Hey, jet pilot types, learn me something'

ATN_Pilot said:
No, they got killed because they weren't properly trained. No one gets into an airplane and says "I think I'm going to do something stupid today and risk my life." They didn't have the required knowledge to know that what they were doing was something stupid and dangerous. Frankly, very few pilots at Pinnacle at the time did. The captains were all Saab drivers who were thrown into a jet with a super-critical wing without anything resembling high altitude performance training, and most of the FOs had under 1,000 hours and were still trying to figure out visual approaches, let alone high altitude stalls.

And if memory serves, the temperature that night at FL410 was ISA+13. So yes, in the right airplane, getting up close to limit altitude at ISA+16 is a serious thing, and you would definitely want to come down pretty quick. Forecasts aren't always accurate, either. A forecast of ISA+10 may be just fine, but if you find out after climbing up that it's ISA+15, your plan has to change. My current airplane is overpowered for its limit altitude, but I never pick up something to read until after we've reached cruising altitude and I can see that it's stable. Temps can be higher than forecast, payload weight could be higher than the rampers reported, etc. Several airlines have had high altitude stalls because the crews weren't paying attention to what was going on with their airplanes. I refuse to be the next one.
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Is not switching seats in the new training manual
 
ATN_Pilot said:
No, they got killed because they weren't properly trained. No one gets into an airplane and says "I think I'm going to do something stupid today and risk my life." They didn't have the required knowledge to know that what they were doing was something stupid and dangerous. Frankly, very few pilots at Pinnacle at the time did. The captains were all Saab drivers who were thrown into a jet with a super-critical wing without anything resembling high altitude performance training, and most of the FOs had under 1,000 hours and were still trying to figure out visual approaches, let alone high altitude stalls.
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While not debating their level of training, that completely disregards the manner in which the entire flight was conducted.
 
cencal83406 said:
I'll let ATN's reply do most of the talking, since I wasn't even there for that but:

There is a good reason the entire industry is limited to FL370 in the CRJ-200 now... It should have never been certified to 410 in the first place, considering that the legs you can get it up there on aren't even remotely comfortable time-wise for passengers.
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Is this the case? I'm not on the 200 anymore, but as recently as 7 months ago it was still 410, as far as I knew. Maybe I missed the memo???
 
canadian_atc said:
Had a pilot call in a panic tonight..

"we need a descent, the deviation is +16"

Gave it to him, but what exactly does that mean?

Made me feel like a woman being told her headlight fluid is low..."is that a thing? Better not ask and look stupid"
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What was the aircraft type?
 
canadian_atc said:
Had a pilot call in a panic tonight.....

"we need a descent, the deviation is +16".....
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I agree with the other post but am confused as to why he called ISA a "deviation"......

ATN_Pilot said:
No, they got killed because they weren't properly trained.
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This is an obvious opinion. And while the NTSB did make training recommendations, these were not at the root of this accident.

ATN_Pilot said:
No one gets into an airplane and says "I think I'm going to do something stupid today and risk my life."
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Maybe not, but many a pilot have said to themselves, "I'm going to do something that's not too smart today". And sometimes (this case being one of them), there is a fine line between "not too smart" and "stupid". As for the "risk my life" part? It's just part of the job we all accept.

ATN_Pilot said:
They didn't have the required knowledge to know that what they were doing was something stupid and dangerous.............Frankly, very few pilots at Pinnacle at the time did. The captains were all Saab drivers who were thrown into a jet with a super-critical wing without anything resembling high altitude performance training, and most of the FOs had under 1,000 hours and were still trying to figure out visual approaches, let alone high altitude stalls.
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I've got to throw the flag in on this statement. From reading this I can see that you're addressing only the stall and the subsequent engine failureS. The REAL meat and potatoes of this accident started a long time BEFORE the stall. If you look at the departure profile, the conversation in and OUT of the cockpit, the seat switching, the drinks, the laughing, etc, I think that most people (the NTSB included) would agree that they clearly had the knowledge and knew full well "that what they were doing was stupid and dangerous".

As for the stall itself, there was a training deficiency in both handling the stall AND engine restart procedures but the lack of discipline and overall attitude was the real cause of this crash, not a lack of training .
 
jtrain609 said:
All operations are limited to ISA + 35, takeoff is limited to +52 C.

Additionally, they scaled this thing back. The real ceiling in the aircraft is FL410, but it was limited to FL370 with the RJ model. Some folks say to provide some buffer for low time pilots so they couldn't get themselves back into a corner at higher altitudes, some say it was done in order to increase the life of the airframe. In any event, this thing would have no problems climbing another 4,000', and at that point, you may find problems with performance, but this may be why I've never seen the plane take a crap with high ISA temps. Slower climb? Sure, but I've never thought to myself, "ZOMG, this thing won't make it!" We can make it directly to the service ceiling at nearly any weight.

Also, we climb slow as it is. The XR's climb at 290 to .60, and I've never had a problem holding that through FL370 on most days. And even on hot days when the climb rate starts to decrease, I've never seen the thing fail to accelerate once you level off.
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Man, if you get so distracted in the 145 that you stall it at altitude...man. Oh man.
 
canadian_atc said:
Had a pilot call in a panic tonight..

"we need a descent, the deviation is +16"

Gave it to him, but what exactly does that mean?

Made me feel like a woman being told her headlight fluid is low..."is that a thing? Better not ask and look stupid"
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I've asked for a decent after flying into warmer temperatures. Typically the at the higher altitudes things will change fast and while I can't speak for 121 guys there are a lot of distractions in a biz jet.

In my particular case we were fat dumb and happy at mach .86 and I looked up to see the airspeed decreasing steadily. It had already gone down to .82 at .80 we asked for lower. This was at FL470. The outside temperature had gone from -55C to -46C.

I don't often go up that high because turbulence and temperature can make you fall out of the sky. I also worry about things like the engines flaming out but I don't have any reason to. At least I haven't seen anything published that leads me to believe I should. I just worry at lot above FL410. Aircraft performance is really limited up there and there isn't a lot of time to react to a lot of things. Most notable, the rapid decompression.

I hope this clears things up for you as to why the guy seemed so worried.
 
C150J said:
This is quite true, but I have been surprised before. I was over the North Sea two months ago and ISA spiked for about an hour to +11. Forecast TD was +3. We had planned at FL430 in lieu of FL450 to mitigate the possibility of not being able to maintain .82M if such a thing occurred. Glad we did!

Call me a wuss, but I'll generally plan oceanic crossings roughly 4,000 feet below optimum to prevent surprises. If they are able to let me climb at 30W, I'll do it.
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Probably smart. I've seen a few people completely disregard optimum altitude, thinking that "higher is always better for fuel burn." Of course, we both know that's not the case, significantly higher than optimum causing a fun combination of increased burn and reduced maneuvering margins.
 
Thanks for the answers folks.

Makes sense now, the whole "called in a panic" may have been mistaken for someone being caught off guard, the cruise level was 360, they asked for 380 only to have to immediately ask for 360 again...
 
I took a CRJ7 up to FL410 in the fall. The FO had never been up there before and we were light enough and it was cold enough that we could do it. I wanted him to see just how narrow a performance band we had up there. We made up just fine but couldn't hold speed once we got there. Had to ask ATC to home down in a hurry. Wasn't an emergency by any stretch of the imagination but there was certainly some urgency to it.

EDIT: I just checked my logbook. That was the last time I flew the -700. Interesting.
 
BobDDuck said:
Because ISA+16 is 16 units (in this case units of celsius) of deviation away from the standard at a given altitude.
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I got that part.
Sorry, I didn't clarify my confusion (?). I'm confused as to why he would report ISA as a deviation to ATC...
Not really a common term and obviously caused some confusion on the radio as well.
 
I've taken the -200 up to FL410. It was something like ISA-5 and we were completely empty except for the FA and a jumpseater, so we could make it and hold speed just fine. But the airplane is certainly less than stable at that altitude. I wouldn't want to be there in anything less than perfectly smooth air.
 
dustoff17 said:
Sorry, I didn't clarify my confusion (?)

I'm confused as to why he would report ISA as a deviation to ATC...
Not really a common term and obviously caused some confusion on the radio as well.
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Actually, that's a very common term. Every release I've ever received has "ISA Deviation" listed in the performance section.
 
dustoff17 said:
I've got to throw the flag in on this statement. From reading this I can see that you're addressing only the stall and the subsequent engine failureS. The REAL meat and potatoes of this accident started a long time BEFORE the stall. If you look at the departure profile, the conversation in and OUT of the cockpit, the seat switching, the drinks, the laughing, etc, I think that most people (the NTSB included) would agree that they clearly had the knowledge and knew full well "that what they were doing was stupid and dangerous".

As for the stall itself, there was a training deficiency in both handling the stall AND engine restart procedures but the lack of discipline and overall attitude was the real cause of this crash, not a lack of training .
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Something being stupid and being dangerous are very different things. The departure profile was not dangerous. Anyone who has a little bit of time in the CRJ knows that the airplane can easily handle the departure profile that they flew. Would I do it? Of course not. It's not very professional. But it's also not dangerous. As far as switching seats, the drinks, the laughing, the conversation, etc., clearly none of it was dangerous. You can certainly argue that it was inappropriate and unprofessional, but not dangerous. Nothing they did that day was going to get them killed or injured, except for going up to FL410. And that's where the lack of training comes in.
 
ATN_Pilot said:
Actually, that's a very common term. Every release I've ever received has "ISA Deviation" listed in the performance section.
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Common radio or ATC term?

ATN_Pilot said:
Something being stupid and being dangerous are very different things. The departure profile was not dangerous. Anyone who has a little bit of time in the CRJ knows that the airplane can easily handle the departure profile that they flew. Would I do it? Of course not. It's not very professional. But it's also not dangerous. As far as switching seats, the drinks, the laughing, the conversation, etc., clearly none of it was dangerous. You can certainly argue that it was inappropriate and unprofessional, but not dangerous. Nothing they did that day was going to get them killed or injured, except for going up to FL410. And that's where the lack of training comes in.
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BINGO!! I'll concede that this is where the training was lacking......

Unless these guys were in extreme close contact with each other on at least three different occasions, then at least three times in the "seat switching" process, there was no one at a pilot station. Dangerous isn't even a stretch. The climb profile exceeded anything taught at Pinnacle or any other airline for that matter. Dangerous? The cavalier attitude, yelling, and celebrating the events were a precursor to the end result. Dangerous?

Also while we're discussing this. The NTSB committee notes were very revealing in this accident. These notes include the discussions and theories of the accident investigation team and the NTSB. These discussions included a lot of information that wasn't included in the final hearing as it didn't serve to enhance the final report. However, strong evidence supported the committee's conclusions. These were not included in the final presentation. I'm sure you've seen them so you'll understand why I think they were dangerous.

I take it you knew one or both of these guys. Sorry for the loss.
 
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