Pilots Engaged in Small Talk Before Botched Jet Takeoff

But in the CVR, the crew notes the flap setting. Which is used most often? 20? And out of CRW, would there be that much difference is performance between 8 and 20? Now we seem to be getting into more than just 'sterile cockpit'.

FWIW, I think the sterile cockpit rule is good but used too often as some trump card. The lesson I see is the small item of a delay throws the crew off its normal pacing. And it is a good idea to run the checklist two or three times when a less than normal progression occurs.

About 80% of takeoffs on the CRJ are flaps 8. Calling for flaps 8 on taxi feels like almost standard procedure. Honestly with most flaps 20 takeoffs the call usually is something like "Flaps eigh...err...twenty please".

I agree with you on the sterile cockpit. I think people have misunderstood the intention of the rule. Having a full conversation on taxi out is one thing, but if they want absolutely no impertinent conversation they've going to have us scrutinizing everything we say instead of concentrating on flying. Sometimes you just say stuff.
 
About 80% of takeoffs on the CRJ are flaps 8. Calling for flaps 8 on taxi feels like almost standard procedure. Honestly with most flaps 20 takeoffs the call usually is something like "Flaps eigh...err...twenty please".

Depends on the airline. At 9E, a fair number of our -200s do not have a flap 8 detent so for us, the overwhelming majority of takeoffs are flap 20 departures, even in an aircraft with the flaps 8 detent. If I have the option, I try and go with whatever gives me the better performance.
 
The key is to take this experience and learn from it.

Read the CVR, correlate it to the FDR, and reflect.

From NTSB Ops 2, this CA has 11 years at the company and 4600 hrs as PIC of the CRJ. If it can happen to him, it can happen to anybody.
 
You know there have been some lambasting styled comments on this thread about this crew. And some of ya'll making them I know with near certainty have had zero transport category crew cockpit experience. It is really easy to sit in judgment of these guys when you have never operated in such an environment. I'm not making excuses for them. But is very very easy to get distracted and miss something critical in such a setting. Thankfully we have a lot of automation on our sides but as stated above, this sort of thing happens often, probably as much as a hundred times a day without incident. These guys were as unlucky as they were poorly trained.

The supreme arrogance of the "it can't happen to me" or the "I would never act like that" mentality astounds me coming from any professional aviator, 121 crew cockpit or not. Such a tone implies large deficits in both career and general life experience as well. I urge some of you to reconsider your damnation of this crew, take in all relevant data and turn it into something positive by learning from their mistakes. Such a path will bare far more fruit for your future with both flying and even your personal life. It's all about objectivity! When you actually understand that, you will be much better for it in many many ways.

Disclaimer: When I spoke of this not being able to happen in a Dash I was referring to the loud as a smoke detector take off warning horn making it pretty clear the aircraft is not configured properly. Not my personal ability to error.
 
CAM-2 parking brake?

CAM-1 sh- should I set it? I guess yeah.


:clap:

I think he was talking out loud here, to himself. Setting the parking brake might be a good idea, and it might not be a good idea. Those brakes were likely VERY hot.

Not the best showing by this crew, but I'm going to refrain from judging them too much. It looks bad on paper, but I think in reality it wasn't quite a "career ending" event.

Look at it this way: Which is worse, going into the EMAS, or hitting an tree or fence at the airport boundary because you have an improper flap setting?
 
RSG, very well said, bravo!


Little tidbit that a wise old instructor passed onto me one day. Every degree of flaps reduces, or increases depending on which way they are going, your Vref by 1 knot.
 
Again...

The CRJ-200 will give you a green T/O Config message for BOTH flaps 8 and flaps 20. It is the responsibility of the crew to determine which setting is appropriate for the situation.

And they F'ed it up, it looks like. Right around 16:08. Calls for "flaps 20. Taxi." Then, at 16:09, they start talking flaps EIGHT numbers. Both pilots even confirm flaps eight not a minute after CA called for flaps 20. Shouldn't have given them a "Config flaps" warning, though. The plane doesn't know what V-speeds are set. If company policy or a majority of the takeoffs you do are flaps 8, I could see this happening if you're tired/complacent/distracted. Can bite you in the ass if you set flaps 20 speeds and flaps 8 for takeoff. I know at least one of them said he was tired. They also checked the "T/O Config" and according to the transcript, they were getting an okay message. You'll get that if you're in flaps 8 or 20 as well. I almost wonder if they set flaps 8, then realized on the t/o roll, moved the handle, and they got the "config flaps" because the flaps were MOVING during the takeoff. Don't know if that'll happen or not, but it's a possibility. If you're gonna get a config warning in the thing, it's normally right as soon as you start moving once the N1s spool up. I've got a config warning ONCE, and it consisted of slapping the TRs to idle, and the thing stopped. For some reason, we still got a "t/o config okay" message and no "flight spoilers" status message with the spoiler lever in the first detent. It sure as hell told us "Config spoilers" though.
 
But in the CVR, the crew notes the flap setting. Which is used most often? 20? And out of CRW, would there be that much difference is performance between 8 and 20? Now we seem to be getting into more than just 'sterile cockpit'.

Depends on the situation and operator. At my airline we always try to use flaps 20 unless we need flaps 8 for the airport elevation, temperature, or aircraft weight.
 
You know there have been some lambasting styled comments on this thread about this crew. And some of ya'll making them I know with near certainty have had zero transport category crew cockpit experience. It is really easy to sit in judgment of these guys when you have never operated in such an environment. I'm not making excuses for them. But is very very easy to get distracted and miss something critical in such a setting. Thankfully we have a lot of automation on our sides but as stated above, this sort of thing happens often, probably as much as a hundred times a day without incident. These guys were as unlucky as they were poorly trained.

The supreme arrogance of the "it can't happen to me" or the "I would never act like that" mentality astounds me coming from any professional aviator, 121 crew cockpit or not. Such a tone implies large deficits in both career and general life experience as well. I urge some of you to reconsider your damnation of this crew, take in all relevant data and turn it into something positive by learning from their mistakes. Such a path will bare far more fruit for your future with both flying and even your personal life. It's all about objectivity! When you actually understand that, you will be much better for it in many many ways.

Disclaimer: When I spoke of this not being able to happen in a Dash I was referring to the loud as a smoke detector take off warning horn making it pretty clear the aircraft is not configured properly. Not my personal ability to error.

The CRJ would have done the same thing.

If flaps zero had been set.

Instead, flaps 8 were set.

You had the same thing in the ERJ; you could takeoff with flaps 9, 18 or (I think) 22, and you wouldn't get a takeoff config warning on any of them.

Now what if you needed flaps 18 and you put in flaps 9 like you do 99% of the time? No takeoff config warning.

Maybe you get that and I'm missing it (I'm kinda tired right now, so that's possible), but the CRJ and ERJ will both squawk at you if you don't set ANY flaps.
 
I think he was talking out loud here, to himself. Setting the parking brake might be a good idea, and it might not be a good idea. Those brakes were likely VERY hot.

Not the best showing by this crew, but I'm going to refrain from judging them too much. It looks bad on paper, but I think in reality it wasn't quite a "career ending" event.

Look at it this way: Which is worse, going into the EMAS, or hitting an tree or fence at the airport boundary because you have an improper flap setting?

True, but I also think stopping and taxiing clear BEFORE fixing the flap setting woulda been the best option. Then you avoid both A and B above. From the transcript, it looks like they tried to "fix" the issue on the roll.
 
I almost wonder if they set flaps 8, then realized on the t/o roll, moved the handle, and they got the "config flaps" because the flaps were MOVING during the takeoff. Don't know if that'll happen or not, but it's a possibility.

Almost positive you are correct. The only valid flap settings for takeoff are 8 and 20 so if they are moving past 9, 10, etc.. you will get a config flaps warning.
 
The supreme arrogance of the "it can't happen to me" or the "I would never act like that" mentality astounds me coming from any professional aviator,

One of my favorite quotes

"It's not the fall that kills you, nor the sudden stop at the end. It's the sudden shocking realization that yes, you were that F'n stupid!"

Any pilot who looks at something and says "I could never do something like that" is in fact an accident waiting to happen. YES, you could do something stupid. The NTSB record is full of professional experianced pilots who made simple rookie mistakes and died because of it.

A constant attitude of humility will keep you vigilant to watch for your own mistakes. As many CRJ pilots have said, this accident was partially a result of a very simple common mistake that all of us have made on several occasions.
 
Word to the wise. Watch the cell phone useage...you never know who (or what) is listening.

Richman
 
True, but I also think stopping and taxiing clear BEFORE fixing the flap setting woulda been the best option. Then you avoid both A and B above. From the transcript, it looks like they tried to "fix" the issue on the roll.


Agreed. If you look at the transcript, it appears the change was made about halfway between the 80 knot call and the V1 call. Take into account the time it takes to realize and reach for the flap lever, you could very well be talking about an abort somewhere between 80-100 knots, probably well below V1 and well within the parameters to more than meet your accelerate-stop distance.


And I believe you are right about the flap movement. Once you push the thrust levers up beyond 79% N1, you should get config warnings for anything that is not "normal". If I get a chance tomorrow, I will email our company guru :) .
 
Word to the wise. Watch the cell phone useage...you never know who (or what) is listening.

Richman

Absolutely!


On a side note... sent the link to a non pilot friend of mine for him to read and give me his opinion. He noticed a "hold on." comment prior to the discussion about the Corvette along with a comment concering if something was turned off right before they took the runway. He seems to think that there was a phone or something in play where they were looking at pictures during the discussion...

One more possible link in the chain.
 
Take into account the time it takes to realize and reach for the flap lever, you could very well be talking about an abort somewhere between 80-100 knots, probably well below V1 and well within the parameters to more than meet your accelerate-stop distance.

And some accelerate stop distances take into account a runway clearway. Which means you're going off the end, just not too far.
 
I wonder what their work day was, this was the comment that caught my eye.

15:57:40​
CAM-2​
got clearance. who’s tired? * me.

While the sterile cockpit had an effect on this one it looks more like fatigue to me.

As far as talking on the phone goes, panic makes you do stupid things.
 
These guys are like Sully and Skiles...except opposite. Couple things I liked was the term "uh...I guess so" twice from the captain. I also enjoyed the almost complete lack of concern for the pax - captain immediately started worrying about his career and talking on the phone.
 
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