Mid-Air in SFO Bay Area...
- Thread starter GypsyPilot
- Start date
jgheggie
Well-Known Member
I've been reading through all of your thoughts on why he continued to Ione instead of landing in Oakland or other mentioned airports. I don't have enough experience to justify my opinion on the incident.
I do have a question though. Given that some of you thought he should have landed immediately, and some give reasons why he may have went to Ione.....
.....what are your thoughts on loosing an engine on a twin? I know of one incident where a pilot flew 80+ miles with one engine (one shut down) to get back to base. He passed up close to 10 viable landing options. Places with good maintenance, long run ways, and even a place with a nice hotel on the field. His thought was; "I'm better off to break down at home."
Long story short, he didn't even declare an emergency, AT FIRST! However, the good engine started running a little rough about 10 miles from base. He then declared the emergency and made it to the home field. Once the FAA realized he did not declare an emergency after losing the first engine, they were not happy.
I do have a question though. Given that some of you thought he should have landed immediately, and some give reasons why he may have went to Ione.....
.....what are your thoughts on loosing an engine on a twin? I know of one incident where a pilot flew 80+ miles with one engine (one shut down) to get back to base. He passed up close to 10 viable landing options. Places with good maintenance, long run ways, and even a place with a nice hotel on the field. His thought was; "I'm better off to break down at home."
Long story short, he didn't even declare an emergency, AT FIRST! However, the good engine started running a little rough about 10 miles from base. He then declared the emergency and made it to the home field. Once the FAA realized he did not declare an emergency after losing the first engine, they were not happy.
In the example you cite, that's kind of where you get into the concept of choosing a landing point due to convenience. To caveat that though, there has to be alot more information known. Did he know the reason the one engine shut down? What was his performance? Was there the possibility of the second engine shutting down also if the reason for the first one shutting down wasn't known? What kind of area was he flying over and enroute back to his own field (ie- was he trying to exit an urban area?) Amongst other questions. I don't know those details and what was what on his decision tree, but whatever they were, apparently the FAA was none too happy, according to what you wrote.
To me, it comes down to:
1. Is there a valid operational or emergency necessity to bypass suitable (key point: suitable) landing fields, during an emergency? If that can be reasonably articulated, then good. If it can't be reasonably articulated, then not so good.
2. Am I taking the most conservative action(s) and decision(s), commensurate with the emergency at hand?
As can be seen from what I've written, generally speaking, I'm not a huge fan of keeping a sick or damaged airplane in the air any longer than absolutely required for operational/emergency necessity. Certainly not for any personal covenience factor, unless of course it's something relatively minor.
jgheggie
Well-Known Member
Well from what I remember, it was later determined to be a fuel system issue. Not sure what exactly. It was actually two people flying a time build for the flight school. They both said that an instructor told them one engine is ok to fly on. They said the instructor told them that if the bad engine was not on fire then you didn't need to declare an emergency. This was in central/south Florida area. Right on the east coast. They were following the coast line and mostly talking to Miami center during the duration of the flight. They later told the chief pilot of the flight school that their instructor told them Miami center is too busy to deal with issues if its not a major emergency, and that losing one engine wasn't a "major emergency".
GypsyPilot
Mohawk Town
Just had dinner with a guy who worked with the guy who was flying the Cessna. Apparently he was on his way back home after the event at HAF.
Hoping they find him, but it's certainly not looking so good
The Sea Fury pilot knew a lot about the 210... He knew the registration, number of people on board, etc. Seemed pretty obvious they were closely connected when we were listening to it unfold.
Hacker15e
Who am I? Where are my pants?
The 210 pilot was the crew chief for the Sea Fury. Both airplanes were owned by Sanders. They were both at the Dream Machines event at HAF, departed the field together, and were headed to Ione together.
They were a formation flight that had a midair, not just two random airplanes that hit each other.
GypsyPilot
Mohawk Town
I didn't want to outright say it, but yes it was pretty obvious they were a formation flight as soon as we heard it happening.
Hacker15e
Who am I? Where are my pants?
Latest report is saying that the collision took place during or after a lead change.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/planes-collided-passing-san-francisco-bay-23508744
An interesting and important bit of information, IMHO.
The lead change is a maneuver that has a high potential for swapping paint due to the change in roles between the aircraft (ergo, who is responsible for clearing for the formation -- the lead -- and who is responsible for maintaining deconfliction with the other aircraft -- the wingman) and the close proximity and relative movement required when the change takes place.
There are numerous ways that either miscommunication between the two pilots or failure to adhere to the roles contract, OR simply some kind of distraction can result in airplanes hitting.
I the USAF jet community, we build an extra bit of lateral deconfliction between the aircraft during the lead change by having the overtaking aircraft (the wingman becoming the lead) have a vector that is slightly away from the other aircraft while moving forward. In the civilian world (the FAST standard) they don't do this, and there are even differences between different "camps" of civilian pilots as to what kind of space there is between the aircraft when swapping the lead.
I can't comment on how these particular pilots did it, but it does not surprise me in the slightest that it was during this phase of flight that something happened which caused them to impact each other.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/planes-collided-passing-san-francisco-bay-23508744
An interesting and important bit of information, IMHO.
The lead change is a maneuver that has a high potential for swapping paint due to the change in roles between the aircraft (ergo, who is responsible for clearing for the formation -- the lead -- and who is responsible for maintaining deconfliction with the other aircraft -- the wingman) and the close proximity and relative movement required when the change takes place.
There are numerous ways that either miscommunication between the two pilots or failure to adhere to the roles contract, OR simply some kind of distraction can result in airplanes hitting.
I the USAF jet community, we build an extra bit of lateral deconfliction between the aircraft during the lead change by having the overtaking aircraft (the wingman becoming the lead) have a vector that is slightly away from the other aircraft while moving forward. In the civilian world (the FAST standard) they don't do this, and there are even differences between different "camps" of civilian pilots as to what kind of space there is between the aircraft when swapping the lead.
I can't comment on how these particular pilots did it, but it does not surprise me in the slightest that it was during this phase of flight that something happened which caused them to impact each other.
What's interesting is that you and I take for granted a lead change, in the sense that it's a benign maneuver because of the fact of how we treat it and the methods we use to make it happen (diverging vectors and such). It's almost 3rd nature. In the countless numbers of lead changes I've done in my time....be it basic form, on the tanker, during a battle damage check post-range, and even in IMC when in close due to the then-lead having a NAVAID error. All those times, it wasn't even paid much mind to because it was so routine. But learning that simple mitigating items such as no diverging vector, was a factor in how these pilots train, and it does say a lot as an important factor here. Especially when it comes to dissimilar formations, where you one can't count on a certain distance "always" working for deconfliction, such as you could when flying form all the time with similar aircraft.
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D
Deleted member 27505
Guest
I still suspect there was either something undesirable in the pilot or the lack of something required in the airplane. Unfortunately, no investigation now will ever be able to determine that. Which, albeit seemingly missed, was really my point. I wasn't so much going for lack of specificity as subtlety. Unsuccessful, and now obviated attempt I guess.
JetDoc
Pit Bull Wrangler
I knew Dave. I worked with him for a couple years some time back. He was a great A&P and an even greater person. This makes me very sad...
ChasenSFO
hen teaser
Damn. RIP.
Lots of local talk about how dangerous Bay Tours are because of this incident. I'm quick to remind people this was a formation flight, but any reason to make excuses for being terrified of the Bravo is typical here.