Noises heard at 41 seconds

OK...going to show my stupidity here, fortunately it will come as a surprise to no one.

I always thought V1 was the speed at which you were committed to flying if an engine failed, due to the inability to stop on the remaining runway if you aborted at that speed or higher. If that is indeed the case, how would Pat's comment above work? If you have an airplane that can take off within 3,500 feet, on an 11,000 foot runway - how would you calculate V1? You obviously have much more runway than is needed, and if V1 is calculated based upon the stopping distance from a given speed, then V1 would be a very high number on this runway wouldn't it?

Straight from the FAR/AIM:

V1 means the max speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g. apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means teh minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at Vef at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance.
 
It's fairly simple...V1 and above, you're going flying. Below V1, get 'er stopped by any means. It shouldn't matter regardless of the runway or surroundings.
 
OK...going to show my stupidity here, fortunately it will come as a surprise to no one.

I always thought V1 was the speed at which you were committed to flying if an engine failed, due to the inability to stop on the remaining runway if you aborted at that speed or higher. If that is indeed the case, how would Pat's comment above work? If you have an airplane that can take off within 3,500 feet, on an 11,000 foot runway - how would you calculate V1? You obviously have much more runway than is needed, and if V1 is calculated based upon the stopping distance from a given speed, then V1 would be a very high number on this runway wouldn't it?

Yes but V1 can never be higher than Vr. So they are typically the same speed for small airplanes.
 
If you are afraid of "fighting it" then build a few extra knots on that long ass runway and then rotate. It's a dead engine, it didn't fall off or catch on fire. Do the procedures up in the air, come back and land. Why fight training?

I tend to think that some of the ways we think about things are a little dangerous. Frankly I don't know what the right answer is, training is good, and going into the air and flying the approach is all well and dandy, but a million other things factor in, not the least including how the crew is feeling, what the weather is, runway condition (e.g. you definitely don't abort on slick runways). If you have plenty of runway, why is it that its a bad idea to use it. The problem is we have no metric to detirmine what "plenty of runway" is, so we need it so that people can have another outs.

The erj crew mentioned above probably wanted to continue the takeoff, but that would have killed them. There was a CO2 leak on the hazmat that a crew at my old company was flying, the only reason they survived at all was they aborted (presumeably after V1, as they just barely made the ramp) they passed out in the airplane after managing to feather the motors in a confused oxygen deprived haze. V1 continue flying would have been a death sentence.

The reason IMO for the V1 abort go/no-go is to take all guesswork out of it. While you are thinking "hey I have enough runway to stop here even though I am past V1" you are running off the side of the runway. The fact that the airplane may be able to stop after a V1 is irrelevant.

That's the problem. We need a metric to figure that out. And may be able to stop is not exactly accurate. I know that the 1900 will stop in 8000' with brakes alone and no beta, but the problem is that we have no way to judge that on a daily basis with varying field length, wx, etc. Hence the potential need for a "Vbrake" or something.

Statements like these are why Velo gives you such a hard time.

Ehh, I'm not trying to impress the guy, I just don't think its a good idea to mindlessly follow any procedure. There has to be reasons, justifications, and additional courses of actions. You've got to think. Even if its a split second "this airplane cannot safely fly." and throw the power levers to idle/reverse. 999 times out of 1000 a V1 about is what's required and what's the way to go, and above it were flying. However, there are plenty of times when its not. I know two guys who aborted and are breathing because of it, and I've thought a lot since then about what I would do. Company procedures and the Flight Manual say continue the takeoff, nothing is really that abnormal right? This will be fine, just like in training. Those guys are alive because they recognized what was abnormal, even though it was subtle, and realized that the consequences for not reacting fast enough. They aborted and are alive. I'd rather be alive than have followed procedure right over the trees then nose down into the river.

To put it in perspective, a guy I flew with who's a captain with 26000TT, about 20,000 of it is in the 1900 once told me "never take a problem into the air that you can't handle on the ground." I don't know if that's always the right solution, but it seems to have worked for him real well.

Conversly I know a guy who continued after V1 because he knew that in PADU even with a balanced field length the winds were so chaotic that he wouldn't be able keep the airplane on the ground and stop in time. So he punched it and made it off the ground. I've also heard of brake release being v1 in PADU for the DC6s.

Idealy, abort at V1. However, I don't recommend anyone follow procedure to their grave.
 
It's fairly simple...V1 and above, you're going flying. Below V1, get 'er stopped by any means. It shouldn't matter regardless of the runway or surroundings.

What about a control surface failure? or a structural fire? Do you still want to go trapsiing around the pattern without any controls? Ehhhhhhh, not for me. I don't want to turn what would be a runway overrun into an al haynes adventure.
 
What about a control surface failure? or a structural fire? Do you still want to go trapsiing around the pattern without any controls? Ehhhhhhh, not for me. I don't want to turn what would be a runway overrun into an al haynes adventure.
If you are at Vr and pull back and don't have any elevator well you don't really have any choice. I would say the chances that you would lose control authority between V1 and Vr when they are practically the same speed on your airplane are about .0000001% and there is no way you could reconize that fact in the time it takes to go from V1 to Vr and rotate. We're splitting hairs.
 
If you are at Vr and pull back and don't have any elevator well you don't really have any choice. I would say the chances that you would lose control authority between V1 and Vr when they are practically the same speed on your airplane are about .0000001% and there is no way you could reconize that fact in the time it takes to go from V1 to Vr and rotate. We're splitting hairs.

True, only 4kts of difference at mtow, and now that I'm flying the 207 again, its v1 is infinity because if I lose a motor, I have to stop. What about on a bigger bird though. Let's say you've got 20kts between v1, and rotate, you hit rotate and and nothing happens, or a fire happens in the cockpit at v1 + 5kts do you continue.
 
What about a control surface failure? or a structural fire? Do you still want to go trapsiing around the pattern without any controls? Ehhhhhhh, not for me. I don't want to turn what would be a runway overrun into an al haynes adventure.
If it is a control surface failure you arn't gonna go far after V1. Typical brief is to mention that if you can't get it off the ground safely due to control malfunctions you won't go flying. It is a part of my brief every day anyhow.

Back to the engine failure.

First I wanna say that you're are thinking about the problem and that is a credit to qualities as a pilot. I don't agree with you here so much but maybe time and math will prove me wrong. With that said, onto the engine failure:

I'd be curious if the engine failure had to do with all the oil pouring out of the engine due to some mechanic not putting on the cap (watched it happen the aircraft in front of me). Awesome when you dump all that oil on the tires and those brakey things connected to the wheely things (on a turboprop). Lose an engine past V1 go in the air, do your procedures, come back and land, and the best part will be now you have the whole 11,000ft of runway (-1000 for touchdown), maybe the wind will knock a little of that oil off on the approach so you don't have to burn so much runway lightly touching the brakes trying to burn off the oil from your discs. Trust your SOP's. I would even encourage you to blindly follow your SOP's because both companies I've been at, the SOP's tell you on the first page that the SOP's can't forsee every eventuality. By making something up when a new/different suitation comes up you ARE following SOP's. For the situations that are spelled out in the SOP's, like a simple engine failure, follow the procedures.
 
True, only 4kts of difference at mtow, and now that I'm flying the 207 again, its v1 is infinity because if I lose a motor, I have to stop. What about on a bigger bird though. Let's say you've got 20kts between v1, and rotate, you hit rotate and and nothing happens, or a fire happens in the cockpit at v1 + 5kts do you continue.


Look up the DC8 crash in JFK where the elevator was jammed and the crew though they had a CG shift a decided to try to force the airplane to fly.
 
Look up the DC8 crash in JFK where the elevator was jammed and the crew though they had a CG shift a decided to try to force the airplane to fly.

Didn't it jam/start rotating before V1 though? Not really relevant.
 
Didn't it jam before V1 though? Not really relevant.


I guess I don't follow your logic, Vr follows V1 they tried to rotate at Vr and no elevator, I'm not sure how the fact that the debris was tossed up into the elevator at the gate changes the discussion on going or stopping at V1?
 
According to a report I read it started rotating on its own. Not sure at what speed but I would assume before V1 as they were 1,500 down the runway.

The DC-8 freighter started rotating in a nose-high attitude 1500 feet into the take-off. After becoming airborne at 2800 feet down the runway, the aircraft climbed to about 300-500 feet, rolled 20 degrees to the left, crashed and caught fire. The loss of pitch control was caused by the entrapment of a pointed, asphalt-covered object between the leading edge of the right elevator and the right horizontal spar web access door in the aft part of the stabilizer.

PROBABLE CAUSE:
pilot in command - failed to abort takeoff
airframe - flight control surfaces: elevator assembly,attachments
miscellaneous acts,conditions - jammed
miscellaneous acts,conditions - interference with flight controls
miscellaneous - foreign material affecting normal operations
FACTORS:
pilot in command - inadequate supervision of flight
miscellaneous acts,conditions - checklist-failed to use
 
If it is a control surface failure you arn't gonna go far after V1. Typical brief is to mention that if you can't get it off the ground safely due to control malfunctions you won't go flying. It is a part of my brief every day anyhow.

Back to the engine failure.

First I wanna say that you're are thinking about the problem and that is a credit to qualities as a pilot. I don't agree with you here so much but maybe time and math will prove me wrong. With that said, onto the engine failure:

I'd be curious if the engine failure had to do with all the oil pouring out of the engine due to some mechanic not putting on the cap (watched it happen the aircraft in front of me). Awesome when you dump all that oil on the tires and those brakey things connected to the wheely things (on a turboprop). Lose an engine past V1 go in the air, do your procedures, come back and land, and the best part will be now you have the whole 11,000ft of runway (-1000 for touchdown), maybe the wind will knock a little of that oil off on the approach so you don't have to burn so much runway lightly touching the brakes trying to burn off the oil from your discs. Trust your SOP's. I would even encourage you to blindly follow your SOP's because both companies I've been at, the SOP's tell you on the first page that the SOP's can't forsee every eventuality. By making something up when a new/different suitation comes up you ARE following SOP's. For the situations that are spelled out in the SOP's, like a simple engine failure, follow the procedures.

Very very very very very good points. Nothing I can really argue with there, glad to see too that your brief includes it. 11,000' vs. 8,000' is a very good argument for it, though I wonder if it is a good idea to bring the airplane in the air just out of the very nature of accidents (e.g. a list of things going wrong that in their compilation become catastrophic). I dunno, engine failures are pretty simple and straight forward compared to the myriad of other possibilities that can occur in an emergency, and should typically be followed to the letter, but even then sometimes I wonder.

Example:

Dutch harbor, spooky place. The problem is that 3900' doesn't really give you that many options. Do you take off into weather that changes so rapidly that you might no longer have a place to land? or do you mash on the brakes and risk flying off into the drink. In that case I pick fly, because you can pull fuel out of the other tank and get to PACD, PAKN, or PADL, if all of those are closed you've still got illiamna and anchorage if you've got the fuel. However, if you're doing the same thing out of Kodiak, you're shafting yourself, because even though there's an ILS, the wx might go below mins before you can get back around. Plus, there's a lot of terrain that can make things challenging, no radar, and brutal violent winds, and in winter months terrible icing. Now, granted, at PADQ, you've only got 7500' of runway on 25, so you have to weigh that against the other options, but I've seen 40kts of wind there last winter on the GPS on short final, so you could use that too. None of these situations are favorable, even coming back around at ADQ and shooting the ILS isn't really a good option, you'd have to go out, then join the arc, then come back around land through bad ice and brutal winds with a full load with less directional control on a windy runway than usual, and thus more chance for fire if you rupture your tanks in a botched landing. Plus, you have to land, because with the special approach I don't know if I'd want to go missed with the mountain at the end of the runway.

Lots of stuff to think about.
Notice the mountain at the end of runway 25 (the only runway with an ILS, though granted its not that high)
adqarpt2.jpg
 
Yeah. If there is one thing these types of conversations bring up, it is always that "this #### isn't easy".
 
Two things:

-The engineers that figured out the V speeds have spent a lot more time crunching the numbers than I possibly can when I hit V1, so I'll trust my training and their numbers. It works 99% of the time, and I'll take those odds.

-If you think that staying on the ground during a V1 cut is safer than taking the plane into the air, simply put you need to go back to training. A V1 cut is, in many aircraft, a complete non event. Mash the thrust levers, look out the window and fly the plane straight with your rudder and fly the numbers. Nice and simple as far as I'm concerned.

We're pilots, not Nascar drivers. We're trained to deal with aircraft moving at 130 knots better in the air than on the ground.
 
You have to evaluate what the problem is. If the risk posed by the high-speed abort and subsequent off-roading (if above refusal speed) is less than taking the emergency airborne, then you have to go with the option of what poses less risk to you, any passengers/crew, and the aircraft.

This is why we are professional pilots and not robots.

It really depends on the aircraft, that aircraft's systems/capabilities, and what the possible failure modes are. For example, in the F-15E where I have antiskid brakes, a tailhook, and at least two arrestor cables on the runway, it is possible to abort above "Max Abort" speed (which is this jet's term for refusal speed) and not end up in the dirt off the end of the runway. For certain catastrophic failures, this may be a less-risky option than taking a sick jet airborne and dealing with a really, really severe problem. In some cases it's even a better option than just getting airborne and ejecting from a really sick jet.

In another jet, the T-38, it had such poor brakes, thin tires, no hook, and a so-so ejection seat, that I was in a "go" mentality most of the time. A high-speed abort in that jet was probably going to be bad news, even if it was officially below refusal speed. For any of you guys with T-38 time, recall that the procedure used to generate the TOLD charts in the -1 ("maximum braking in a 3-point attitude") was different than the -1 proscribed abort procedure (which included aerobraking). This means that for decades the jet flew with invalid TOLD. The issue was corrected with a B.S. solution that subtracted 2,000 feet from available runway length and created a new TOLD number called "adjusted refusal speed" to make up for the differences in deceleration procedures. As a side note, when they re-engined the T-38 fleet, they had the Test Pilot School re-test the jets to create new TOLD charts and -- lo and behold -- the new accurate refusal speeds changed quite a bit.

Anyway...

So, V1 is NOT necessarily a binary decisionmaking speed in all cases with all aircraft. If you're talking about a simple engine failure, then sure. But there are other possible failures that blur the lines depending on aircraft capabilities.
 
You have to evaluate what the problem is. If the risk posed by the high-speed abort and subsequent off-roading (if above refusal speed) is less than taking the emergency airborne, then you have to go with the option of what poses less risk to you, any passengers/crew, and the aircraft.

This is why we are professional pilots and not robots.

It really depends on the aircraft, that aircraft's systems/capabilities, and what the possible failure modes are. For example, in the F-15E where I have antiskid brakes, a tailhook, and at least two arrestor cables on the runway, it is possible to abort above "Max Abort" speed (which is this jet's term for refusal speed) and not end up in the dirt off the end of the runway. For certain catastrophic failures, this may be a less-risky option than taking a sick jet airborne and dealing with a really, really severe problem. In some cases it's even a better option than just getting airborne and ejecting from a really sick jet.

So, V1 is NOT necessarily a binary decisionmaking speed in all cases.

I'm not really sure that you can compare the civilian vs. military procedures for this kinda stuff, as you guys have a lot of other factors going for you. As you said, in the end, you can always give the plane back the tax payers. In fact don't you have a zero zero ejection seat on that thing, allowing you to punch out while the aircraft is rolling down the runway?

While I agree we're not robots, the standardization is there for a reason. In many ways, in the last 50 years especially, we've found that we need protection from ourselves. Simply put things can be happening too fast to consider all the factors we're discussing in this thread while you're chewing up runway at an incredibly high rate of speed, so with that we have briefs. The standard brief I'd hear from captains usually included this:

-Below 80 knots we'll abort for anything.
-Above 80 knots we'll abort for engine fire, failure, loss of directional control or a control surface failure.
-At V1 we're taking it flying unless the airplane won't, at which point we'll take what we've got on the abort.

But the fact of the matter remains, you need to accept that you've got a good chance of going off the runway after V1. Now as you said, that might be preferable to taking the plane airborne, but what if you're on a 7,000' runway with a 100' drop off at the end of the runway? I'd take almost any problem into the air as opposed to taking that drop off at the end of the runway, as that's going to be certain to cause a hell of a lot of damage to the aircraft and I'm willing to bet get everybody on the airplane killed.

So let's take an example I think folks were talking about; The CHQ EMB-145 incident at JFK. These guys had a problem with their elevator (gust lock didn't release properly, but checked ok in the cockpit to the points. They've got new procedures to check it now), couldn't rotate and I think ended up aborting at something like V2+15. Now by the time you hit V1, you're accelerating INCREDIBLY quickly, so I'm willing to bet they were probably V2+15 within 5 seconds after V1 (it's just a guess after flying the aircraft for a year). In those 5 seconds you'll end up thinking:

-V1, rotate....rotate.....rotate, why isn't the other guy rotating.

All the while the flying pilot is thinking.

-V1, rotate....rotate....rotate....what the ####.....WHAT THE #### IS HAPPENING!?!?!? ABORT!!!! ABORT THE ####ING TAKEOFF!

I mean honestly something like that is so out of the ordinary that it's incredibly hard to train for, and if it takes you only 5 seconds to realize that the airplane isn't going to come off the ground, on a lot of runways you're already off the end of the runway and probably dead.

The point being, fly what you brief. The airplane doesn't fly at V1? I'd say that at that point, you need to be a robot. You briefed that if it won't fly at V1 due to a control failure, then you're going to abort the takeoff. Don't try to over think the situation and get yourself killed, get the airplane stopped as soon as possible. Those guys in JFK got lucky they weren't in AVL when that happened, and they were lucky they had so much runway to play with. They would have had fractions of a second to make the decision to abort AT V1 if the airplane decided to not fly, and if they were dicking around thinking about all the possibilities of what could be happening and whether it's a prudent decision to abort, they'd be dead.

I mean to be honest, there are very few situations in an airplane when something goes wrong and you need to be on the ball 2 seconds ago or you and everybody in the plane is going to die, but things going wrong on the takeoff roll can produce situations that will require those kinds of reactions. Most of the time, when something goes wrong, I stick the time tested policy of winding the clock. Unfortunately, with how quickly things happen in a transport category aircraft on takeoff, with a limited number of options on how to get the airplane into a safe situation in an incredibly limited amount of time, we need to be robots then, or at least I feel we do.
 
Back
Top