Pilots Engaged in Small Talk Before Botched Jet Takeoff

We USED to have the flaps as part of the taxi check, but then we moved it to the boxed itmes (which I guess is below the line at PSA) on the after start checklist. The main reason was one less thing for the FO to be heads down doing while the aircraft was moving. This incident kinda highlights another reason, though. You're not moving yet, so you're not distracted, so you can LOOK at the flap handle and LOOK at the EICAS to verify the correct flap setting instead of automatically saying "Flaps X degrees and indicating." We also pre-set v-speeds based on what our take off numbers are and verify them before leaving the gate. Just another net to catch something like this from slipping through.

Just to add...

This change took place shortly after I started flying the line a 9E. I did not have that much time under the old method of setting flaps during taxi, but I really do like setting the flaps while stopped after pushback with the brake set before any taxiing happens. From a been there done that as an FO under both methods, I am heads up a lot more with the new method then the old...
 
Just to add...

This change took place shortly after I started flying the line a 9E. I did not have that much time under the old method of setting flaps during taxi, but I really do like setting the flaps while stopped after pushback with the brake set before any taxiing happens. From a been there done that as an FO under both methods, I am heads up a lot more with the new method then the old...

I agree...I like the fact that as an FO, I can be heads up and be there to confirm taxi instructions with the captain, esspecially at airports that can be very confusing (BOS comes to mind). I don't know how many times I've saved my CA's butt by saying things like "No, its the next taxiway." Same thing with some of the CA's I've flown with-I read back a wrong clearance, ground didn't catch it, but my CA did.

I just think that having two people heads up is the best way to do it. With me as an FO having to worry about doing a ton of work during the taxi is just going to lead to more incursions and more wrong turns because I'm not really paying attention and there's no one there to back up the CA. Despite what we might think of ourselves, we're gonna make mistakes-why not have an extra pair of eyes up as a backup?
 
These guys remind me of Wooderson: Let me tell you what Melba Toast is packin' right here, all right. We got 4:11 Positrac outback, 750 double pumper, Edelbrock intake, bored over 30, 11 to 1 pop-up pistons, turbo-jet 390 horsepower. We're talkin' some f-in' muscle.:cool:
 
What really needs to happen is for a way to set what flap setting you're using in the airplane, and then if you attempt to advance the throttles (or do a takeoff config check) with the flap handle being out of the position you've designated, you get a takeoff config warning.

Now somebody is going to come in and say, "Just set the flaps right and there's no problem!" But the fact of the matter is that there IS a problem, and it's a problem that's been repeated over and over.

It'd a simple fix that, at least with the ERJ, could probably be fixed with a software update. You could easily put a menu in one of the MFD pages where you could select whether you're going to takeoff with flaps 9, 18 (or if approved, 22).
 
It'd a simple fix that, at least with the ERJ, could probably be fixed with a software update. You could easily put a menu in one of the MFD pages where you could select whether you're going to takeoff with flaps 9, 18 (or if approved, 22).

There would still be an induced error. You mean to put in flaps 18, you type in 9. You set 18. Still bad juju.

Config warning is a gross-error check...will it fly? Yes...eventually

Attention to detail by both pilots using procedures and managing workloads is a fine check.

Lots of levels of safety.

I'll say it again, not recognizing the hazards, and not recognizing that there were mitigating factors that lower your point of task oversaturation without realizing it.

Again, that's my opinion from reading the transcript.
 
There would still be an induced error. You mean to put in flaps 18, you type in 9. You set 18, the aircraft generates a warning you set the flaps back to 9 instead of crosschecking data cause you read it right the first time. Still bad juju.

Config warning is a gross-error check...will it fly? Yes...eventually

Attention to detail by both pilots using procedures and managing workloads is a fine check.

Lots of levels of safety.

I'll say it again, not recognizing the hazards, and not recognizing that there were mitigating factors that lower your point of task oversaturation without realizing it.

Again, that's my opinion from reading the transcript.

I took too long to fix it, so no edit button. This is the clarification I wanted to post.
 
And old trusty method of remembering a non-standard flap setting is throwing a empty cup over the flap handle. Works great!

our flap handle has a guard next to it. My method of remembering out of the ordinary things is to flip the knob on the display reversionary panel. Thar makes my MFD go blank. That way when I look down and see a blank screen I go "whoa, what's up with that? Oh yeah, they want us to call 5 prior to push"
 
our flap handle has a guard next to it. My method of remembering out of the ordinary things is to flip the knob on the display reversionary panel. Thar makes my MFD go blank. That way when I look down and see a blank screen I go "whoa, what's up with that? Oh yeah, they want us to call 5 prior to push"


I have a small brain.

I'd take a Huge piece of paper and write what I needed to do on it. Clip it on the yoke clip so I'd always be bumping it. Never forgot.

I came up with this when I did a "reminder" but forgot and took off to Nassau without customs paperwork. (thank god for faxes)
 
True. And even the best amount of training will still never prepare us for the shock, surprise, disbelief, fear (of many things), anger, and a host of other emotions that all come like a whirlwind when something of this magnitude occurs, especially in the immediate moments following it. The people you would think would react one way, react differently, and vice versa. It's very interesting and sobering at the same time, coming upon pilot/crew from an accident in the immediate aftermath, and seeing these reactions firsthand. It surprised me, and has each time; for different reasons.

This reminds me of 'The Right Stuff' - the book, not the movie. One thing that really stuck out at me during my reading of the book is that the orig. Mercury 7 were trained to NOT REACT – to not have that host of emotions - and it was in that un-reaction that made them successful. The tests and training that they underwent trained their mind and body. Even in the most stressful of situations - high G takeoffs, splashdown, being sealed into a tin can, and etc. it was treated as if all was normal and to react like a computer would to the situation. They were fully desensitized from the experiences they were going to undergo during their flight.

I think about that a lot and compare it to my training and experience in the airline world where we all still have dreams of having ‘The Right Stuff.’

For me, and in my experiences, it was the opposite of the astronauts. The overall fatigue that the company subjected you to dulled your senses into complacency rather than over preparedness.

I did get a ‘CONFIG FLAPS’ triple chime/audible on a take off roll. Once, when I was a new FO and with a Captain who was rushing through a short taxi. The lesson that I learned was a very good one – not to rush and to have a flow that would minimize errors in the future. Because of this I became a better pilot... in fact I ended up developing a pre-takeoff flow that covered both mine and the captains required items along with a continued double check of everything important. And because of that abort, a situation like it has never happened again. (to me... yet) And, most importantly, because of mental vigilance, I caught other ‘gotchas’ that might have bitten me in the future.

And to this day, there is a mental ‘abort, abort, abort…’ running through me head till the V1 callout.

Does this mean I never missed a radio call and was a perfect robotic pilot… A perfect Johnny Brownnose… No, no one is perfect. It means that I treated the ‘critical phases of flight’ as critical… I know most of the things that can kill me. If people make fun, or asked why I would point and touch during the Before Takeoff Checklist, I would explain that I took a whole bunch of good experiences taught to me by a whole lot of good captains and made it into my own.

In this particular situation, -the theme of the thread- I would hopefully have caught it… because each and every time I would point and look [and check] each item on that line of the Before Takeoff Checklist…

Flaps 20 Required… Point and Look at ACARS,
Flaps 20 Selected… Point and Look at the Flap Handle,
Indicating Flaps 20… Point and Look at ED1

if it was set wrong, and there were days where things didn't agree – which is another story for later – it was corrected. (Which is the reason we have checklists and flows)

So, really, what am I saying... well, we are all human. We are not infalliable. We are all tired... of course we are, especially at the regionals. We are all also professionals - try to act like it, every day. Could this have happened to me, I hope not. But, yes... every day people with years more experience than me make mistakes.

I work hard to build my box of tools so that the day it's my turn, hopefully, with the grace of God, I will be ready.
 
These guys remind me of Wooderson: Let me tell you what Melba Toast is packin' right here, all right. We got 4:11 Positrac outback, 750 double pumper, Edelbrock intake, bored over 30, 11 to 1 pop-up pistons, turbo-jet 390 horsepower. We're talkin' some f-in' muscle.:cool:


I know its making lite of the situation but "party at the moon tower" yeah still working for the city ya know keep a little change in my pocket.

Back to the post. All of us supposed professional aviators out here all have had something happen at some point that we walked away from and said that was stupid! I hope that these two learned from their mistakes and will never get complacent like this again. We all have to take a second before every push and realize you have peoples lives riding behind you. This is a major responsibility that we have to our passengers to get them to their destination safely and preferably without scaring the crap out of them.
We have all gotten complacent from one time to another and sometimes you have to take a small step backwards and do everything the right way.
 
That is not the only small thing you have...

Quality burn.

That was definitely a burn. One that hurt deeply. So deeply, in fact, that I will have to go home to my tall blonde wife (you know, the one you met and kept telling me how attractive she was) and have her console that burn.

I'll try to forget that you go home to a dude room mate and a dog. :eek:

So you're doing to disappear for weeks and then come oh'snap on Polar?

Oh no you di'int! ;)

I'll take your word for it since obviously you two have shared some intimate moments.
Did you use the international pilot for Continental line on him too?

He used it, and I fell for it. Luckily, I was the daddy.
 
That was definitely a burn. One that hurt deeply. So deeply, in fact, that I will have to go home to my tall blonde wife (you know, the one you met and kept telling me how attractive she was) and have her console that burn.

You forgot the "So I'll be back in four minutes!" :)
 
One of the things that I will always keep with me from instructing is to constantly check the configuration of the aircraft when taking the runway and when on short final. Unfortunately some of us start to just call out the items on a checklist from rote memory as being completed. Its stupid but after duty hour 13 on leg 5 of day 4 it does happen. I've trained myself (from a bad experience instructing) so that as soon as we get "position and hold" or a take off clearance I glance at the Flaps, Trim, Spoilers, and N1. When landing once the aural system says 100 I look at gear, flaps, spoilers. Sometimes over and over again. Does this make me a great pilot? NO, its just one of the things that I've developed to mitigate the "killer things" and I think every somewhat decent pilot has their different little things. For Doug its a cup on the flap lever, for others it to dim the MFD, some hang the QRH from the upper console.

This could have happened to anyone of us. They were doing what they always do and got complacent. Hopefully they can get some more training from PSA and this can be a learning experience for them. Luckily that EMAS was there or these would be more of a RIP thread.
 
I have to disagree. He didnt fess up to anything. They quickly discussed what happened, and in the midst of all it forgot that the CVR was capturing it all.

I'm talking about being honest at the hearing. As stated in my post
Many pilots have strong egos and believe they're the best and can never screw up. When they do screw up in a very big career ending way, they are stunned. The Captain here is obviously stunned into disbelief. The press article commented about his failure to properly respond to a question about a checklist by saying "Yeah, guess so". It's obvious to me he was in a state of mental shock.
 
Huh? On Page 1, you wrote this:

That transcript is not good for anyone.

I cant believe he straight up confessed on the CVR about what happened.

Now, you write this:

I have to disagree. He didnt fess up to anything. They quickly discussed what happened, and in the midst of all it forgot that the CVR was capturing it all.


So which is it? You're contradicting yourself. :confused:
 
Back
Top