one involving a Southwest Airlines jet last month in Missouri and a jumbo cargo plane last fall in Kansas, U.S. commercial air carriers have either landed at the wrong airport or started to land and realized their mistake in time, according to a search by The Associated Press of government safety databases and media reports since the early 1990s.

A particular trouble spot is San Jose, Calif. The list of landing mistakes includes six reports of pilots preparing to land at Moffett Field, a joint civilian-military airport, when they meant to go to Mineta San Jose International Airport, about 10 miles to the southeast. The airports are south of San Francisco in California's Silicon Valley.

(Read more: Southwest flight lands at wrong Missouri airport)

"This event occurs several times every winter in bad weather when we work on Runway 12," a San Jose airport tower controller said in a November 2012 report describing how an airliner headed for Moffett after being cleared to land at San Jose. A controller at a different facility who noticed the impending landing on radar warned his colleagues with a telephone hotline that piped his voice directly into the San Jose tower's loudspeakers. The plane was waved off in time.

In nearly all the incidents, the pilots were cleared by controllers to guide the plane based on what they could see rather than relying on automation. Many incidents occur at night, with pilots reporting they were attracted by the runway lights of the first airport they saw during descent. Some pilots said they disregarded navigation equipment that showed their planes slightly off course because the information didn't match what they were seeing out their windows—a runway straight ahead.

"You've got these runway lights, and you are looking at them, and they're saying: 'Come to me, come to me. I will let you land.' They're like the sirens of the ocean," said Michael Barr, a former Air Force pilot who teaches aviation safety at the University of Southern California.

Using NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System, along with news accounts and reports sent to other federal agencies, the AP tallied 35 landings and 115 approaches or aborted landing attempts at wrong airports by commercial passenger and cargo planes over more than two decades.

The tally doesn't include every event. Many are not disclosed to the media, and reports to the NASA database are voluntary. The Federal Aviation Administration investigates wrong airport landings and many near-landings, but those reports aren't publicly available. FAA officials turned down a request by The Associated Press for access to those records, saying some may include information on possible violations of safety regulations by pilots and might be used in an enforcement action.

(Read more: Uh Oh! 'Dreamlifter' lands at wrong airport)

NASA, on the other hand, scrubs its reports of identifying information to protect confidentiality, including names of pilots, controllers and airlines. While the database is operated by the space agency, it is paid for by the FAA and its budget has been frozen since 1997, said database director Linda Connell. As a result, fewer incident reports are being entered even though the volume of reports has soared, she said.

The accounts that are available paint a picture of repeated close calls, especially in parts of the country where airports are situated close together with runways similarly angled, including Nashville and Smyrna in Tennessee, Tucson and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, and several airports in South Florida.

In a report filed last July, for example, an airline captain described how his MD-80 was lined up to land at what he thought was San Antonio International Airport when a rider in the cockpit's jump seat "shouted out that we were headed for Lackland Air Force Base." The first officer, who was flying the plane, quickly aborted the landing and circled around to line up for the correct airport. The captain later thanked the cockpit passenger and phoned the San Antonio tower. "They did not seem too concerned," he reported, "and said this happens rather frequently there."

Continental Airlines' regional carriers flying from Houston to Lake Charles Regional Airport on the Louisiana Gulf Coast have at least three times mistakenly landed at the smaller, nearby Southland Executive field. Both airports have runways painted with the numbers 15 and 33 to reflect their compass headings. Runways are angled based on prevailing winds.

The recent wrong airport landings by a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 in Missouri and an Atlas Air Boeing 747 freighter in Kansas have heightened safety concerns. The Southwest pilots stopped just short of a ravine at the end of the short runway in Hollister, Mo., when they meant to land on a runway twice as long at the nearby Branson airport. Of the 35 documented wrong landings, 23 occurred at airports with shorter runways. The runways were longer in three cases, they were the same length in two and the wrong airport wasn't identified or its runway length was unavailable in seven.

FAA officials emphasized that cases of wrong airport landings are rare. There are nearly 29,000 commercial aircraft flights daily in the U.S., but only eight wrong airport landings by U.S. carriers in the last decade, according to AP's tally. None has resulted in death or injury.

"The FAA reviews reported wrong-airport incidents to determine whether steps such as airfield lighting adjustments may reduce pilot confusion," the agency said in a statement.

(Read more: Renovation plans in the works for Biden's 'worst airport')

But John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board member and aviation safety expert, says the FAA and the NTSB should be concerned. Air crashes are nearly always the result of a string of safety lapses rather than a single mistake, he noted. Attempts to land at wrong airports represent "another step up the ladder toward a riskier operation," he said.

Runway condition is also a worry when a plane makes a mistaken approach. When an air traffic controller clears a plane to land on a specific runway, "you know you pretty much have a clear shot at a couple of miles of smooth concrete," said Rory Kay, a training captain at a major airline. "If you choose to land somewhere else, then all bets are off. There could be a bloody big hole in the middle of the runway. There could be a barrier across it. There could be vehicles working on it."

In some reports, pilots said they were saved from making a wrong airport landing by an alert controller. That was the case for an MD-80 captain who nearly landed his mid-sized airliner at Page Field, a small airport in Fort Myers, Fla., used mainly by private pilots, instead of the much larger Southwest Florida International Airport nearby. A controller caught the mistake in time and suggested the captain explain the detour by telling passengers the flight was "touring downtown" Fort Myers.

"I was pretty shaken as to what could have happened and was very glad to have an understanding, helpful (controller)," the captain said. "They (controllers) said there would be no problem with (the FAA) and that this was a common occurrence."

By The Associated Press
 
Have you flown in the SF Bay Area before? I can sympathize a little bit more now that SJC dug up runway 29/11 and extended 30R/12L, making their runway configurations more identical. But Moffett field is still a VERY different airport, and one that has always been there. Moffett is literally on the edge of the bay and SJC is not. I could see this being a problem landing there at night, but that highlights the importance of backing up your visual with a secondary approach (like the ILS RWY 12R) and making sure your heading is 120 degrees and not 140 degrees. Unfortunately SJC (and the Bay Area in general) lands to the southeast infrequently enough that I bet people just forget Moffett even exists. :(
 
Sooo...in MORE than 2 decades (we don't actually know how many years this data covers, except it's more than 20), we have had 35 landings at wrong airports. I can think of many more industries that make far more than 35 mistakes in over 2 decades.


"35 landings and 115 approaches or aborted landing attempts at wrong airports by commercial passenger and cargo planes over more than two decades."
 
It can happen to anyone, I lined up with Moffett one night going into SJC. I was new to Eagle and flying with the LAX Ex-CP (Think big lady for guys in the know).
 
I think I may see the disconnect.

I read that story early today. When I read it, there were statistics of how many of the events were during visual approaches.

I may be missing it, but I don't see that in the posted story. I had assumed it was the same story since they used that "Do you know the way to San Jose" line, so I didn't read it a second time. However, going into that article, I don't see the statistics. I checked a couple other articles and they too did not contain the statistics.

If I'm missing it or is someone sees those numbers elsewhere, please point me to them.
 
Obviously that has you emotionally upset. Why is that?

You answered my question.

It is no surprise that you want to break it down to 'it is the visual approach' because those you work with want to do the same thing. Blame it on the individual pilots, instead of working to find the systemic problems.

So tell me (also @mshunter please chime in) were the Northwest guys that landed in the wrong country flying a visual approach? Do you know if the Atlas or Colgan guys were flying visuals? In the Colgan incident, the crew was flying a visual backed up by an instrument approach, so not a true visual per se. Both crew members in their separate interviews both stated that they noticed the course needle was 'acting weird', of course nothing was said. That points more towards a breakdown of CRM more than anything. See this thread...

http://forums.jetcareers.com/thread...-the-pilot-monitoring-crm-and-culture.192016/
 
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It's the nature of the beast that aviation draws more than it's share of attention.

The take-away from all this is how the visual approach is the common thread in such events.

Atlas was cleared for the RNAV approach.

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You answered my question.

It is no surprise that you want to break it down to 'it is the visual approach' because those you work with want to do the same thing. Blame it on the individual pilots, instead of working to find the systemic problems.

So tell me (also @mshunter please chime in) were the Northwest guys that landed in the wrong country flying a visual approach? Do you know if the Atlas or Colgan guys were flying visuals? In the Colgan incident, the crew was flying a visual backed up by an instrument approach, so not a true visual per se. Both crew members in their separate interviews both stated that they noticed the course needle was 'acting weird', of course nothing was said. That points more towards a breakdown of CRM more than anything. See this thread...

http://forums.jetcareers.com/thread...-the-pilot-monitoring-crm-and-culture.192016/

I'll buy the breakdown in CRM for sure. But the common link in a lot of these is "oh, hey look, a runway! Let's go visual!"

I just came out of AQP, as in TODAY. There was a lot of discussion about "being careful on a visual approach. This is what we have been seeing lately.". Even going so far as to show a few videos, and setting us up in the Sim for a scenario where we could make the wrong choice and point at the wrong airport. We, as humans, tend to disregard perceived instrument "failures" because "the runway is right there.". And we are also a heard/pack animal, that once one see it, the other may agree if unsure.

I'm not trying to discount a breakdown of CRM, but I feel like you are trying to disassemble the link that is undeniable in a visual approach.

The lure of "OH LOOK! There is the runway" can be pretty big. It can quickly lead to *bloup bloup bloup* "That was me, autopilot off, I'm going to hand fly the visual.". Then, "why don't the instruments agree? They must be wrong, because I am super pilot and can see the damn runway!"
 
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