Pilot Dies in Utah Plane Crash

I was not in town.

bad windy

I was up from about 0800 to 0900 and it was bad enough to call off the rest of the flight, it got worse as the day progressed.

The last metar I saw was 25G36 at Provo. Visibility was pretty bad from the dust in the air.

Tree limbs downed, tumbleweeds on second story balconies, and power was out for a few hours.
It will be interesting to see the cause of this crash. There have been several in flight break-ups of the Zodiac 601 and there has been some question about the design of the wing.

I do some Light Sport instruction in the Zodiac 601XL and am hesitant to take it flying in windy/gusting conditions.
I was flying traffic watch when the crash was located, and had been monitoring the on-scene tactical frequency the two CAP crews were operating on. I listened to them lead the sheriff's helicopter to the site, followed very shortly by an AirMed helicopter. The sheriff's helo landed and its crew hiked in to the wreckage, which was in a ravine on the leeward side of the only major east-west ridge on the island. The wind was indeed roaring out of the south, so I imagine there was some pretty significant rotor-type turbulence and downdrafts north of that ridgeline.

As the accident occurred underneath the SLC Class B and just outside its surface area, the CAP search aircraft (x2), the sheriff and AirMed were all under Salt Lake Approach's control, as was I. Where this got stupid was when ATC advised both the sheriff and AirMed helos of the on-scene tactical frequency the CAP crews were using so as to coordinate with them, then required all the aircraft involved to stay with him on Approach's freq. The problem then became one of the controller continuing to jabber at all four of the involved aircraft on his freq with traffic advisories of each other (nobody else was in the air; the strong winds kept most all GA traffic on the ground and it was between airliner banks in/out of SLC) while they were trying to coordinate on the on-scene freq. I was monitoring both and wanted to tell the controller to shut the hell up as he was impeding what was then still a rescue effort. Note to you controllers: if you know for a fact that you've got aircraft working two frequencies at once, keep your communications with them to a minimum. The REASON for the on-scene tactical freq was to permit the crews to self-de-conflict while directing in the helos.

I do agree that the characterization of the deceased pilot's experience was grossly misleading.

To anyone outside of the aviation field though, 500 hours sounds like a lot (especially when they think about how much it costs). I try to tell people that I have just enough experience to not have enough experience. Lol.