Re: Marine captain faulted in \'friendly fire\' incident
Sadly it is a bunch of errors to go around, but it's the same stuff we keep doing over and over and over. From the description, the Marine Forward Air Controller, or FAC (known as an ANGLICO or Air and Naval Gunfire Liasion Officer) was performing what's known as Type III control. FACing comes in three "types" for an air or ground FAC: Type I: Standard FACing. The FAC sees the target, and directs you to hit it as he monitors. Also known as "direct positive control". Type II: The FAC is not in visual contact with the target, but he has a forward element that is, or some sort of forward observer that is in visual contact with the target and he's ALSO in contact with that element. From that, he can clear you to hit the target using the forward element to correct and give BDA (bomb damage assessment). This is also known as indirect positive control, and the "forward element" in question can even be a UAV that's looking at the target and giving real time feedback. Key is that the FAC still, in essence, "sees" the target. Type III: The FAC doesn't see the target, and doesn't have anyone HE'S in contact with that can monitor the strike. However, the area in question is known to be "downrange" or beyond the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), and the FAC can talk the aircrew onto the target off a map or satellite imagery. Through talk descriptions, the FAC can know that both he and the aircrew are talking about the same target area. The FAC can then clear the fighters under flight-lead-control to hit the target in question.
Type III control is the tricky one that I've always had the problem with. The FAC has "cleared" the fighters to hit the target based on knowing, through target description/ lead-in features/adjacent targets and their location etc, that both he and the fighters are looking at the same target. But how far should the FACs responsibility (liability) extend in this case? IF he's not in contact with anyone that sees the target, yet through all his AVAILABLE info, there's no friendlies up that way, then is he still liable for fratricide? With Type I control is't pretty cut and dried, with Type III, IMO, it isn't. On one hand, the military will say "you as the FAC were controlling the fighters by giving the target to them in the first place"...which you really weren't..not CONTROLLING them DIRECTLY in the classic sense. On the other hand it can be argued, being Type III control, the FIGHTERS are responsible since you HANDED OFF control to the fighters under "flight-lead-control"....meaning, to me, the onus for identifying WHAT YOU'RE SHOOTING AT, WHEN YOU'RE SHOOTING AT IT, directly falls on the AIRCREW. Just because a FAC clears you to hit something, that doesn't mean that as a fighter pilot, you just loose off rounds from your aircraft. Granted, there has to be confidence in the FAC telling you to hit the right target, but with ESPECIALLY with Type III control, the onus is on YOU to make sure of what you're shooting at. IMO, Type III control is sketchy to begin with, and that's why I NEVER do it as a FAC. When I'm a fighter, I'm leery of Type III control.
THIS is the same situation I had where I elected to hold fire when I was ordered to put 30mm down on an island in Tigris river. It became apparent that the right hand wasn't talking to the left. First red flag was the FAC NOT being co-located in the target area....that gets my hairs standing up a bit. Second was the nearly IMMEDIATE clearance to fire....well before I even had SA on where ALL the friendlies were. Third was when I contacted one friendly element, and they gave me erroneous position reports of their actual location....their unsureness of exact positioning making ME reasonably sure of where they WERE, but not of where they WEREN'T. They were not under any threat or direct fire, so it was time to call a time-out on expending munitions.
Regards the Type III control again....like I was saying, when the aircrew accepts Type III control, the onus for them making sure of what they're shooting at becomes, IMO, MUCH more clear. It pisses me off because an A-10 pilot claiming not to be trained to identify certain ground vehicles is akin to an F-14 pilot claiming he doesn't know all models of Sukoi's and MiGs. And THIS goes RIGHT BACK to..."if you're NOT sure of what you're firing at (ie- don't recognize it, can't make it out from the smoke, or just don't know what the hell it is) THEN DON'T FIRE!
What sucks is that these Marine LVTP-7s were hit...fratricide AGAIN! The A-10 and fratricide now tally:
-These two LVTP-7s.
-Two British Scimitar armored vehicles also in this
war.
-Two British Warrior APCs in the first Gulf War.
-One Marine LAV-25 APC in the first Gulf War.
And it's the same screw-ups in nearly each of these cases.
Why don't we learn?
