Phenom 100 crash in MD

I'll give you some perspective from a part 91 guy. It should absolutely be every 6 months for PICs of turbine aircraft.
I fly 85 hours a year, maybe. It's a struggle to maintain landing currency let alone instrument.
Unique situation perhaps but as a professional pilot that's still relatively low time (~5000 hours) I wish I got more time in the box.

Get a desktop simulator that's got a yoke and pedals and all that. I'm going to buy one here soon because now that I fly medevac I seem to barely work at all, and for my own peace of mind I want to fly approaches more regularly. To be honest, many of those little sims are harder to fly than the airplane.
 
Get a desktop simulator that's got a yoke and pedals and all that. I'm going to buy one here soon because now that I fly medevac I seem to barely work at all, and for my own peace of mind I want to fly approaches more regularly. To be honest, many of those little sims are harder to fly than the airplane.
I think i'll just get a different job.
 
http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58153/584848.pdf

CVR is out.

Holy crap, these guys make the Bedford MA Gulfstream guys look competent. Hot damn man. I didn't see a single checklist start to end, not a single briefing for takeoff or landing, and a general vibe of an airplane that is over his head and in awe of the technology in it.

CVR is broken down for two flights, prior to accident flight and accident flight itself. Scary to hear the prior to accident flight approach/landing. And of course the accident flight itself is sad.

Wasn't this Maryland crash the one where that poor lady and her child and infant baby burned up in a bathtub?

Regular GA pilots in corporate jets, without the discipline and training of professional airline pilots, well it just ends up bad. Real bad.
 
Aural alert "STALL, STALL" went off 4 times without any hint of pilot acknowledgment and/or action. It wasn't until the 5th "Stall, stall" warning that the pilot said "oh no."


Looking back at the first 4 pages of this thread I guess I was a little harsh for this accident on the pilots, but after this kinda thing surfaces with 0 checklists, 0 briefings, 0 monitoring, it's hard to accept that this kind of negligence killed not only them but also a mother and her two kids down below.
 
According to data from the airplane’s flight data recorder, the ice protection system was not activated at the time of the accident. Performance data indicated that the for the configuration of the airplane at the time of the accident (Landing gear down, flaps down at position 4), the stall warning angles of attack would have been 21.0 degrees and 28.4 degrees for aural warning and stick pusher activation respectively with the ice protection system turned off, and 9.5 degrees and15.5 degrees for aural warning and stick pusher activation respectively with the ice protection system turned on.

The final portion of the FDR recorded data depicted the airplane’s approach to GAI. Performance data indicated that the airplane experienced an aural stall warning at an indicated airspeed of 88 knots. At the time of the aural stall warning the airplane was at an altitude of 803 ft msl and on the final approach to the airport. The FDR had no parameter to record activation of the stick pusher. According to performance information, had the ice protection been activated the pilot would have received an aural warning of impending stall about 20 seconds earlier, and the stick pusher would have activated about 5 seconds earlier.



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I don't think you can really say the crash was because of icing. This sounds like the Colgan 3407 with the increase Vref speed switch. In the Colgan case, the stall warning went off well before the actual stall speed because the icing Vref increase speed was higher. Had that switch been off, the actual stick shaker speed would have been lower.

In this Phenom case, it seems like throwing the anti-ice switch on would have gotten the stall buffer (speed for shaker/pusher) to increase. Still, nothing changes the fact that the PIC allowed the airspeed to decay dangerously low and did not do anything about it despite repeated aural, "Stall, stall" warnings.

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Looking back at the first 4 pages of this thread I guess I was a little harsh for this accident on the pilots, but after this kinda thing surfaces with 0 checklists, 0 briefings, 0 monitoring, it's hard to accept that this kind of negligence killed not only them but also a mother and her two kids down below.
The right seater was one of the passengers in that were they not? It's not unheard of to silently do checklists when you're flying alone.
 
The right seater was one of the passengers in that were they not? It's not unheard of to silently do checklists when you're flying alone.

Separately, the FDR did not record control position like it did on the GIV in the BED accident.

The facts as I read them are: 1) the aircraft had many stall indications and 2) the deice system was not engaged.
 
Wow, if the previous flight (how many times did they check that ATIS) is anything to go by. The PIC had his fair share of accidents and incidents too.

I get how an ice build up can cause the speed to decay, but surely mid way through an approach that close in to the runway, any indication of a stall is full power...

Jeex, no deice? what a waste
 
Couple things in response to the comments so far:

First, no excuse for not turning on the ice protection. Limitation on the plane is 10 degrees or colder and in visible moisture, ice protection on. There are no exceptions given, so unless it was above 10 degrees, it should have been selected on.

Second, checklists and briefings. There is no way to know that he didn't do them. All we know is that he didn't verbalize them. When I fly single pilot, I don't read checklists out loud and I don't give verbal briefings. I doubt many other people do either.

Third, the Phenom itself. Ref in the airplane is in the 90s/low 100s with the ice protection off. With the protection on, Ref, as well as the stall protection, jumps up by 15 or 20 knots. There is no shaker, only a pusher.

Still on the plane, the landing numbers are horrible. The plane does not have spoilers, does not have reversers, and has a computerized braking system that leaves a lot to be desired. At the weight he was probably landing, his stopping distance on a dry runway with the ice protection off would have been right about 2500 ft. Gaithersburg is 4202. Turn on the ice protection and the stopping distance jumps to about 4000, on a dry runway.
 
his stopping distance on a dry runway with the ice protection off would have been right about 2500 ft. Gaithersburg is 4202. Turn on the ice protection and the stopping distance jumps to about 4000, on a dry runway.

Why is that?
 
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