Hypoxic Kalitta Crew audio

I am surprised that the pilot maintained consciousness. It sounded like they he was above FL260. Great controller! great outcome!:clap:
 
Is this real-time? It's amazing how quickly the crew goes from sounding nearly unconscious to normal after descending. Very lucky, indeed!
 
Wow! It sounded like the crew never realized anything was awry (e.g., how they were mumbling) besides the difficulty controlling the a/c and reason for declaring the emergency.
 
From the NATCA Communicating for Safety Website
Stephanie Bevins & Marvin McCombs
Cleveland Center
Over the radio, Jay McCombs tried hard to understand the slow, slurring words muffled among the blaring sirens sounding in the background. The radio was poor, and the pilot difficult to understand, leaving only unintelligible transmission and uncontrollable noise to be heard.

Controllers at Cleveland Center were now faced with the complex and difficult task of deciphering the message if they had any chance of finding a solution. The critical diagnosis that was to come would make all the difference in securing the safety of the Kalitta Learjet, KFS66.

The events unfolded on July 26, 2008 when McCombs accepted the hand-off of KFS66, which appeared to have a stuck mike creating incomprehensible transmissions. Unclear to those in the Center, however, was that the co-pilot’s arm was all the while moving violently and uncontrollably on the other end as the captain worked hard to hand fly the aircraft.

Through the help of another pilot’s translation, Jay learned that the aircraft had declared an emergency. The plane was quickly changing altitude and McCombs immediately began to suggest closer airports, only to receive no reply.

Amid the chaos to translate the captain’s words, fellow controller Stephanie Bevins turns on the receiver so that she can now hear the pilot with her own headset. As she thinks through the symptoms in her head, she concludes that he must be hypoxic, a serious condition involving lack of oxygen due to pressurization problems. She knows immediately that they must descend the aircraft.

Following Bevin’s initiative, McCombs begins bringing the aircraft to the lowest altitude available in order to alleviate the possible oxygen deprivation. Unable to answer questions, the pilot is only able to respond to direct commands that the controllers now begin to voice. “Descend and maintain,” they repeat.

Remarkably, the captain’s inability to turn on autopilot requires him to have to work in order to fly the airplane, keeping him conscious and the plane airborne. The pilot’s words gradually become more understandable, and around 11,000 feet, he returns to normal and confirms that he had, indeed, been suffering from hypoxia.

Without Bevins and McCombs, there is no telling what would have happened. Bevins’ diagnosis made all the difference to the fate of the passengers, and without McCombs, the necessary actions to solve the problem would not have been taken to get the aircraft down safely. Various individuals were involved in the assistance of KFS66, clearly stated by McCombs who says that “the entire area (Area 5) worked extremely well as a team.”

Seeing that this is amazing story embodied by unusual and startling circumstances, it is clear why this case study has not only been chosen as an Archie winner, but also as a classroom teaching aid at the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City.

With the Transcript for those who want to follow along...

http://www.natca.org/assets/Documents/mediacenter/GREATLAKESZOBTRANSCRIPT.pdf
 
That is amazing audio
<input id="gwProxy" type="hidden"><!--Session data--><input onclick="jsCall();" id="jsProxy" type="hidden">
 
THOSE GUYS ARE DANGEROUS AND SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO FLY ANYTHING BIGGER THAN A URINAL EVER AGAIN, THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN TO GET THEIR MASKS ON FASTER!!! :sarcasm:
One was a conscious decision by the pilot to continue to fly in marginal weather that could have resulted in the loss of an aircraft and 4 individuals due to CFIT.

One was not a decision made by the pilots to have what appears to be a problem with pressurization.

Yeah, they're both exactly the same. Good call. :rolleyes:

-mini
 
One was a conscious decision by the pilot to continue to fly in marginal weather that could have resulted in the loss of an aircraft and 4 individuals due to CFIT.

One was not a decision made by the pilots to have what appears to be a problem with pressurization.

Yeah, they're both exactly the same. Good call. :rolleyes:

-mini

Well, again, we don't really know the circumstances. I've seen the weather change fast enough to trap a guy in it, and then that could happen. I'm not trying to defend the guy,and in all fairness the guy probably is a dumbass, I'm just saying we don't know enough to arm-chair qb the thing to death. Or do I venture to say that you yourself have never had lapses of judgment. The lapse in question is fairly serious, but we don't know enough to say one thing or another about it.

We don't know where this happened, we don't know why this happened, we don't know who these other guys are, we know nothing other than "this guy was in IMC when he almost took a dirt nap. That and his buddy has a cool L39 (I think that's what that was)" What about the L39, was he still flying in those conditions? Why didn't the guy climb, we don't know anything, and yet people are willing to say that this guy is some kind of moron and shouldn't be allowed to fly ever again.

If it were my family riding on board, and this was the sole piece of evidence that we had to make that dicision, then no, they would not fly. But people are different, and maybe this was just a fluke. Bad timing combined with bad assumptions. Nothing that can't be fixed since they didn't crash.
 
I'm not trying to defend the guy
ORLY_Mexican.jpg


-mini
 

Nice, good pic, but seriously, I'm not, I'm just not for the relentless arm-chair qb-ing that goes on. I've done it plenty in the past, but I've come around to the idea that since we don't know enough of the facts in most instances, we can't really say things are right/wrong/yes/know/black/white. In this case, we know the guy got lucky, and clearly he made some bad choices, but the specifics, and what kind of aviator that makes this guy to be are things we have know idea about.
 
Nice, good pic, but seriously, I'm not, I'm just not for the relentless arm-chair qb-ing that goes on. I've done it plenty in the past, but I've come around to the idea that since we don't know enough of the facts in most instances, we can't really say things are right/wrong/yes/know/black/white. In this case, we know the guy got lucky, and clearly he made some bad choices, but the specifics, and what kind of aviator that makes this guy to be are things we have know idea about.

I usually am right on par w/ you Pat but I feel you are totally off base on this one.

1.) Inadvertent Flight into IMC (Ok, we have all done it but come on you just exit the IMC)

2.) Using his handheld for TA

3.) Not maintaining proper altitudes. (OROCA)

4.) An overall lack of proper ADM. Lets scud run up a valley w/ terrain all over the place. Sounds like a good idea to me. :sarcasm:
 
I usually am right on par w/ you Pat but I feel you are totally off base on this one.

1.) Inadvertent Flight into IMC (Ok, we have all done it but come on you just exit the IMC)

2.) Using his handheld for TA

3.) Not maintaining proper altitudes. (OROCA)

4.) An overall lack of proper ADM. Lets scud run up a valley w/ terrain all over the place. Sounds like a good idea to me. :sarcasm:

1.) Sometimes you can't exit the IMC (like in mountainous terrain) where you went just a microscopic bit too far and now can't turn around.

2.) Using his handheld for TA is better than nothing. Some situational awareness is better than none. Even though navigating with it exclusively is dumb.

3.) Agreed, he should have climbed as soon as he went IMC, climbed and turned (if he could).

4.) I agree, poor ADM all around, but we don't really know enough about it to say one thing or another.
 
I just took the FAA sponsored 2 day Aviation Physiology and Survival Training Course at CAMI in Oklahoma City.

It included spatial disorientation, basic survival, land/water egress and hypoxia training.

The hypoxia session was really interesting and included a high altitude chamber 'ride' where you experienced the effects of hypoxia at 25,000' for 5 minutes. I highly recommend it.

The course was very educational, well put together and taught by excellent instructors. Very worthwhile!!! (Did I just made a postive comment about the FAA??? :D)

And the best part was that it was FREE and I get a discount on my insurance!!!

U-Dog
 
The insurance company looks for some kind of 'structured' training each year to get a discount. This FAA training qualified.

Next year, I'll try something else.
 
Back
Top