New Wreckage found in AF447 crash

[dustoff17]

Multiple cascading failures at night in IMC and turbulence. Just glad I wasn't at the controls so you could all crucify me after the fact.

I absolutely agree with you. And, other than the "fly the airplane" post, no one here (including me) has torched into the pilot(s).

 

[dasleben]

It seems clear to me that the airplane systems screwed up and were the main cause for the crash, not the pilots, or even less the fact that a "baby" pilot of 32 years old was at the controls.

No matter what really happened, they will never blame the manufacturer of the aircraft. If they did, the manufacturer would see a reduction in its sales, employees would lose their jobs, and no one wants that. Especially in this case with a company like Airbus and employees all over the world.

The media, as always, is pretty quick to blame the pilots. They can easily be blamed as it will only impact their family, and possibly result in additional training on the A330. I also suspect the French government pulling the strings and allowing specific information to be leaked from the black boxes to the media for them to point the finger at the crew.

That's a pretty terrible article. Paints a lot of us poorly (I'm a 27 year old FO!).

 

[MikeD]

Interesting sidelight for those old enough to remember it. Obviously there are huge dissimilarities in the systems of the aircraft, but in both cases, a large aircraft stalled and failed to recover, and in both cases, the stall warning systems were inop/unreliable.

http://ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20001208X07150&key=1

Remember that one well. At the time, was flying small feeder for ABX.

Another applicable accident to consider is Aeroperu 603, also in '96.

 

[SteveC]

From an email list I'm on, purported to be info from an A330 pilot:

There are things that the Airbus is designed to do that would prevent the pilots from maintaining or regaining control if the pitots are blocked. For example if the crew tried to descend out of the icing conditions with the pitots blocked, the airspeed indication would increase. The flight control protections (speed too low or too high as in this case) could take control of the airplane away from the crew and pitch up to correct. This could further slow the airplane when in fact it was not over speeding. We are not taught to turn off any flight control computers. The conventional wisdom is that turning off computers is worst than waiting out the blocked pitots. Of course, most pilots who find themselves in an unreliable airspeed situation may be able to think through the problem, if everything else is ok. I believe that given the strong possibility that they were in moderate or greater turbulence, it was all they could do to focus on the panel, much less think through a complicated solution to the computer protections kicking in.

I talked to [a high time Airbus intructor] and he said that when he was given the problem (in the sim) as described above, he thought, "bring it on I know this airplane better than most and I can handle it". The problem came when he tried to change altitude with the pitots blocked. He said that he almost lost the airplane. He, being a check pilot and APD, was able to turn the right combination of flight control computers off and eventually regain control. He believes that if he were in turbulence or didn't teach in the program he may not have survived.

 

[pullup]

From an email list I'm on, purported to be info from an A330 pilot:

That's an eye opening email, but wouldn't the computer regain control once the pitots were not iced over any more?

 

[VTC_WS6]

That's an eye opening email, but wouldn't the computer regain control once the pitots were not iced over any more?

Just my inexperienced .02 here, but what if by then (no known time frame), the aircraft was simply too far/deep into the stall to recover?

 

[Trip7]

Just my inexperienced .02 here, but what if by then (no known time frame), the aircraft was simply too far/deep into the stall to recover?

Quite possibly.15 degrees most up and 10,000 ft/min descent rate requires a tremendous amount of altitude to recover.

I'd say with and aircraft the size of an A330, even at high altitude, you only have a few seconds to recover from a fully stalled condition before you are doomed.

I've read the full preliminary report, and two things come to mind, the initial reaction to the first stall warning which was TOGA power and steep pitch up, and secondly, why the stall warning horn silenced when speed was invalid (below 60 ias). What may have confused the crew was pushing the nose down, which increased ias above 60, made airspeed valid again and got the stall
warning again.

 

[Hacker15e]

The real issue here is that Airbus sucks.

Although I wouldn't ever hesitate to ride on one or fly one, I definitely dislike how much the digitization of the entire aircraft has taken airmanship out of the loop.

Obviously, in the history of commercial aviation, the #1 cause of airline accidents has been pilot error. To some extent, the automation has drastically increased the safety factor and bred out some of the ways that pilots can kill themselves and passengers. Big success as far as that's concerned.

I think, though, that Airbus has crossed over the line with the way things currently are, and this accident seems to me to be a perfect example of how far they've bred pilots out of the loop.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

Multiple cascading failures at night in IMC and turbulence. Just glad I wasn't at the controls so you could all crucify me after the fact.

Jesus rollerblading Christ do I ever agree with this statement.

Again, I want to understand what the flight control laws do when airspeed and alpha information go all wonky.

 

[MikeD]

The real issue here is that Airbus sucks.

Although I wouldn't ever hesitate to ride on one or fly one, I definitely dislike how much the digitization of the entire aircraft has taken airmanship out of the loop.

Obviously, in the history of commercial aviation, the #1 cause of airline accidents has been pilot error. To some extent, the automation has drastically increased the safety factor and bred out some of the ways that pilots can kill themselves and passengers. Big success as far as that's concerned.

I think, though, that Airbus has crossed over the line with the way things currently are, and this accident seems to me to be a perfect example of how far they've bred pilots out of the loop.

I see what you're saying. But I would ask though, does Airbus deserve the blame for creating a product that the industry was demanding? Or should aviation as a whole take some blame for essentially eroding the concept of airmanship from the training of airmen, in the quest to chase the endless limits of automation?

 

[Autothrust Blue]

I see what you're saying. But I would ask though, does Airbus deserve the blame for creating a product that the industry was demanding? Or should aviation as a whole take some blame for essentially eroding the concept of airmanship from the training of airmen, in the quest to chase the endless limits of automation?

Automation lets you make the same mistake faster and more reliably. And it creates more complicated mistakes (e.g. "What's it doing now?")

 

[PositionAndHold]

I see what you're saying. But I would ask though, does Airbus deserve the blame for creating a product that the industry was demanding? Or should aviation as a whole take some blame for essentially eroding the concept of airmanship from the training of airmen, in the quest to chase the endless limits of automation?

I think they should be blamed for creating an aircraft with insufficient pitot heat. If you are going to be that reliant on digital information then the sensors should ALWAYS work. If you cant guarantee they will work in the worst icing possible, there should be a back system that will work. Hell, even an IFR 172 has an alt. static source. I seriously can't believe the lack of adequate pitot heat is even being discussed in this modern age. I also can't believe that it even happened up to 11 times prior and then they finally had to come up with a retro fit. The pitot heat situation is what is blowing my mind. I can't blame the pilots. They were delt a crap hand, and they held the attitude and thrust where they thought it would work.

 

[RDoug]

Already new calls for additional pilot training. So much for automation making things easier.

 

[MikeD]

I think they should be blamed for creating an aircraft with insufficient pitot heat. If you are going to be that reliant on digital information then the sensors should ALWAYS work. If you cant guarantee they will work in the worst icing possible, there should be a back system that will work. Hell, even an IFR 172 has an alt. static source. I seriously can't believe the lack of adequate pitot heat is even being discussed in this modern age. I also can't believe that it even happened up to 11 times prior and then they finally had to come up with a retro fit. The pitot heat situation is what is blowing my mind. I can't blame the pilots. They were delt a crap hand, and they held the attitude and thrust where they thought it would work.

In the F-117, one of THE most important pieces of that aircraft were the four data probes on the nose (which included pitot functions). We couldn't have one probe without probe heat working or otherwise inoperative, even though only 3 were in use and one was a standby; they were that important to the life and well-being of that aircraft. Without information from them due to ice or any other kind of blockage, the 117 became a tumbling wedge-shaped brick.

 

[DE727UPS]

"I also can't believe that it even happened up to 11 times prior and then they finally had to come up with a retro fit. The pitot heat situation is what is blowing my mind. I can't blame the pilots. They were delt a crap hand, and they held the attitude and thrust where they thought it would work."

Totally agree. I'd get an ECIAS message in the 75/76 if a probe fails and I'd do the unreliable airspeed checklist which calls for automation off and fly pitch and power. It's easy to blame the pilots cause they aren't around. I put the blame on Airbus for setting the pilots up to fail.

 

[Boris Badenov]

I trust my reputation preceeds me on the "Autmation vs. Not" argument. With that said, and without rescinding my preference for cables or at least computers you can turn off, my understanding is that the Airbus goes into "direct law" (ie. closer to what we're all used to) when systems fail, and (editorializing here, maybe) that's perversely why things got really confusing for these guys.

IMHO, and certainly without passing judgement at all, my suspicion is that the problem isn't "too much automation" or whatever, but that the lines are blurred about where the automation starts and ends, what it means, etc. Now, there's a serious argument to be made that "too much" automation MEANS "automation that's so complex that a crew can't understand what it does or doesn't do". I might even agree with that line of thought, but that's not the same thing as saying "Ya just need needle, ball, airspeed, and a sectional".

Now of course, I could fly an X-15 to a perfect three pointer and make the first turnoff with just my flying scarf and a toughguy attitude. As I'm sure any of you could, too. But the accident records don't support the notion that automation, properly handled and designed, is anything less than an improvement for pilot safety.

I'd rather fly raw data in a dangerous airplane, keep my skills sharp, and sleep at night knowing I'm The Consumate Aviator (haha!). But the actuaries are never wrong about anything, and those glass cockpits didn't pay for themselves.

Are there flaws in the Airbus systems and how human beings interact with them? I don't know enough to comment. But even if there are, let's not throw out the baby with the bathwater and pray for the return of the accident rate of the 1960s. I mean, obviously I am invincible and perfect, and I'm sure you are, too. But for those Lesser Aviators out there (wherever they may be...certainly not here!) sometimes the crutches are good. Properly designed, etc.

 

[dasleben]

I have to wonder how in-depth the unreliable airspeed training is on most Airbuses. There are a couple 757s in the ocean this very day because of taped over static ports; as a result, I got my fair share of that training in sim. Do Airbus pilots typically get a chance to see that during training?

 

[boondr]

I have to wonder how in-depth the unreliable airspeed training is on most Airbuses. There are a couple 757s in the ocean this very day because of taped over static ports; as a result, I got my fair share of that training in sim. Do Airbus pilots typically get a chance to see that during training?

What do you know you're just a baby pilot

 

[RDoug]

"It is impossible to make anything foolproof, because fools are so ingenious."

——Robert Heinlein

 

[MFT1Air]

The real issue here is that Airbus sucks.

Although I wouldn't ever hesitate to ride on one or fly one, I definitely dislike how much the digitization of the entire aircraft has taken airmanship out of the loop.

Educate me, please? From watching "The Military Channel," isn't that same comment made about the F/A-18 or the F-22 as well? (Not a sarcastic, rhetorical question)