Doug, I believe you are getting this confused with the Egypt Air Boeing 767 crash.
This one is the Gulf Air A320 that crashed on approach into Bahrain:
Executive Summary
Brief History of the Flight
On 23 August 2000, at about 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF-072, an
Airbus A320-212, a Sultanate of Oman registered aircraft A40-EK, crashed at
sea at about 3 miles north-east of Bahrain International Airport. GF-072
departed from Cairo International Airport, Egypt, with two pilots, six cabin
crew and 135 passengers on board for Bahrain International Airport,
Muharraq, Kingdom of Bahrain. GF-072 was operating a regularly scheduled
international passenger service flight under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation and the provisions of the Sultanate of Oman Civil Aviation
Regulations Part 121 and was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.
GF-072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. At
about one nautical mile from the touch down and at an altitude of about 600
feet, the flight crew requested for a left hand orbit, which was approved by the
air traffic control (ATC). Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centreline
on a south-westerly heading, the captain decided to go-around.
Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered the radar vectors, which the flight
crew accepted. GF-072 initiated a go-around, applied take-off/go-around
thrust, and crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow
climb to about 1000 feet. As the aircraft rapidly accelerated, the master
warning sounded for flap over-speed. A perceptual study, carried out as part
of the investigation, indicated that during the go-around the flight crew
probably experienced a form of spatial disorientation, which could have
caused the captain to falsely perceive that the aircraft was ‘pitching up’. He
responded by making a ‘nose-down’ input, and, as a result, the aircraft
commenced to descend. The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) voice
alarm sounded: “whoop, whoop pull-up …”. The GPWS warning was repeated
every second for nine seconds, until the aircraft impacted the shallow sea.
The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces, and all 143 persons on board
were killed.
Conclusions
The factors contributing to the above accident were identified as a
combination of individual and systemic issues. The individual factors during
the approach and final phases of the flight were: non-adherence to standard
operating procedures (SOPs) by the captain; the first officer not drawing the
attention of the captain to the deviations of the aircraft from the standard flight parameters and profile; the spatial disorientation and information overload experienced by the flight crew; and, the non-effective response by the flight crew to the ground proximity warnings.
The systemic factors that could have led to these individual factors were: a lack of a crew resources management
(CRM) training programme; inadequacy in some of the airline’s A320 flight
crew training programmes; problems in the airline’s flight data analysis system
and flight safety department which were not functioning satisfactorily;
organisational and management issues within the airline; and safety oversight
factors by the regulator. Any one of these systemic factors, by itself, was
Executive Summary ix A320 (A40-EK) Aircraft Accident
insufficient to cause a breakdown of the safety system. Such factors may
often remain undetected within a system for a considerable period of time.
When these latent conditions combine with local events and environmental
circumstances, such as individual factors contributed by “front-line” operators
or environmental factors, a system failure, such as an accident, may occur.
The investigation showed that no single factor was responsible for the
accident to GF-072. The accident was the result of a fatal combination of
many contributory factors, both at the individual and systemic levels. All of
these factors must be addressed to prevent such an accident happening
again.
The airline has taken a number of post-accident safety initiatives to
address some of these individual and systemic factors. The airline has
reported that it is in the process of enhancing its flight crew training.
Safety Recommendations
The safety issues in this investigation report focus on the above
individual and systemic factors. In order to prevent a probability of such
occurrence and increase the overall safety of the aviation system, the
investigation report has made twelve safety recommendations concerning
these issues. They are addressed to: the DGCAM, Sultanate of Oman
(seven); the owner-States of Gulf Air (two); Bahrain CAA (one); and
International Civil Aviation Organisation (two).
Investigation Procedure
The procedure followed for the conduct of investigation is described in
Appendix A.
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