Landing Incident @ SFO

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To borrow this from pilot and author Patrick Smith:

Lastly, we're hearing murmurs already about the fact that Asiana Airlines hails from South Korea, a country with a checkered past when it comes to air safety. Let's nip this storyline in the bud. In the 1980s and 1990s, that country's largest carrier, Korean Air, suffered a spate of fatal accidents, culminating with the crash of Flight 801 in Guam in 1997. The airline was faulted for poor training standards and a rigid, authoritarian cockpit culture. The carrier was ostracized by many in the global aviation community, including its airline code-share partners. But South Korean aviation is very different today, following a systemic and very expensive overhaul of the nation's civil aviation system. A 2008 assessment by ICAO, the civil aviation branch of the United Nations, ranked South Korea's aviation safety standards, including its pilot training standards, as nothing less than the highest in the world, beating out more than 100 other countries. As they should be, South Koreans are immensely proud of this turnaround, and Asiana Airlines, the nation's No. 2 carrier, had maintained an impeccable record of both customer satisfaction and safety.
Whatever happened on final approach into SFO, I highly doubt that it was anything related to the culture of South Korean air safety in 2013. Plane crashes are increasingly rare the world over. But they will continue to happen from time to time, and no airline or country is 100 percent immune.


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South Korea of the 80s and 90s is not the South Koera of today 2013. It is far better, far safer, with better CRM than in the 80s and 90s. Would you like to compare air safety in the USA in the 70s, 80s, and 90s compared to today? It is also better and safer. I wouldn't use this as red herring and say OMG! Cabotism! This proves it is dangerous!

He is real ignorant/stupid if he is doubting it was culturally related.
 
No doubts mistakes were made.

But let's look at the system that caused the mistake to prevent it from happening again. This cycle of accidents (Colgan 3407, Air France 447, and Asiana 214) ALL appear to have been caused by speed control issues. That points more to a systemic problem worldwide rather than an individual pilot mistake.


Not to be crass about it, but with the amount of operations daily worldwide and you have three example of human/pilot error. Those are not numbers that dictate a systematic change worldwide to me. A few pilots made some disgusting mistakes and thats it. Its unfortunate but that is what happened.
 
Not to be crass about it, but with the amount of operations daily worldwide and you have three example of human/pilot error. Those are not numbers that dictate a systematic change worldwide to me. A few pilots made some disgusting mistakes and thats it. Its unfortunate but that is what happened.

Those examples have all lead to a hull loss. What is the common denominator in those hull losses? Air speed control.
 
Ruled out the Asian cultural attitude, since both were captains...... Then again maybe not.

Another interesting aspect is the very High Decent Rate. Wonder if the PNF spoke up!

What would you guys do if you were PNF?

Captain PNF: "Hey Captain, add power! Were a bit low now."
Captain PF: "I know, It's alright I'll grease it softly on the runway, it'll float, just watch."
two low airspeed warnings and if no appropriate response...I take over. The response you provided is not appropriate... "Correcting" is the only appropriate response.
 
What post? They have largely been addressed. Not related to the culture in 2013. Asiana has a bunch of expat pilots and continue to hire expats in both left and right seats, both Airbus and Boeing.
 
Those examples have all lead to a hull loss. What is the common denominator in those hull losses? Air speed control.


Right, but maybe I am confused at what your point is. The airspeed control was the main factor but all those examples were completely different phases of flight. Thats a tough systematic problem to try to fix. I have never flown a 777 but a friend of mine retired flying it and he still can't wrap his head around the fact that this crew got the aircraft in that situation.
 
I am not a pilot, nor do I play one on TV, but it seems to me if the stated narrative sticks than there was something larger than a few pilots simultaneously having brainfarts that lead to a perfectly good plane flying into a seawall. A checklist needs improvement, training needs to improve, something more than just, "it was just an oopsie by an isolated group of pilots, they happen".
 
What post? They have largely been addressed. Not related to the culture in 2013. Asiana has a bunch of expat pilots and continue to hire expats in both left and right seats, both Airbus and Boeing.


So, is that suppose to give them a pass by American standards because they may or may not hire American pilots? Confused on what this has to do with anything.
 
Right, but maybe I am confused at what your point is. The airspeed control was the main factor but all those examples were completely different phases of flight.

My point is that for some reason airplanes are crashing because we are having trouble controlling our speeds.

Thats a tough systematic problem to try to fix.

But we need to try.

I have never flown a 777 but a friend of mine retired flying it and he still can't wrap his head around the fact that this crew got the aircraft in that situation.

No offense to you or your friend, but when people say broad statements like that, well, if you can't think it can happen to you, it can.
 
If there is a culture that produces pilots who fail to correct a chain of events that can lead to an accident, then I'm not flying with them. Individually these were likely smart, capable and qualified pilots on the flight deck, but as a group they couldn't keep their aircraft from hitting the sea wall in CAVU on what began as a stable approach.

Call me a bigot if you like, but 850 posts into this topic alone and that seems to be the prevailing wisdom - it's cultural.
 
two low airspeed warnings and if no appropriate response...I take over. The response you provided is not appropriate... "Correcting" is the only appropriate response.

That is the thing, 99.999999999999% of the pilots I have flown with will say something very simple such as 'you are 5 knots slow' or 'getting slow' if one is simply five knots under your ref speed. To be 30 knots under, with no one saying anything until the last minute? Doesn't make sense, unless, of course you look at the CRM practices we are dealing with here.
 
"I have talked a lot of former Flight Engineers on the 727 and DC-10 recently and they said it was the best seat in the house as they learned a lot catching the mistakes of others"

This is very true. I learned a lot from the back seat on how to fly a 727. And right seat in the 72 was my first jet time. It's crazy how you can sit in the jumpseat and see stuff happen.

I'm no FMC expert, but recently I was jumpseating online and a rushed crew got an "insufficent fuel" message during preflight. I spoke up right away with what the problem probably was and was correct in that it was an input error by the F/O. I spoke up because I'm qualified on the equipment and was comfortable with my place as a helper in the cockpit while not "really" being a crewmember. I was truly not afraid to say something in that situation where I would have been more reserved if I was off-line on a plane I've never flown.

But, I don't care what the situation, if I saw I guy 20 knots slow below 1000 feet, I'd be yelling "airspeed" closely followed by "go around". Seagull's comment about "backseaters" not paying attention is what prompted my post. I've NEVER seen such a lack of professionalism as a crewmember not paying attention on short final. That's just unreal. Where I work, IRO's are required to be on the flight deck below 10 and are part of the crew, dot period. If you want to suggest they weren't paying attention during a critical phase of flight, then I'd take a hard look at fatigue.
 
I'm a private instrument multi guy, but when I've got a safety pilot or instructor with me, I brief him to call out when I'm 10 degrees off target heading, 10 knots off target airspeed or 50 feet off target altitude. If I don't immediately respond, assume that I am spatially disoriented and take the controls. That leaves the door open for him to step through.
 
Oh boy. nc1982, you seeing this?

Yea. It's funny when people mention the culture has been fixed. Expats in the cockpit. Haha. Read up on pprune from expats who actually fly in Korea. Those cockpits are actually more toxic with expats in the cockpit. I get it. People don't understand how a people's culture can't contribute to an accident. It doesn't make sense. But living it everyday, it makes perfect sense to me and was one of the first things that popped into my head after this accident.
 
We "need to try". Try what? Like what program do you propose that will be more effective at making sure pilots stop somehow forgetting that when you go too slowly, plane no worky? Maybe we should focus on not hiring fools. And while yes, many careless mistakes have been made and will be made by me in the future, no, it "can't happen to me". I will never crash an airplane because woopsie I forgot the power! If I do, you can totally repost this and make me look bad.
 
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