is ADM psychobabble?

Adrock

Adrock

Well-Known Member
I am working on CFI lesson plans and currently working on developing a lesson plan from the ADM chapter of the Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge. Is it just me or is this chapter incredibly confusing? Besides being overwhelmed by tedious acronyms, many of definitions are filled with abstractions. I am also having trouble categorizing these concepts, because in one paragraph it sounds like ADM is the broadest category--a Category all other concepts (SRM, Situational Awareness, PAVE, IMSAFE, etc.) fall into—and in another paragraph ADM is listed side by side of these concepts. I realize there are some good points to be made here (Hazardous Attitudes, Operational Pitfalls) but is most of this just psychobabble? Will I have to make sense of all of this for my CFI check-ride?
 
The overuse of acronyms is IMO idiotic but the concepts are valid. Memorize the acronyms for the test (then forget them) but take the underlying concepts as valuable.

It's really a shame that, despite teaching that correlation is the highest form of learning, the FAA continues to concentrate and test on rote, the lowest. But I guess its just easier to test on rote nonsense than to engage in thoughtful discussion.
 
MidlifeFlyer said:
The overuse of acronyms is IMO idiotic but the concepts are valid. Memorize the acronyms for the test (then forget them) but take the underlying concepts as valuable.

It's really a shame that, despite teaching that correlation is the highest form of learning, the FAA continues to concentrate and test on rote, the lowest. But I guess its just easier to test on rote nonsense than to engage in thoughtful discussion.
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I have to say, I had quite a many thoughtful discussions with every examiner I had. So, while the writtens are based on rote (for sake of test presentation and evaluation), I can't quite say with much certainty that examiners are relying solely on rote.
 
Blackhawk said:
Is it really psychobabble to evaluate risks before and during a flight?
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Well, considering it was what is going to keep you alive.

I've never been shy about saying "we ain't flying today.". Might not happen often, but always be prepared to do so (no matter what boss/CP/DO/dispatch/student/pax thinks about it.)
 
ppragman said:
Good pilots were doing this before we had 50 acronyms and special euphemisms; its called airmanship.
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Many pilots were (are), not doing it, however, which is why the FAA has attempted to find ways to integrate it into training. Many good pilots were doing it, but they were finding out how to do it after making mistakes and surviving, or seeing other pilots make smoking holes in the ground. That, unfortunately, is how I learned decision making. An acquaintance would be turned into an unrecognizable gob of goo and I would try to find out how and why. I'd learn from it and adjust my behavior. Or I'd do something stupid that would leave myself shaking and questioning my immortality and adjust my behavior. How much better it would have been if my friends had been taught ADM from day one and avoided leaving behind grieving parents, wives and children.
 
drunkenbeagle said:
Well, considering it was what is going to keep you alive.

I've never been shy about saying "we ain't flying today.". Might not happen often, but always be prepared to do so (no matter what boss/CP/DO/dispatch/student/pax thinks about it.)
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The idea as a CFI is not to tell students "we ain't flying today", but to get them to say "we ain't flying today".... which is why there is the emphasis on CFIs teaching ADM. Personally, I am less concerned about the acronyms that are used than the end result. But if IMSAFE, PAVE or whatever assists a new pilot in going through the decision making process then I'm fine with it.
 
Thanks for the help guys. What I meant by "psychobabble" was that the very words used to describe these concepts actually confuses the very point they are trying to clarify. I was not using it as a pejorative or do I think the basic Idea of ADM (evaluating situations for acceptable levels of risk, and making decisions that mitigate risks) is a bad thing. There is a "3p model" and "5p model" the "DECIDE model" --how many people here that are singing the praises of the FAA literature on ADM knew what one "P" in one models was from the next? If a pilot is neglectful or stupid, is reciting, "Perceive, Process, Perform," really going to alter their decision? If your judgment sucks to begin with you probably aren’t "perceiving" risk that is there in the first place. Telling yourself to perceive, seems about as pointless as telling yourself to breath--either you do it naturally or you don’t.
 
ppragman said:
Good pilots were doing this before we had 50 acronyms and special euphemisms; its called airmanship.
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Yes.

That said, I have to file FRATs (Flight Risk Assessment Tool) at work when going to an unfamiliar airport. Scores above a certain threshold have to get management/Chief Pilot's Office approval; some even higher scores simply cannot be approved, an automatic no-go. I like the FRAT because it lists a whole bunch of things that could possibly go wrong or hinder my performance, and requires me to consider each one of them before submission for approval.

I see the FRAT (AOPA has a "Flight Risk Evaluator"), and the "systemic" ADM processes as an aid to decision making. No amount of written guidance will ever be a replacement for airmanship. Perhaps the systemic ADM processes are an attempt to describe airmanship...a model of thought process. (Or at least, I see it that way.)
 
Adrock said:
Telling yourself to perceive, seems about as pointless as telling yourself to breath--either you do it naturally or you don’t.
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If you are learning to be a flight instructor, you should begin to realize that some, maybe most, people don't do anything naturally when the brain is flooded with adrenalin from the physical act of hurtling through the air at 100mph.
 
nosehair said:
If you are learning to be a flight instructor, you should begin to realize that some, maybe most, people don't do anything naturally when the brain is flooded with adrenalin from the physical act of hurtling through the air at 100mph.
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Exactly the point I was trying to make. Unfortunately the decision making process is still not being taught to students in spite of the FAAs emphasis. I don't know how many times I've heard CFIs tell students "We aren't flying today due to...".
 
We hear the term accident chain. That is a good concept to know for practical use. Students should be shown that accidents start hours before a crash not at impact.
 
nosehair said:
If you are learning to be a flight instructor, you should begin to realize that some, maybe most, people don't do anything naturally when the brain is flooded with adrenalin from the physical act of hurtling through the air at 100mph.
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The FAA approach to this just doesn’t work for me. I can tell by the lack of emphasis made by multiple instructors I’ve had, and lack of any details or specifics for commenters of this post that it isn’t working that great for anybody else. The excessive use of acronyms and the absence of real world examples make the presentation of this stuff untenable. ONCE AGAIN IM NOT DEBATING THE MERITS OF ADM just the poor job the FAA publication does in explaining it. I have learned more from reading Accident Reports than I would ever from memorizing 10 different acronyms that describe the same thing. As for the need to have acronyms for use in emergency/stressful situations; I agree! I will bet your bottom dollar that few CFI’s that love ADM would be placing components into the DECIDE model if the engine failed inflight (ABC’s or THREE Gs’s; sure.) If I wrote the chapter on ADM (when I am king someday ; ) ) it would be dominated by real-world examples of both failures and successes of ADM in aviation. Once again it’s ironic that the FAA--a proponent of Scenario Based Training--missed a huge opportunity to instill concrete examples of the pitfalls that have caused so many tragedies in aviation. It’s weird I never heard Sully Sullenberger talk about running through the DECIDE model after both engines quit!
 
Adrock said:
Once again it’s ironic that the FAA--a proponent of Scenario Based Training--missed a huge opportunity to instill concrete examples of the pitfalls that have caused so many tragedies in aviation.
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You can take this opportunity to realize that the FAA is not a training organization. The government function of the FAA is enforcement. Enforcement of existing regulations, and "technical counselors" in the process of making new regulations. But they don't make them, they propose them. To congress. Politics becomes the rule maker.

And politics effects the attempt at writing technical advisories, which is what the FOI, AFH, PHAK, ACs, etc, are.

Your evaluation of the FAA job of introducing "ADM" into the FOI book is correct. We all realize it is written by idiots, but does contain valuable information.

Your job, should you decide to accept it, is to turn this "government-speak" into understandable (and applicable) terms to a student pilot.
 
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