Hacker MikeD and others..

And you didn't make the FO take the landing?

No stick in the back of the Tomcat. If there were, the RIO would of logged the landing fer sure. Wherever wind, clouds or darkness exist, there are flying and landing opportunities galore for my First Officers. After all, I have important captain stuff to take care of....:whatever:
 
"I hooked an 18,000lb load in the desert on my first try at night."

"But if it was night time in a featureless environment, how did you maintain a reference point?"

"I was on goggles."

"Bullsht!"

"Naw man, it was a really great move. He was wearing NVGs and hooked the load..."

:whatever:

Whatever... screw you fighter guys. :D
 
Okay, just to change it up, here's a story from UPT. Most "there I was" stories from UPT students are pretty...oh, the adjectives I could use here...boring, insignificant, mountains-outta-molehills, etc. Students can get pretty worked up about some otherwise mundane stuff.

This one is one of those stories!

This was an in-flight emergency when I was a T-38 student -- a compressor stall that turned into an engine eating itself by throwing some compressor blades. All in all, not that huge of a deal. But, at my experience level when it happened, it was a helluva big deal to me. It's a little funny to read with 10 years and 2000 hours of perspective between then and now, but has an interesting lesson nonetheless.

Phantom 92's Got A Problem!

An in-flight emergency is a time when pilots are truly "put to the test." A pilot's actions alone can spell the difference between success and failure - even living or dying. In the military flying environment, this is especially true: high performance flying in high performance aircraft often beget high performance emergencies. A pilot's inability to cope with these emergencies is simply unacceptable, given the value of the pilot and his aircraft and the disastrous consequences of accidents with live munitions on board.

A significant tenet of the U.S. Air Force's pilot training philosophy is preparation for performing Emergency Procedures (EPs). Each student pilot is exposed to a simulated EP at least twice a day. Students must talk through emergencies with their instructors following every flight and nearly every morning, as a class, they perform a dreaded "stand up" EP. This is where a student, picked at random, must stand at attention in front of the whole class (simulating the pressure of an actual emergency) and verbally solve an emergency situation to a logical conclusion (e.g. landing the jet safely or ejecting safely). Student pilots are also required to practice EPs in the simulator every few months. These flights are not-so-affectionately called "dial-a-death," because the sim instructors make trainees handle just about every possible emergency situation in real-time. If you don't handle things correctly in a timely manner, you can die...only simulated, of course. EPs are a much-hated part of training, but I never fully realized their value until I experienced an engine failure while flying solo in a T-38 on 19 April 1999. It was an important lesson learned - and my "million dollar" USAF training paid off!

At the time I was an Air Force student pilot at Columbus AFB, Mississippi, flying the Northrop T-38A Talon, the Air Force's supersonic advanced jet trainer. I had about 220 hours of total time (both civil and military), with about 20 of those hours in the Talon. By USAF standards, I was still a kid learning to ride my bike without the training wheels attached!

The mission on this particular day was to practice formation flying - I was flying solo in a 2-ship formation with the callsign Phantom 91. We flew to the Military Operations Area about 50 miles from base and practiced flying fingertip, tactical, and fighting wing formations. We successfully completed the majority of the mission and were preparing to head back home when I lost sight of my flight lead as he flew through the sun. Fighter pilots fly in formation to provide mutual support and protection - maintaining sight of the other flight member is the most basic responsibility in formation, so it was important that we get back together quickly. I informed my flight lead that I had lost sight and he directed me to look for him over a prominent lake underneath the MOA at 300 KIAS and 15,000'. To avoid midair collision potential I stayed down at 14,000' MSL and maintained 1000' of vertical separation. I visually acquired my flight lead about 2 miles off my left wing and told him I had him in sight. He cleared me to rejoin into close formation, so I turned toward him and planned to join up on his right side after he passed me. As he passed off my left wing, I pushed the throttles up from 90% to military power (full throttle). Suddenly I felt the jet yaw abnormally to the right and I heard the engine whine decreasing. I looked down at the instrument panel to see the right engine RPM winding down and the EGT decreasing. As the engine RPM wound down past the generator cut-in speed the Master Caution light illuminated. At first my brain didn't register that my right engine was no longer running. My reaction was, "Oh my God, this can't be happening to me!"

Once I mentally processed that my engine had failed, I relied on the procedures I'd learned and practiced time and again - maintain aircraft control, analyze the situation, take the proper action, and land as soon as conditions permit. Military and civilian instructors alike teach students that the first order of business in any emergency is to "fly the damn airplane," and since the jet still had power and I had plenty of airspeed this wasn't a problem. As a member of a formation, however, I also had to maintain mutual support with my flight lead, the most basic element of formation flying. I knew I had to fess up that I had a problem and keep visual on my flight lead.

"Phantom 92's got a problem!" I spouted out over the radio, "I've got a right engine flameout...no fire."

I continued my turn, keeping the other T-38 in sight and glancing at the instrument panel to analyze the engine indications. The EGT showed 200 degrees (the lowest possible reading), and the Tach showed a windmilling RPM of 24%. With no other indications of malfunction, I determined the engine had simply flamed out. This was a situation I'd "handled" many times, both in the simulator and in my head, so I knew the procedures well. I verified that it was the right engine that had flamed out (it would be bad news to accidentally shut off the good engine!), then placed the right throttle in cut-off to prepare for a restart. I had not yet opened up my checklist (it was in the map case next to me), but I had the engine restart procedure memorized, so I quickly ran through the 8 steps using the memory aid "A-A, B-B, C-C, push-push".

"Okay 2," my flight lead said, "I'll rejoin on you." Now I didn't have to worry about flying formation, I could just handle the emergency.

After waiting 30 seconds (the length of the in-flight engine start cycle) there were no signs of the engine restarting. I placed the throttle back in cut-off, waited the required 10 seconds before trying again, then tried the alternate airstart method. The alternate airstart is designed to be used in emergency situations when you don't have time to run through 8 individual steps. All you have to do is push the throttle up into MAX afterburner and this starts fuel and arms the igniters. I tried this with the right throttle and waited the required 30 seconds, but there were still no indications of a restart.

Now, after two failed restart attempts, I was starting to get nervous. It was looking like I was going to have to fly home and land single engine. I was confident I could bring the jet home and land safely - the T-38 has very benign single-engine flight characteristics and we practice single engine landings frequently. The nervousness lay in the fact that this was an actual single engine situation - if I screwed it up, I wasn't going to have that "simulated" dead engine to magically come back and save me.

"Phantom 92, turn left 090 and get pointed toward home," the flight lead directed, "you have the lead on the left and I'm gonna flow back to a chase position. I've got your radios."

As I turned, I could see the other jet pull up into a loose formation position about 500' off my left wing. As per procedure, I was now leading the formation, which freed me to maneuver however I needed to get home safe - the other jet was now a "chase" aircraft and was there only to support me. He was also going to handle the emergency on the radios.

"Memphis Center, Phantom 91, EMERGENCY," my flight lead announced.

"Go ahead with your emergency Phantom 91," the ATC controller replied.

"Phantom 91 is a 2-ship in Area 7, number two has lost an engine and we're headed direct Columbus at this time."

"Roger 91, we copy your emergency, you're cleared direct Columbus. Descend at your discretion to one-zero thousand, I'll have lower for you with Columbus Approach. Let us know if we can be of any other assistance."

Once pointed toward home, I hauled the checklist out of the map case and tried to strap it to my leg. Nervously, I dropped it and had to retrieve it from the floorboard under the ejection seat. Once I had it on my right thigh, I carefully read through all the applicable checklists. Had I missed some critical step that was causing the engine to not restart? Finding nothing, I decided to perform the engine restart procedure again, this time methodically following the checklist line-by-line.

The engine still didn't light!

My flight lead performed a battle damage check, crossing under and behind me to assess the condition of my jet. I watched him reappear on the other side and give me a thumbs-up, indicating that there were no external signs of damage, fire, or fluid leakage.

I was now about 20 miles from home descending through 5,000' MSL and I was accepting the fact that my right engine was not coming back. I decided to try one more "last ditch" alternate airstart. I again shoved the throttle into the front left quadrant. This time, the engine immediately lit-off - I could hear the whine increase as I watched the EGT and RPM increase normally. As the RPM approached 100%, I felt a sudden airframe vibration and heard an audible buzz. The right RPM was now winding back down slowly and right EGT was increasing. Recognizing the indications of a compressor stall (disrupted airflow through the engine which usually leads to a flameout), I followed the procedures I'd practiced in the simulator many times. I quickly pulled the right throttle to idle and pressed the start button to energize the igniters in an attempt to keep the engine from flaming out. The engine recovered from the stall and soon stabilized at flight idle with normal instrument indications.

It was a beautiful clear day and I now had the airfield in sight 16 miles off my nose. My flight lead was still on the radios coordinating our recovery, requesting a Single Frequency Approach (SFA). A SFA puts RAPCON, tower, and the Columbus Supervisor of Flying (SOF) on the same radio frequency, allowing emergency aircraft to fly without messing with radio frequency changes. The SOF is a senior-level officer (Major or Lt Col) with a lot of flying experience whose job is to monitor all flying activities on the base.

In the case of an emergency, the SOF coordinates the response by base emergency services, including the fire department. With the SOF now on my frequency, he asked the exact nature of my emergency and what my intentions were after landing. I relayed to him the situation with my right engine and my plan to land on the center runway and taxi clear. Satisfied with my plan, he said "okay, sounds good - see you on the deck."

Twelve miles out, ATC cleared me to fly a visual straight-in to runway 13 Center, the base's 12,000' instrument runway. I configured for a normal single engine approach (using 60% flaps instead of full flaps) and computed my final approach airspeed - in the T-38 the final approach airspeed varies with on-board fuel weight and flap setting. One of the pitfalls of flying single engine approaches in the T-38 is becoming slow because the Talon is very thrust-deficient when single engine. Often afterburner is required on the good engine to maintain approach airspeed and it's possible to develop a severe and unrecoverable sink rate. This time, I decided, I would carry 10 knots of extra airspeed the whole way. I definitely wanted to avoid becoming slow in an actual single engine situation.

On 5 mile final, I confirmed that I had the proper configuration and reported gear down to the tower. Cleared to land, I maintained 10 extra knots all the way down final. As I passed over the runway overrun, I looked at the fire trucks waiting to follow me down the runway. "Wow," I thought, "those guys are waiting for ME!" As I began to flare the jet ballooned - I'd forgotten to bleed off my extra airspeed before flaring! Holding the landing attitude, I nursed the jet down to a slightly firm touchdown about 2,500' down the runway. I pulled the nose up into an aerobrake, waited for the airspeed to decrease, then gently applied the brakes. Since I had landed on a 12,000' runway, I still had several thousand feet remaining, even with a fast and long touchdown! Soon I was at taxi speed, pulling off the runway into the hammerhead.

I was met in the hammerhead by crash rescue trucks and the Fire Chief, who directed me to shut down. Once I indicated that there was no more danger, he terminated the emergency. I took a deep breath, happy that I was safely on the ground. Interestingly, I wasn't out of breath, shaking like a leaf, or any of those other nervous signs I'd have expected out of myself given the situation.

"Everything okay, sir?" one of the firemen asked. "Yeah, I suppose so," I replied, "because both the jet and I are safely here on the ground!"

I gathered my personal gear as maintenance came to impound the jet for investigation. The Wing Safety officer met me and drove me back to my squadron to fill out paperwork and tell my story to the operations supervisor.

As I walked to the Sup's desk, I halfway expected him to congratulate me on doing a good job recovering a broken jet as a solo student. Instead, he gave me a lengthy critique on what I had done wrong during my emergency! He was mostly unhappy that I had landed 2000' - 2500' down the runway, versus the normal touchdown of 500' - 1000'. His assertion was that I should have made the best possible landing, especially given that it was an actual emergency.

I walked away from the desk with mixed feelings. I believed I'd done a good job handling the actual emergency; I analyzed the problem, applied the proper procedures, and safely recovered the aircraft. On the down side was what I'd done incorrectly. I realized that I became channelized on solving the engine failure and neglected to follow some important formation administrative procedures. I had also failed to fly a good final approach and landing. In retrospect, I didn't need to fly fast - I should have done it the way I was taught! I was irritated with myself for messing up something that I'd practiced many times before. It drove home to me that you have to fly the best jet you can when it's an emergency, otherwise you may compound your problem.

A few weeks later I received the incident report back from the Wing safety office. Maintenance found that two fan blades from the engine's 4th stage compressor had broken off and caused the initial engine failure. Apparently the blades had pre-existing cracks on the trailing edges which grew over time until the blades broke off in flight. My flight lead told me afterward that as we passed each other and my engine failed, he could see a big plume of white smoke come out the back of my jet! They tell me that smoke was a result of the blades being chewed up by the successive compressor stages and combustion section. The damage to the other compressor blades caused the failure of the engine to restart, as well as the violent compressor stall I experienced when the engine did restart. Bottom line? It could have been disastrous, but I was lucky; in my case it only cost taxpayers $61,000 for a new J85-GE-5 jet engine!

I'm glad this emergency occurred early on in my flying career and while I was in a training environment. The best thing any pilot can take from an emergency is knowledge and experience. I know a lot of pilots who've yet to experience their first IFE, but I've already been there. Hopefully the experience will benefit me next time something like this goes wrong.
 
Paddles rogers up the Clara call and tells us to turn on our taxi light. At 1/2 mile and about 250' I still can't see a thing. I'm still on needles at a point where I should be flying the ball or at least changing my scan to visual to fly the ball. Paddles let me keep coming but I started to go a little high on glideslope, did not want to get low at all behind the boat when I can't see it. Now my sphincter is tight as a frog's ass. I kept coming. When I broke out, I was high and right....I made one play for the deck, a left wing drop, max power to keep the ball from going full red as I dropped like a ton of out of the sky. I never saw red but had a high come down at the ramp, OK 2 wire for the conditions. When I watched the tape, you could only see my taxi light during the last 2-3 seconds...pure grey before that.

I hope they gave you an underline for that pass...
 
I don't have any "oh crap there I was stories", but I had my fair share of "oh **** why did flares just dispense?" moments. No where near the stories told here though.
 
Brian Shul, Retired SR-71 Pilot via Plane and Pilot Magazine

As a former SR-71 pilot, and a professional keynote speaker, the question I'm most often asked is "How fast would that SR-71 fly?" I can be assured of hearing that question several times at any event I attend. It's an interesting question, given the aircraft's proclivity for speed, but there really isn't one number to give, as the jet would always give you a little more speed if you wanted it to. It was common to see 35 miles a minute. Because we flew a programmed Mach number on most missions, and never wanted to harm the plane in any way, we never let it run out to any limits of temperature or speed. Thus, each SR-71 pilot had his own individual “high” speed that he saw at some point on some mission. I saw mine over Libya when Khadafy fired two missiles my way, and max power was in order. Let’s just say that the plane truly loved speed and effortlessly took us to Mach numbers we hadn’t previously seen.

So it was with great surprise, when at the end of one of my presentations, someone asked, “what was the slowest you ever flew the Blackbird?” This was a first. After giving it some thought, I was reminded of a story that I had never shared before, and relayed the following.
I was flying the SR-71 out of RAF Mildenhall, England, with my back-seater, Walt Watson; we were returning from a mission over Europe and the Iron Curtain when we received a radio transmission from home base. As we scooted across Denmark in three minutes, we learned that a small RAF base in the English countryside had requested an SR-71 fly-past. The air cadet commander there was a former Blackbird pilot, and thought it would be a motivating moment for the young lads to see the mighty SR-71 perform a low approach. No problem, we were happy to do it. After a quick aerial refueling over the North Sea, we proceeded to find the small airfield.

Walter had a myriad of sophisticated navigation equipment in the back seat, and began to vector me toward the field. Descending to subsonic speeds, we found ourselves over a densely wooded area in a slight haze. Like most former WWII British airfields, the one we were looking for had a small tower and little surrounding infrastructure. Walter told me we were close and that I should be able to see the field, but I saw nothing.

Nothing but trees as far as I could see in the haze. We got a little lower, and I pulled the throttles back from 325 knots we were at. With the gear up, anything under 275 was just uncomfortable. Walt said we were practically over the field—yet; there was nothing in my windscreen. I banked the jet and started a gentle circling maneuver in hopes of picking up anything that looked like a field. Meanwhile, below, the cadet commander had taken the cadets up on the catwalk of the tower in order to get a prime view of the fly-past. It was a quiet, still day with no wind and partial gray overcast.

Walter continued to give me indications that the field should be below us but in the overcast and haze, I couldn't see it. The longer we continued to peer out the window and circle, the slower we got. With our power back, the awaiting cadets heard nothing. I must have had good instructors in my flying career, as something told me I better cross-check the gauges. As I noticed the airspeed indicator slide below 160 knots, my heart stopped and my adrenalin-filled left hand pushed two throttles full forward. At this point we weren't really flying, but were falling in a slight bank. Just at the moment that both afterburners lit with a thunderous roar of flame (and what a joyous feeling that was) the aircraft fell into full view of the shocked observers on the tower. Shattering the still quiet of that morning, they now had 107 feet of fire-breathing titanium in their face as the plane leveled and accelerated, in full burner, on the tower side of the infield, closer than expected, maintaining what could only be described as some sort of ultimate knife-edge pass.
Quickly reaching the field boundary, we proceeded back to Mildenhall without incident. We didn't say a word for those next 14 minutes.

After landing, our commander greeted us, and we were both certain he was reaching for our wings. Instead, he heartily shook our hands and said the commander had told him it was the greatest SR-71 fly-past he had ever seen, especially how we had surprised them with such a precise maneuver that could only be described as breathtaking. He said that some of the cadet’s hats were blown off and the sight of the plan form of the plane in full afterburner dropping right in front of them was unbelievable. Walt and I both understood the concept of “breathtaking” very well that morning, and sheepishly replied that they were just excited to see our low approach.

As we retired to the equipment room to change from space suits to flight suits, we just sat there-we hadn't spoken a word since “the pass.” Finally, Walter looked at me and said, “One hundred fifty-six knots.

What did you see?” Trying to find my voice, I stammered, “One hundred fifty-two.” We sat in silence for a moment. Then Walt said, “Don’t ever do that to me again!” And I never did.

A year later, Walter and I were having lunch in the Mildenhall Officer’s club, and overheard an officer talking to some cadets about an SR-71 fly-past that he had seen one day. Of course, by now the story included kids falling off the tower and screaming as the heat of the jet singed their eyebrows. Noticing our HABU patches, as we stood there with lunch trays in our hands, he asked us to verify to the cadets that such a thing had occurred. Walt just shook his head and said, “It was probably just a routine low approach; they're pretty impressive in that plane.” Impressive indeed.

Little did I realize after relaying this experience to my audience that day that it would become one of the most popular and most requested stories. It’s ironic that people are interested in how slow the world’s fastest jet can fly. Regardless of your speed, however, it’s always a good idea to keep that cross-check up…and keep your Mach up, too.
 
Now that's a great story! I was one of the kids that saw the SR-71 as the ultimate achievement of man and machine in the sky and now that I'm staring USAF pilot training in the face, I'm wishing that I could get just one chance to fly one of Kelly's greatest creations.
 
Now that's a great story! I was one of the kids that saw the SR-71 as the ultimate achievement of man and machine in the sky and now that I'm staring USAF pilot training in the face, I'm wishing that I could get just one chance to fly one of Kelly's greatest creations.

Fez.....unfortunately, you're in the NEW USAF. That is, your career is going to be the world of all-around REMFs pushing such important things such as reflector belts, Class A uniform changes, stupid CBTs, political correctness, "asian-pacific islander" celebration months, and new cell-phone-in-uniform regs.

It is not, I repeat not.....contrary to what you've heard......a fighting force that breaks things and kills people.

Welcome!!!
 
Mission comes first!!


...after safety.

...and sexual assault/harassment briefs.

...and 42 character passwords that include chinese characters

...............that need to be changed every 12 days.


:clap:
 
Yes, I believe it was my one and only OK underline!!! It was something like HLURX \IM LOBIC-AR OK

There is a guy here who, even prior to his first BI flight, managed to pass word around the ready room that he had taken the jet on his first trunk flight and performed a 450kt break, to a perfect abeam, and managed to fly several centered ball passes right off the bat. "It really isn't hard" was supposedly his comment, and that he had gotten lots of back patting from the IP in the front. Needless to say, the story made it's way into the IP ready room as well as across the street to the sim building and all the crusty old dudes who were waiting for him on his early BI/RI flights. For a while there was a standing list on the whiteboard in his ready room, listing everyone's recommendation for callsign. I think OK may have won out, though there were certainly some harsher ones up on the board as well.
 
There is a guy here who, even prior to his first BI flight, managed to pass word around the ready room that he had taken the jet on his first trunk flight and performed a 450kt break, to a perfect abeam, and managed to fly several centered ball passes right off the bat. "It really isn't hard" was supposedly his comment, and that he had gotten lots of back patting from the IP in the front. Needless to say, the story made it's way into the IP ready room as well as across the street to the sim building and all the crusty old dudes who were waiting for him on his early BI/RI flights. For a while there was a standing list on the whiteboard in his ready room, listing everyone's recommendation for callsign. I think OK may have won out, though there were certainly some harsher ones up on the board as well.

A student was saying this? That's classic. Yeah, those FCLP's at an outlying airfield are tough ones :pirate:
 
OK ? What does that mean?

You have certain grades that are normally given for every boat landing. The primary ones are

OK --is worth 5.0 and is generally given for a perfect break, pass to touchdown or given when you have an emergency or difficult circumstances when landing. Very rarely given.
OK -- which is worth 4.0
(OK) -- which is a fair and worth 3.0
B -- a bolter which is worth a 2.0 as I recall
-- is a no-grade and is worth a 1.0 as I recall
WO -- if a performance wave-off then it's a 0

You can have a combination of grades, like a no-grade bolter which would same as a no-grade.
 
You have certain grades that are normally given for every boat landing. The primary ones are

OK --is worth 5.0 and is generally given for a perfect break, pass to touchdown or given when you have an emergency or difficult circumstances when landing. Very rarely given.
OK -- which is worth 4.0
(OK) -- which is a fair and worth 3.0
B -- a bolter which is worth a 2.0 as I recall
-- is a no-grade and is worth a 1.0 as I recall
WO -- if a performance wave-off then it's a 0

You can have a combination of grades, like a no-grade bolter which would same as a no-grade.

Is a bolter or no-grade considered a bad thing or negative? Or does it depend on the circumstance behind it being given?
 
For reference to the guy who asked, even a straight OK is very uncommon in the training command (at least at the boat itself). At the field during FCLP's, you may get a couple OK's here and there if you really fly some nice passes, but overall grades tend to reside in the fair to no-grade range.......the ball itself isnt that hard to fly at the field, but getting to a good start, not overcorrecting in close, and really flying it all the way to touchdown seem to hinder myself and my fellow students the most. If the LSO does not see your little white helmet turned and looking directly at the fresnel lens as you pass by it as you touch down, he knows you are deck spotting. And if I had a nickel for every time I was long in the groove, or angling, I'd have a good piggy bank going for the LSO booze fund (all three of those things will turn an otherwise decent pass in terms of ball flying into a no grade).
 
For reference to the guy who asked, even a straight OK is very uncommon in the training command (at least at the boat itself). At the field during FCLP's, you may get a couple OK's here and there if you really fly some nice passes, but overall grades tend to reside in the fair to no-grade range.......the ball itself isnt that hard to fly at the field, but getting to a good start, not overcorrecting in close, and really flying it all the way to touchdown seem to hinder myself and my fellow students the most. If the LSO does not see your little white helmet turned and looking directly at the fresnel lens as you pass by it as you touch down, he knows you are deck spotting. And if I had a nickel for every time I was long in the groove, or angling, I'd have a good piggy bank going for the LSO booze fund.

The OLS is the typical VASI-type system I see at all the NAS/MCAS fields I've flown into. IIRC, they're generally set at about a 4 degree GS, and aren't coincident with the ILS GS.
 
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