I was looking over ASRS reports on this boring thursday night and found one that was pretty shocking. According to the report, the chief pilot reportedly pressured the flight crew into flying what was pretty much a unairworthy aircraft. What are your takes on this? Have you ever had situations like this and how as dispatchers did you resolve them?
Narrative: 1
MEL 33-1-XY was effective. Aircraft flew for nine days with this MEL, and transited at least eight Maintenance bases in the previous five days. In Captain and First Officer opinions, remaining lighting system lights may not have been sufficient to clearly illuminate all required instruments, controls, and other devices for which it is provided. Also, lighting configuration and intensity from alternate sources may not have been acceptable to the flight crew. Dispatch agreed with Captain on these concerns, and provided link to Maintenance.
After directing Captain in several unsuccessful circuit breaker resets, and without advising Captain and Dispatch, Maintenance brought in Chief Pilot on Call. Chief Pilot did not provide safer alternatives for Crew to consider in operating the aircraft. Rather, Chief Pilot said Crew could be replaced with somebody who was willing to fly the aircraft one more leg. Chief Pilot also stated that nine other Captains operated that aircraft, and implied I should, as well. After thoroughly evaluating cockpit lighting conditions during engine start and taxi, Crew decided it could safely operate aircraft. Crew used overhead flood light in combination with bulkhead lighting to operate the area affected by MEL, however, lighting in many areas was very marginal.
Narrative: 2
Aircraft flood lights physically do not illuminate the FMC keyboards requiring the use of hand held flash lights, creating a safety issue during critical phases of flight. Turning the flood lights up to full bright in order to provide enough and sufficient illumination for the pedestal was so bright it created night vision and glare issues requiring the further use of flash lights and said safety issues during critical phases of flight. The threat here is the Maintenance on Call person and the Chief Pilot on Call.
The Captain called Dispatch to work through this issue and MEL. The Dispatcher brought Maintenance into their conversation, who was unable to resolve the issue. At that point Maintenance hung up, and the Captain and the Dispatcher continued to talk. Then the Captain's phone rang while talking to the Dispatcher; it was the Chief Pilot on Call. The Maintenance on Call person (without advising the Captain or the Dispatcher) took it upon himself to bring in the Pilot on Call to pressure, bully and all but brow-beat the Captain into agreeing the aircraft was ok to fly.
On Call [with] Maintenance person circumventing the process by going VFR direct to the Chief Pilot on Call, he directly affected, in negative manner, the ability of the Captain and the Dispatcher to properly and thoroughly work through this safety issue and MEL (which may have eventually led them to the Chief Pilot on Call anyway). By abruptly bringing the Chief Pilot into the conversation, in mid-thought process, completely destroyed their safety thought process of working through an issue as professionals.
Narrative: 3
Got call from Captain saying when landing at ZZZ he felt that due to MEL 33-1-XY (the control stand lights being out) the Lighting configuration and intensity was now unacceptable to the flight crew. His reasoning was that due to the next leg being conducted at night they would need to use the flood lights to illuminate the center control stand and the reflection of those lights would cause excessive glare in the cockpit. He was therefore not accepting the aircraft. At this point I got Maintenance Control on the line and the Captain explained the situation to him. After questioning pilot for a few min and trying to reset a few breakers he informed him that this MEL has been on this aircraft for days and no other crew had rejected the aircraft. He also informed the Captain that this MEL would drop dead tonight and it would big a pain because aircraft was in ZZZ. The Maintenance controller then said he wanted to talk it over with a few other controllers so he put us on hold. After about 3min we were blindly transferred to Chief Pilot (CP) (CP already knew the whole story, I'm assuming Maintenance Control filled him in) I want to point out that neither the Captain or I requested to talk to the CP. The CP said exactly what Maintenance Control said "9 crews have taken this aircraft over the past few days and none of them had a problem". Captain again explained why he thought it would be unsafe to take this aircraft. The CP repeated what he said before. Captain again said no. CP then said "if Captain did not take aircraft he would get with SOD and scheduling and find a crew that would" both of these statements, in my opinion were made with a very aggressive tone toward the Captain. The CP did say "it's up to [the discretion] and Captain" but then would immediately follow it with one of the above comments. At this point the Captain put CP and myself on hold for a min then came back on and said "how bout if we push the gate, get away from the terminal, and turn the flood lights on" At this point I reminded the Captain that; with me, Maintenance, and the CP (until now) he had felt the aircraft was unacceptable to him. He said they talked it over and said they would push and check the lighting and if it was unacceptable they would return to the gate. I asked if he was sure this is ok with him now, he said it was. I said that would meet the MEL proviso and was good with me. He pushed, lighting was good with him and he took off. My safety concerns with this flight were two. 1. Maintenance should not be going around Dispatch and the Captain to the CP. Then after talking to the CP by himself transfer us over in the blind. 2. I felt the CP may have influenced the pilot's decision solely by his statements and aggressive tone.
Synopsis
A flight crew and Dispatcher reported that the flight crew were pressured into flying a B737 with inadequate cockpit lighting.
Narrative: 1
MEL 33-1-XY was effective. Aircraft flew for nine days with this MEL, and transited at least eight Maintenance bases in the previous five days. In Captain and First Officer opinions, remaining lighting system lights may not have been sufficient to clearly illuminate all required instruments, controls, and other devices for which it is provided. Also, lighting configuration and intensity from alternate sources may not have been acceptable to the flight crew. Dispatch agreed with Captain on these concerns, and provided link to Maintenance.
After directing Captain in several unsuccessful circuit breaker resets, and without advising Captain and Dispatch, Maintenance brought in Chief Pilot on Call. Chief Pilot did not provide safer alternatives for Crew to consider in operating the aircraft. Rather, Chief Pilot said Crew could be replaced with somebody who was willing to fly the aircraft one more leg. Chief Pilot also stated that nine other Captains operated that aircraft, and implied I should, as well. After thoroughly evaluating cockpit lighting conditions during engine start and taxi, Crew decided it could safely operate aircraft. Crew used overhead flood light in combination with bulkhead lighting to operate the area affected by MEL, however, lighting in many areas was very marginal.
Narrative: 2
Aircraft flood lights physically do not illuminate the FMC keyboards requiring the use of hand held flash lights, creating a safety issue during critical phases of flight. Turning the flood lights up to full bright in order to provide enough and sufficient illumination for the pedestal was so bright it created night vision and glare issues requiring the further use of flash lights and said safety issues during critical phases of flight. The threat here is the Maintenance on Call person and the Chief Pilot on Call.
The Captain called Dispatch to work through this issue and MEL. The Dispatcher brought Maintenance into their conversation, who was unable to resolve the issue. At that point Maintenance hung up, and the Captain and the Dispatcher continued to talk. Then the Captain's phone rang while talking to the Dispatcher; it was the Chief Pilot on Call. The Maintenance on Call person (without advising the Captain or the Dispatcher) took it upon himself to bring in the Pilot on Call to pressure, bully and all but brow-beat the Captain into agreeing the aircraft was ok to fly.
On Call [with] Maintenance person circumventing the process by going VFR direct to the Chief Pilot on Call, he directly affected, in negative manner, the ability of the Captain and the Dispatcher to properly and thoroughly work through this safety issue and MEL (which may have eventually led them to the Chief Pilot on Call anyway). By abruptly bringing the Chief Pilot into the conversation, in mid-thought process, completely destroyed their safety thought process of working through an issue as professionals.
Narrative: 3
Got call from Captain saying when landing at ZZZ he felt that due to MEL 33-1-XY (the control stand lights being out) the Lighting configuration and intensity was now unacceptable to the flight crew. His reasoning was that due to the next leg being conducted at night they would need to use the flood lights to illuminate the center control stand and the reflection of those lights would cause excessive glare in the cockpit. He was therefore not accepting the aircraft. At this point I got Maintenance Control on the line and the Captain explained the situation to him. After questioning pilot for a few min and trying to reset a few breakers he informed him that this MEL has been on this aircraft for days and no other crew had rejected the aircraft. He also informed the Captain that this MEL would drop dead tonight and it would big a pain because aircraft was in ZZZ. The Maintenance controller then said he wanted to talk it over with a few other controllers so he put us on hold. After about 3min we were blindly transferred to Chief Pilot (CP) (CP already knew the whole story, I'm assuming Maintenance Control filled him in) I want to point out that neither the Captain or I requested to talk to the CP. The CP said exactly what Maintenance Control said "9 crews have taken this aircraft over the past few days and none of them had a problem". Captain again explained why he thought it would be unsafe to take this aircraft. The CP repeated what he said before. Captain again said no. CP then said "if Captain did not take aircraft he would get with SOD and scheduling and find a crew that would" both of these statements, in my opinion were made with a very aggressive tone toward the Captain. The CP did say "it's up to [the discretion] and Captain" but then would immediately follow it with one of the above comments. At this point the Captain put CP and myself on hold for a min then came back on and said "how bout if we push the gate, get away from the terminal, and turn the flood lights on" At this point I reminded the Captain that; with me, Maintenance, and the CP (until now) he had felt the aircraft was unacceptable to him. He said they talked it over and said they would push and check the lighting and if it was unacceptable they would return to the gate. I asked if he was sure this is ok with him now, he said it was. I said that would meet the MEL proviso and was good with me. He pushed, lighting was good with him and he took off. My safety concerns with this flight were two. 1. Maintenance should not be going around Dispatch and the Captain to the CP. Then after talking to the CP by himself transfer us over in the blind. 2. I felt the CP may have influenced the pilot's decision solely by his statements and aggressive tone.
Synopsis
A flight crew and Dispatcher reported that the flight crew were pressured into flying a B737 with inadequate cockpit lighting.
